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Thomas Willis is commonly used as a touchstone for the modern brain sciences: his 
Cerebri anatome (1664) is celebrated as having placed the brain on its ‘modern footing,’ 
while Willis is referred to as the ‘founding father’ of neuroscience. Driven by a set of 
present-centred and medically orientated concerns, great emphasis has traditionally been 
placed upon Willis’s neuro-anatomy as a precursor to our own ways of thinking about 
the ‘neurological brain’. Such approaches have tended to neglect Willis’s broader 
theoretical contributions, particularly his physiological theories, or have failed to consider 
how (distinctly early modern) concepts around the soul informed Willis’s interpretation 
of the anatomical brain. This thesis re-examines Willis through his use of metaphors and 
analogies, exploring the relationship between his use of language and his physical 
practices around the brain (dissection, chemical experiment). Although recent 
scholarship on Willis has turned to social or cultural history approaches, there has yet to 
be a detailed examination of Willis’s use of language. Ideas around the appropriate use of 
metaphor and analogy in scientific writing have long informed responses to Willis. His 
credibility has been undermined by suggestions of theoretical embellishment and 
imaginative speculation – charges that necessarily pick up on the use of analogical 
reasoning. In contrast, this thesis argues that Willis’s concept of the brain cannot be 
viewed independently of the ways in which it was described and represented: rather than 
mere ornaments, metaphor and analogy were an essential part of Willis’s conceptual 
architecture and tools by which the brain (as an object of knowledge) was made to exist 
in the world. Willis’s use of language embeds his knowledge within a specific set of 
intellectual, cultural and material contexts of the late seventeenth century. His ideas 
around the brain cannot, therefore, be straightforwardly appropriated as part of our own 
understanding of neurology.  
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Introduction 
Thomas Willis, Neuroscience and History 
 
Thomas Willis was once regarded as the most successful English physician of his day. A 
contemporary, Anthony Wood, noted that Willis had become ‘so noted, and so infinitely 
resorted to, for his practice, that never any physician before went beyond him, or got 
more money yearly than he’.1 Despite his many notable achievements, Willis now stands 
as a relatively marginal and poorly understood figure in the history of medicine. As 
Michael Hawkins has remarked, Willis appears ‘only in passing’ in most histories of 
medicine and science.2 His contributions are nevertheless frequently invoked within the 
modern field of neurology, where Willis is widely recognised by medical students on 
account of the arterial network at the base of the brain bearing his name, ‘The Circle of 
Willis.’ Today, his works are predominantly read and written about by retired 
neurologists, who frequently invoke Willis as a ‘founding father’ of the modern 
discipline.3 This position is reflected in medical histories around the study of the brain 
and nerves: in 2007, historian George J. Rousseau noted that Willis ‘invented the concept 
of a ‘nervous system.’4 In the same year, C. U. M Smith wrote that those looking for the 
birth of modern neurology would do well to begin with Willis’s Cerebri Anatome. This was, 
he felt, a ‘most obvious’ starting point.5 Willis’s positioning as a rhetorical anchor for the 
modern neurosciences is perhaps the single most prominent theme in the body of 
literature surrounding him.  This belies what is actually a rather fractured and 
controversial historical picture.  
 
Prior to the 1960s, there was a steady, if unremarkable, amount of interest around Willis; 
following the tercentennial of Cerebri anatome in 1964, the period witnessed a marked 
                                                      
1 Anthony Wood, Athenae oxonienses, (London: Printed for Tho. Bennet, 1691-2), vol. 3, p. 1051. 
2 Michael J. Hawkins, The Empire of Passions: Thomas Willis’s anatomy of the Restoration Soul (PhD Thesis: 
University of London, 2004), p. 1. 
3 William Feindel notably repeated the ‘founding father’ epithet in his introduction to Thomas Willis’s, The 
Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves, tercentenary edition (1664-1964), ed. by William Feindel, 2 vols. (Montreal: 
McGill University Press, 1965). A number of neurologists and clinicians have published studies on Willis: 
Sir Charles Sherrington (1940); Alfred Meyer and Raymond Heirons (1965); Hansruedi Isler (1968); 
Kenneth Dewhurst (1982); M.J. Eadie (2002); Mark Wilson (2012). 
4 George S. Rousseau, “Brainomania’: Brain, Mind and Soul in the Long Eighteenth Century’, Journal for 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 30. 2 (June, 2007), pp. 161-191 (p. 171). 
5  C.U.M. Smith, ‘Brain and Mind in the Long 18th century,’ in Brain, Mind and Medicine: Essays in 18th 
Century Neuroscience, ed. by H. Whitaker and others (New York: Springer, 2007), p. 15. 
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expansion of interest in and a certain ‘rediscovery’ of his works by medical historians.6 A 
little before this in the 1940s, the eminent British neurophysiologist Sir Charles 
Sherrington commented favourably on Willis noting that he had ‘practically refounded 
the anatomy and physiology of the brain and nerves.’7 This was a recovery of much 
earlier assessments, such as by John Friend who, in 1725, had acknowledged Willis as 
‘the first inventor of the nervous system.’8  These comments reflected the fact that Willis 
had been the first to use the term ‘neurologia’ (translated into the English ‘neurologie’ in 
1681) to describe the study of the structure of the brain and nerves as a self-contained 
system, which he had termed the ‘doctrine of the nerves’.9  Although this ‘doctrine of the 
nerves’ did not specifically address physiology and pathology (which were dealt with by 
Willis in a later book), our conception of the modern discipline of clinical neuroscience 
assumes the inclusion of these elements when we refer to his ‘neurology’.  
 
Importantly, as Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached’s book Neuro: The New Brain 
Sciences notes, the groundwork for what we would recognise as the modern discipline of 
neuroscience was being laid in the early 1960s: the same period in which scholarly 
interest in Willis began to expand. Neuroscience grew out of specific institutions 
established in the 1960s and 1970s. Francis O’ Schmitt first coined the term neuroscience 
in 1962, closely followed by the creation of the disciplines first major organising body, the 
Society for Neuroscience (SfN) in 1969.10  The ‘re-discovery’ of Thomas Willis (from a 
position of relative obscurity) as the early modern ‘founder’ of neurology and as a 
rhetorical anchor for the emergent discipline occurred in conjunction with these 
developments. 11 The timing suggests that the re-engagement with Willis, although certainly 
helped by a tercentenary anniversary in this decade, became part of a much broader effort 
by the new community to forge and promote a ‘long history’ for itself, rooted in the 
                                                      
6 Robert Frank Jr. notes that there were between four and eight articles or books per year published on 
Willis in the 1940s, rising to thirty-three from the 1960s: ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle’, in The Languages of 
Pysche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. by G. Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), pp. 107-147 (p. 109). 
7 Sir Charles Sherrington, ‘The Brain and its Work’, Man on his Nature (Orig. Pub. 1940: Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 203-234. 
8 John Friend, The History of Physick from the Time of Galen (London, 1725) ii, p. 315. 
9 Clifford F. Rose has discussed the distinction between Willis’s use of the Latin and the introduction of 
the English term by Samuel Pordage in The History of British Neurology (London: Imperial College Press, 
2012), p. 28. 
10 Judith P. Swazey, ‘Forging a Neuroscience Community: A Brief History of the Neurosciences Research 
Program,’ in The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery, ed. by Frederic G. Worden and others (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1975), pp. 529-546. 
11 Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind 
(Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 25. 
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neurology of the late seventeenth century.12 Willis’s historical position cannot then, be 
divorced from the institutional history of this profession.  
 
Projecting a set of present-centred concerns back onto historical practices around the 
brain, modern neuroscience has reproduced historical ways of investigating and thinking 
about the brain which accord with its own image; this has involved highly selective and 
teleological readings of historical neurology, especially – but not limited to – the work of 
Thomas Willis. Outlining a set of emphases that would come to dominate this historical 
picture, Sir Charles Sherrington made special note of those aspects of Willis’s practices 
which appeared to most directly correspond with his own: namely, the correlation of 
clinical observation with anatomical inspection and, above all, Willis’s emphasis on the 
physical substance and structure of the brain itself. In so doing, he observed, Willis had 
put the ‘brain and the nervous system on their modern footing so far as that could be 
then done.’13 Here, the rather Whiggish implication is that Willis was always striving 
towards what we know to be true today, but was simply held back by the limitations of 
his age.14  This present-centred and medically orientated reading is clearly very much of 
its time, yet it is an approach that remained remarkably stable in the following decades 
and which continues to shape responses to Willis. 
 
One of Willis’s most prominent biographers from the 1960s, Hansreudi Isler, a retired 
neurologist, wrote that Willis’s hypotheses and observations ‘very often come close to 
what science today thinks important.’ For Isler, this proved ‘all the more astonishing 
since the majority of his basic theories must be found wrong today.’15 He did however 
note that Willis’s language around ‘biochemical processes in the body’ showed how he 
was ‘transcending the possibilities of his age…postulating something like today’s 
                                                      
12 Gordon M. Shepherd, Creating Modern Neuroscience: The Revolutionary 1950s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
13 Charles Sherrington, Man and his Nature, p. 203. Jaime C. Kassler also refers to Willis placing the brain on 
its ‘modern footing’ in his ‘Restraining the Passions: Hydropneumatics and Hierarchy in the Philosophy of 
Thomas Willis’, in The Soft Underbelly of Reason, ed. by Stephen Gaukroger (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 
147-164 (p. 148). 
14 On ‘Whig’ history and present-centered concerns, see: Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of 
History  (London: 1931; 1965). For more recent works, see: Adrian Wilson and Timothy Ashplant, ‘Whig 
History and Present-Centered History’ and ‘Present-Centered History and the Problem of Historical 
Knowledge,’ both The Historical Journal (1988), 1-16, 253-74. See also, Andrew Cunningham, ‘Getting the 
game right: Some plain words on the identity and invention of science,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 19 (1988), pp. 365-389. 
15 Hansruedi Isler, Thomas Willis, 1621–75, Doctor and Scientist (London: Hafner Publications Company, 
1968), p. 67. 
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laboratory-based medicine.’16 While there is necessarily scope for invention and creativity 
in a given setting, it is difficult to see how Willis could have transcended the intellectual 
frameworks of his age considering that new ideas are necessarily produced out of existing 
categories of knowledge and practices. Another prominent example of scholarship from 
this period is the comprehensive and much-noted study of Willis’s neurophysiology by 
former consultant neurologists, Raymond Hierons and Alfred Meyer. In 1965, Meyer and 
Hierons talked about the ‘controversial judgement passed by modern historians upon the 
scientific achievements of Thomas Willis,’ even while they attempted to invoke some of 
those very achievements.17 They noted in particular that his clinical observations had lent 
a ‘veil’ of empirical accuracy to his works, which had helped them ‘appear modern,’ 
despite the historical ‘jargon’ of Willis’s discussions of animal spirits and iatrochemistry 
(medical chemistry).18 What we see emerging here is the idea that, if medical history was 
to find any value in Willis’s works, it would need to ‘recover’ his clinical and anatomical 
observations from the historical language and terminology that accompanied (indeed, 
obscured) his insights and discoveries. The recognisably ‘early modern’ aspects of his 
‘science’ were a set of problems to be navigated around and explained away. 
 
Although Willis wrote extensively on matters of physiology, the passions and 
iatrochemistry, today he is primarily celebrated for his anatomical work on the structure 
of the brain and nerves in his Cerebri anatome (1664).19 The focus on his anatomical 
investigations reflects a particular concern to distinguish between what Willis got ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong,’ according, that is, to what we can verify through our own studies of the brain, 
rather than to attempt to understand his ideas on their own terms. These approaches 
tend to reproduce a careful selection of Willis’s anatomical achievements while 
overlooking the significance of his broader theoretical explanations concerning the 
physiological functions of the brain. This assumes that the two discussions – anatomy 
and physiology - can be separated in his work; that, for Willis, describing the structure of 
the brain and nerves was an end in and of itself. His attempts to explain how these 
structures functioned have been frequently dismissed: in 1984, Mary A. B. Brazier 
remarked that, in spite of Willis’s success in exploring brain and nerve structure, ‘he 
                                                      
16 Ibid. p. 67. 
17 Alfred Meyer and Raymond Heirons, ‘On Thomas Willis’s concepts of neurophysiology: Part I & II,’ 
Medical history, ix (1965), part II, p. 152. 
18 Ibid, p. 292. 
19 Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 83. 
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made little lasting contribution to the underlying mechanisms of their function.’20 Brazier, 
in effect, criticised Willis here for daring to stray from simply describing what he could 
see to offering up his own (physiological) explanations. For Brazier, these were 
necessarily the ‘wrong’ explanations (and therefore, of little contemporary value) because 
they were based upon notions of spirit, rather than electrical impulses.  
 
A more recent example of a ‘cherry picking’ approach to Willis’s contributions is found 
in Mervyn J. Eadie’s 2002 article in the Journal of Clinical Neuroscience: ‘if Willis’s 
hypothesising about his animal spirit mechanisms and his locations of cerebral function 
are ignored, most of his account of apoplexy is readily interpreted in relation to modern 
day knowledge of cerebral vascular disease.’21 Eadie concludes that ‘the deficiencies, 
limitations and peculiarities of Willis’s writing on neurological disease, render them now 
mainly of historical importance.’22 Yet, as Eadie’s remarks demonstrate, (highly selective) 
readings of Willis are still often called upon as a means of informing our own current 
positions. Eadie’s work is also notable for having presented Willis’s descriptions of 
pathological disorders in a tabular format. The idea being visually represented here is that 
the discipline imposed by the template might help to ‘recover’ the content of Willis’s 
insights apart from the otherwise literary distractions in the text.23 It is difficult to see 
what this tabular re-presentation of Willis’s work can possibly tell us about his concepts, 
when they have been so removed from the ways in which he described and represented 
them within the text.  
 
Willis also features prominently within the growing body of popular publications on the 
history of neurology, of which Stanley Finger’s Minds Behind the Brain, published in 2000, 
is a characteristic example. Here, as in other similar examples, a particular emphasis is 
placed upon Willis’s anatomical discoveries around the brain, over and above his 
theoretical work concerning chemistry, physiology, and pathology. As Finger writes, 
Willis ‘published one of the most important books in the history of the brain sciences’ 
                                                      
20 Mary A. B Brazier, A History of Neurophysiology in the 17th and 18th centuries (New York: Raven Press, 1984), 
p. 64. 
21 Mervyn J. Eadie, ‘A Pathology of the Animal Spirits - the Clinical Neurology of Thomas Willis (1621-
1675) Part I – Background, and disorders of intrinsically normal animal spirits,’ Journal of Clinical 
Neuroscience, 10.1 (2002), pp. 14-29 (p. 25). 
22 M.J. Eadie, ‘A Pathology of the Animal Spirits - the Clinical Neurology of Thomas Willis (1621-1675) 
Part II - Disorders of Intrinsically Abnormal Animal Spirits,’ Journal of Clinical Neuroscience, 10.2 (2003), pp. 
146–157 (p. 156). 
23 Eadie, Pathology of the Animal Spirits, Part I, p. 17. 
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with Cerebri anatome.24 He argues, furthermore, that ‘the fame associated with Thomas 
Willis today does not stem from his acumen at diagnosis, his bedside manner…Nor is he 
well remembered for his chemical theories of medicine. Without question, it was his new 
way of looking at the brain and behaviour that is his most significant contribution.’25 In 
2014, rather more subtly, Mitchell Glickstein summed up Willis’s time at Oxford as a 
period of ‘anatomical studies’, thereby ignoring his extensive chemical and physiological 
experiments conducted there. Glickstein also anachronistically characterised Willis’s work 
as concerning ‘mental illness’ and stressed its relevance to modern-day psychiatry – 
categories that did not exist, in the form imputed by these labels, at the time Willis was 
writing.26 In a similar vein, philosophers of neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. 
Hacker (2008) celebrated Willis’s ‘cortical revolution’ (referring to his focus on the 
structuring work of the cortical substances in the brain) in their textbook on the History of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, but omitted to refer to him even once in their earlier book on the 
Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003).27 Willis’s historical contribution is routinely 
and selectively framed in terms of how it appeals to the interests of contemporary 
scholarship around the brain sciences. 
 
The propensity to stress Willis’s neuro-anatomical practices necessarily comes at the 
substantial neglect of his broader physiological, chemical, natural philosophical and 
theological interests – elements that, as this thesis will argue, were a vital part of his work 
around the brain. Moreover, these emphases speak to contemporary assumptions 
concerning the putatively objective nature of scientific practice and observation, 
especially in terms of prioritising the physical structures of the brain. These practices, 
centred on the physical object, are contrasted with the supposedly subjective nature of 
Willis theoretical explanations. The idea that we can straightforwardly uncover what 
Willis saw when he looked at the brain, without having to also consider how he was able 
to make sense of and ascribe significance to those sights, strips away the very conceptual 
                                                      
24 Stanley Finger, Minds Behind the Brain: A History of the Pioneers and their Discoveries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 23. 
25 Stanley Finger, Minds Behind the Brain, p. 87. 
26 Mitchell Glickstein, Neuroscience: A Historical Introduction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press, 2014), 
pp. 324-5. For similar recent examples that emphasise Willis’s founding father role in respect of neuro-
anatomy, see: Carl Schoonover, Portraits of the Mind: Visualising the Brain from Antiquity to the 21st century 
(London and New York: Abrams, 2010), p. 38; Andrew P. Wickens, A History of the Brain: From Stone Age 
Surgery to Modern Neuroscience (Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2014), p. 98; Clifford Rose, History of 
British Neurology (London: Imperial College Press, 2012). 
27 M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), p. 216. 
Willis is omitted from the earlier work by Bennett and Hacker on the Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience 
(Malden, Mass.: Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
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architecture underpinning Willis’s account of the brain. This is done in order to help 
make Willis’s account of the brain appear as a more easily recognisable foundation for 
our own ‘neuroscientific’ brain. 
 
These themes also overlook how scientific practice is fundamentally constrained and 
shaped by theory. Similarly, to speak of one single unchanging kind of ‘objective practice’ 
is problematic. Early modern notions of ‘objectivity’ governed how Willis approached 
the brain (how he chose to cut it open, experimented on it and represented it) and these 
do not necessarily relate to our own ideas of what an objective account of the brain 
would represent (perhaps through Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans, for 
example.) The historically-shifting nature of these concepts around objectivity have been 
notably addressed in the work of Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison.28  
 
As Robert Martensen and Michael Hawkins have explored, this situation is partly 
produced by the disproportionate interest in Willis coming from medical professionals 
who are, unsurprisingly, interested in how his techniques might fit into a narrative of 
progressive advances in that area.29 Writing in the journal Neurosurgery in 2006, Bradley C. 
Lega discussed Willis’s influence on John Locke’s philosophy, arguing that Willis’s 
philosophical ideas are too often overlooked because of medically-orientated concerns.30 
In 1990, the social historian Robert Frank Jr. reflected on what he termed Willis’s ‘catch 
22’ position, arguing that ‘then, as now – [Willis] was a writer whose reputation was 
greatest among those whose professional or technical backgrounds most fitted them to 
understand the details that he tried to synthesize.’ 31  At the same time, this same group 
of readers were also those most likely to be inclined to critique Willis on the basis of 
‘incorrect’ medical terminology or erroneously named structures. As Frank notes, these 
writers have been ‘vocal in their praise of the accuracy of the anatomy and the quality of 
the illustrations’, while being ‘intrigued’ by Willis ideas on localisation and ‘repelled’ and 
‘befuddled’ by his ‘speculations’ on brain function. 32  The body of scholarship 
surrounding Willis – particularly from among those who write from a medical-
                                                      
28 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (London: MIT, 2007). 
29 Robert L. Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape: An Early History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 
76; Michael Hawkins, Empire of Passions, p. 11. 
30 Bradley C. Lega, ‘An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: How The Cerebri Anatome Of Thomas 
Willis Influenced John Locke,’ Neurosurgery, 58.3 (2006), pp. 567-576 (p. 573). 
31 Robert G. Frank, Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle: Brain and Mind in Seventeenth century Medicine,’ 
in The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. by G.S. Rousseau (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1990), p. 142. 
32 Robert Frank, ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle,’ p. 129.  
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professional background – has tended to assume that, regardless of Willis’s historical 
‘jargon’, what he observed in the brain is a recoverable set of empirical observations: that 
it is somehow outside of or beyond culture. This supports broader efforts to trace out 
the evolution from Willis to modern neurology. These representations intervene to 
produce a sense of clarity around Willis (as a ‘neurologist’), because that is what is most 
relevant to our current perspectives.33  
 
Teleological approaches to Willis are not exclusively the outcome of the interests of 
retired medical professionals. 34  Historians of medicine have also mined Willis for how 
he might inform modern science’s own ways of understanding and investigating the 
brain. As we have seen, it is Willis’s anatomical activities, rather than his chemical or 
physiological research, which is most readily appropriated as a way of informing the 
‘neurological’ brain.  Supported by narratives of Willis as a ‘father’ of neuroscience, his 
work holds a particularly strong appeal for histories of the brain as explored in relation to 
what has been termed the ‘neurosociety’ or the ‘neuroturn’ - a set of discourses that 
increasingly root models of personhood in the physical structures of the neurological 
brain.35 This emphasis is often traced back, through the accounts of medical historians, 
to Willis’s development of what has come to be termed a theory of localisation: this 
refers to ascribing specific functions to discrete structures inside the brain. As historian 
Ann Thomson noted in 2008, Willis’s study of the anatomical brain constituted his 
‘primary contribution to medical history’ and his books were, she writes, ‘particularly 
important for their attempts to localize brain functions’ through an emphasis on the 
brain’s solid (cortical) substance.36  
 
                                                      
33 Michael Hawkins, Empire (2004), p. 10; Louis Caron, The Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis (1621-
1675) with Particular Reference to John Locke (1632-1704) (PhD Thesis: Kings College Cambridge, 2011), p. 11; 
Robert Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape (2004), p. 229. 
34 Louis Caron, Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis, p. 11. 
35 On Willis and the brain as an ‘object of knowledge’ see: Sarah de Rijcke, Regarding the Brain: Practices of 
Objectivity in Cerebral Imaging, Seventeenth Century to Present (PhD thesis: University of Groningen, 2010); S. de 
Rijcke and Anne Beaulieu, ‘Networked Neuroscience: Brain Scans and Visual Knowing at the Intersection 
of Atlases and Databases,’ Representation in Scientific Practice Revisited, ed. by Catelijne Coopmans and others 
(London: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 131-152 (p. 131). 
36 Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 83. Retired psychiatrist and prolific Willis scholar, Kenneth Dewhurst, likewise 
acknowledged Willis for his ‘pioneering’ localisation model with its emphasis on solid brain substances but 
stresses that of ‘utmost importance’ were his classification of cranial nerves: ‘Thomas Willis and the 
Foundations of British Neurology,’ in Historical Aspects of the Neurosciences, ed. by F.C. Rose and W. F. 
Bynum, (New York: Raven Press, 1982), pp. 327-346 (p. 336-7). 
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The localisation of mental activities to discrete physical locations in the brain has 
increasingly come to operate as a vital component of our modern concepts of brain 
function: in 2010, Michael Hagner described the ‘episteme of the modern brain’ as 
‘encompassing both a localizationist paradigm’ or ‘narratives of the brain.’37 Despite 
Willis’s model of localised function being rooted in specifically early modern notions 
around the activities of animal spirits, his ideas have been seized upon as a way of 
informing these particular interests. He is often viewed as foregrounding our modern 
recourse to the physical brain as the locus of mental activities, because he ascribed 
cognitive phenomena to a material rather than disembodied soul, located within the 
brain.38  As Rousseau noted in 2004, Willis’s stress on the solid substance of the brain 
was a paradigm shift that marked out the ‘mind’ as something that was ‘resident in the 
body’; as a consequence, the mind could become synonymous with the (neurological) 
brain.39 This may have been a historical consequence of his work, but it is also more 
reflective of how we have used Willis’s ideas rather than the ideas themselves.  
 
What has been lost here, in particular, is an understanding of how Willis conceived of the 
brain in relation to early modern notions of the soul. As Rousseau has also argued, 
Willis’s new account of the brain aimed, above all, to establish it as the exclusive seat of 
the sensitive soul. 40  Willis undertook his anatomical research chiefly in order to 
substantiate an alternative, physiological account of the sensitive soul rather than to 
simply describe the brain ‘as it is’ - as I explore in chapters four and five.41 His ideas of 
the soul were intrinsic to these anatomical pursuits: when Willis looked at the brain it was 
through the prism of a worldview that was given meaning by the active principles of 
spirit and soul. His ‘doctrine of the nerves’ is, therefore, fundamentally distinct from any 
of our current understandings of neuroscience, with its language of neurochemicals and 
electrical impulses, and cannot be in any way straightforwardly ‘mapped’ onto it. 
 
                                                      
37 Michael Hagner’s 2010 lecture is quoted by Joseph Dumit in: ‘How (Not) to Do Things with Brain 
Images,’ Representation in Scientific Practice Revisited, ed. by Catelijne Coopmans, Janet Vertesi, Michael Lynch, 
and Steve Woolgar (London: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 291-316, (p. 293). Dumit notes that these ideas are 
‘quite crucial for an understanding of modern brain research as a human science,’ p. 293. 
38 On Willis and ‘dispensing’ with the soul see: Ann Thomson, Bodies, p. 85; Carl Zimmer, Soul Made Flesh: 
The Discovery of the Brain - and How It Changes the World (London: William Heinemann, 2004), p. 229. 
39 On Willis’s work as a paradigm shift see: G. S. Rousseau, Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture, and 
Sensibility, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 360. On making the brain ‘co-equal with mind and 
soul’ see also: Rousseau, Brainomania, (2007), p. 171. 
40 This argument is originally put in Rousseau’s 1975 essay ‘Nerves, Fibres and Spirits,’ revisited in Nervous 
Acts (2004), p. 165. 
41 Louis Caron makes a similar argument in The Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis, (2011), p. 29.  
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Part of how we get at this historical difference is by looking at how Willis was able to 
represent the brain through his writing; that is, through the narrative frameworks 
provided by his concepts of spirits and the soul. Metaphors and analogies are at the 
centre of all scientific models; the objects and concepts that were available to Willis when 
he was attempting to construct his own models of the brain were specific to his cultural, 
material and intellectual contexts. These frameworks are fundamentally different to our 
own. The further we unpick the meanings and associations entailed within Willis’s 
metaphors and analogies of the brain, the more alien and less ‘neurological’ his brain 
appears to be. Equally, though the act of looking at the brain may be shared across many 
cultures and periods, the means by which we convert those acts into a body of 
knowledge are inherently bound up in culture and language.  
 
Importantly, a properly contextualized understanding of Willis’s physiological and 
chemical theories can form a vital part of challenging remarkably narrow assessments of 
his work. For instance, some in the history of psychiatry have favoured the view that 
Willis’s focus on the solid structures of the brain created the conditions for a ‘reductive 
turn’ in the field, inventing the medical (or neurological) mind as opposed to the 
psychological one. 42  However, this view is supported only if we neglect Willis’s 
significant views on vital materialism (the principle of active matter). Were his vital 
matter theory of the spirits to be taken into account, it would be difficult to present his 
theory of the mind as a purely anatomical or reductionist model. In 2014, Kathryn Tabb 
convincingly tackled these misreading’s of Willis’s work by examining the vitalistic and 
alchemical influences in his account of the animal spirits.43 This is a key example of how 
an appreciation of Willis’s broader conceptual influences can counter selective or 
teleological readings of his work. 
 
Equally problematic is how related fields, beyond neurology, have claimed Willis as a 
‘founding’ figure: Mark Wilson has noted, for example, that ‘modern behavioural 
psychologists claim Willis as one of their early, most ardent champions.’44 He further 
                                                      
42 Gregory Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1941), p. 265. For a 
more recent discussion of this issue in the history of psychology see: Kathryn Tabb, ‘Struck, As it Were, 
With Madness: Phenomenology and Animal Spirits in the Neuropathology of Thomas Willis,’ in Brain, 
Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience, ed. by C.U.M. Smith and Harry Whitaker, vol. 6 of the 
series History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 43-57. 
43 Kathryn Tabb, ‘Struck, As it Were, With Madness’, pp. 43-57. 
44 Mark Wilson, ‘The Life And Times Of Thomas Willis And His Impact On Contemporary Medicine,’ 
Journal Of The History Of The Neurosciences, 21.2 (2012), pp. 127-131 (p. 127). 
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argued that Willis’s Soul of Brutes was the ‘first English work in the field of psychiatry’ and 
that it ‘incorporated behaviourism’ – despite the fact that we can not point to anything 
that meaningfully approaches our idea of psychiatry or indeed ‘behaviourism’ before 
1800.45 These were not intellectual categories available to Willis. In 2004, historian 
Michael Hawkins effectively addressed this use of Willis to speak to overtly modern 
concepts of mental illness, noting the fundamental incompatibility between Willis’s 
conceptual framework of passion-states (which were bound up in notions of souls, spirits 
and humors) and modern day ideas of mental health, as rooted in neurons and 
neurochemicals.46 
  
Thomas Kuhn’s classic theory of paradigm shifts can be useful here in thinking about the 
incommensurable nature of Willis’s concept of the brain with current neuroscientific 
ideas. 47  As Kuhn famously proposed, the questions, methods and assumptions 
underlying any contribution to knowledge are specific to a given time, place or 
community and can be subject to change; as such, the questions and assumptions driving 
Willis and his contemporaries’ natural philosophical inquiries is necessarily incompatible 
with what constitutes inquiry and knowledge in neuroscience today. Willis’s concept of 
the brain was ultimately based around a different set of questions and different notions 
of what constituted a ‘fact,’ explored within radically different disciplinary boundaries 
and articulated through a specific cultural and linguistic framework. The arguments 
against projecting modern categories back onto the past have been well explored by 
leading scholars. Thomas Dixon’s landmark book, From Passions to Emotions, for example, 
is animated by a caution about projecting the category of emotions back onto periods 
where concepts of affective states were qualitatively different to those signified by the 
later term ‘emotion’.48 In a similar sense, social historians of medicine have long-criticised 
the practice of ‘retrospective diagnosis’, imposing current categories onto contexts where 
they did not exist.49 Barbara Shapiro and Mary Poovey’s work is also useful here; both 
have examined the historically specific ways in which facts were produced and signified 
                                                      
45 M. Wilson, ‘The Life And Times Of Thomas Willis,’ p. 130.  On the idea that Psychiatry did not emerge 
as a discipline before the 1800s see: Kurt Danziger, Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language, 
(London: Sage Publications, 1997). 
46 Hawkins, Empire of Passions, p. 11. 
47 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Orig. pub. 1962; London: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
48 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: the Creation of a Secular Psychological Category, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
49 On these debates, see: Adrian Wilson, ‘On the History of Disease-Concepts: the case of pleurisy,’ History 
of Science, 38.3 (2000), pp. 271-319; Katherine Foxhall, ‘Making Modern Migraine Medieval: men of science, 
Hildegard of Bingen and the life of retrospective diagnosis,’ Medical History, 58.3 (Jul., 2014), pp. 354-74. 
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in the early modern period.50  Similarly, Andrew Cunningham has emphasised how early 
modern disciplines do not neatly ‘map’ onto our own categories or easily translate into 
our own focus on disciplinary specialism.51 These are all works that have informed my 
theoretical approach to Willis, in seeking to examine his works on the basis on his own 
culturally and historically situated intellectual practices. 
 
‘He loved Words as Words’: Willis and language 
 
An important set of criticisms often leveled at Willis, which I want to examine in more 
detail here, relates to an association drawn between (what has been regarded as) his 
speculative theorising and an ornate or embellished style of writing. Since the early 
eighteenth century, Willis has been consistently characterised as a figure of ‘true 
imaginative genius,’ who despite some notably accurate discoveries and astute clinical 
observations produced vivid and fanciful speculations on the brain’s physiology. 52 
Imagination is a loaded term in this context, suggesting a creative endeavour distinct 
from the work of scientific observation. The undercurrent to these remarks is often that 
Willis did more than merely speculate, that he luxuriated in imaginative excess in an 
attempt to compensate for (or distract the reader from) inadequate empirical 
foundations. Willis’s noted biographer, Kenneth Dewhurst, so remarked in 1982 that 
Willis had a ‘proclivity to speculation, which he obviously relished’ and that these 
speculations were, for Willis, ‘a necessary embellishment’ to his neurology.53 Dewhurst 
even comes close to apologising for these excesses, asking ‘what more could he have 
done?’ with the clearly inadequate tools then at his disposal. This position assumes that 
speculative theorising is something modern science has progressed beyond; however, 
modern string theory requires some notable speculative extrapolations. While this was 
not a necessarily unorthodox view to have assumed in the 1960s, a current of dismissive 
assessments of Willis’s physiological ideas has remained consistent. In 1984, in her A 
History of Neurophysiology, Mary Brazier remarked that Willis ‘must be held responsible for 
                                                      
50 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998); Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999).  
51 On the early modern disciplines of physiology and anatomy see: Andrew Cunningham, ‘The Pen and the 
Sword: Recovering the Disciplinary Identity of Physiology and Anatomy before 1800. I. Old Physiology - 
The Pen’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33 (2002), pp. 631-665. Michael 
Hawkins also discusses this issue of distinct and markedly ‘nebulous’ early modern disciplinary categories, 
Empire, p. 11. 
52  Charles Symonds noted that Willis’s deductions from anatomy showed ‘true imaginative genius’: 
‘Thomas Willis, F.R.S.’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 15 (Jul., 1960), pp. 91-97 (p. 97). 
53 K. Dewhurst, ‘Thomas Willis and the Foundation of British Neurology,’ p. 343. 
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some delay in the acceptance of scientific study of the brain, because he did not hesitate 
to speculate,’ instead he indulged himself at the expense of scientific progress.54 Pre-
modern science is characterised, here, by a lack of restraint and control. What I want to 
explore here is how these accusations recurrently pick up on Willis’s use of language - 
specifically his analogical or metaphorical reasoning, as these are the chief devices by 
which novel, unseen or hypothetical phenomena are articulated from what is already 
known.  
 
Suspicion around Willis and his speculative inclinations emerge from among his 
immediate contemporaries. Some of the most circulated comments on this matter 
originated with Willis’s disgruntled neighbour, Henry Stubbe, in his Legends no Histories 
(1670) - comments soon repeated by the ‘waspish’ Oxonian, Anthony Wood in his 
famous Athenae Oxonienses (1691).55 Stubbe had remarked that Willis built a ‘hypothesis 
chiefly of his own framing,’ which would therefore be of no lasting value. He premised 
this claim on the suggestion that Willis had done little more than apply speculative 
hypotheses to the practical achievements and technical skill of his collaborator, Dr. 
Richard Lower – a skilled dissector. Stubbe claimed that ‘whatsoever there is that Piece, 
which is Anatomical, the glory thereof belongs to Dr. Lower.’56 All that remained to the 
credit of Willis, then, was his writing – his narration of the anatomical ‘facts’ produced by 
Lower’s hand. As Stubbe concluded, ‘all that Dr. Willis contributed…was the discourses 
and conjectures upon the Anatomical deductions of Dr. Lower.’57 Willis used his literary 
skills, or his  ‘discourse,’ to take credit for the real science of Lower. As we can see, 
discourse and conjecture are clearly linked in these discussions.  
 
Anthony Wood directly drew on Stubbe’s attack, additionally remarking that Willis’s 
‘natural smoothness, pure elegancy, delightful, unaffected neatness of Latin style,’ which 
‘none scarce have equalled,’ was nevertheless to be acknowledged. 58  This was a 
somewhat underhanded compliment: the pairing of Willis’s notable talents as a writer 
                                                      
54 M. Brazier, A History of Neurophysiology, p.64. 
55 Henry Stubbe, Legends no histories…animadversions upon The history of the Royals Society (London, 1670), p. 95.  
56 Stubbe, Legends, p. 62; Anthony Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, vol. 3. The idea that Willis took credit for 
Lower’s work is now roundly dismissed. The fact that Lower never mentioned any disagreement between 
himself and Willis, and that Wood had a longstanding land dispute with Willis, suggests that this was an 
unsubstantiated claim – moreover, Willis openly acknowledged Lowers (and others) work in his preface. 
Frank and Dewhurst have both discussed this matter in some detail, see esp. Frank, Willis and his Circle, 
p.128. 
57 Stubbe, p.95. 
58 Quoted by William Feindel, ‘Thomas Willis (1621-1675). The Founder of Neurology’, Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, 87 (1962), pp. 289-296 (p. 295-296). 
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and a Latinist alongside the suggestion that he had benefited from the practical efforts of 
others was no accident. The stress on his use of and particular skill in Latin, in the 
context of seventeenth century English natural philosophy and Willis’s traditional 
Oxford education, would have raised associations with the rhetorical vanities and errors 
of humanist eloquence, rather than the new experimental learning - among whose 
advocates there was an explicitly polemical stance taken against the potentially misleading 
effects of language.59 Accordingly, these remarks pitted Lower’s practice against Willis’s 
discourse, in order to undermine Willis’s alternative theories.  
 
Criticism of Willis’s use of language really began to take hold in the latter half of the 
eighteenth-century. The 1781 and 1784 editions of the popular New and General 
Biographical Dictionary recorded that Willis, ‘instead of deducing real knowledge from 
observation and experiment, exercised himself in framing theories.’60 Again, reflecting the 
original denouncements by Stubbe and Wood, this remark was coupled with the 
observation that ‘perhaps no writings, which are so admirably executed, and prove such 
uncommon talents to have been in the writer, were ever so soon laid aside and neglected, 
as the works of Dr. Willis.’61 In 1799, Hutchinson’s Biographica Medica repeated these 
remarks, noting Willis’s ‘uncommon’ talents as a writer. 62 These assessments continued 
to be repeated well into the nineteenth century.63  Much later, in 1980, Robert Frank Jr. 
again referred to the idea that Willis had imposed a theoretical, chiefly chemical, agenda 
onto the bare ‘facts’ produced by Lower’s scalpel, exercised through his writing up of the 
findings.. 64   
 
Perhaps the most memorable attack, however, came from the Cambridge professor of 
Physiology, Michael Foster, during his Lectures on the History of Physiology given in 1901. 
Describing Lower as the ‘henchman of the fashionable Willis’ and a ‘real man of science,’ 
Foster described Willis as being ‘of a different type’ entirely: ‘love of truth was in him 
                                                      
59 For a contemporary example of such attitudes, see: Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, 
For the Improving of Natural Knowledge (London, 1667), p. 113. 
60 A New and General Biographical Dictionary…, (London, printed for W. Strahan, T. Payne et al, 1784), vol. 
XII, p. 533. 
61 Ibid, p. 533. 
62 B. Hutchinson, Biographica Medica (London, 1799), vol. II, p. 484.  
63 The noted British biographer, Alexander Chalmers, repeated these remarks almost verbatim in his 
bestselling, A New and General Biographical Dictionary (London, 1814), p. 32. This was further repeated by W. 
Munk who dismissed Willis’s contributions as ‘trivial’: The Roll of the Royal College of Physicians (London, 
1861), p. 69. 
64 Frank refers to the ‘multitudinous facts’ that Lower’s ‘knife laid bare’ for Willis to structure and organise 
with his intellectual agenda: ‘Willis and his Circle’, p. 145.   
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less potent than a love of fame.’65 Fame is, of course, not the same thing as being 
excessively figurative or elegant in ones writing, yet there is an underlying connection 
suggested here: Willis achieved fame not by the hard labour of practice, but by appealing 
to the ancient art of rhetoric, which aimed to delight and persuade the audience through 
imaginative tricks and embellishments. Foster continued that, where Lower ‘expounded 
with brevity’ and used ‘words only as expressing the meaning of things […] Willis’s mind 
was of the rhetorical sort, he loved words as words.’66 Willis’s vanity was served, Foster 
suggested, by his embellished prose and lazy rhetoric – his love of words for their own 
sake - rather than through dedicated, scientific practice. Moreover, in having luxuriated 
over words instead of attending to the experimental method, Willis had himself been 
deceived by the superficial persuasiveness of his well-crafted words: ‘Willis’s mind was of 
that sort which when it has hit on an illustration or discovered an analogy, thinks it has 
found proof.’67 Here, Foster referred specifically to Willis’s analogy between the soul in 
the blood and a ‘vital flame’, which I examine in chapter five. During the 1930s and 
1940s, Foster’s claims were widely repeated by the likes of K.J. Franklin (1939), F.J. Cole 
(1944) and C.C. Mettler (1947), who referred to Willis as a ‘dandy.’ 68  
 
The tensions outlined in these discussions, between the presumed objectivity of practice 
and the subjectivity of words in science, continues to present a fraught area of debate. In 
the 1980s, leading philosopher of science Ian Hacking argued that we should move away 
from examining how theories represent the world to consider how scientific practices 
enable us to get a more reliable handle on phenomena: he comes to the famous 
conclusion, ‘if you can spray them, then they’re real’ – that is to say, objects have a real 
existence outside of the language we use to describe them and this reality can only be 
accessed through practice. While I do not seek to argue that there is no reality beyond 
culture or language, this position nevertheless overlooks how we are able to access and 
                                                      
65 Michael Foster, Lectures on the History of Physiology During the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), p. 181, p. 270. 
66 Michael Foster, Lectures, p. 270. 
67 Ibid, p. 271. 
68 K.J. Franklin, ‘The Works of Richard Lower (1631-1691)’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 25 
(1939), pp. 113-118; F.J. Cole, A History of Comparative Anatomy (London, 1944), p. 222; C.C. Mettler, History 
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explanations’ – pointing to Willis ideas around the animal spirits and his import of chemical analogies to 
that discussion, History of Medical Psychology, p. 264.  
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make sense those objects and experiences – through language and representation.69 In 
contrast, the work of medical anthropologist, Annemarie Mol has argued that scientific 
practices are not necessarily a more reliable means of producing a single, coherent body 
of knowledge. She examines how different ways of investigating the body produce 
ultimately incommensurable versions of the body, through various sets of emphases or 
exclusions.70  The practices we adopt, as much as the language we employ, produce 
different kinds of intellectual objects from the same physical subjects: there is no self-
evident way to see and represent the body.  
 
This is something that resonates with Jonathan Sawday’s seminal work on Renaissance 
anatomy, which examines how the anatomical body of this period differed from earlier 
representations. The early modern body was informed, for instance, by prevailing 
discourses around the discovery of the new world and the accompanying expansion of 
cartographic technology; these parallel activities provided new metaphorical registers for 
understanding and representing the body.71 In my approach to Willis’s work around the 
brain I adopt a similar stance in arguing that his way of investigating and representing the 
brain was necessarily bound up with (and limited by) the metaphors and analogies 
available to him, as determined by the specific cultural, intellectual and material 
environments in which he lived and worked.  
 
In the 1960s, Meyer and Hierons noted that ‘an undercurrent of criticism because of the 
speculative nature of many of Willis’s assertions has never died out completely.’72  In a 
startlingly frank dismissal, they concluded that while Willis ‘respected’ facts, he ultimately 
believed that reasoning (by analogy) could be used to ‘fill in the gaps’ – a practice that, 
for the authors, explained why ‘many of Willis’s speculations have proved valueless,’ 
according to modern medical interests.73  His ideas about how the brain worked (its 
physiology) are taken here as little more than quaint embellishments intended to bridge 
the gap between Willis’s empirical practices and his seventeenth century world-view. In 
the same period, Willis’s noted biographer, Hansreudi Isler, spoke of ‘the combination of 
                                                      
69 Ian Hacking, Representing and Inventing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For a critical 
discussion on Hacking’s argument see: William Seager, ‘Ground Truth and Virtual Reality: Hacking vs Van 
Fraasen’, Philosophy of Science, 62.3 (1995), pp. 459-478 (p. 195). 
70 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: ontology in medical practice (London: Duke University Press, 2002), p.viii, 
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71 Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
72 Meyer and Heirons, ‘On Thomas Willis’s concepts of neurophysiology,’ part II, p. 151. 
73 Ibid, p. 145. 
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epoch-making scientific ideas and discoveries with reckless speculation and overt 
nonsense which is typical of Willis’s books.’74  The observations of the brain upon which 
the ‘value’ of Cerebri anatome was based would therefore have to be picked over and 
recovered from amongst the imaginative excesses and ‘fantasies’ of the author.75 In 1970, 
Julian Jaynes pointedly remarked that Willis’ ‘conception of the brain was even more 
baroque than Descartes’, complete with ventricles like halls of mirrors and windows.’76 
The choice of the word baroque, in this context suggests that Willis’s use of language 
was whimsical or florid, and is related to a style of art or architecture. It certainly 
underlines the point.  More recently in 2004, the popular science writer Carl Zimmer 
commented that while Willis marked a  ‘defining moment in neuroscience,’ in respect to 
the animal spirits, Willis saw in the brain what ‘he wanted to see’ and described the 
‘wanderings of invisible spirits as if he had travelled alongside them.’77 That is, he 
projected his own ‘imaginary’ phenomena onto the empirical possibilities presented by 
the dissected brain.   
 
Such readings from the outset exclude the possibility that what Willis observed, and what 
he was able to describe, were fundamentally enabled by the language and metaphors then 
available to him. Willis’s use of the metaphor of the animal spirits continually excites 
censure, which supposes that he could have somehow described the brain as a neutral, 
empirical object. As I will explore in the sections below, this denies the role played by 
metaphor and analogy in generating and constituting the scientific models through which 
observations are produced. Moreover, these arguments act as a backdrop to the selective 
uses of Willis discussed above. They are based on the flawed idea that we can recover 
and draw upon Willis’s descriptions of brain structure because, despite his use of 
language, beneath this, his insights were somehow disciplined by his acts of observation 
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 Cultural and Social history 
 
In keeping with wider historiographical shifts, scholarship on Willis since the 1980s has 
increasingly reflected social and cultural history approaches, which reject these 
positivistic, present-centered and explicitly medicalised readings. This involves arguing 
for approaches that situate methods of knowledge within their proper cultural, social and 
material contexts. These ideas reflect much broader themes emerging from approaches 
such as the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), based at the University of 
Edinburgh during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also draws upon anthropological and 
ethnographic studies of science carried out by pioneers such as Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar, and later by John Law and Annemarie Mol.78 The work of prominent historians 
of science, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, is also highly significant here in having 
argued that the cultural and social conditions of knowledge production must be taken 
into account.79 More recent scholarship on Willis in line with these positions argues that 
his understanding of the brain cannot be taken as a self-evident account of an empirical, 
and therefore universally accessible, object that remains stable over time or space. 
Instead, historians must attend to the specific conceptual underpinnings of Willis’s 
concepts and practices around the brain – what made his theory of the brain possible in 
that particular historical setting - and not to simply attempt to ‘map’ these onto our own 
ways of approaching the subject.  
 
One of the more significant works on Willis reflective of these new approaches is Robert 
Frank Jr.’s Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists.80 Frank asked how the problem of the brain 
and mind would have been approached ‘in the context of seventeenth century medicine 
and culture?’ 81  He notes that in late twentieth century literature, Willis has been 
remembered for his ‘positive’ contributions to neuroscience and not for his ‘fantasies’ 
about how the brain worked,’ a positioned challenged by Franks’ work.82 Frank also drew 
attention to the ‘constellation of elements’ of Willis’s career, eclecticism he took as a 
defining feature of seventeenth century natural philosophy. He therefore attempts to 
                                                      
78 For a classic example on this field see: Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social 
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represent Willis not simply as a neuro-anatomist, but as a clinician, devout Anglican, 
experimental natural philosopher and chemist. 83 Despite this, Frank also observes the 
difficulties that this eclectic synthesis poses for the modern historian, as he writes, ‘it 
always seems as if Willis is trying to do too much.’ There is certainly a significant gap 
between our modern notions of finely divided, distinct, disciplinary specialisms and the 
more nebulous early modern disciplines. 84 
 
The attempt to examine Willis’s wider beliefs and values has been similarly tackled in the 
slightly earlier work of William Bynum in his 1973 Anatomical Method, where he argued 
that Willis’s religious views had underpinned his anatomical method. In particular, his 
religious views informed a correlation between form and function that was then taken as 
evidence of providential design.85 As Michael Hawkins also pointed out in 2004, these 
contributions continue to focus on Willis’s anatomical method and largely exclude 
motivations beyond (an assumed) religious orthodoxy – such as social, political, or 
philosophical influences.86 In 2004, Robert L. Martensen’s The Brain Takes Shape also 
examined Willis’s religious motivations in relation to his ‘methods of knowledge’ around 
the brain.87 At the same time, this book also looked at Willis’s role in establishing the 
modern ‘neurological’ model of personhood through localising functions to specific, 
solid structures of the brain and in moving away from its pores and ventricles.88 Again, 
the story of the modern neurosciences continues to form the architecture of these 
accounts, with religious motivations used as a broader context. Drawing on an alternative 
emphasis, Antonio Clericuzio’s 1995 book, The Internal Laboratory, paid specific attention 
to Willis’s theories around active, chemical matter, noting that these concepts were vitally 
important to understanding his physiological theory of the soul, which in turn directed 
Willis’s anatomical interpretations. Clericuzio positions Willis’s project, then, not as an 
anatomy of the brain but a ‘chemical reinterpretation of the animal spirits,’ which, he 
argued, could be used to inform early eighteenth century ideas around materialism and 
sensibility.89 While Willis’s ideas of brain function were not straightforwardly chemical, 
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anymore than they were solely anatomical, this particular focus is important for having 
drawn attention to the intersecting influences involved in Willis’s account. The issue of 
Willis’s historical significance was revisited by George Rousseau in 2004, when he noted 
that Willis remained ‘poorly understood’ because of approaches that continued to 
examine him through narrow, modern disciplinary specialisms: that he ‘cannot be 
adequately studied from one disciplinary perspective alone’ because his “neurologie” is 
multidisciplinary.90 Rousseau therefore called on scholars to examine Willis’s work ‘as a 
whole,’ adding that ‘the cultural, national and political brain must be added to the 
anatomical one’ Willis articulated. 91  
 
Michael Hawkins’s 2004 doctoral thesis is an important contribution to these debates. 
Hawkins is primarily concerned with resituating Willis’s work as an early modern theory 
of the passions, in order to move beyond narrow, present-centred narratives that seek to 
make Willis’s account speak to mental health interests (a category which did not exist at 
the time Willis was writing).92 As Hawkins argues, Willis linked ‘matters of physiology 
and pathology to social, political and religious concerns.’93  While Willis’s work on the 
physical structure of the brain is celebrated for its ‘neurocartographies’, Hawkins notes 
that historians have ‘generally avoided examining his works as theories of the passions.’94  
Importantly, Hawkins moves away from a straightforward use of Willis’s religious 
orthodoxy as a way of explaining his physiological theories, instead examining a broader 
set of medical, chemical, philosophical, political and professional factors. More recently, 
in 2011, Louis Caron examined the general reluctance within scholarship to view Willis’s 
works as important philosophical, as well as medical, contributions. Caron examines how 
Willis’s broader medical, religious and intellectual practices informed his model of neuro-
physiology. He does so in order to situate Willis in an intellectual tradition that includes 
the philosopher John Locke, a famous student of Willis’s.95 While there is a tendency 
here to establish Willis’s significance by situating him in relation to those he either 
influenced or was influenced by – rather than looking at him in his own right – this is an 
important part of addressing those prevailing medical, present-centred interests which 
have obscured the relevancy of Willis’s philosophy of the mind.  
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91 Ibid., p. 360. 
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This thesis, in examining Willis’s use of language and how it related to his intellectual and 
physical practices, builds on the recent work of Hawkins, Caron and Tabb. It therefore 
addresses a growing field of scholarship, which seeks to add historical, cultural and 
philosophical dimensions to the prevailing picture of Willis as a ‘neuro-anatomist’. While 
these accounts have, to varying degrees, engaged with Willis’s metaphors and analogies, 
they have not tended to feature as the focus of study in and of themselves. As Hawkins 
has also noted, despite acknowledging the use of chemical analogy in Willis’s works, 
historians have tended to overlook the significance of his particular selections and use of 
that imagery.96 Hawkins’ own work discusses Willis’s use of monarchical and political 
imagery, to argue that his theory of the passions was influenced by the politics of the civil 
war and Restoration. In 2011, Hawkins also examined Willis’s pragmatic use of chemical 
analogies to bridge a gap between his medical training and wealth of chemical 
experience.97 In 2014, Kathryn Tabb used Willis’s anthropomorphic metaphors of the 
animal spirits to argue against claims in the history of psychology about Willis’s role in 
the ‘reductionist turn’.98 These are incredibly valuable studies; however, the chosen 
examples tend to be used to support specific arguments about Willis’s motivations - his 
political commitments, or religious orthodoxy.  
 
Any one set of these analogies, if taken in isolation, can present a too narrow picture of 
Willis’s ideas: for instance, in 2008, Ludger Schwarte used examples of Willis’s 
mechanistic imagery to suggest that his model of the brain and body was, above all, a 
mechanical philosophy. Conversely, Tabb used a different set of metaphors to argue the 
exact opposite. It is important, then, to take a much broader view of use of metaphors 
and analogies, examining them both in terms of their own meanings and associations, 
but also for how they might inform, alter or extend other images within the same text. 
Willis’s mechanistic images become something quite different when we read them in 
conjunction with the vital agency of the spirits he had acting within those structures. 
What these images can do – when taken together – is reveal a multi-faceted, multi-
disciplinary model of the brain and body that incorporates a range of sources, influences 
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and practices and material environments. This will not necessarily furnish us with an 
internally coherent idea of Willis’s brain: the point of metaphors and analogies is not to 
present a complete picture or idea of an object, it is selectively to develop a given set of 
relationships or associations, according to what is being said. It is these productive, 
dynamic tensions between Willis’s metaphors and analogies around the brain that are 
useful in disrupting or unsettling the ‘clarity’ that modern neurosciences have attempted 
to create for Willis’s body of work. 
 
We might also consider here how Willis’s physical or technical practices around the brain 
were shaped by the ways in which he was able to talk about (and therefore think about) 
the brain as an object of knowledge. For instance, his new technique for dissecting the 
brain reflected a concern to retain its ‘natural’ form but also to gain greater access to new 
areas at the base of the brain and to retain intact its interconnected arterial and nervous 
pathways; these concerns drove the nature of his practical innovations. It is a set of 
concerns that was articulated by Willis through his characterisation of the brain’s 
structures as a set of topographical analogies (river ways, crevices, provinces) which 
needed to be retained and exposed, rather than sliced and broken as chapter three 
explores. These considerations complicate narratives that might wish to view Willis’s 
dissection method as the inevitable progression towards more accurate representations of 
nature or the simple outcome of technological change. This thesis therefore critiques the 
notion that Willis’s observations and descriptions of the anatomical brain can be 
appropriated – in any meaningful way - without considering the ways in which Willis 
represented and talked about the brain as an object of knowledge.  
 
Literature and Science 
 
As I have set out above, Willis’s position in historical scholarship has been substantially 
informed by broad conceptions of a binary between ‘scientific’ and ‘literary’ uses of 
language. As James Bono has argued, ‘popular and professional images of science’ are 
based around a perception of science as a “mirror” to nature, contrasted with a 
conception of ‘literature enmeshed, if not mired, in language.’99 This conception of 
modern science is, in no small part, based around the idea that the late seventeenth 
                                                      
99 James Bono, ‘Science, Discourse and Literature: The Role/Rule of Metaphor in Science,’ in Literature and 
Science: Theory and Practice, ed. by Stuart Peterfreund (Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), pp. 59-
89 (p. 59). 
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century witnessed a broad program to reform linguistic convention, used to establish a 
direct, objective and plain use of language that would reliably denote ‘facts’. As Clive 
Sutton observed in 1994, ‘the anti-word tradition comes down to us very strongly, and 
no scientist or science teacher wants to be caught dabbling with ‘mere words.’100 These 
attitudes, deeply embedded in notions of modern science, are reflected in assessments of 
Willis’s historical contribution. 
 
In addressing these themes, the thesis will draw from the field of literature and science 
scholarship. This incorporates two broad areas of study: first, literary scholars have 
examined how literature engages with scientific ideas; second, historians, following a 
social constructivist model, have examined science as a cultural discourse.101 A Landmark 
text in the latter field is George Rousseau’s 1979 essay in ISIS, ‘Literature and Science: 
the state of the field.’102 Jonathan Sawday’s important book on Renaissance anatomy, The 
Body Emblazoned, examined shared discourses of the body between poetry and anatomy in 
this period, and showed how a core set of metaphors around the body as a book, or 
cartographic atlas, shaped the discipline of anatomy as a practice of ‘writing’ the space of 
the body.103 More recently, in 2011, Charlotte Sleigh has pointed to the common origins 
of the modern novel and modern science, in the last forty years of the seventeenth 
century. Sleigh notes that both the modern novel and modern science function as new 
technologies for making versions of truth. Both involve a set of selections and 
prioritisations that embody ‘the contexts and methods’ of their making.104 Likewise, in 
2004 Elizabeth Spiller argued that the categories of literature and science emerged out of 
the same conditions in the seventeenth century, by defining themselves in opposition to 
one another.105 What is highlighted in these discussion is how the notion of an essential 
binary between science and literature emerged from a very specific historical setting: the 
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latter half of the seventeenth century, in Northern Europe, promoted among the fellows 
of the Royal Society. It is therefore neither an essential nor inevitable to recognise a 
dichotomy between literature and science. Much has been written about specifically 
early-modern attitudes to the role of metaphor and analogy, literature and science – this 
will be discussed in chapter one. 
 
This thesis draws on these areas of scholarship insofar as these discussions inform my 
critique of modern medical sciences’ ahistorical uses of Willis’s work: uses that have 
failed to acknowledge the full conceptual richness of his contributions, bound as they are 
to his apparently unscientific and rhetorical uses of language. Part of this has involved 
the ‘cherry picking’ of Willis’s anatomical observations while dismissing his physiological 
theories as ‘fantasies’ built upon mere ‘words’ – matter’s of philosophy or literature, but 
not ‘science’. This thesis argues against the idea that Willis’s use of metaphor or analogy 
marks him out as unscientific, particularly by the standards and practices of his own 
contemporaries, as chapter one will explore. Indeed, even our present-day sciences are 
very much reliant upon the use of key metaphors and analogies.  
 
This work clearly picks up on social constructivist approaches, which have elicited 
famous opposition from those in the sciences: in 1998 Alan Sokal claimed that science 
was not the same as other discourses, as it was able to employ language differently and 
was ‘not a mere reservoir of metaphors’ for use by humanities scholars. Rather, he 
argued, scientific metaphors are distinct because they are disciplined by being rooted in 
experiments and verifiable hypotheses.106 The ‘science wars’ of the early 1990s were 
particularly fractious over this question of ‘reality’ and ‘metaphor’, ‘literature’ and 
‘science’.107 Much of the most heavily-cited literature therefore comes from this period of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. While I am not arguing that science or medicine are 
necessarily the same as other types of discourse – or that they produce the same idea of 
‘real’ – it is important to note that science does not operate outside of culture, nor are its 
strategies for producing, representing and communicating its ideas beyond discourse.108 
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This is in no small part because language cannot move beyond culture. Scientific ‘facts’ 
are necessarily enmeshed in the language that delivers them.  As long ago as 1961, N.R. 
Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery noted how there is a ‘linguistic factor in seeing.’109 Hanson 
argued that scientists do not ‘see’ an object but are actively engaged in ‘seeing as’ – 
constantly interpreting phenomena through analogy. Complementing these studies are 
works that have examined the ‘literary structure’ of scientific argument; notably, the work 
of Peter Dear (1991) and Clive Sutton (1994).110 I am again influenced here by the work 
of Shapin and Schaffer, who argued that a community (of readers) participate in making 
the contents of scientific argument emerge as ‘public knowledge’ as a set of agreed upon 
facts; literary strategies in science are therefore also social technologies, both of which 
are part of the production of knowledge.111 Likewise, Daston and Gallison’s work in 
2005 around the historical nature of concepts of fact and objectivity is relevant to these 
discussions. 
 
Metaphor and analogy 
 
The particular focus of this thesis falls on Willis’s use of the devices of metaphor and 
analogy in constructing and representing his ideas around the brain. It aims to show that, 
despite having been widely criticised for employing these devices as figures of literary 
embellishment, they were in fact generative and constitutive elements in the ‘science’ he 
practiced; this is arguably true in the production of all scientific knowledge. A specific 
focus on Willis’s metaphors and analogies of the brain can be used to offer new insights 
into his intellectual practices: for instance, while the relationship between form and 
function is widely accepted as being fundamental to Willis’s ideas, as noted by the likes of 
William Bynum and Robert Frank Jr., it has yet to be examined specifically in light of the 
literary strategies that were used to support and validate the correlation.112  In this 
approach I draw from Hayden White’s classic essay on ‘Historical Text as Literary 
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Artefact’ by examining literary strategies in Willis.113  
 
Of course, ideas around the role of metaphor and analogy are themselves culturally and 
historically contingent; in this section I focus on setting out aspects of the current 
literature on the topic and debates within the modern sciences, while chapter one 
examines seventeenth century attitudes in context. The modern definition of metaphor 
traces its origins to Aristotle, who defined metaphor as the application of a ‘strange 
name’ to a new object, carrying the connotations of its previous context over to a new 
one. This action contained within it the prospect of a disruption to the relationship 
between words and the things they were meant to represent. It was a disruption, 
moreover, which served creative ends: Aristotle considered metaphor to be a device of 
poetry rather than rhetoric or logic – suggestive of a role in imagination and adornment, 
rather than a structural component of thought and language.114  As James J. Bono has 
expressed, the ideas flowing from this philosophy came to view metaphors as 
fundamentally misleading.115 Friedrich Nietzsche remarked in the nineteenth century, that 
truth cannot be un-entangled from the metaphors which describe them; we only forget 
their metaphorical root. Describing ‘a mobile army of metaphors,’ he notes that ‘truths 
are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions.’116 
 
According to modern definitions, a metaphor is a figurative description used in place of a 
literal one, to which it is analogous.117  When we describe the brain as being ‘hardwired’, 
for instance, this is not a literal description of the brain’s neurological structures, which 
bear little physical resemblance to the wires or circuit boards; what the metaphor conveys 
is the idea that there are functional similarities (analogies) that exist between computers 
and the human brain.118 The metaphor is intended to further an understanding of the 
brain by reference to another, more familiar, object: the computer. Additionally, the 
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focus expressed by the hardwired metaphor falls upon shared functional aspects, rather 
than the brain’s material substance or visual likenesses. This recourse to functional 
narratives is, furthermore, compounded by the advent of neuroimaging techniques which 
visually highlight neural activity. Metaphors, then, can intersect with technologies in a 
host of complex ways to steer knowledge in new directions.119  
 
Like metaphor, analogies similarly facilitate understanding by comparing an unfamiliar 
object to a more familiar one. They differ from metaphor in that, as a comparative 
device, analogy purports only to bear similarities to its target object, rather than proposing 
to stand in place of it. For instance, a biological ‘cell’ could be said to behave like a 
factory in a given role, whereas the human genome is a ‘blueprint’ for the body.120 
Analogy also tends to focus upon and draw out a specific point of similarity between two 
objects rather than encompassing all the possible relationships between them – analogy 
therefore requires greater work on the part of the reader in contextualisation to discern 
between these possibilities.121 There is clearly a substantial overlap here: a metaphor 
works by setting up parallels, via certain analogies or similitudes; both devices work to 
establish a set of associations between qualitatively different objects; both emphasise 
common relational abstractions.  
 
Importantly, metaphors and analogies capture a given set of intellectual, technological 
and cultural contexts. They direct the ways in which we are able to speak about the 
world, and set the possibilities for new knowledge and invention. As Michael Hunter has 
it, ‘metaphors lay the tracks for trains of associations, they direct the way we think, name 
and hypothesize…metaphors capture an intellectual climate.’122 As such, they have their 
own life cycles, rather than being true for all time; they are, above all, historically situated. 
It is not just the choice and availability of the objects of comparison that are contingent: 
ideas about how these devices operate, when or if they ought to be used, are also 
historically defined and subject to change. 
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The outlines of the modern debate are often traced back to Max Black’s seminal work, 
Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy first published in 1962 and later 
revised in 1979 and 1995.123 Instead of viewing metaphor as standing in place of what 
could otherwise be said literally, Black outlined a dynamic ‘interaction’ model whereby 
the metaphor is used to actively supress or highlight associations with other objects in 
order to generate new meanings – a model widely taken up within literary studies.124 
According to these positions, metaphors do more than passively transfer meaning from 
one object to another by substitution or comparison; they actively constitute new 
meanings and new knowledge.125 They work to embed objects into broader webs of 
meaning, into culture, in a myriad of ways. For instance, we can consider how the 
selection of one object (apart from any other) to act as the ‘figure of transport’ or 
comparative object is itself a highly interpretive and creative act, designed to draw out a 
specific set of connections and relationships. As Black’s work outlined, the metaphor 
works by selectively emphasizing, organising, or suppressing certain features of the 
primary object. By steering and directing our ‘sight’ in this way, one set of associations or 
relationships is highlighted to the exclusion or obscuring of other possibilities of 
knowledge. These connections are selectively drawn so that the given object is 
understood through the desired epistemological prism – the choice of a metaphor or 
analogy does more than make an object vivid or comprehensible, it is a part of the social 
and cultural production of knowledge.126  
 
Revisionist perspectives, influenced by Black’s work and its uptake within literary 
scholarship, have sought to attribute ‘cognitive value’ to metaphors.127 George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson’s classic text Metaphors We Live By (1980) has been highly influential in 
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this regard, arguing that all thought and language are fundamentally metaphoric.128 Lakoff 
and Johnson defined metaphor as a means of ‘conceiving of one thing in terms of 
another’, whereby we come to conceive of the target in terms of the characteristics of the 
source object.129 All new ideas and concepts are produced in this way, by referring to 
what we already know. We might think here of the modern metaphor of DNA as a 
‘code’ or ‘book’ to be read: we might use DNA in a way that is comparable to how we 
read and interpret a set of codes, but neither codes nor books are substantially like the 
actual ‘stuff’ of DNA. This metaphor instead helps to establish an idea of how DNA 
functions as a an object knowledge, by drawing on existing models for producing 
knowledge of the world – it is a visual code that we study or ‘read’ in order to ascertain 
the ‘blueprint’ design of the body. These metaphorical devices direct how we think about 
and use the concept of DNA, rather than acting as an illustrative substitution standing in 
place of a literal definition. 
 
Since the 1980s, integrationist models have set out to express the explanatory power of 
these devices and have proved to be more widely accepted. In 1987, scientist Stephen Jay 
Gould stated that ‘theory informed by metaphor and observation constrained by theory 
– marks any major movement in science.’130 New discoveries are always governed by and 
embedded within existing tropes of knowledge; it is impossible to construct a theory 
without drawing on existing categories of knowledge, through metaphors and analogies. 
In turn, observation is necessarily guided by those theories. In the 1990s, James Bono, 
following on from Black’s interactional model, argued that metaphors are generative and 
transformative in his Science, Discourse and Literature.131 Slightly later, in 2003, Theodore 
Brown’s Making Truth: Metaphors in Science argued something similar.132 Andrew Pickering 
also notably proposed that metaphors and analogies are at the core of all scientific 
modelling: scientific models are metaphors, based around similitudes, as they only project 
what we imagine or expect something to be like, rather than what we think it is.133 Joseph 
Dumit’s Picturing Personhood (2004) has similarly examined the formative role of 
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metaphors in the modern brain sciences. He traces out certain historical metaphors on 
which neuro-technologies ‘depend’, such as electrical telephone wires.134 The use of these 
metaphors is governed or informed by the availability of certain technologies, 
epistemological or social frameworks: metaphors of the brain are broadly governed by 
what is perceived to be the most complex or sophisticated technologies of a particular 
period, from the clock to computational machines and latterly, the internet.  
 
Metaphors and analogies also offer us a way to see the interactions between language, 
practices and material culture within certain historical settings. Gerd Gigerenzer in his 
‘Tools to Theories Heuristic’ (1992) notes how our scientific tools can slide into 
informing the kinds of theories we have about things, becoming metaphors for objects. 
He uses the example of statistical choice models, used in looking at cognition, which 
then become metaphors of the mind - leading to some researchers talking as if the brain 
actually functions in that way.135  Indeed, modern science has displayed a remarkable 
reliance upon metaphors and analogies in communicating its discoveries and ideas – 
from Richard Dawkins’ ‘selfish gene’ to the ‘hardwired’ brain of neuroscience, scientific 
discourse has been shaped by a set of highly effective metaphors. Today, they are 
generally viewed as useful devices that can help the public understand complex models 
and are a particularly vital part of the public relations effort undertaken by modern 
science. In 1998, Timothy Lenoir, for example, notably pointed to the continuing 
relevance of metaphorical language in science today.136 While there is still much debate 
about the role and limits of their use in scientific work, there is little outright hostility and 
few would entirely dismiss the significance of their work in relation to producing scientific 
knowledge.137  
 
The embracing of metaphor by modern science - what was once considered by Thomas 
Hobbes to be a chief ‘abuse of language’ - rests, however, on a very specific way of 
representing the role of metaphor within the contemporary scientific setting. Modern 
science has carefully promoted the idea that it has a privileged means of employing 
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language transparently, wherein metaphor can operate as a neutral and objective “tool” 
used to inform rather mislead an audience. According to this view, the use of metaphor 
in supporting scientific understanding and communication is disciplined by being 
tethered to clearly stated research goals and the experimental context. Literary uses, set 
up in contrast to these accounts, employ metaphors in an open-ended context and for 
affective capacity.138 Metaphors in science are considered as being distinct from those in 
politics or poetry in that they function in the same capacity as ‘tools’ rather than as 
features of embellishment. As Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski observed in 1994, 
Robert Boyle used metaphors and analogies scientifically in that he observed ‘firm 
constraints’ in their use; in so doing, he retained control over those ‘tools.’139 Pre-modern 
figures, however, ‘embraced’ these devices with ‘unbridled eagerness’ and were this 
‘owned’ by their examples rather than wielding them.140 It remains unclear, though, how 
readers might internalise or reproduce this ‘discipline’ when interpreting the metaphors 
of science.  
 
The idea of metaphor and analogy as powerful ‘tools’ presents them as a means by which 
we might access a fixed and self-evident reality, rather than as devices which help to 
determine how we are able to conceive of and experience the world.141 This is part of the 
rhetoric of modern science, which promotes the sense of a privileged access to a ‘reality’ 
beyond culture. However, it is through scientific practice that models – based on 
metaphors - are made to exist and produce real effects in the world. James Bono and 
Katharine Hayles have, in particular, addressed the notion that scientists can delimit the 
role of metaphor through what Bono termed a ‘privileged insight’ that ‘controls 
the unruliness of metaphoric meaning.’142 As Hayles argues in Chaos and Order, scientific 
discourse extends the ‘belief that a language exists, or can be forged, that is purely 
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instrumental.’143 However, ‘anyone who has seriously studied how language works is 
aware…that it shapes even as it articulates thought.’144  
 
While metaphor and analogy are clearly used in historically specific ways, there is little to 
support the positivistic idea that contemporary scientists have found a way to employ the 
work of comparison in a substantially different – and more objective way - than earlier 
periods. Despite many obvious differences between Richard Dawkins’ metaphor of the 
‘selfish gene’ and Willis’s evocation of ‘melancholy’ animal spirits, for example, both 
impute human or anthropomorphic characteristics to (what were then accepted as being) 
biological components of the body in order to say something about the way in which 
they acted or behaved. Both worked upon broader theoretical frameworks – Darwinism 
and vital matter theory, respectively. This is not to collapse the wealth of historical and 
cultural differences between Willis’s and Dawkins’s examples, but to suggest that modern 
science has no unique claim to be able to employ metaphor in a neutral way. In effect, 
the policing of this boundary between modern and pre-modern use of metaphor and 
analogy is, in itself, part of a broader effort to reproduce and validate the identity of 
modern science. As this thesis looks to demonstrate, science has – and continues to – 
employ literary and rhetorical strategies even while presuming its own objectivity.145  
 
In the 1990s, Gentner and Jeziorski put forward a new variant upon the scientific ‘tools’ 
argument, proposing that a shift from metaphor to analogy characterised the emergence 
of modern science. As they noted, what has counted as a scientific uses of these devices 
has changed over time. However, their argument is based not simply on noting 
difference but on mapping out a linear progression from pre-modern metaphors to 
modern, scientific analogizing. As they argue, modern scientists recognise ‘a set of tacit 
constraints’ in analogical reasoning, which makes them more reliable – an argument I 
explore further in chapter one.146 Analogies, they proposed, have been viewed as more 
acceptable ‘tools’ of science and are used by (true) scientists wherever it is possible to 
avoid metaphor. It is not entirely clear how these constraints are to be applied, 
monitored or how effective they might be; what is significant here, though, is the very 
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application of these notions of discipline and restraint to language as a marker of what 
makes it ‘scientific’. It is also somewhat artificial to have drawn a distinction between 
metaphor and analogy as they substantially overlap and both are regularly used in 
scientific discourse; it is done more in the hope of carving out a space for an exclusively 
scientific use of language. Lastly, the argument assumes, at the most basic level that 
readers are unable to recognize and appreciate the effects of metaphor while being able 
to interrogate or reject the implications of an analogy if they so choose. Simply because 
we, as readers, know that the brain is only being compared to a computer, this does not 
necessarily mean that there is some other ‘universal’ object of the brain to which we can 
appeal in order to limit the cognitive effects of the analogy, any more than there is for 
the metaphor.  
 
It is also an argument that has failed to convince scientists themselves. The boundary 
between whether an object is intended to act as a comparison (analogy) or used to stand 
in for an object (metaphor) by the author is elusive, perhaps impossible to pin down. In 
2003 M.J. Eadie complained that it is this ‘slide’ from analogy to metaphor that makes 
Willis’s theories (around chemical physiology) so problematic: ‘it sometimes becomes 
difficult to be sure if he may have slid from analogy into postulated chemical actuality.’147 
Elements of the attacks on Willis reflect a sense in which he intentionally blurred the 
boundary between ‘literary’ metaphor and ‘scientific’ analogy: he is thus less secure 
historically than Robert Boyle, who is taken as an exemplar of ‘scientific analogizing’.148 
This contrast will be revisited in chapter one. 
 
Despite these fears, metaphors and analogies continue to abound in science today. At the 
same time, it is possible to detect a growing sense of unease around the extent to which 
science might have come to rely upon the illustrative work of these devices, especially in 
terms of public communication strategies. This may reflect the beginnings of a renewed 
backlash against metaphors in particular, which remain a cause of considerable suspicion. 
As Sabine Maasen notes, metaphors continue to be regarded with equivocation: ‘they have 
been seen as ornamental, yet inessential; educational, yet lacking genuine insight; as 
economical carriers of complex meaning, yet easily misleading.’149  A question, continually 
lurking behind these debates, is that of how we actually distinguish between the function 
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of metaphors in science as opposed to politics or poetry – a distinction that has not been 
comprehensively settled by any means. An oft-quoted warning among the scientific 
community comes from cyberneticists Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener, who 
noted that, while indispensible, ‘the price of metaphor is eternal vigilance.’150  
 
Phillip Ball, writing in the popular science publication Nature in 2011, proposed that  
‘maybe we are too eager to find a neat metaphor rather than just explain what is going on 
as clearly and honestly as we can.’151  The metaphor might make the task of scientific 
explanations easier and more appealing, but Ball does not consider it to count as a 
constituent part of the process of knowledge production; it is, in contrast, a shortcut and 
one that obscures vital content in the process. Richard Roche’s essay, ‘Lost in 
Translation: the dangers of using analogy in science’ (2012) – shortlisted for the 
Wellcome Trust Science Writing prize – expressed the fear that analogies are limiting as 
‘tools’ and do not always serve scientific knowledge faithfully. Roche described an 
intellectual ‘pay-off’ that occurs when scientists employ easily accessible analogies to 
explain complex scientific ideas or models to the public.152 Analogies might enable a non-
technical audience to grasp difficult ideas, but, as Roche argues, these are over-
simplifications that flatten out detail and thereby restrict what it is possible to think about 
the subject. More recently in 2016, Shane Neilson’s article in Medical Humanities examines 
the fundamental yet restrictive role of metaphors in a study on metaphors around pain in 
medicine, taking them to be a device that both enables and confines the very basis of 
knowledge. As he writes, ‘disciplines progress according to the strength of their 
metaphors’ and can become entirely bound up in their meaning – this can restrict 
alternative ways of thinking about experiences and objects.153  
 
While analogies and metaphors do indeed supress ‘detail’ to achieve a different kind of 
intelligibility, it is also difficult to imagine how those details or facts are to gain meaning 
(as part of a scientific model or concept) without the prism of the analogies and 
metaphors through which we organise them. Here, they are represented as tools for the 
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transmission of an already perfect science, rather than as tools for “doing” science; they 
are a means by which scientists explain themselves to the public, rather than the tools by 
which they produce knowledge. As mentioned in regards to Pickering’s arguments about 
scientific modelling, all experiments are ultimately based on models of the world, and 
those models are generated from metaphors or analogies.154 This is nevertheless a useful 
example of how popular science discourse continues to project the impression that is has 
a privileged way of using language to convey a specific kind of reality.  
 
These arguments support my position that in ‘cleansing’ Willis’s clinical and anatomical 
work of the metaphors and analogies that he employed, we intervene in and distort the 
meaning and sense he attached to those activities. Notions about the appropriateness of 
metaphors and analogies in science are, moreover, directly relevant to the way in which 
Willis has been represented within historical writing. Even where Willis’s use of these 
devices is not explicitly attacked, discussions concerning his ‘imaginative’, ‘embellished’ 
and ‘rhetorical’ writing speaks to these ideas around the role of language and its 
relationship to producing a certain kind of scientific knowledge. References to Willis’s 
imaginative genius or speculative reasoning denote his use of metaphor and analogy as a 
means of drawing an extension between what could be seen to what remained unseen; 
that he preferred to rely on the creative inventiveness of words rather than empirical 
observation. Willis’s metaphorical and analogical reasoning is, according to such readings, 
little more than an attempt to conceal inadequate empirical foundations while promoting 
speculative theories.  
 
Lost in Translation? Willis and Samuel Pordage 
 
Drawing on some the key themes set out above, I would like to turn finally to the matter 
of translation. In keeping with the tradition of the universities, Willis’s major works were 
written and published in Latin, running to numerous editions at home and on the 
continent in his lifetime and the decades that followed.155  However, Willis has been most 
widely read by scholars in English translation: during the 1680s, following Willis’s death 
in 1675, the English poet and playwright Samuel Pordage (1633 – c. 1691) published 
edited translations of his key texts, commencing with The Remaining Medical Works of Dr 
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Thomas Willis in 1681, which incorporated his tracts on fermentation and fevers alongside 
his anatomy of the brain. The Practice of Physick followed this in 1684, featuring eleven 
treatises including Willis’s Soul of Brutes and his last work, published posthumously, 
Pharmaceutice Rationalis (1675). To the extent that the major themes addressed in this 
thesis rest on assessments of Willis’s use of language, it is important to consider more 
closely the role of Pordage in the transmission of Willis’s ideas. We might well ask if the 
issues taken with Willis’s ‘flowery’ and prolix prose style ought properly to be thought of 
as responses to Pordage’s interventions and what significance, if any, this might hold for 
the arguments I explore here.  
 
As this section will briefly examine, scholarly assessments of Pordage’s contribution have 
tended to be unforgiving and dismissive. Pordage is often cast simply as a ‘minor 
Restoration playwright’ who was, due to his education and background, ill-placed to 
understand the material he was translating and thus made frequent errors. 156  It 
nevertheless remains the case that Pordage’s translations – though mistrusted – have and 
continue to be used to inform the vast majority of Willis scholarship, which in itself 
marks out these editions as a significant historical source on Willis. One difficulty that 
arises here is that Willis – and his translated texts – are often used interchangeably by 
scholars: Stanley Finger writes, for instance, that ‘Willis was an absolute master of 
flowery language and an innovator of terminology,’ but it is unclear which edition these 
remarks properly refer to.157  
 
It would be inaccurate to suggest that accusations of a ‘flowery’ or embellished style have 
been the simple result of a reaction against Willis’s decision to publish in Latin when his 
apparently ‘scientific’ contemporaries were increasingly favouring the vernacular. Willis’s 
decision to publish solely in Latin was not in any way unusual or counter to the practices 
of his fellow members of the Royal Society (though contemporary criticisms may well 
have referred to the kind of Latin style - scholastic or humanist - he employed).158 There 
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was, however, no sense in which experimental philosophers associated with the Society 
were straightforwardly anti-Latinate; we need only look to how leading writers in the 
period employed Latin - Hobbes’ Leviathan being an obvious example. Pierre Gassendi, 
whom Willis much admired, was said to have written in a ‘prolix’ Latin while other 
notable ‘scientific’ figures from the period – including Boyle and Harvey – all wrote and 
published in Latin.159 Willis, like Harvey before him, wrote and published his works as a 
Professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford, educated in a traditional scholastic 
curriculum based upon Aristotelian natural philosophy.160 His publications are less to do 
with his identity as a practicing physician, and more to do with his scholarship. Despite 
the increased popularity of the vernacular, Latin remained the dominant language of the 
universities, church and government. It was a mark of a particular authority and learning: 
medical prescriptions, for example, continued to be written in Latin. Publishing in Latin 
would have denoted Willis’s learned medical education as well as pointing to the 
international significance of his work, which could be circulated among an English and 
continental community of scholarly readers.161  
 
Notably, it is Willis’s Latin prose that has been the most praised for being precise and 
‘straightforward,’ suggesting that it is his poet translator who has tended to draw 
criticism. We should, however, be careful to critique assumptions around the role of a 
poet-translator here: for those looking to recover and position Willis as a ‘scientist’ or 
proto-neurologist it would be convenient indeed to attribute (what are recognised as 
being) the literary elements and historical ‘jargon’ of Willis’s texts to the intervention of a 
poet in what was an otherwise empirical work delivered in a ‘straightforward’ language. 
In this reading, we assume that where the scientist sought clarity with an economical use 
of language, the poet intervenes and obscures with his embellishments. It has yet to be 
argued, however, that Pordage intervened to the extent that he invented the elaborate 
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metaphorical and analogical explanations of Willis’s prose – and is responses to these 
features that I seek to address.  
 
Who, then, was Willis’s translator? During the 1660s, Pordage published a series of 
poems reflecting an interest in theological, mystical and alchemical themes, chiefly 
focused on the nature of spirit. His first, Mundorum explication, published in 1661, 
examined the theme of ‘External, Internal, and Eternal worlds’ commencing with the fall 
of man. These interests most likely stemmed from Pordage’s father, a follower of the 
German Christian philosopher Jacob Böhme (1575-1624) whose writing incorporated 
alchemical and mystical themes within a Lutheran tradition. These themes in turn 
resonated with Willis’s own physiological discourse, which drew upon alchemical 
principles while outlining a broadly Christian framework for his discussion of the soul. 
The prefatory pages to Pordage’s translation of Practice of Physick even included his own 
verses on Willis’s ‘Medical-Philosophical Discourses,’ highlighting the author’s 
knowledge of the ‘intricate and hidden cause of things,’ the various motions of the 
elemental bodies in nature and the spirits moved in the human ‘frame.’ 162  
 
Pordage was also vocal politically. Although a loyalist and supporter of the established 
church, he published a satirical Whig pamphlet attacking Charles II’s chief minister, the 
earl of Danby.163 He presented Willis’s works as a fittingly patriotic dedication for his 
patron, Sir Theophilus Biddulph, who had shown a ‘pattern of Loyalty and Religion’ 
during ‘these troublesome times’ (Willis was himself a notable Royalist and active 
supporter of the Anglican Church during the Interregnum years at Oxford).164 The point 
to be made here is that, as a translator of Willis’s natural philosophy, Pordage was not 
necessarily a disinterested party or one merely seeking financial profit. He was in fact 
quite capable of bringing his own intellectual interests, political and social ambitions to 
the task. As Pordage noted, the work of vernacular translation was, in his eyes, a firmly 
patriotic exercise - a way of serving his fellow countrymen and ‘publick’ with valuable 
learning delivered in the ‘mother tongue’ – valuable, in particular, to a growing body of 
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practicing physicians for whom accessible versions of Willis’s (chiefly chemical) medical 
learning would have been useful. 
 
The question, however, is whether we can use Pordage’s role to significantly inform any 
assessment of the transmission of Willis’s ideas and his scholarly reception. Since the 
1950s, the prevailing consensus has been that Pordage’s translation ill-served Willis’s 
original text and has, historically, been a barrier to more positive assessments of his 
contributions. As Sir Charles Symonds suggested, the English translation was technically 
‘faulty,’ but also ‘ponderous and ambiguous,’ ‘tedious and obscure.’165 It was not simply 
inaccurate, but a difficult and unpleasant reading experience. More recently, Willis’s 
notable biographer Hansreudi Isler proved similarly dismissive of Pordage when he 
described him as a ‘minor Restoration playwright,’ observing that his work was ‘far from 
accurate’ and ‘a serious source of misunderstandings since researchers of our time 
regularly mistake Pordage’s translation for Willis’s original’.166 Isler gave no examples of 
these inaccuracies or an assessment of the impact they were thought to have had on the 
overall sense and meaning of Willis’s work. It is seemingly enough for these scholars to 
simply note the unreliability of the translator, while also continuing to rely on his work. 
 
Alfred Meyer and Raymond Hierons – notable neuro-physicians who published 
prominent works on Willis in the 1960s - were clear in their judgement that the more 
objectionable elements of Willis’s text were a product of the poet’s intervention. They 
noted with some the regret the lack of a modern translation of Willis’s ‘direct and 
unpretentious Latin diction other than the rather flowery language of Pordage who was a 
poet.’ 167  The undercurrent to these remarks is the assumption that the nature of 
Pordage’s impact must have been, by dint of his literary background, one of 
embellishment, where science would call for clarity. Yet, as Jonathan Sawday has well 
explored, the suggestion of any firm distinction between literature and ‘science’ is an 
anachronism in these discussions. Poets and anatomists in this period would have 
recognised significant areas of overlap in their respective projects to examine human 
nature, drawing upon a shared discourse.168 For many more recent scholars, Pordage’s 
suitability – as a poet and playwright – to act as a mediator of Willis’s ‘science’ continues 
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to exercise concern. Clifford F. Rose’s History of British Neurology from 2012 notes that, 
though Willis wrote in a ‘straightforward’ Latin, his translator is generally regarded as 
unreliable, being clearly ‘uninformed’ on the subject matter and an ‘unsuccessful 
Restoration playwright.’169 
 
Criticisms of Pordage have notably tended to be concerned above all with whether 
Pordage was sufficiently equipped to translate scientific terms from the Latin to English, 
rather than with broader questions of whether he misrepresented Willis’s ideas, 
metaphors or concepts. They are specifically concerned, that is, with his rendering of 
anatomical and medical terminology. Tellingly, Meyer and Hierons observed that Willis’s 
most ardent modern critics tended to be ‘anatomists,’ while his admirers were more likely 
to be ‘historians, clinicians, psychologists and philosophers.’170 In a 2003 article on 
Willis’s impact in the journal Paediatrics, A. N. Williams notes that Pordage’s edition was 
‘incomplete’ in that it missed out important patient cases.171 Even where the English text 
is defended, it is on the grounds of its anatomical worth: in 2003, M. J. Eadie noted that 
‘at least in relation to the Cerebri Anatome, the general competence of Pordage’s 
translation has been acknowledged.’172 Zoltan Molnar commented in 2004, ‘Pordage had 
no medical training and probably did not understand much of the text…Nevertheless, 
some parts of his translation of Cerebri Anatome could almost be used today as a standard 
anatomy text.’173 Tellingly, the intellectual themes which tie Pordage to Willis (alchemical, 
mystical, physiological) fail to align with what modern scholarship has tended to value 
above all in Willis’s work: his anatomical and medical expertise. From this rather narrow 
and present-centred perspective, Pordage can only muddy what is sought in Willis’s 
work.  
 
Part of this anatomical focus also picks up on notions around the unsuitability of English 
vernacular as a medium for rendering early modern anatomical and medical discourse. 
Latin had been and remained the technical language of anatomy when Willis was writing: 
most existing concepts and terms had no obvious correlate in the far more restricted 
vocabulary of English vernacular. As Roger French notes of Harvey, ‘when dealing with 
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technical aspects of anatomy he used only Latin’ because of its vast vocabulary as 
opposed to the scant provisions of the English language. Moreover, because the study of 
anatomy was built upon a traditional education in natural philosophy, it was ‘best 
expressed in Latin.’174 French comments that the Latin of natural philosophy ‘bristled 
with technical terms, the resonances of which were the intellectual world and authority 
within.’175 When we examine the content of Willis’s writing, it is apparent that the reader 
he envisaged was required to be conversant in the more technical aspects of natural 
philosophical discourse, which would have required a certain grasp of this expansive 
Latin vocabulary. As a mere poet and playwright, Pordage probably lacked the education 
required to navigate these pitfalls. As John Henry notes, Willis’s works displayed a ‘level 
of technicality’ that would have excluded most readers beyond his own professional 
circles.176  
 
Pordage’s intervention was, of course, aimed at making Willis accessible to the ‘vulgar’ 
and unlearned ‘publick’ – for whom he even included a glossary of Latin and Greek 
terms, pointing to the challenge faced by the common English reader. There is a sense 
that Pordage’s efforts here have seen him pitted against long-standing ideas both about 
what Willis’s contributions are (anatomical learning) and what that discourse ought to be: 
technical, precise, learned. This is also, then, about authority - Pordage’s authority to 
speak on matters of medical learning. While the general consensus is that the translations 
are not to be trusted, suggesting a desire to get at the ‘truth’ of Willis, there is an 
attendant lack of critical reflection on the nature of what is that might mean in this 
setting. Why are we so concerned with terminological exactness as opposed to how 
Pordage might have conveyed the meaning and sense of Willis’s physiological 
explanations, or with how he represented his metaphorical arguments? Judgements as to 
the value of Pordage’s editions are hard to separate from these broader issues. These 
emphases are, of course, a representation of how we see Willis, not Pordage.  
 
It is difficult to unpick whether suggestions of terminological inaccuracy (imposed by 
Pordage) might also have intersected with issues properly relating to Willis’s own writing 
practices: for instance, it is possible to suggest that Willis’s widely noted practice of 
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appropriating new terms across disciplinary boundaries (often via metaphor) could have 
come to be read as evidence of the translator’s own error or misreading. Did the 
translator misapply a term, or had Willis inverted a commonly established use? Wes 
Wallace, writing in 2003, argued for instance that what has often been deemed Willis’s 
‘fanciful style’ is perhaps an impression ‘due in part to unfamiliarity with his chemical 
vocabulary, which departed from the common usage of his time.’177 Here, Wallace draws 
on Michael Foster’s rather pointed remarks that Willis ‘caught up the phrases of his 
friends, Boyle and others, without understanding them’ – the implied criticism being that 
the language used is borrowed, appropriated without understanding, and is therefore jarring 
and obscure.178 Yet, as chapter two of this thesis explores, and as Wallace also argues, 
Willis’s chemical writing was no ‘mistake’ or simple matter of misappropriated 
terminology, but a deliberate attempt to forge new kinds of physiological explanation. 179   
 
A final strand to these discussions, forwarded in the early 1960s by Charles Symonds 
(since left unchallenged), is that the equivocal nature of Willis’s historical position, 
especially in English scholarship, stems from the poor quality of Pordage’s work. As he 
noted, ‘On the Continent, where he was read in the original Latin, the true worth of 
Willis was earlier appreciated, and his influence probably greater, than in his own 
country.’180 This argument ultimately overlooks how the intellectual and philosophical 
climate among continental audiences might have actively impacted on how Willis’s ideas 
were read and received. It is a position that assumes that the original Latin granted a 
direct and unproblematic access to Willis’s ‘true’ ideas, from which more favourable 
assessments inevitably followed; it in turn explains away his English critics as being 
simply ill-informed, which overlooks the possibility of fundamental objections to what 
was being proposed by the author. This deceptively neat explanation further neglects the 
fact that the Latin original of Cerebri anatome had been widely reproduced and circulated 
in England before Pordage undertook his translations in the 1680s. Much of the criticisms 
aimed at Willis’s work by his learned contemporaries, such as Walter Charleton, would 
have been based on reading the Latin.  
 
                                                      
177  Wes Wallace, ‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse in Newton, Willis and Gassendi: First Steps in a 
Mechanical Theory of Communication,’ Brain and Cognition, 51 (2003), pp. 66-94 (p. 75) 
178 Michael Foster, Lectures (1901), p. 275. 
179 W. Wallace Vibrating Nerve Impulse (2003), p. 75.  
180 Symonds, Notes and Records (1960), p. 97. 
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With these issues in mind, how should we approach Pordage when studying Willis? As 
with the majority of scholars working on these texts, I primarily quote in this thesis from 
the English edition whilst checking key terms and passages against the Latin. However, I 
also want to actively defend here the value and usefulness of the English edition as a 
historical source on Willis. The scholars and retired neuroscientists - who today produce 
the majority of writing about Willis - assess his historical contributions based on this 
English edition. We should be cautious, then, of regarding the Latin text as ‘authoritative’ 
simply because it is the original (this requires a more extensive discussion of how we 
recover a ‘true’ authorial intent from historical sources, which lies somewhat beyond the 
scope of this thesis). Above all, if we are to evaluate Willis as a historical figure in the 
history of neuroscience, the English edition must be taken as a primary point of 
reference. 
 
One’s view on the value of the English translation also largely depends on how we 
choose to approach Willis: if we are interested only in mining his works for his 
anatomical and medical relevance, then the issue of Latin terminology and its rendering 
in early modern English vernacular presents a specific set of challenges. If, however, as 
historians of science and medicine, we want to look at Willis as a natural philosopher 
(rather than as an anatomist or proto-neurologist) then the English text, while still 
presenting difficulties, does not present the same set of problems. It is notable that 
among all the criticism, there is little to suggest the view that Pordage’s errors amount to 
a substantial alteration in the sense and meaning of Willis’s arguments or explanations. In 
the tercentenary edition of Cerebri anatome, Dr Lloyd Stevenson contributed a 
bibliographic assessment which, although noting the difficulties arising from trying to 
find appropriate equivalents when it came to ‘new scientific terms,’ nevertheless 
concluded that Willis was ‘well served by his translator.’181  
 
Most notably, Willis’s ‘most ardent critic’ Michael Foster commissioned his own 
translation of the Latin text and yet held firm to his core criticisms. 182 The issues which 
concerned him rested with what Willis said and how he said it - using inappropriately 
                                                      
181 L. G. Stevenson, ‘A Note on Pordage’s Translation’, in The Anatomy of The Brain and Nerves, ed. by 
William Feindel, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), pp. 61–65. On these discussions see: K. D. 
Keele, "Thomas Willis on the Brain The Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves, by Thomas Willis, tercentenary 
edition (1664–1964) edited by William Feindel. Montreal, McGill University Press, 1965, 2 vols.," Medical 
history, 11.02 (1967), pp. 194-200 (p. 194). 
182 Meyer and Hierons, ‘On Thomas Willis’s concepts,’ Part II, p. 151. 
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metaphorical and ‘speculative,’ analogical reasoning. These features are not the product 
of Pordage’s particular intervention. Clearly, especially when dealing with metaphors, the 
use of an alternate object could have considerable implications for the overall sense and 
meaning of what is being described; my point here is that this is not what criticisms of 
the English translation have been concerned with. Certainly, I have found no mention 
concerning inconsistencies between the metaphorical imagery and sense of Willis’s 
(mostly physiological) explanations – the issue here is more that these aspects of Willis’s 
work are altogether overlooked and disregarded. 
 
I would argue that, ultimately, Willis’s equivocal position within historical scholarship is 
not reducible to a straightforward matter of mistranslation, something to be overturned 
by an appeal to the authority of the ‘original’ text. As this thesis argues, the issues 
surrounding Willis run much deeper than this: they significantly rest with his discourse 
on the soul and with his apparently troubling use of metaphors to transgress certain 
boundaries in producing that account. It is Willis’s metaphors and analogies - and the 
suspicions they arouse within science - rather than his anatomical discoveries and 
terminology that inform the specific discussions I seek to address here. The very 
question of Pordage’s ‘accuracy’ is also skewed in this context by a medicalised focus on 
Willis’s text. This concern speaks more to our uses of Willis than to issues of translation. 
Of course Pordage’s version should be read with care and attention; all works of 
translation are imperfect acts of linguistic negotiation. It is, however, important to 
critique suggestions that Pordage’s text is straightforwardly ‘unreliable’, especially as we 
continue to base so much of Willis scholarship on it. These themes have generally been 
neglected in scholarship on Willis, besides the issuing of caveats concerning reliance on 
the English edition. There is clearly a need to reflect further on these matters, even 
though their resolution – which would require a dedicated comparison of the two texts - 




Chapter one examines seventeenth century attitudes towards metaphor and analogy in 
the context of natural philosophical inquiry in England during the 1600s. It will consider 
that Willis’s use of these devices was indeed compatible with the conventions 
acknowledged at the time, comparing his strategies with other leading figures such as 
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William Harvey, Walter Charleton and Robert Boyle. It will argue that the idea of a plain 
and direct use of language in science emerges through the specific rhetoric of the early 
Royal Society; this was also a political rhetoric, espousing a set of ideals that were not 
necessarily intended for practice.  
 
Chapter two examines Willis’s chemical discourse around fermentation in his first 
publication, Diatribae Duae (1659). It focuses on his use of an important, structuring 
chemical analogy for the medical spirits of the body, as well as his casting of the brain as 
a chemical ‘alembic’. This last metaphor is tied into his later representations of the brain 
as the exclusive seat of the animal spirits of the corporeal soul. These chemical analogies 
were important in helping Willis to import far more familiar terms, categories and 
practices from the chemical laboratory into the new medical and anatomical setting in 
which he produced his Anatomy of the Brain. 
 
Chapter three deals with Willis’s famous work Cerebri anatome, and specifically with his 
new dissection method. It considers how Willis used the claims of his methodology to 
lay an important foundation for his alternative, physiological model of the soul. In this 
way, the chapter challenges the view that his methodological changes were the result of 
an inevitable progression towards more accurate or ‘realistic’ ways of investigating and 
representing the brain as an empirical object. It also explores the rhetorical nature of 
Willis’s representation of a naturalistic and unmediated presentation of the brain, 
intended to embody a specific notion of ‘objectivity’ as it related to this period.  
 
Chapter four continues to look at Willis’s anatomy of the brain, considering in more 
detail the structural, architectural, and mechanistic metaphors and analogies he used to 
further his physiological theories in conjunction with anatomical explanations. It 
considers how these images were used to support broader claims about the role and 
function of the brain, especially Willis’s new ideas around localisation and the involuntary 
nervous system. 
 
Lastly, Chapter five addresses Willis’s physiology and pathology of the corporeal soul in 
De Anima Brutorum (1672). It examines, for instance, his images of the vital flame in the 
blood and of the passions of the soul as tempests and storms. It also considers how 
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Willis used certain metaphors and analogies in his discourse on the passions in order to 
address the political climate of the civil war and the Restoration. 
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Chapter one 
New Inventions by Old Words: Metaphor, Analogy and Rhetoric in the 
Seventeenth century. 
 
The possibility of achieving an objective and neutral use of language is central to modern 
science. It draws upon the notion of an entrenched binary opposition between ‘scientific’ 
and ‘literary’ modes of speaking about and representing the world in text. The former 
denotes a literal use of language for the purposes of instruction, whereas the latter 
signifies meaning and uses symbolic representations; it ornaments and embellishes. 
Bound up within these ideas is a particular suspicion of the work of figurative language 
and the devices of metaphors, analogy, and simile. While they are accepted as useful tools 
of communication, they are not generally accepted as having any creative or constitutive 
role to play in scientific discovery and invention. The over-arching argument of this 
chapter is that these ideas – of the virtue of restricting and excluding metaphors from the 
realm of scientific knowledge - are historically and culturally rooted, rather than universal 
and ahistorical. Importantly, while the functions of similarity and comparison (which are 
at the centre of metaphor and analogy) are widely acknowledged, the meanings that are 
attached to these categories and the roles we ascribe to them are certainly not stable. 
Quite the opposite: ideas around what constitutes a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way to employ such 
devices have been the subject of historical change.  As Dedre Gentner and Michael 
Jeziorski have noted, analogizing is never absent from scientific discourse; what is to be 
examined, rather, are the conditions under which the applications of analogy have been 
considered ‘scientific’, historically. 1  
 
This chapter examines seventeenth century ideas about what would constitute an 
appropriate use of metaphor and analogy. The ideal of a ‘scientific’ way of using these 
devices, as ‘tools’ rather than ‘ornaments’, traces its historical roots to the debates that 
accompanied the rejection of scholasticism and humanism and the rise of the ‘new 
sciences’ between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a number of leading 
historians of science have noted, the distinction between what counted as ‘knowledge’ 
                                                      
1 Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski, ‘The shift from metaphor to analogy in western science’, in 
Metaphor and Thought, ed. by A. Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 447-480. 
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and ‘opinion’ was radically reformulated after the 1660s. 2  This reformulation was 
significantly bound up in ideas about the relationship between words and things – that is 
to say, the ability of words to directly represent the true nature of things, rather than 
acting as a veil or mist to the understanding, came under particular scrutiny. Traditional 
historiographical accounts of this period have emphasised experimental philosophy’s 
complete rejection of rhetorical excess and ornamentation, which had sullied the work of 
preceding philosophies, as a means of attesting to its successful reform of language. 3 
This is most notably represented through the ‘plain’ style advocated by leading figures of 
the early Royal Society in England (of which Willis was a founding member). The 
Society’s efforts in this matter are often lauded as laying the foundations of modern 
science.4 However, more recent scholarship has questioned this view, proposing that the 
narrow focus on the activities of the leading protagonists of reform overlooks a range of 
alternative approaches and views on the matter. As historian of rhetoric, Brian Vickers, 
among others, has noted of Richard Jones’ famous work on English prose style, it was 
assumed that the ‘plain style’ was ‘reflected in the scientific writings of its members,’ 
while the concessions of important figures, including Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke, 
have been overlooked by such assessments. 5  Moreover, the notion of an outright 
hostility to metaphor and rhetoric within this group has been widely overstated.6 The 
predominant focus on the activities of the Royal Society’s members and the presumed 
fact of linguistic reform is more an affirmation of present-day values in science than an 
accurate reflection of historical practices.  
 
Moving away from a focus on an absolute opposition to rhetorical devices, a number of 
modern scholars have pointed to this period as one in which a ‘scientific’ use of analogy 
                                                      
2 Steven Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology’, Social Studies of Science, 14.4 
(Nov., 1984), pp. 481-520; Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975, 2006), Ch. 3 and 5; Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth century England 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), Ch. 2. 
3 The seminal text in this regard is Robert F. Jones’s, ‘Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter 
of the Seventeenth Century,’ PMLA, 45.4 (Dec., 1930), pp. 977-1009. For an early objection to this view, 
see: Robert Adolph, The Rise of Modern Prose Style (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968). 
4 Robert Jones, ‘Science and English Prose Style,’ (1930), pp. 977-1009. 
5 Brian Vickers notes that Hooke, Boyle and Henry Power were ‘tacitly taken as supporting his thesis’: ‘The 
Royal Society and English Prose Style: A Reassessment’, in Rhetoric and the Pursuit of Truth: Language Change 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. by Vickers and Struever (Los Angeles, California: University of 
California Press, 1985), pp. 3-76 (p. 17); Jones, Prose Style, p. 88. 
6 Ryan J. Stark, 'From Mysticism to Skepticism: Stylistic Reform in Seventeenth century British Philosophy 
and Rhetoric,' Philosophy and Rhetoric, 34. 4 (2001), pp. 322–334 (p. 20); Clive Sutton, ‘Nullius in Verba’ and 
‘Nihil in Verbis’: Public Understanding of the Role of Language in Science,’ The British Journal for the History 
of Science, 27.1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 55-64 (p. 59); Michael Lynch, Solomon’s Child: method in the early Royal Society of 
London (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 152-3. 
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was first proposed, chiefly in the conventions set out in the work of Robert Boyle. 
Vickers argued, in 1984, that modern western culture witnessed a shift away from ‘occult’ 
notions of identity when thinking about the relationships held between objects in reality 
and the words used to denote them to a ‘scientific’ use of analogy – whereby words were 
distinct from the objects they described, but nevertheless bore the capacity to illustrate 
relationships between objects themselves.7 In 1993, Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski 
argued that the period marking the advent of modern science witnessed a shift away 
from metaphor to the use of analogy.8 However, metaphorical language continued to be 
employed to notable effect in the works of leading figures of the new sciences. As this 
chapter will outline, experimental philosophers faced a difficult tension in their work: 
while it was widely recognised that metaphor and analogy could mislead and obscure 
truth, it was equally acknowledged that such devices were a vital means of furnishing 
understanding – of making new or difficult phenomena intelligible. While language 
needed to be reformed by being restricted and reduced, according to the anti-rhetoric 
stance of the Royal Society, making sense of new discoveries required its expansion. 
Clearly, then, the issue here is how notions around ‘appropriate’ uses have been variously 
asserted and contested, rather than any meaningful expectation of their expulsion. This 
chapter will not ask whether early modern writers employed figurative devices: they did, 
to great effect. 9  It will instead consider the ideas seventeenth century natural 
philosophers had about how such devices were to be used, under what conditions and to 
which ends.  
 
As this thesis concerns Willis’s use (or indeed, alleged misuse) of the rhetorical tropes of 
metaphor and analogy, it is important to begin by establishing what was meant by these 
terms in the seventeenth century. As I traced out in the introduction to this thesis, ideas 
around modern science’s rejection or suspicion of figurative language have had an impact 
upon Willis’s historiographical position. It is important, then, to consider how his 
practices compared to those of his close contemporaries and to the standards of the 
time. The chapter will deal, firstly, with how these devices operated within the classical 
model of rhetoric – that is, as they applied to the categories of inventio, elocutio and 
                                                      
7 Brian Vickers, ‘Analogy versus identity: The rejection of occult symbolism, 1580-1680’, in Occult and 
scientific mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. by Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 95-
164. 
8 Gentner and Jeziorski, ‘From Metaphor to Analogy,’ (1993).  
9 Vickers observed that ‘you cannot distinguish anyone from anyone in mid-seventeenth century prose if 
the use or non-use of metaphor is your criterion, since everyone used metaphor,’ Rhetoric and Truth, p.21. 
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dispositio.10 It will then address how the function of rhetoric in relation to the natural 
sciences came to be restricted and reformulated, over the course of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. It will propose that – when situated within his proper historical 
context – Willis’s use of language was neither exceptional nor any less ‘scientific’ than the 
practices of other leading figures from the same period. Figurative language was an 
indispensible tool of both Willis’s and his contemporaries’ ways of conceiving of and 
representing their discoveries. How the specific analogies and metaphors used by Willis 
informed or related to his intellectual concepts and practices will form the focus of 
subsequent chapters; what I look to sketch out here is a contemporary context in which 
to situate his practices. 
 
Aristotle and the “Art” of Rhetoric 
 
Before examining the classical model of rhetoric, it is worth noting that from the 
sixteenth century it was possible to take the ‘art’ of rhetoric as applying both to speech 
and written modes of argument. In 1589, English rhetorician George Puttenham, for 
example, referred to a ‘good utterance, be it by mouth or writing.’11As Quentin Skinner 
has noted, the metaphorical presentation of writing as a form of speech – where the text 
‘speaks’ on a subject – emerged in this period and remains with us today.12 It is therefore 
a model that also applies to written texts of natural philosophy, which are the focus of 
this work. The role and application of rhetoric was a significant, and much contested, 
feature of experimental philosophy’s engagement with the written conventions of its 
enterprise. The classical model of rhetoric is rooted in Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric, 
which was taken up in the writings of the Roman rhetoricians and widely studied by 
sixteenth-century humanists.13 Aristotle classified rhetoric as an ‘art’ – meaning that is 
was a system by which the rhetorician constructed and delivered a persuasive argument 
or speech rather than a science, which deals with the ‘nature of any definite subject.’14 
Rhetoric is here defined as ‘the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion’ 
                                                      
10 On the distinction between modern understandings of rhetoric as a literary strategy and Renaissance 
models see: Quentin Skinner, Introduction, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-18. 
11 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie. Contrived into three Bookes: The first of Poets and Poesie, the second 
of Proportion, the third of Ornament (1589), ed. by G. Willcock and A. Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 155. 
12 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 109. 
13 Skinner notes that, of the three, inventio was the most intensely discussed, p. 46. 
14 Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, translated by John Henry Freese (London, 1926), Book I, II. 7-8, p. 19. All 
quotations to this work will refer to this edition and will hereafter use in-text citations. 
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(I. I. 14-II. 2, p.15). It referred to a method of demonstration, which Aristotle termed a 
kind of ‘rhetorical induction’ or syllogism; that is, a mode of argumentation by logical 
proofs, rather than by the ‘matter’ of things (I. II. 7-8, p.19). In the classical model of 
rhetoric, the primary elements were inventio, dispositio, and elocutio; the first refers to the 
finding and selection of examples to form the basis of an argument; the second, to the 
work of ordering and arranging those examples; and the third category, to the means by 
which the argument is to be put persuasively, by the considered application of words and 
thoughts.15 Metaphor and similarity were topics of elocutio, as tools of the style and 
presentation of argumentation rather than the basis of its construction. 
 
As we shall see, (aspects of) the art of rhetoric would come to be banished from the 
natural sciences on the grounds that it sought to inspire confidence on the basis of 
effective argument, rather than to inform on the basis of evidence or matters of ‘fact.’ It 
was, as a system of art, concerned with the arrangement of words, not with representing 
content. The orator’s skill and performance, moreover, stood in the way of any direct 
engagement with the knowledge of ‘things.’ Even more disconcerting were Aristotle’s 
views on the orator’s necessary ability to work on and rouse the passions – rhetoric is, in 
the first instance, an appeal to the imagination, which leads (and potentially misleads) the 
more important work of reason (I. II. 3-7, p.17). This appeal to the passions is of course 
where metaphor and analogy played a key role, in their ability to arouse the delight and 
attention of the listener. Notably, Aristotle chiefly discussed the work of metaphor in his 
Poetics and The Art of Rhetoric, while excluding it from his discussion of logic. He defined 
metaphor in his Poetics as, 
 
The application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or 
from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, 
proportion.16  
 
This transference of an ‘alien name’ had to observe certain rules, chiefly in adhering to 
the principle of similarity. He notes that in a metaphor, the replacement or substitution 
of an object must bear an analogous relationship to the one it is replacing: analogy 
therefore underpins the work of metaphor. Metaphors based on analogy were, he notes, 
the most ‘popular’ and thereby more successful (III. X. 5-7, p.399). Aristotle regarded 
                                                      
15 Ibid. 
16 Aristotle, Poetics, part XXI, p. 34. 
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simile, an explicit form of comparison, as another version of metaphor differing in the 
form of expression.  These devices both worked to cast existing objects in new and, 
crucially, unusual terms in order to aide comprehension but also to make a more striking, 
memorable and convincing argument. Aristotle viewed the function of metaphor as 
using existing knowledge to support new learning, as he notes, ‘we must give names to 
things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind’ 
(III. II. 12-13, p.359). Quintilian similarly defined a trope (metaphor) as the ‘turning of 
speech’, where sense or meaning of a word was transferred to heightened effect. A figure 
involved, on the other hand, an unusual or surprising configuration (analogy) – putting 
the familiar in unfamiliar terms.17 
 
The work of learning was, Aristotle claimed, heightened by the specific effect of novelty 
or strangeness entailed in metaphor. Metaphor, he noted, ‘is a kind of enigma,’ in that its 
meaning is not obvious and requires unlocking, such that ‘it is clear that the transference 
is clever’ (III.II. 12-13, p.359). Part of the later objections to the use of rhetorical tropes 
would rest on this sense of deliberate word play and linguistic misdirection. Furthermore, 
Aristotle outlined an explicit appeal by metaphor to the work of the senses and the 
imagination; fallible aspects of the human mind, popularly thought capable of overriding 
or misleading the more important work of reason and the will.18 As Aristotle directed, 
metaphor should be derived from what is beautiful, ‘the beauty of a word consisting…in 
its sound or sense.’ The selection of the substituted terms or names was important here, 
as some words are ‘better suited to putting the matter before the eyes,’ and should appeal 
either in sound, sight ‘or to some other sense’ (III.II. 12-13, p.359). Metaphor, then, acts 
as a kind of word-picture for the mind, by playing on the images of sense (held in 
memory) to invoke new visual presentations in the imagination by the work of 
transference. This is where the need for similarity at the heart of metaphor originates – 
the metaphor descends into gibberish if the object is not in some way familiar and 
conceivable, so metaphors necessarily work to re-present existing knowledge in the mind 
(memory-images). While familiarity supports comprehension, the strangeness or the 
‘foreign air’ affected by meaning-transfer in metaphor or by unusual configuration in 
analogy provokes stronger and more striking images in the imagination. 
                                                      
17 Quintillian, (1920-2), VIII. VI. 1, p. 300; Quoted and discussed by Skinner, (1996), p. 50. 
18 Metaphors used by the rhetorician could make objects appear near and more immediate, making them 
more likely to be objects of passion, which could unseat reason: Susan James, Passion and Action: The 
Emotions in Seventeenth century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 217.  
 58 
 
Aristotle viewed rhetorical tropes as playing a part in achieving the quality or style of 
‘perspicuity’, meaning clarity or transparency. For Aristotle, the pleasant effects of 
metaphor were not opposed but joined to the work of clarity: he observed, that 
‘metaphor above all gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air’ (III. II. 7-10, p. 355). By 
this account, metaphor could enhance learning and work against conceptual obscurity, 
owing to the striking impression occasioned by its strangeness and the support offered 
by the use of familiar and easily-pictured objects. This notion of metaphor as an aide to 
learning was directly undermined, for later writers, by Aristotle’s observation that 
metaphor and similitudes also had a key role to play in ornamenting and amplifying the 
presentation of argument, as a function of elocutio or style. This effect would be achieved 
by selecting a comparative object from a more elevated domain than the target object 
(for example, if we were to compare the processes of the animal body to the harmony of 
celestial motions). Aristotle observed that if ‘we wish to ornament our subject, we must 
derive our metaphor from the better species, under the same genus’ (III.II. 7-10, p. 355). 
A metaphor is not in itself ornamental, as opposed to illustrative, but through the choice 
and selection of comparative objects the subject in question could indeed be elevated. 
The metaphorical casting of metaphor as ‘adornment’ goes to the root of its contested 
role, as a means of appealing to passions and the senses over reason and judgement. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that Aristotle did not also advocate certain restrictions or 
limitations in the use of metaphor. He also directed that, while ‘it is a metaphor above all 
that gives perspicuity,’ the metaphor must also be ‘appropriate,’ which is ensured by ‘due 
proportion’ (III.II. 7-10, p. 355). Proportion was achieved both in terms of not using 
metaphor too often and in being careful with the selection of objects (III. III. 3-4, p. 
365). This was intended to act as a means of distinguishing between the metaphors of 
prose and poetry: it was fine to illustrate by metaphor, but those that were too ‘far-
fetched’ became poetical and obscure (III. V. 6-VI. 4, p. 375). Metaphors, then, achieve 
clarity of understanding by being both familiar and strangely put (displaced), pleasurable 
and proportional. Notably, both the language of perspicuity (as visual clarity) and 
proportionality (as a mathematical notion of economy) would be key features of 
discussions around a new ‘plain’ style for experimental writing in the seventeenth 
century. As we shall see, the question of whether natural philosophers could still utilise 
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the pleasurable effects of metaphor whilst ultimately taming and disciplining their 
potential for obscurity, was an important tension in these later debates. 
 
Francis Bacon and the rhetorical invention of science 
 
During the sixteenth-century, the concept of rhetoric became increasingly associated 
with the categories of elocutio and memoria. 19 Despite the continuing centrality of training 
in classical rhetoric to the arts curriculum at universities such as Oxford, polemical 
arguments were nevertheless being forwarded by humanist scholars against the perceived 
abuses of language under medieval, scholastic Latin and its proposed detriment to the 
‘true sense’ of words.20 In the context of discourses on the new learning, advocates of the 
plain style proposed a reorientation of the work of rhetorical devices to the matter of 
style (elocutio) - but did not in any straightforward sense seek to banish rhetoric from their 
natural philosophical writing, aware as they were of its potentially beneficial effects.21 
George Puttenham, writing in 1569, retained the Aristotelian definition of metaphor as 
the ‘figure of transport’ by which features from a ‘readily accessible object’ are transferred 
onto another, ‘less readily grasped object’ and continued to emphasise their work in 
producing comprehension, so that ‘every man can easily conceive the meaning’ of the 
latter.22 However, Puttenham was also typically expressive of the prevailing sense of 
mistrust and suspicion associated with metaphors, noting that, while necessary, they were 
devices that could mislead and ill-inform: 
 
But if for lacke of naturall and proper terme or worde we take another, neither naturall nor 
proper and do untruly applie it to the thing which we would seeme to expresse […] it is not 
then spoken by this figure Metaphore or of inuersion as before but by plaine abuse.23 
                                                      
19 On the sixteenth-century re-engagement with rhetoric, and moves towards a restriction of its scope, see 
Quentin Skinner (1996). Angus Gowland uses the renewed focus on classical rhetoric in England and 
Europe during the sixteenth century as a context for his examination of Robert Burton’s rhetorical 
strategies in the Anatomy of Melancholy: ‘Rhetorical Structure and Function in The Anatomy of Melancholy’, 
Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, 19.1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 1-48. 
20 Drawing on arguments forwarded by Vickers (1988), Mordechai Feingold discusses the polemical stance 
of humanist scholars and the continuing influence of Latin culture and classical rhetoric in university 
education during this period: ‘The Humanities,’ in Seventeenth century Oxford, Vol. IV, ed. by Nicholas Tyacke 
(Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 247-8. On Humanist and Medieval Latin towards the end of the sixteenth 
century see also: Ann Moss, Renaissance Truth and the Latin language Turn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 4. 
21 Skinner (1996), p. 60; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 206.  
22 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (1589/1970), p. 4-6.  
23 Ibid., p. 150.  
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Bad metaphors, then – those that were neither ‘naturall nor proper’ - were examples of 
linguistic trickery amounting to an ‘abuse’ of the natural or proper application of terms.24 
This sense – of the work of misdirection achieved by rhetorical tropes and figures - was 
rooted in an emerging commitment to a literal use of language, or a direct equation of 
words to ‘things’ in the world. This was accompanied by a corresponding rejection of 
words as signs, symbols or portents of hidden meaning and ideas. These significant 
arguments were most influential through the philosophy of Francis Bacon, in whose 
work seventeenth century discussions in England around the reform of language in 
science were very much rooted.25  
 
In his Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620), Bacon set his 
programme for a new model of natural philosophy, which would be premised on the 
‘foundation of experience’ and direct observation of nature.26 This was, then, an explicit 
rejection of what he considered to be the ancients’ preoccupation with the study of 
words and texts, or of ‘eloquence’ and the ‘copy of speech’, rather than the actual 
substance of matter. Their self-referential practices, he argued, had lead directly to a crisis 
of faith in the body of accumulated knowledge, by which he refers to the rise of 
scepticism (AL, II, p.222).  Bacon argued that the deductive reasoning of Aristotle, based 
on syllogisms, was founded on notions and only the ‘propositions of words’ and was 
therefore unfit for the purposes of science (NO, p.19). He argued that words had 
formerly been employed as ‘the tokens and signs of notions,’ which had abstracted them 
from any relationship with the empirical constituents of nature. Instead, words were not 
to be studied as things in themselves, but to be used as tools for communication. More 
broadly, this philosophical argument marked a shift away from what has been termed the 
‘emblematic’ medieval world-view, conceived of as a system of signs, symbols and 
correspondences, where words could act as the signs or portents of hidden meanings 
about the world.27 This was to be replaced by a literal use of words, where the substantial 
nature of the world was to act as foundation of language. Words, in this setting, where to 
be re-tasked with reflecting content (the substantial stuff of ‘things’), rather than ideas. 
                                                      
24 B. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty (1983), pp. 228-9. 
25 C. A. Patrides and Raymond B. Waddington, The Age of Milton: Backgrounds to Seventeenth Century Literature 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 329. 
26 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620; 1960 facsimile edition), p. 78; The Advancement of Learning (1605), in 
Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Book I, 
p.141. All in-text citations will refer to these editions.  
27 Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
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Bacon cautioned that language ought to return to its pre-lapsarian role as a means of 
conveying the true ‘nature of things’ (AL, p.20). The reformed and restricted use of 
words would be used to embody the new category of a ‘matter of fact’ - conceived of as 
empirically defined phenomena, strictly demarcated from opinion or interpretative acts. 
This marked what is often represented as a ‘turning to nature,’ where philosophers would 
form an ‘acquaintance with things, not notions’ (NO, I. xxxvi, p.19). In typically vivid, 
figurative language Bacon described how men had withdrawn from the study of nature 
‘by observation and experience,’ leaving them to ‘tumble’ within the confines of their 
‘own reason and conceits’ (AL, I, p.147). As Amos Funkenstein has noted of Bacon and 
his followers, ‘their philosophy, so they believed, was not the Scholastic preoccupation 
with words and definitions, but a philosophia realis, a turning to nature itself.’28 
 
The rhetorical tropes of metaphor and analogy were a specific disruption of this sense 
that words could directly reflect content, with their borrowed names and substituted 
meanings. In contrast to Aristotle, Bacon argued that rhetorical argument (which 
incorporated the tropes of metaphor and analogy) had no place in natural science, but 
instead belonged to politics. 29 Bacon considered metaphors especially as idola fori, the 
heresies that resulted from a confused use of language. He attacked the use of rhetorical 
tropes as one of the ‘distempers of learning,’ occurring when 
 
Men begin to hunt more after words than matter; more after the choiceness of 
phrase...the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than after 
the weight of matter. (Advancement, I, pp.138-9) 
 
The ornaments and amplifications associated with style or elocutio were to be banished: ‘as 
for embellishment of Style, metaphorical Expressions, and studied Eloquence […] they 
should be wholly rejected’ (AL, III, p.9). The persuasiveness of argument would, instead, 
be based upon content: as Bacon noted, the ‘substance of matter is better than beauty of 
words’ (AL, I, p.140). This rejection of figurative language in favour of a literal use 
continued to draw on the metaphorical language of plainness, transparency or perspicuity 
- as opposed to a ‘smoke’ of obscurity or an adornment. Bacon referred, for instance, to 
the ‘propriety of words and perspicuity of narration’ (AL, I, p.161). This was, of course, 
                                                      
28 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 
(Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 28-30.  
29 Heather Graves, Rhetoric in(to) Science: Style as Invention in Inquiry (New York: Hampton Press, 2005), p. 53. 
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itself a particular concern with style – albeit a ‘plain’ one – rooted in a metaphorical model 
that united visual or optical qualities of transparency and clearness with a conceptual 
clarity or insight. This is a theme that I will come back to later in the chapter. These ideas 
around plainness and clarity fed into a necessary reformulation of the experimental text 
or essay as an extension of experiential observation (as the basis of knowledge): if words 
could be relied upon to directly represent their objects, then the reader could be afforded 
the privilege of (indirectly) ‘witnessing’ the evidence ‘demonstrated’ by the scientist’s own 
experience.30  
 
Importantly, this did not mean that rhetorical tropes were to be rejected outright, or that 
Bacon himself managed to adhere to these standards when forwarding his own 
arguments. Brian Vickers has argued that Bacon was not necessarily opposed to 
eloquence or metaphor, but was concerned more specifically with the inappropriateness 
of these features in ‘collections of data’.31 Moreover, Bacon asserted his model of reform 
in opposition to what he saw as the mystical and occultist uses of analogy by the inferior 
‘sciences’ - alchemy, astrology and natural magic. 32 He wrote of the alchemists, that their 
method ‘rests not so much upon evidence of truth proved’ but by ‘arguments, 
authorities, similitudes, examples’ (AL, I, p.141). Pointing to the polemical nature of 
these discussions, Bacon described how the alchemical philosophers were part of a 
deliberate attempt to ‘to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings’ (AL, I, p.143). He 
further noted that they sought a direct ‘confederacy’ with the imagination over reason, 
and were full of ‘error’ and ‘vanity.’ He objected, in particular, to the correspondences 
drawn by astrologers, for instance, in their comparisons of celestial and sub-lunary realms 
(AL, I, p.143). These were tokens of amplification, intended to inflate and cloak natural 
objects in fanciful notions and ideas. Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) would also later 
attack analogies that appeared to conflate domains, confusing that which was real (in 
nature) and that which was only imagined. He noted of Ptolemy that he ‘luxuriates in 
using comparisons in a poetical or rhetorical way, since the things that he compares are 
not real things in the heavens.’33 It is the acknowledgment of the essential demarcations 
between knowledge categories – and a restriction to those of the natural world - that 
                                                      
30 Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance’, p. 491. See also: Scott Black, ‘Boyle’s Essay: Genre and the Making of 
Early Modern Knowledge’, in Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: Practices, Objects and Texts, 1400-1800, 
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31 Vickers, Rhetoric, p. 11-12. 
32 Ryan Stark, 'From Mysticism to Skepticism,’ p. 323. 
33 As quoted by Gentner and Jeziorski, ‘From Metaphor to Analogy’, p. 473. 
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determines whether the analogy could be considered to be purely ornamental or 
something capable of illustrating the substantial nature of things. This would be a 
prominent feature of later schemes of ‘controlling’ analogies.  
 
This was an important opposition to have established; it allowed Bacon to assert his right 
use of analogy and metaphor over others, which thereby allowed him to retain their 
effects as a means for furthering his own arguments. In a typical caveat to his anti-
rhetoric arguments, he proposed that elocution was not to be ‘hastily condemned’ as it 
was still necessary to ‘clothe and adorn obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible 
and plausible elocution’ (AL, I, p.139). It was not, then, the use of these tropes so much 
as their excess: as Bacon reminds us, ‘but the excess of this is justly contemptible’ (AL, I, 
p.140). Indeed, even within philosophy, the demands set by comprehending and 
communicating what was new and obscure would require a continuing role for 
similitudes. Whilst metaphor and ‘occult’ analogies continued to be excluded from 
methodological or observational testimonies, Bacon did propose a vital (yet clearly 
defined) role for analogy in the ‘rhetorical invention’ of science: communicating new 
discoveries or in reflecting on new findings.  It is worth noting that, in these 
considerations, Bacon paid greater attention to analogies, which although implicated in 
metaphor, were less ambiguous in their explicit work of comparison – and were 
conventionally demarcated in the text with the prefix ‘like’ or ‘as it were.’ Early modern 
writers were more concerned over the ‘hidden’ and misleading work of metaphor.  
 
In Book II of The Advancement of Learning, ‘The Art of Elocution’, Bacon advocated a 
specific role for analogy.34 Here, Bacon distinguished between the twofold work of 
invention in science: this was to be separated into ‘true invention’, concerning the 
creation of new facts by experience and experiment, and ‘rhetorical invention’ conceived 
as the work of speech and argument.35 The invention of speech was properly speaking 
‘no invention’ but an act to ‘recover or resummon’ existing knowledge to make use of 
the new - a remembrance with application, with the end being the ‘readiness’ of 
knowledge (AL, II, p.219-222). This re-application of existing knowledge necessarily 
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employed analogy and drew on the stylistic work of metaphor. Rhetorical invention was 
ultimately required to make ‘true’ invention both known and intelligible. This went beyond 
the mere recovery of existing knowledge; analogy and metaphor were indispensible tools 
in knowledge-creation. As Bacon himself observed, chiefly in respect of analogy, ‘there is 
no proceeding in invention of knowledge but by similitude.’36  
 
Moreover, in the case of new or hidden objects, the writer faced a difficult task in 
adhering to the standards of ‘demonstration’ (as opposed to figurative argument), as 
Bacon observed: ‘those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double 
labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate; 
so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to 
express themselves’ (AL, II, p.236). The problem was not fundamentally with the use of 
such devices, but with their corruption. As Bacon suggested, when the world had been 
genuinely new and unknown the ancients had relied upon analogy. In these times, 
similitudes were not used  ‘for shadowing and concealing the meaning’ but simply and 
directly as a means to make it understood.37 The new philosophy could, its followers 
would claim, renew this original use. Bacon was nevertheless somewhat equivocal on the 
matter. He cautioned that analogies should be used with discretion and only in the 
‘absence of proper instances’. Yet, he also maintained that ‘they are also of great use even 
when proper instances are available, because they can confirm what we learn from the 
proper instances.’38  
 
A form of managed compromise could be reached, however, if the analogy could be 
shown to draw on existing, proven objects of nature, then the work of the imagination 
could be ‘disciplined’ by being tied to a solid foundation and to those images already 
located in memory. Hence Bacon’s stress on plausible elocution: such analogies would, 
after all, remain grounded in the matter of ‘things.’ This possibility of a ‘managed’ or 
controlled use of analogies within natural philosophy is something that members of the 
Royal Society would later come to draw upon and assert in their own writing. Bacon’s 
equivocal views point to the inherent tensions within the larger project. As Brian Vickers, 
Barbara Shapiro and Heather Graves have noted, Bacon never intended to fully eradicate 
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rhetorical devices, but to assert his appropriate use of those features. He also employed 
detailed and extensive metaphors and analogies in his own writing.39 The difficulty of 
course would lie in managing and continually reasserting the difference between 
figurative language as a tool of illustration and as unnecessary ornamentation. The quest 
to retain the uses of metaphor and analogy while at the same time asserting strategies of 
control was an important element of the debates being had among Willis’s more 
immediate contemporaries in the seventeenth century.40  
 
The institutional context: the early Royal Society 
 
Although Bacon’s views should not be directly equated with the experimental 
philosophies that emerged during the second half of the seventeenth century, his ideas 
certainly formed an important basis for their development. The anti-rhetoric stance of 
Bacon was taken up by the public proponents of the early Royal Society in England – 
established in 1660, the Society emerged out of the activities of a group of experimental 
philosophers associated with the ‘Oxford Philosophical Clubbe,’ of which Willis had 
been a leading member.41 Leading members of the early Royal Society, Thomas Sprat, 
Joseph Glanvill and John Wilkins were particularly prominent voices on the matter of 
linguistic reform, calling for member’s commitment to a new, ‘plain style’. In 1667, Sprat 
wrote his now famous History of the Royal Society, in which he called on members to bring 
words back into ‘an equal number’ with things. Sprat outlined the need to reject all 
rhetorical tropes and figures and instead keep to a succinct and plain language, which 
would return to a direct relation between words and things.42 He famously described 
members commitment to  
 
reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the 
primitive purity, and shortness, when men delivr’d so many things, almost in an 
equal number of words. They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, 
                                                      
39 Shapiro (1983) notes that Bacon was more of a ‘propagandist than practitioner,’ employing analogy and 
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natural way of speaking […] bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, 
as they can.43 
 
This statement itself clearly employed rhetorical strategy and used the metaphorical 
language of a ‘naked’ and ‘natural’ mode of speech, also importing the trope of plainness 
and proportionality from the mathematical domain into a linguistic one. John Wilkins, in 
similarly Baconian terms, described in 1668 how ‘tis a sign of low thoughts and designs, 
when a mans chief study is about the polishing of his phrase and words.’44 The discipline 
was to be purged, in particular, of what Sprat called the ‘trick of Metaphors,’ devices that, 
through their disruption of the direct relationship between words and objects, directly 
undermined clarity and transparency of thought.45 Sprat thus pondered, ‘who can behold, 
without indignation, how many mists and uncertainties, these specious Tropes and Figures 
have brought on our Knowledge?’46 William Petty, whom Willis often worked alongside, 
was also vocal on the matter of linguistic reform and directly critiqued those who were 
‘charmed with fine Allusions and Metaphors,’ in his correspondences with Samuel 
Hartlib.47   
 
Moreover, the concern around a need to restrict and reduce language, to bring it into 
proportion with things, was being fuelled by the demands of the very enterprise of 
discovery undertaken by the experimental philosophy. As John Wilkins expressed in his 
Essay towards a real character and a philosophical language (1668), he feared a creeping 
ambiguity, brought about by the invention of new phrases that could bear several 
meanings; this lead to a situation where words were ‘gobbling up things.’48 In 1666, 
another member, Samuel Parker, launched a strongly worded attack on the use of 
figurative language, describing them as ‘wanton and luxuriant fancies climbing up the 
into the Bed of Reason […] instead of real conceptions and notices of Things.’49 
Notably, the argument was itself put using a striking metaphor. Here, Parker picked up 
on Aristotelian associations between the art of rhetoric and appeals to the passions, as 
something designed to stimulate pleasure and undermine reason. 
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These discussions extended across natural philosophical, medical, theological and 
political domains. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, described figurative rhetoric as a form 
of deliberate deceit because words were being used ‘in other sense than they are ordained 
for.’50 As Theodore Brown has outlined, for these philosophers metaphors were a tool of 
grammar and style, rather than any device for explicating true meaning. 51 The call for 
linguistic reform was even incorporated into the very fabric of the Society: the statutes 
from 1728 set out the conventions for all submissions from its members, outlining that 
‘in all Reports of Experiments to be brought into the Society, the Matter of Fact shall be 
barely stated, without any Prefaces, Apologies, or Rhetorical Flourishes.’52 We need only 
think of the society’s motto, nullius in verba (take nobody’s word for it), or in other words 
the call to ‘see for yourself’, to have a sense of the emphasis that was to be placed on 
direct empirical and experimental observation, and the suspicion of those too closely 
involved in the study of words.53 Michael Foster’s remarks in 1901 on how Willis love of 
‘words as words’ seem to have been a direct attack on his commitment to these core 
values of the Royal Society and, by extension, on his right to be included within the 
scientific community.54  
 
The picture is, however, more nuanced than these statements would suggest. The words 
of Sprat and his associates were public pronouncements that must be read against the 
work of institutional identity-formation and within the context of contemporary 
polemical debates. That is to say, they are examples of self-reflexively curated ideals, 
rather than statements on the actual practices of members. As Barbara Shapiro has 
argued, the new science needed a new mode of communication to help identify the 
community as set apart from others.55 The views outlined above were also a public attack 
on the ‘wrong’ use of language by rival philosophies and, by extension, a means of 
undermining their alternative accounts of nature. As with Bacon, the Royal Society’s 
practices were chiefly set up in contrast to what was to be cast as the excessive, occultist 
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and pluralistic uses of analogy by ‘other’ groups, such as the followers of Paracelsus and 
the alchemists. 56  In 1666, Samuel Parker (later Bishop of Oxford) attacked the 
Cambridge Platonists’ use of metaphor, again using heavily metaphorical language to 
make the case. He noted that they employed 
 
nothing but rampant Metaphors and Pompous Allegories, and other splendid but 
empty Schemes of speech […] true Philosophie is too sober to descend to these 
wildernesses of Imagination, and too Rational to be cheated by them.57  
 
Besides imaginative excess, the alchemists’ uses of analogy were taken as linguistic 
expressions of intellectual secrecy – a deliberate attempt to shroud knowledge in an 
opaque web of metaphors and allusions. Again, drawing on the trope of visual 
transparency, Sprat spoke of the secrets ‘which makes their style to resemble the smoak, 
in which they deal’ and pondered how ‘their Writers involve them in such darkness.’58 In 
the Sceptical Chymist (1661), a prominent example of this kind of attack, Boyle commented 
on the ‘obscure, ambiguous, and almost aenigmatical way of expressing what they 
pretend to teach.’ 59 He argued that the alchemist’s linguistic obscurity was intended to 
conceal the emptiness of their knowledge - the 'inflated' style was an extension of their 
intellectual poverty. These criticisms were set up in stark contrast to the Society’s own 
stated commitment to public knowledge. Despite Willis’s involvement in the Royal 
Society and his commitment to experimental research, he was vulnerable to the charges 
of secrecy being levelled at the alchemists since he had refused to publish some of his 
more famous chemical cures and had drawn on numerous alchemical analogies in his 
chemical work, Diatribae Duae (1659). I return to these specific issues in chapter two. 
 
However, the commitment on the part of the Society’s members to the conventions set 
out by the public reformists within the Society has been much overstated. As Richard 
Nate notes, the Royal Society has ‘become famous for its hostility to rhetoric,’ yet, as 
Ryan Stark has also noted, the leading protagonists of the Society were clearly not averse 
to employing heightened rhetorical ploys when putting their own arguments across.60A 
significant number neither desired nor imagined the possibility of successfully 
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implementing all of their claims. 61  There were, in fact, important voices in the 
seventeenth century making reasoned concessions to figurative language in their own 
work, just as a number of scientists attempted to utilise the notable effects of rhetorical 
tropes in their own writing.62 The focus on figures such as Sprat and Glanvill is, in part, a 
projection of present-centred values and concerns, which still draw on these ideas of a 
plain and economical use of language in science. Importantly, Vickers that notes that the 
Society’s remarks on style only really gained traction from the twentieth century onwards, 
whereas, ‘contemporary references to it are negligible.’63 As Charles Wolfe and Ofer Gal 
argue, by attending to the writings of the ‘public champions’ of the Society, modern 
historiography uncritically reproduces the notion that ‘the society ushered in the new 
mode of inquiry and swept all others away,’ rather than historicizing those views. 64 More 
recent scholarship has therefore challenged this reading; shifting emphases and paying 
greater attention to the more varied attitudes and practices of wider members of this 
community.  
 
Equivocation and concession: Metaphor and analogy in Experimental 
Science 
 
Despite his strong denunciations, Sprat would not venture so far as to reject the use of 
similitudes or tropes altogether. As Richard Nate, among others, has argued, the Royal 
Society – in keeping with Bacon – were, in reality, more opposed to the language of the 
‘alchemists, cabbalists and the English followers of Paracelsus,’ than they were set against 
metaphorical language in any meaningful sense.65 Sprat denounced only the ‘specious’ 
tropes and figures used by the Platonists, Pythagoreans, or Alchemists; in contrast, he 
praised Bacon’s ‘Treasure of admirable imaginations,’ which he had used to better 
‘express and adorn his thoughts about other matters.’66 As Alexander Wragge-Morely has 
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convincingly argued, equivocation of this kind ‘typifies the attitude of Society Fellows to 
the powers of rhetoric’.67  What Sprat and other members were essentially promoting was 
their use of metaphor and analogy as an extension of the experimental method, in a way 
that managed and controlled the unruly potential of those devices.  
 
Moreover, the methodology of the new sciences would, Sprat proposed, work to 
produce a new set of ‘solid and lasting’ comparisons.68 Unlike analogies and similitudes 
based on imaginary or cosmological schemes, those used by experimental philosophers 
would draw on the ‘Images that are generally observ’d, and such visible things which are 
familiar to mens minds.’69 This was an important means of safeguarding clarity: in the 
case of a new or unfamiliar subject, a reader’s interpretation of meaning needed to be 
guided and anchored in real (rather than invented) notions through the use of a familiar 
or sensible comparative object. If the comparison is with something we can see or touch, 
the more effective it would be through its appeal to the senses. As Sprat writes, the 
comparison so drawn, ‘will be intelligible to all, because they proceed from things that 
enter into all mens Senses.’70 Again, this view was tied into the notion that visual images 
had a greater capacity to excite and move the imagination.71 Such analogies could work 
against unfettered imagination. That is to say, if readers are able to picture a given image 
(based on their own direct observational experiences) then there is less scope for 
interpretative acts. Words remain tethered to direct observations, even if they must be 
borrowed into some other context for the purpose of illustration. Bound up in these 
remarks is the sense that comparative or figurative language could be managed and 
disciplined through the role of the experimental method, and made to operate as neutral 
tools. The work of linguistic similarity and substitution – which necessarily continued – 
was instead thought to rest, as Foucault notes, on ‘a known possibility of substitution’ 
based on demonstrable, proven objects.72  
 
These statements were of course themselves expressions of a distinctive rhetorical 
strategy on the part of the new institution. The concern with a ‘plain style’ reflected a 
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self-conscious engagement with literary strategy. As Michael McKeon has noted, ‘the 
fundamental trope of this anti-rhetorical style is the self-reflexive insistence on its own 
documentary candour’. 73  This was not simply a matter self-contradiction, but an 
important aspect of institutional identity formation.74 Indeed, rather than banishing 
metaphors, they were doing important work in establishing the rhetorical plea of this 
very programme of linguistic reform. Notably, the shared discourse of plainness, 
nakedness and transparency of speech was metaphorically put, as was the popular 
metaphor of words as clothes ‘fitted’ to things. The language of a ‘naked’ or ‘plain style,’ 
contrasted with notions of obscurity, drew specifically upon the classical idea of 
perspicuitas.75 Robert Boyle noted, for instance, that ‘perspicuity ought to be esteem’d at 
least one of the best Qualifications of a style.’76 Perspicuity, from the Latin perspicuitas, 
referred to qualities of translucence, transparency, or to the power of insight and lucidity. 
It is a term that was also being used in alchemical contexts in this and earlier periods to 
describe translucent materials; the metaphor had, therefore, some root in sensory or 
material phenomena.77 From the mid sixteenth-century, it was used chiefly in reference 
to clarity of expression or succinctness in speech or writing, and to the ‘penetrating’ 
insights of knowledge.  
 
In the context of these debates, ‘clarity’ of understanding could be challenged by the 
‘opaqueness’ of linguistic excess. Boyle also contrasted the illuminating potential of 
tropes and figures (as illustration) with their capacity, in the wrong hands, to ‘dazzle’ and 
mislead. He wrote in the Scepitcal Chymist we should ‘not allow ourselves to be dazzled by 
that light which should but assist us to discern things the more clearly.’ 78  These 
metaphors around transparency and clarity of vision clearly drew on leading optical 
technologies and theories, just as ideas about mathematical plainness and proportionality 
drew on tropes from other intellectual domains. In a constant recourse to these senses, 
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the ways in which light acted upon sight was being used here a useful model for how 
words might act upon the mind. It speaks, then, to wider ideas about the significant role 
played by affective images in processes of reader-visualisation as a mode of cognitive 
understanding, as represented through the capacity of sense-images to act upon and 
move the imagination.79 Of course, the sense of being able to furnish the imagination 
with a direct or reliable image of the world, via the senses, was being steadily undermined 
much more widely in relation to art and optical theory.80 Against the uncertainties of the 
senses, one could place their trust in the scientific method, in which a reformed language 
(promising instructive clarity, direct transmission) played its part. The considerations 
around the virtue or style of perspicuity points to members’ concern with an effective 
and appropriate style, despite their leaders’ renunciation of such considerations. Both 
Hobbes and Boyle drew attention to the virtues of their perspicuity as a stylistic quality 
of their writing, with Boyle noting that ‘as for the style of our Experimental Essays […] 
my expressions should be rather clear and significant, than curiously adorn’d,’ to which 
end ‘Perspicuity ought to be esteem’d at least one of the best Qualifications of a style.’81 
 
William Harvey is a good example here, as somebody who had considered the tensions 
that arose from recognising both limitations of language and the impossibility of entirely 
dispensing with figurative tools, especially given the wealth of new discoveries being 
produced. Harvey’s work was also replete with strong metaphors and analogies. Indeed, 
his more notable metaphors – comparing the heart to a pump and the circulation of the 
blood to weather cycles – have been extensively studied, but as a means of examining his 
intellectual processes rather detracting from them – in some contrast to treatments of 
Willis.82 Picking up on Bacon’s own consideration of the uses of metaphor and analogy, 
Harvey notably described how, when entering into the ‘new and unfrequented paths’ 
represented by the experimental inquiries into nature, one would inevitably confront by 
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‘a crowd of observations’ and ‘exotick shapes.’ As Lorraine Daston has noted, in the last 
half of the seventeenth century: ‘facts, conceived as chunks of pure experience detached 
from inference or conjecture, were new and many, and many of them were strange.’83 
The real challenge of discovery, then, lay not in locating the new but in managing, taming 
and describing those findings. Harvey concludes, that ‘to unfould to others the mysteries 
himself hath discovered, will be more toyl, then the finding of them out.’ This difficulty 
was compounded by the limitations of language: 
 
For many things occur which have yet no name; such is the plenty of things, and the 
dearth of words. So that if a man should cloath them in Metaphors, and express his 
new inventions by old words, and such are in use: the Reader could no more 
understand them, than canting: and would never be able to comprehend the 
business, since he never saw it.84 
 
The ‘dearth’ of words Harvey spoke of required that, involved in the act of empirical 
discovery, would be a corresponding search for and selection of metaphorical tropes. 
Otherwise, these new objects could never be made known. As Bacon likewise wrote in 
Novum Organum, the difficulties arising from the objectives of the new philosophy lay in 
the fact that ‘things that are in themselves new will be understood on analogy with things 
that are old.’85 The metaphor of metaphors as clothing used here picks up on the popular 
trope of words as clothes fitted to things, which featured in an earlier example from 1565, 
by the Physician and mathematician Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576), who remarked that 
‘words should fit things as clothes fit the body.’ 86  By which he indicated that words are 
made for things, not the other way round. In the sense that they are fitted to their objects, 
they can be said to speak to the form of their content. However, in Harvey’s passage, it is 
less the direct fittedness of words being suggested as the necessity of cloaking less-
obvious objects in the borrowed clothes of metaphor. These new objects could only, 
then, be viewed indirectly and partially, concealed as they were under the cover of 
existing forms. Old words, carrying borrowed meanings, would nevertheless be required 
to construct and deliver the new.  
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As Ian Maclean has argued, what Harvey proposed here was a troubling situation 
whereby the process of invention would in fact be a process of ‘linguistic negotiation.’87 
This brings us to a recurring tension: the program of the rediscovery of nature relied on 
existing language and explanatory frameworks to make ‘new’ objects intelligible. This was 
not incompatible, but certainly in tension with, the Royal Society’s programme of 
reducing and restricting language – indeed, it calls for an expansion of available ‘words’. 
Moreover, as Harvey observed, this issue here was very much one of reader 
comprehension. Picking up on Bacon’s views on invention in science, Harvey settled on 
allowing the borrowed or ‘unusual terms’ of figurative speech to assist the reader in 
comprehending the distinctly unfamiliar facts of experimental investigations. The 
invention of scientific knowledge was not, then, simply a methodological task; it 
necessitated a literary process of invention and communication. However, as Harvey’s 
passage conveys, this process had its own limitations: the reader’s inability to conceive of 
an entirely new or unobservable object would leave them entirely dependent upon the 
work of the metaphorical explanation. These metaphors could be illustratively useful (if 
not indispensible), but could prove equally misleading for the reader who, having no 
prior visual experience in which to anchor their interpretations, would have no means of 
disciplining all the potential meanings held by a particular metaphor. On the other hand, 
if the discoverer were to simply ‘mint up new and fictitious terms’ then this would prove 
just as confusing for the reader who would be left having to ‘unriddle the words.’ This 
would, he wrote, ‘rather cast a mist, than enlighten.’88 So, while metaphor (and other 
modes of comparison) were the only way of achieving some sort of intelligibility, it also 
meant that readers would never fully comprehend the plain ‘truth’ of an object. Reading-
as-comprehension could never be posited as a direct or equal substitution for knowledge 
derived from direct observation or experience. There was, though, little option in regards 
to new discoveries or invisible phenomena: figurative language was flawed but ultimately 
necessary. 
 
Harvey was not alone in making considered concessions to the tropes of metaphor in 
order to make effective arguments, especially on the subject of unobservable processes. 
Robert Hooke also famously used the metaphor of the Bologna stones to express his 
ideas about visual memory – alongside more explicitly ‘elevated’ representations of the 
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soul through metaphors of celestial microcosm. The phosphorescent light retained by 
the stones acted as an analogy for the ways in which the mind retained visual images 
transmitted to it. In Europe and England, chemists were searching for processes capable 
of producing light, highlighting the close relationship between an intellectual climate and 
the choice, selection or availability of certain metaphors in framing new ideas. As Douwe 
Draaisma notes, the phosphorescent metaphor aroused suspicion from within the Royal 
Society, but Hooke nevertheless retained it.89 Hooke, like Harvey, also considered that 
metaphors and analogies were essential tools under certain circumstances – unsurprising 
given the intangible nature of his subject matter. In a paper given in 1682, he remarked 
that, on the matter of memory, ‘It is not, I conceive, possible to be truly understood or 
described, but only by Similitude.’ 90  Hooke nevertheless suggested that some 
comparisons were more reliably drawn than others, noting that the most effective 
examples represented familiar, ‘mechanical and intelligible ways of working.’ In the same 
address, he noted that 
 
nothing is so well understood as when it is represented under some sensible Form, I 
would, to make my Notion the more conceivable, make a mechanical and sensible 
Figure and Picture thereof, and from that shew how I conceive all the Actions and 
Operations of the Soul as Apprehending, Remembering and Reasoning are 
performed.91 
 
Hooke in effect argues that we can rely on mechanical figures and sensible forms - though 
he did not restrict himself to such examples. He also refers to using these mechanical 
principles as a way of conceiving of the actions of an immaterial soul. This disrupts the idea 
of analogy as a tool of illustration anchored to an empirical object, and instead renders 
the analogy the basis of a conceptual model – of an idea of the soul.  
 
These examples were open to the same sort of charges that would also be levelled at 
Willis. In his discussion of memory, Hooke used examples from nature and leading 
technologies of the day (chemical materials, optics), but he did so in order to discourse 
on certain hidden – and much contested - operations usually ascribed to the mind or 
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soul. The boundary between using figures to merely illustrate or to create (speculative 
theories) is thereby challenged: the examples are being marshalled to fit a pre-existing 
hypothesis, rather than acting as its foundation. Moreover, in positing an incorporeal 
model of the soul and memory, Hooke used his metaphors to conflate physical and 
spiritual domains of knowledge. Of course, many natural philosophers were engaged in 
using analogies to discuss phenomena that were not directly observable – such as Boyle’s 
work on atomistic bodies and the pneumatic qualities of the air. The issue here was less 
the visibility of the objects in question, as the amplifications involved in applying those 
notions to theories of the soul. Hooke nevertheless appealed to mechanistic philosophy 
in order to represent his ideas via a purportedly verifiable model of action in the world. 
Mechanical events were, of course, open to physical or experimental demonstration, 
unlike the actions of memory. The problem remained that Hooke used these figures in 
order to make sweeping claims about the physiological operations of soul; this is 
something that also applied to Willis – a tension that I will come back to at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
The examples touched on above point to a far more complicated approach to the use of 
figurative devices among writers in this period than would be expected from simply 
examining the pronouncements of the Royal Society’s leading figures. Another noted 
figure of the new science, the astronomer and mathematician Johannes Kepler (1571-
1630), is also often pointed to as having strong objections to figurative language, but he 
similarly strayed into more elevated metaphors, such as when he spoke of a ‘world soul’ 
and music of the spheres.92 Robert Boyle has likewise been described as a ‘prolific 
analogizer,’ while Harvey’s training in classical rhetoric and use of prominent metaphors 
is well established. 93  Clearly, these practices were not entirely incompatible with 
experimental philosophy, or at least were not wholly eradicable. The issue, seen in this 
light, is not one of suppression but one of management. As William Lynch concluded in 
his discussion of the Society’s members, ‘their goal was not to eliminate metaphor but to 
find a means of controlling the effects of metaphor’.94  
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Robert Boyle and ‘scientific analogy’ 
 
Of the various schemes to assert an ‘appropriate’ use of rhetorical figures and tropes by 
philosophers in the period, by far the most successful model – according to modern 
scholarship – was forwarded by Robert Boyle (1627-1691). Boyle was another member 
of the Oxford club of experimental philosophers, of which Willis was a prominent 
member. Like Willis, Boyle conducted chemical experiments and worked on atomistic 
principles; Boyle was even called upon to explain the results of one of Willis’s reports to 
Society members and corresponded on the matter of Willis’s experiments. Boyle stands 
out in the discussions around linguistic reform in this period as a figure who is often held 
as developing the accepted linguistic form of modern science. As Shapin and Schaffer 
have argued, Boyle’s Proemial Essay (1661) was a methodological statement setting out the 
‘rules for the literary technology of the experimental programme.’ They concluded that it 
was Boyle, and not Bacon, who ‘developed the literary forms of experimental 
communication’.95 Similarly, Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski have also taken Boyle 
to be the exemplar of modern and ‘progressive’ practices, specifically in regards to a 
circumscribed use of metaphor and what they consider to be his ‘structural’ approach to 
analogy. They refer to Boyle as expressing the broader shift away from an older, 
Aristotelian concern with surface qualities to concentrate on the structural relationships 
between objects.96 Vickers notably described these themes in 1984, when he spoke of the 
emergence of modern science in this period as characterised by the move from ‘occult’ 
notions of identity to ‘scientific’ uses of analogies.97 The fact that metaphors, alongside 
analogies, continue to pervade modern scientific discourse alone suggests that these ideas 
are the projection of a modern, scientific ideal.  
 
Firstly, these discussions tend to revolve around the development of a specific genre - 
the experimental essay, or report - attributed to Boyle. Clearly, these texts operated under 
different conditions to the medical-philosophical texts being produced by the likes of 
Willis. They described a bounded event, a limited set of variables and were more 
obviously concerned with describing the (physical) experimental scene, and as such had 
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less need of figurative language. This was clearly not the only style of writing Boyle 
engaged in. Moreover, to the extent that Boyle’s model (of analogising) has been 
abstracted from this context, to be used as a more general measure of ‘scientific’ 
applications of analogy within modern historiography, it still bears an influence on 
corresponding evaluations of Willis’s own practices and requires some examination here. 
As Charles Wolfe and Ofer Gal have argued, Boyle’s analogies are specifically ‘mobilized 
to give legitimacy to the experimental philosophy,’ and so he becomes part of the ways in 
which Willis’s work is valued and assessed as a contribution to that body of knowledge.98 
 
A prominent issue here was how the distinction between analogy as unnecessary 
ornamentation and (necessary) illustration was to be policed or managed. A key feature 
of Boyle’s approach to this issue refers to what Dedre Gentner and Arthur Markman 
have described as structure mapping, which outlines the mapping of knowledge from one 
domain to another, such that the system of relationships holds between the target 
objects.99 These relationships do not require any similarity in terms of appearance. 
However, the base objects do need to occupy similar roles within matching relational 
structures. They should not, according to the model, cross over widely separated 
domains (e.g. between corporeal and incorporeal phenomena). The choice and selection 
of the analogy therefore had to observe certain conditions: they should all hold the same 
structural relationship with the target object and not seek to extend beyond the limits of 
a knowledge category; they should be selected from natural and familiar examples. For 
example, an analogy that compares the force of a river stream and the flow of nervous 
juice in the arteries would not count as an amplification, because both are part of the 
natural order and subject to the same physical laws. They share a common structural 
relationship in that both depict the motion of fluid bodies, within a certain contained 
space.  
 
Boyle held that any number of analogy-images might be given in sequence to provide 
evidence for a particular point (multiplication) as long as they each revolved around a 
shared relationship or common relational abstractions. Instead of merely introducing one 
figure, he would draw on many at once.100 This was intended to increase clarity and work 
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against erroneous interpretations – a greater fault - through focusing the reader’s 
attention on a set of shared structural relationships with the target object. In effect, a 
principle is replicated by the given analogies, rather than being subject to more creative 
labours of extension or development. A characteristic example, taken from Boyle’s Of the 
great effects of even languid and unheeded local motion (1690) began with Boyle noting the 
problem of reader comprehension. He complained that men ‘undervalue’ the effects of 
invisible bodies, because they cannot be seen, even though their combined effects as 
‘swarms’ allow them to produce all sensible material change. The root of the 
misunderstanding is itself expressed as resulting from an inadequate analogy: men, he 
notes, commonly think of atoms as ‘grains of dust,’ which do not immediately threaten 
physical harm. To overturn this, Boyle employs an extended sequence of examples of 
localised particulate motion, all of which produce effects in larger bodies. As he explains, 
‘if you turn an Ant-hill well stocked with Ants-eggs, upside down, you may sometimes 
see such a heap of eggs, mingled with the loose earth as a few of those Insects, if they 
were yoaked together…’ But, if each ant were to ‘lay hold of her own egge’ then this 
commixture of eggs and earth are quickly ‘displaced’ en-masse by the motions of each 
individual ant. Subsequent images extended this theme - such as the ‘wind upon a tree in 
Autumn,’ which ‘withall carries off divers of the leaves.’ He then introduces what he 
terms ‘closer instances’ of this principle, citing the dissolution of sugar lumps into beer 
or water. For the learned reader, he includes references to chemical experiments with 
Mercury and wine.101  Boyle’s analogies thus ‘correct’ the significant misapprehension 
wrought by earlier, poorly chosen examples – a preferable state of affairs. 
 
This example presented a distinctly prolix and elaborate passage, densely populated by 
varied vivid analogies. It is nevertheless assessed as a model of management and 
constraint: the collected images all served as instances of local (particulate) motion, 
drawn from natural and observable events; they illustrated vivid yet familiar scenes, 
similar in orders of magnitude. While the chemical experiments were less ‘accessible’ to 
the general reader, they were themselves validated by having been produced in what were 
clearly marked out as first-hand, experimental conditions. Furthermore, Boyle 
emphasises the role, or at least the potential for, his own first hand observation. This 
assertion can be read as a means of anchoring and ‘testing’ analogies against empirical 
demonstration; a way of directing and limiting the range of possible interpretations. He 
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also implies the same opportunities for his readers: many (but not all) of these examples 
were familiar or easily replicated events – trees in autumn, sugar dissolved in beer.  These 
are all features that have been cited as characteristic of a scientific use of analogy. 
 
As with Harvey’s comments, cited earlier in this chapter, Boyle expressed a concern over 
the (active) role of the reader and their need to comprehend what was being described. 
He explicitly justified multiplication as a means by which he could increase his support to 
the reader. In his The Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666) he commented, 
 
I sometimes employ variety of terms and phrases to express the same thing, I did it 
purposely, though perhaps to the prejudice of my own reputation […] both I and 
others having observed that, the same unobvious notions being several ways 
expressed, some readers […] will take it up much better in one of those 
expressions, and some in another.102  
 
Here, Boyle suggests that a variety of expressions ensure that at least one familiar object 
would be available for any given reader to call upon. If these examples stick to those 
objects that are familiar or sensible, this will increase the probability that a reader would 
gain an accurate (if, indirect) image of the object, rather than needing to introduce their 
own interpretations. This is particularly tied then, to a consideration of difficult 
explanations. Of course, the use of many terms and diverse forms of expressions is not 
necessarily the same as figurative language, but as we see in the example above, Boyle 
certainly saw fit to express difficult phenomena through long sequences of analogy. This 
is pointed to in his reference to tackling ‘unobvious’ notions (such as invisible atoms) 
where analogies are required to stand in place of literal description. As Bacon had also set 
out, the usefulness of analogy lies in bringing those things that are not immediately 
perceptible by observation to ‘within reach’ of the senses by indirect observation ‘of 
some related body that is perceptible.’103 Multiplication was also a practice intended to 
encourage the reader to focus upon what linked the chain of images together and to the 
target object, this was designed to work against the use of a given analogy as an inter-
changeable ‘symbol’ of its object. 104 Boyle’s writing was also a further example of the 
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import of rhetorical tropes from mathematical and legalistic discourses: many examples 
increased the weight of ‘evidence’ or ‘testimony’ and supported notions of plausibility.105  
 
It is important, however, to question how far modern critical assessments of Boyle’s 
‘control’ of analogies are a function of current scholarship’s own values and interests. 
Ultimately, these analyses construct a model of what structural analogizing is intended to 
look like, without reference to wider intellectual contexts or knowledge practices of the 
period. Boyle’s approach is made ‘scientific’ by present-day assessments of it, which 
includes a series of tabular presentations designed to import an attendant stress on his 
use of structural relationships and proportionality. 106  This obscures the wider and 
potentially more dynamic relationships that might operate between analogies. 
Interestingly, this use of tabular presentations was repeated in M. Eadie’s discussion of 
Willis’s descriptions of the pathological states of the animal spirits in 2003.107 These 
practices are a means of intervening in historical texts so as to make them appear 
scientific, by our own definition.  In these readings, the active role of the reader 
(comprehending the meaning of an analogy) is substantially overlooked. This is worth 
considering: Boyle’s use of analogies was not merely about gathering a weight of 
‘evidence’; he also placed a significant emphasis on supporting and pleasing the reader. 
Boyle commented that he hoped his work might ‘gratify many readers and instruct more 
than a few’, rather than causing them to ‘despair’ at the ‘darkness and difficulties’ of 
much philosophical discourse.108  
 
Notably, Boyle argued that while a writer must take care not to be ‘florid’ in his style, he 
must equally ‘be allow'd to take a Care that it disgust not his Reader by its Flatness.’ He 
continued that while the ‘ornaments of language’ may well ‘darken as well as adorn’ the 
subject, if applied with discretion – in reflections on findings, rather than in methodologies 
- then their pleasurable effects could still be retained. To illustrate his argument he uses 
an analogy drawing again on optical technologies, in this instance the telescope: 
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Thus (to resume our former Comparison) though it were foolish to colour or 
enamel upon the glasses of Telescopes, yet to gild or otherwise embellish the Tubes 
of them, may render them more acceptable to the Users, without at all lessening the 
Clearness of the Object to be look'd at through them.109 
 
What Boyle suggests here, is that some degree of ornamental language is required in 
order to attract readers and to engage them in learning. This picks up on Aristotle’s 
account of metaphors as a means of obtaining the ‘goodwill’ of the listener. Importantly, 
he proposes that, with restraint and careful application, such ornaments can be used 
without obscuring meaning or clarity of sight. Following his own analogy, pleasing 
figures of speech should not be used as a tool for representing the nature of a subject 
(through the lens), but can be used to make the process of learning more vivid or 
striking. What he means here is that his adornments will be applied only in the reflections 
on findings, not in methodological sections. His telescope analogy stresses once again 
how notions of unmediated and direct sight are used to structure ideas around intellectual 
clarity and the purity of knowledge.110  These considerations clearly strike a very different 
chord to the austere rhetoric of the ‘plain’ and ‘naked’ style, as espoused by Sprat and 
Wilkins and highlight the possibilities for a far more complex or nuanced approach to 
figurative language in the period.  
 
Thomas Willis and the work of analogy 
 
Taking characteristic examples from Willis’s major publication, Anatomy of the Brain 
(1664), does not reveal any sustained transgressions from the measures advocated by his 
contemporaries. In keeping with Boyle, Willis tended to employ analogy far more often 
than metaphor; and, as we have seen, even the staunchest critics of rhetoric were not 
immune to the use of metaphors. He publicly stated his commitment to experience and 
observation, rejected the ‘world of letters’ and renounced ‘poetical philosophy’.  As he 
stated in the Epistle dedication to Anatomy, he had submitted his work to the ‘rule of 
experience’: 
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Therefore I desire, that all mine may be tried and approved, no less by the 
demonstration of Piety and Canons of the Church, than by the Rule of Experience 
and Knowledge, to which I keep. (Epistle)  
 
Importantly, what the various concessions and evocations already explored above 
express is that there was not, in fact, a sense in which these philosophers would have 
recognised an insurmountable contradiction between their commitment to experimental 
values and the use of rhetorical tropes. Furthermore, there was no single ‘right’ way to 
use figurative devices to which all could adhere and no reason to suggest that Willis saw 
his own literary practices as being in any way opposed to the shared values of his fellow 
experimental philosophers and Society members. Willis was as aware as his 
contemporaries of the dangers of ‘luxuriating’ in words and textual learning, and went on 
to explicitly rejected his earlier ‘poetical’ philosophy in his Preface, 
 
I do not think of Empires in Arts, nor do I promise to my self Triumphs by 
overcoming the World of Letters […] I was ashamed that I had been so easie 
hitherto, and that I had drawn out for my self and Auditors a certain Poetical 
Philosophy.111  
 
When Willis mentions ‘Poetical Philosophy’, he is referring to his first and only 
preceding publication, Diatribae Duae (1659), in which he set out a chemical theory of 
fermentation and fevers. Crucially, this was a model supported by an overarching 
chemical analogy applied to medical ‘animal spirits’ in the body. It correspondingly 
formed the basis of much more contentious argument, that the soul had a material 
component. I will return to these issues shortly. Firstly, having set out how Boyle’s 
model stands as one half of a model against which Willis is implicitly judged, it is 
revealing to assess an example from Willis according to those same criteria. Clearly, 
Boyle’s model was not the only possible approach available in this period, but in so far as 
it reflects wider themes of proportion, management and control of rhetorical tropes it 
remains a useful framework to refer to here. 
 
In the research for Anatomy of the Brain, drawing on a new method of dissection, Willis 
was able to observe detailed interior structures of the brain for the first time. What he 
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saw – and what his readers would also be required to visualise - was a visceral, chaotic 
and remarkably alien presentation. The translation of these intricacies into some kind of 
intelligible form – that is, to render the brain a sensible object of knowledge, would 
require extensive work on the part of analogous vehicles. In a characteristic example, 
Willis used the following analogies to depict the complex network of arteries covering 
the brain’s cerebral hemispheres: 
 
[…] the frame of the subject may be seen, covered with the infoldings of Vessels, as 
it were with a net admirably variegated […] its sight of aspect shews like the picture 
of a fruit-bearing wood; the Idea of which, the Vessels of the Brain more aptly 
represent, and are themselves seen better and more distinctly, if you first squirt into 
the Carotidick Artery some black liqour.112  
 
The passage opens with Willis noting that the object in question (the brain) is being 
observed, the initial sight of which he expresses through the analogy of a net - marked out 
by the prefix ‘as it were’. The net analogy uses a familiar and accessible object to illustrate 
the principle of variegation, which comes from the Latin variegatus meaning varied or 
diverse. Both the net and the vessels of the brain share in this common structural 
relationship as complex networked structures, both encasing larger objects. As a unified 
structure, the arteries might replicate the principle of a network but they do not 
necessarily look like a net; there are no clean lines, or proportional divisions. The specific 
visual aspect of arterial variegation, as it presents in the brain, is drawn out with the 
additional image of a fruit bearing wood - another familiar and accessible image. Willis is 
clear that instead of comparing the two objects directly he is using the wood as a means 
to ‘picture’ its ‘sight or aspect.’ These images hold a common relationship in that both 
represent variegated, interconnected, structural complexities that challenge direct 
observation. Willis ultimately reinforces these observational challenges by stressing not 
his own (fallible) eyesight, but the extension of that process afforded to him by the 
experimental method – in his technique of injecting coloured dyes and ink into the brain. 
As I have touched upon throughout this chapter, notions of visual or optical clarity are a 
recurrent rhetorical emphasis in experimental writing. Here, Willis’s analogies are 
supported – or validated by – their association with observational testimony.  
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These analogies are not significantly ornamental or elevated. The images do clear work in 
making a complex object intelligible, through easily visualised figures. The observational 
event, underpinning the example, is clearly indicated. Where he used examples, he 
consistently adopted the requisite prefix of ‘quasi’ or ‘velut,’ which Samuel Pordage 
translated as the phrase ‘as it were’ in the English edition.113 If we apply Boyle’s own 
conditions, Willis has used his analogies ‘appropriately’. However, it is worth noting that 
while the two examples do possess common attributes, they also draw out slightly 
different aspects of the same object. This is as opposed to a strict sense of replication or 
‘multiplying’ which (modern assessments) of Boyle’s analogising stress. Of course, it is 
arguable that the very idea of analogies as adhering to mathematical principles is itself a 
product of these kinds of modern analysis, which draws attention to and repeats the 
rhetorical ploys of early modern experimental discourse. The point, however, is not to 
hold Willis to these standards, which are neither self-evident or neutral; what is instead 
expressed here, is that Willis can not be thought ‘exceptional’ in respect of his 
contemporaries own practices. 
 
What is excluded here of course is the possibility of more dynamic interactions between 
these images and across the text. Overall, as illustrated in the above example, Willis’s use 
of analogies was not meaningfully at odds with the practices observed by his immediate 
contemporaries in the experimental community, who all recognised an important and 
continuing role for figurative writing in their work – especially in regards to unobservable 
phenomena. As Alexander Wragge-Morely has shown, Willis employed a mixture of 
‘commonplace, medium size objects’ in his comparisons and, while some examples 
displayed what the Wragge-Morely describes as an ‘elevated style,’ this would not in and 
of itself have necessarily marked Willis out from his contemporaries. 114  Importantly, as 
with Boyle, Willis tended to draw on analogies far more often than metaphor in 
discussing his findings and chiefly in the assistance of difficult or novel explanations.  
 
However, none of the above is to say that Willis did not, in places, employ distinctly 
heightened and ornamental metaphors. In the preface to Anatomy, for example, he 
employed the following metaphor: 
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Minerva was born from the Brain, Vulcan with his Instruments playing the 
Midwife: For either by this way, viz. by Wounds and Death, by Anatomy, and a 
Caesarean Birth, Truth will be brought to Light, or for ever lye hid.115 
 
Here, Willis employed a literary reference from Greek mythology to argue that the 
physical practice of anatomy is itself a metaphor for the generation (by ‘caesarean birth’) 
of new truth or knowledge.  These prefatory remarks could clearly have been viewed as 
‘embellishing’ the arguments of his empirical work, a practice specifically rejected in the 
stated in the statues of the Royal Society; though, as part of a prefatory passage, they 
could also have been viewed as remarks used to enhance and inform the experience of 
the reader, while not directly impinging on the experimental presentations of the book.116  
 
Another point to pick up on here is that this kind of prose could have been used to 
suggest that Willis wrote with a Humanistic (Ciceronian) concern with an elevated style 
and ornamentation. Anthony Wood had remarked on Willis’s ‘natural smoothness, pure 
elegancy, delightful, unaffected neatness of Latin style,’ an assessment tellingly coupled 
with the observation that Willis’s experimental contributions were as lacking as his 
literary skills were evident.117 These characteristics of Willis’s Latin prose could be taken 
as appearing to contravene a commitment to the ‘plain style’ advocated by some leading 
figures associated with the Royal Society at this time. The suspicion of Latin and a 
commitment to the vernacular by Society members has nevertheless been overstated. 
Polemicist’s calls for a ‘plain style’ certainly drew on the rhetoric of a rejection of the 
swellings of style of Humanist Latin or the obscurities of its scholastic variant, such as 
when Sprat called for members to adopt the ‘native easiness’ of the language of 
merchants and artisans.118 However, many notable natural philosophers associated with 
the Society, such as Hobbes, continued to routinely publish their works in Latin and 
thereby secure a learned, continental audience. The Society would certainly have wanted 
to produce works that could be read by both English and continental colleagues Europe, 
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especially considering the largest international centres of the book trade were mostly in 
Germanic parts of Europe, where Latin remained the standard language of scholarship.119  
 
The matter is, however, more complicated than this. Natural Philosophers in this period 
were confronted with the difficulty of translating complex and highly technical 
terminology from Latin – the traditional language of medicine and university based 
learning – into what was a relatively restricted English vocabulary. As Vickers has argued, 
between the 1640s and 1680s it was difficult to view the English vernacular as having the 
capacity to properly express technical terminology. 120  Walter Charleton, a close 
contemporary of Willis, published his writing in English but nevertheless remarked in 
1680 on the difficulties this involved: 
 
If my Stile shall sound somewhat harsh […] as coming too near to the Latin; I intreat 
you to consider, this is either no indecency in this place, or such a one at worst, which I 
could not otherwise avoid, than by involving my sense in the obscurity of words less 
proper and significant; the nature and quality of subjects treated of, being such, as 
cannot be fully expressed in our yet imperfect Language.121 
 
These remarks again tie into the themes discussed throughout this chapter: of the fraught 
balancing act that had to be struck between using words in a sense other than they were 
strictly intended (in this instance, by resorting to an imported or borrowed Latin term) as 
set against the risk of using unclear (if precise) language – the latter could be more 
detrimental to clarity of understanding. In this case, a continued use of scholarly Latin 
rather than the vernacular could be cited as a way of avoiding the ambiguities promised 
by a new or poorly substituted name. Boyle and Harvey had of course had made similar 
arguments in respect of analogies and metaphor in relation to new or difficult ideas: it 
was better to borrow and substitute a term than to risk the confusion of an entirely new 
or unfamiliar name. Ultimately, metaphors - as devices defined by their specific contexts 
– do not ever translate effectively: they are always changed as part of the negotiations 
implicated in an act of translation. In Willis’s instance, Pordage’s act of translation lifted 
his writing from the specific, learned Latin discourse in which he had composed them 
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into the vernacular setting – but this was not the medium originally intended by the 
author himself and Pordage was himself compelled to retain many of Willis’s original 
Latin terms. The use, or not, of Latin prose is therefore complex and nuanced and is 
certainly no way of assessing Willis’s ‘scientific’ credentials or not against those of his 
contemporaries. 
 
Beyond the issue of his Latin style, Willis has also been criticised for making what appear 
to be very public concessions to the role of beauty and elegance as a function of 
theoretical speculations. In 1694, Ysbrand van Diemerbroeck (1609–1674), professor of 
physick and anatomy at Utrecht, wrote of Willis’s disregard for plain speaking and 
accuracy in order to satisfy his vanity: ‘he does but explain the lesser Obscurity by the 
greater Obscurity […] there is nothing in it but Vanity and Ostentation.’122 In the 1980s, 
his modern biographer, Kenneth Dewhurst, pointed to Willis’s penchant for ‘lapidary’ 
passages and polished phrases as a feature of his desire to both instruct and please his 
readers.123 He cited Willis’s remarks at the end of his Anatomy of the Brain, that 
 
In truth, whatsoever of our work is performed without form or beauty may seem as 
the Foundation of a Building only placed on the ground, in which no elegancy or 
neatness doth yet shine. A Superstructure indeed may be promised to be put upon 
this Foundation, perhaps fair and beautiful, whereby the minds of the Beholders 
may be pleased and instructed.124  
 
Here, Willis notably departs from the emphasis, featured at the start of Anatomy, on 
observation and experience and instead begins to speak about the beauty and elegance of 
(physiological) theory. This takes us back to Aristotle’s ideas around the pleasantness of 
metaphor and the sweetness of ‘strange names’ as a means of encouraging and 
supporting learning. We need only think of the comments made by Anthony Wood, to 
see how such concerns over ornamentation and gratifying the reader could be easily cast 
as tokens of Willis having placed intellectual vanity and fame-seeking over and above his 
requirement to instruct and inform.125 Willis further remarked that, ‘the hard sense of our 
already instituted Anatomy may be sweetened with those kind of more pleasant 
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Speculations, as it were cloathing the Skeleton with flesh.’126 There is an echo here, in 
Willis’s analogy, of Harvey’s comments on metaphors as the clothes that make things 
intelligible. Willis frames his theoretical speculations as the necessary ‘flesh’ giving form 
(and understanding) to the bare ‘skeleton’ of anatomical fact. Evidently, the writers of 
the period were required to balance their concern for clarity, brevity and empirical 
precision against the need to offer effective and appealing arguments to their readers. 
Ideas about how to bring about new learning and discovery could not be entirely 
divorced from concepts around the affective power of visual-impressions to act on and 
move the imagination.127 Willis was no exception in this matter.  
 
Of course, Boyle had also spoken about the need to please the reader with some degree 
of ornamentation; the difference being that Willis proposes here to use such devices as 
means of extending his process of reasoning – from anatomical structure to the workings 
of the soul. This goes to the root of the issues taken with Willis’s use of rhetorical tropes 
and figures: that he did so in order to furnish himself with speculations on physiological 
processes, rather than limiting himself to the illustration of anatomical structures. 
Returning to some of the key historiography examined in the introduction, Alfred Meyer 
and Raymond Hierons’ influential study on Willis’s neurophysiology from 1965, for 
instance, pointed to Boyle’s simple statement of facts, against which they noted that 
while Willis ‘respected’ facts, he ultimately believed that reasoning (by analogy) could be 
used to ‘fill in the gaps’ (with speculation).128 They cite Willis’s own remarks that ‘…at 
length, from the analogy and frequent ratiocination, this (as I think) true and genuine use 
of it occurred.’ 129  The problem here being that analogies, according to the new 
philosophy, were intended to be used as illustrative examples or ‘evidence’, not as a basis 
of inductive reasoning. Of course, this becomes more difficult where the subject in 
question is unobservable. In their experimental work, both Willis and Boyle perused 
atomistic and physiological explanations that depended on the categories of spirit – 
hidden, invisible atoms acting beneath the levels of sense. Clearly, in this context, using 
analogy to ‘fill in the gaps’ (of what could not be seen directly) was unavoidable. As I 
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have been exploring, a number of natural philosophers engaged with ‘unobvious’ 
notions, occurring beneath the level of sense – had acknowledged practical concessions 
to the use of analogy to extend their process of reasoning. Dewhurst (Willis’s noted 
biographer), observed that Willis clearly believed that reasoning from analogy could be 
justified under certain conditions and, importantly, that he attempted to tether his 
examples, where he could, to his wider researches in anatomy, physiology and 
chemistry.130  
 
Importantly, chemical and corpuscular philosophies in the seventeenth century did 
propose that the work of atoms was had material and demonstrable effects (indirectly 
produced through the effects of evaporation, distillation and fermentation or by 
experiments with air-pumps and vacuums). Whether it was acceptable to use analogies to 
describe these bodies or if such work strayed into the purely speculative and 
metaphorical depended on where you stood on the existence of material spirits in this 
period and their relationship to the soul. Notably, the general thrust of the attacks 
levelled at Willis have enduringly focused on Willis’s physiological or corpuscular 
language – rather than his (often figurative) illustrations of the brain’s anatomy. A 
prominent trope relied upon by Willis in his physiological writing was an analogy drawn 
between chemical and medical spirits. The import of new, chemical principles and terms 
to describe medical or cognitive processes was a particular point of contestation.131 The 
Galenic, Irish physician Edmund O’Meara, for example, made a very public objection to 
Willis’s analogous treatment of chemical and medical phenomena. O’Meara claimed that 
iatrochemist’s such as Willis had made pretence of ‘wisdom’ merely by the trick of 
‘inventing new terms.’132 That is, Willis had no solid understanding of the nature of 
medical spirits but had simply imported categories of explanation, by analogy, from an 
entirely unrelated domain.  The issue here, then, is less about the application of literary 
convention, and more about how disputes over language are an integral part of the 
disputed parameters of knowledge within a given intellectual climate.  
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Related to these objections were a broader set of criticisms aimed at Willis’s use of 
anatomical findings to support claims concerning the chemical and physiological 
properties of the animal spirits comprising the corporeal soul. This concern was at the 
centre of a vehement attack on Willis from the Dutch anatomist, Nicholas Steno (1638 – 
1686). Steno was perhaps Willis’s staunchest (or at least, most public) critic. In a Paris 
lecture on the anatomy of the brain, published in 1669 but delivered earlier, Steno 
attacked Willis for having used his anatomical observations as a basis for speculating on 
the operations of invisible bodies - the animal spirits. Steno, in effect, attacked the notion 
that crude anatomical knowledge could provide any insight into the workings of the soul 
in humans – which he would later state should be province only of theology. He 
therefore counted Willis alongside Descartes, as a philosopher whose fanciful and 
speculative theories were based on the operations of animal spirits, about which ‘nothing 
certain’ could possibly be known. 
 
It is important to recognise here that Willis’s decision to use his investigations into the 
body in this manner - as part of a wider investigation into the nature of the soul – was 
neither radical nor exceptional within the setting of early modern natural philosophy. His 
efforts fed into a long established tradition of using anatomy to make teleological 
arguments concerning the nature of the soul, which had proven especially prominent in 
the Lutheran or Protestant traditions of the Northern European anatomy schools under 
such figures as Phillip Melanchthon. 133  However, what could (and did) prove 
controversial in this setting were the kind of conclusions Willis used his anatomical 
findings to defend: in offering detailed arguments on the chemico-medical properties of 
the animal spirits and their activities, Willis extended his investigations of the body into 
what was for some an unacceptably speculative realm. It certainly progressed beyond the 
applications of earlier commentators, such as Galen and Vesalius, who had used the parts 
of the body to provide a basis for thinking about the tripartite arrangement of the soul in 
the body. 
 
The brain was – to Steno – a notoriously difficult object of physical inquiry, from which 
little could therefore be reliably gleaned about the detailed movements, activities or 
chemical properties of the spirits themselves. As Steno would conclude, in the absence 
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of reliable empirical facts, Willis’s misleading account of the animal spirits was left to rely 
upon mere words and figures. He noted, for example, how ‘falsely the figures represent 
the parts which they are designed for.’134 He went on to reject such systems of ‘art,’ built 
upon the foundations of ‘ill chosen’ and ‘obscure terms, metaphors and comparisons.’135 
He further criticised Willis for having imported substituted terms when naming parts of 
the brain, such as testes and anus, noting that these names had ‘no relation at all to the 
parts expressed by them in the anatomy of the brain.’136 Of course, as has been noted 
throughout the chapter, Steno made his own arguments effective through the use of a 
striking metaphor: picking up on the trope of visual clarity as intellectual insight, he 
suggested that further investigations into the brain were needed in order to ‘tear off the 
glaucoma from the eyes of those who calmly accept the opinions of past ages.’137 
 
Some years after Willis’s death, in 1684, the Dutch physician Günther Schelhammer 
(1649-1716) also attacked Willis’s use of similarity (analogy) as a means of constructing 
and demonstrating his arguments. In his De Auditu (1684), Schelhammer claimed that 
Willis was ‘unaware that similarities do not prove anything’ and should be only used as an 
‘incentive for obtaining evidence.’ 138 Although these comments came a decade after 
Willis’s death, they are nevertheless indicative of how Willis’s younger contemporaries 
were able to draw on his use of similarity as a means of undermining his theories. 
Schelhammer concluded that he could not have confidence in Willis, a ‘famous and, in 
Medicine, so well-merited man’, because he too often ‘takes on the role of philosopher, 
and ponders over the uses of organs or the nature of chemical events.’139 Once again, the 
primary issue here was Willis’s chemical and physiological theories, rather than his medical 
practice or anatomical observations. Schelhammer – who was promoting his own, 
alternative account of the ear-drum - went on to specifically tackle Willis’s choice of a 
particular comparative object, suggesting that the dispute was over rival interpretations 
of an analogy, rather than an outright stand against the practice. We can see here how 
scientific concepts are both built upon and contested through given analogies and 
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metaphors; these are not merely passive tools of communication, but rest at the centre of 
knowledge-creation. 
 
These attacks were motivated by disputed methods of knowledge and contested 
disciplinary boundaries, rather than by any overriding concern for literary convention. In 
Steno’s case, he objected to the very idea that the soul was comprised of material agents 
or a subject for anatomists and physicians, rather than philosophers and theologians. He 
argued, rather, that tropes and figures were being used in these discourses to compensate 
for their over-extended reach and insufficient empirical foundations. He objected not so 
much to the use of metaphor or figures, as their inappropriate applications and the 
inadequate selection of examples that were ‘ill chosen’ and ‘puzzling.’ Willis, though, was 
not exceptional in this regard; physiological theories of the mind were gaining traction, 
even while they remained highly contentious and even heretical. As I touched on earlier, 
Hooke had breached recognised domains of knowledge by comparing physical or 
mechanical objects with his notions of an incorporeal soul in his discussion of memory. 
Unlike Hooke, Willis held that the corporeal soul was a material phenomenon and that 
the physical actions of its spirits could be ‘demonstrated’ by chemical analysis and were 
evidenced in the effects of pathological conditions on the body and mind. Depending on 
whether this stance was accepted or not, it could be claimed Willis was not conflating 
natural and imaginary domains, but comparing similarly natural objects. Steno, 
unsurprisingly, had rejected the chemist’s philosophical role in medicine and anatomy or 
its capacity to ‘prove’ the nature of spirits.140 What I want to emphasise here is that 
assessments of Willis’s actual use of figurative devices cannot be divorced from the 
broader, polemical context in which such references would have been received and 
interpreted. This is not about literary convention as much as it is about how contested 
categories of knowledge.   
 
In another example, Willis pre-emptively defended his import of a chemical analogy used 
to express the explosive qualities of the spirits as comparable to the action of gunpowder 
in producing muscular action. He defended this on the grounds that there was no other 
suitable corresponding term within the field of medical knowledge that could clearly 
example the kind of action he wished to convey. Of course, Willis was saying that the 
spirits were explosive – a quality rooted in chemical models. The analogy opened him up 
                                                      
140 Steno, p. 69. 
 94 
to the charge of having rendered the superior matter of the corporeal soul no different 
from the crude material of alcoholic liquors and gunpowder.141 This is a recurring 
problem with comparisons that are used to illustrate unobservable phenomena: it is 
impossible to draw limits on the work of the analogy in shaping and directing the 
possibilities of knowledge. In other words, in cannot be definitely stated that the 
comparison does not slide into symbolic representation. We might think, for instance, of 
Harvey’s metaphor of the heart as a pump – a far more widely recognised and accepted 
metaphor from this period. Here, the notion of muscular action conveyed by Harvey is 
inseparable from the mechanical metaphor that describes it. Today, it is very difficult to 
determine whether the heart is a pump or if this is a metaphor; clearly when Harvey used 
it, he did so as a mechanical-metaphor, but the heart does indeed pump the blood. The 
muscles of the heart were (and are) understood as literally ‘pumping’ the blood, just as 
Willis saw the spirits as ‘exploding’ when mixed with certain chemical substances.  
 
Of course, Harvey’s ‘scientific’ credentials are not undermined on account of his use of 
elaborate metaphors in present day historiography in the same way that Willis’s use of 
language is (at least in part), mistrusted. This is a mark of the metaphor’s success and is 
more broadly reflective of the success of mechanistic categories of explanation. If the 
model is accepted as valid or self-evident, according to the standards of a specific 
epistemological setting, then the language employed around it can be easily cast as an 
illustrative ‘tool’ that has been ‘tested’ against an empirical fact. It is easier to suggest that 
the metaphor came after the fact. Whereas, in the absence of empirical ‘proof’ (i.e. the 
spirits) the metaphorical basis of the model is more readily exposed and rejected. While 
Harvey could observe both the heart and a pump, Willis could only observe gunpowder 
explosions, but not the specific actions of chemical or medical spirits. However, the 
success of the pump metaphor obscures a set of far less-recognisable terms of reference 
that were also needed to construct this theory of the heart-pump. Harvey didn’t just 
think of the heart as a mechanical pump; his conception of its role was also bound up in 
his ideas around the vital spirit of the blood – ideas that were also part of Willis’s 
conceptual framework. These will be explored in a later chapter. The point to be made 
here is that metaphors and analogies, isolated from their wider intellectual and cultural 
contexts, cannot tell the whole story.  
 
                                                      




The discussions mapped out in this chapter serve to stress the ambiguities of 
metaphorical and figurative language – variously cast as tools of illustration or 
ornamentation, as both misleading and illuminating. They also highlight the difficulties 
we might face if we were try to separate out scientific knowledge from their work and the 
historical and intellectual climates in which they were employed. Even Harvey’s 
mechanical metaphor of the pump – which can, according to certain perspectives, be 
easily ‘tested’ against observation of the heart – belies a more complex conceptual 
architecture, premised on a set of metaphors that do not ‘map’ onto our own modern 
day intellectual frameworks. This is as true for Willis’s work as it is of Harvey’s. These 
debates also touch, then, on the cultural invisibility of certain ‘successful’ metaphorical 
models. Within the intellectual setting of the seventeenth century, the mechanical 
metaphor was a particularly dominant model for representing nature, something I return 
to in chapter three - a metaphor so successful, in fact, that it effectively ceased to act as a 
metaphor at all. Such metaphors instead come to frame the parameters of thought, much 
like certain metaphors, including the mechanistic model within neuroanatomy, continue 
to shape scientific models in the present day. Certainly, Willis’s mechanical or hydraulic 
analogies – even where they were being used to explain the movement of animal spirits – 
have not proved as contentious as his vitalistic or chemical analogies, used to discourse 
on matters of brain function. Thinking about spirits as anthropomorphic, reasoned  
‘agents’ does not have any easy modern comparative. The disquiet felt over Willis’s 
‘baroque’ and ‘fanciful’ figures of the animal spirits in some present-day historiography 
has less to do with the actual conventions for ‘scientific analogy,’ more than it is a 
reflection of how difficult it is to stand outside of the prevailing metaphors of our own 
time. Similarly, seventeenth century attacks on Willis’s use of analogical reasoning were 
not necessarily an attempt to uphold the conventions of the Royal Society, but an issue 
of the disputed frameworks of natural philosophical knowledge.  
 
This chapter, then, has shown that in the late seventeenth century, scientific writers 
adopted a far more nuanced, pragmatic or equivocal stance in relation to the work of 
rhetorical tropes. Their practices reflected a concern for plainness, clarity and empirical 
accuracy but this was necessarily balanced by the need to explain, through effective 
illustration, difficult and novel phenomena to their readers. There were widespread 
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concessions to the effectiveness of analogy (and frequent slips into extended metaphors) 
by leading figures of the experimental community in this period. This is a far more 
complex picture than traditional assessments of the Royal Society’s hostility to language 
and rhetoric have tended to suggest. What emerges time and again in approaches to 
rhetorical tropes and figures in the period, is the desire to mark out science’s ability to 
manage their imaginative potential whilst retaining their more pleasurable effects – this 
feeds into modern science’s own notion of analogies as tools. Scientific analogies are such 
when they can be tested, corrected or rejected, while other (literary) analogies easily come 
to act as ‘symbols’ for their objects. As I’ve already touched on, these assertions are 
based on positivistic accounts of the ‘older’ style of the alchemical and Paracelsian 
philosophies, as something that was replaced by the ‘modern’ conventions of the Royal 
Society and its members. 142 Language as a ‘tool’ of science is of course itself a powerful 
metaphor, to be added to the metaphors of words as clothes, adornments or illustrations. 
 
In modern readings of figures such as Kepler and Boyle the misplaced emphasis on the 
anti-rhetorical stance of the Royal Society is largely replaced by an equally present-
centred emphasis on the possibility of a ‘structural’ or ‘scientific’ model of analogising. 
This is in no small part because their stated ideals have been incorporated into the 
character of modern science. It is through these sorts of practices - comparing Boyle 
with Willis - that the boundaries between scientific and non-scientific uses of language 
are policed and constantly re-affirmed. It has not, however, been my intention here to 
suggest that Boyle should be considered in any way less ‘modern’ or that Willis ought to 
be re-evaulated as ‘modern’. The point instead is to question whether the differences 
noted between Boyle or Willis’s approaches are not being invested with meanings that sit 
at the centre of our own ideas about the character of modern science.  As I have 
explored above, the negative responses to Willis’s analogies tended to reflect the tensions 
arising from the collision of new philosophical models and the inevitable (linguistic) 
challenges involved in discovery and invention. These tensions will be explored in more 
detail across the following chapters. 
                                                      
142 Graves, Rhetoric in(to) Science, p. 54. 
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Chapter Two 
The Internal Laboratory: Chemical Ferments and the Body 
 
Thomas Willis is remembered today above all for his contributions to neurology through 
his work around the structure and function of the brain and nerves. This emphasis has 
tended to obscure the that fact that, prior to an extended period of anatomical research 
in the mid-1660s, Willis’s reputation had rested on his considerable knowledge and 
experience in medical chemistry (iatrochemistry).1Willis’s first major publication, the 
Diatribae Duae medico-philosophicae, published in 1659, offered a principally chemical 
account of the phenomena of fermentation and fevers.2 The neglect of Willis’s chemical 
theories and practices is more than an issue of biographical detail: in this chapter, I will 
argue that Willis’s use of chemical modes of explanation in his early physiological writing 
fundamentally informed his later work on the brain and nerves. His ‘neurological’ 
discoveries and practices (dissection, comparative anatomy, clinical observation) cannot 
be divorced from the intellectual framework that Willis’s background in experimental 
chemistry provided. Robert Frank thus noted that to understand Willis’s notion of brain 
function it is vital to start with his chemical ideas.3 
 
The Diatriabae reveals a notable reliance upon key, structuring chemical analogies, which 
Willis applied to physiological and medical problems and explanations. These analogies 
supported Willis in the development of his career, in that they allowed him to transpose a 
set of familiar concepts and categories from the laboratory to the distinctly unfamiliar 
and largely hidden events within the bodies of his patients. They effectively furnished 
Willis with an accessible intellectual and practical framework for constructing a medical-
physiological account of the human ‘oeconomy’ (a term used by Willis to refer to the 
                                                      
1 Hansruedi Isler describes an iatrochemist as an early modern physician who ‘applied chemical principles, 
analogies and practices to solve medical problems’: Thomas Willis, 1621-1675: Doctor and Scientist, trans. by 
the author (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1968), p. 57. 
2 The tracts ‘Of Fermentation’ and ‘Of Fevers’ were first published together in Latin with ‘De 
Urinis,’ in Diatribae duae medico-philosophicae (1659). In this chapter I will use the English translation by 
Samuel Pordage, A Medical-Philosophical Discourse of Fermentation, or, Of the Intestine Motion of Particles in every 
Body (London, 1681). All further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text with the 
abbreviation “DD.” 
3 Robert Frank Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists (London: University of California Press, 1980), p. 116. 
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body ‘system’) and the pathologies that afflicted it.4 As Michael Hawkins has argued, 
Willis ‘transmuted his expertise in understanding and managing chemical processes in the 
laboratory into the experience necessary to explain and manipulate the processes 
occurring within the bodies of his patients.’5 The function of these chemical analogies 
was not, then, a straightforward matter of rhetorical elocutio, ornamentation or 
embellishment – they were creative, intellectual tools used by Willis to ground the 
unfamiliar and the new within a recognisable context.6  
 
The primary focus in the first part of the chapter will be on Willis’s use of a key analogy 
between chemical spirits and those found within the body and their involvement in his 
new account of fermentation and fevers. The second part will then examine some of the 
controversies that surrounded Willis’s account, focusing in particular on questions 
around the applicability of his chemical analogies to medical explanations. Lastly, I will 
consider how Willis’s core chemical analogies informed and directed his (more famous) 
work on the brain and its physiology. Before that, I will map out some of the key themes 
in the responses to Willis’s chemical discourse. 
 
 Historical reception  
 
Willis’s experimental chemical activities during the 1640s formed the basis of his 
Diatribae. A primarily chemical treatise, the work incorporated two tracts, De Fermentatione 
(‘Of Fermentation’) and De Febribus (‘Of Fevers’), which presented a medico-
physiological application of the principle of ferments. As Willis’s noted biographer 
Hansruedi Isler observed, this work relied upon chemical concepts more than any other 
of Willis’s works.7 The work was published to a mixed – but certainly not muted – 
reception. His own contemporaries certainly took his contribution on ferments and 
fevers to be original and distinctive, and expressed considerable interest in the 
publication: the physician Matthew Mackaile (1657-1696), for instance, wrote that in 
                                                      
4Although from a slightly later example, Samuel Collins used the same term when comparing the 
‘oeconomy of the Body politick’ to that of the body, where body-parts occupied subordinate roles to the 
head within the same system: ‘Preface’,  A Systeme of Anatomy, 2 vols., (London, 1685), I. p. xxviii. 
5 Michael Hawkins, ‘Piss Profits: Thomas Willis, his Diatribae Duae and the Formation of his Professional 
Identity’, History of Science, 49.162 (2001), pp. 1-24 (p. 3). Allan Chapman similarly noted that, for Willis, ‘the 
end of the quest lay in acquiring a proper understanding of fermentation, both in the chemical laboratory 
and in the sickroom’: ‘From Alchemy to Airpumps: The Foundations of Oxford Chemistry to 1700’, in 
Chemistry at Oxford: A History from 1600 to 2005, ed. by Robert P. J. Williams, Allan Chapman and John 
Shipley Rowlinson (London: Royal Society of Chemistry Publishing, 2008), pp. 17 – 51 (p. 37). 
6 Hawkins, Piss Profits, p. 12. 
7 Isler, Thomas Willis, p. 58. 
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Willis 'you will find many things concerning fermentation which were never heard of 
before […] all which were but lately published in Latine and came to our hands, two 
moneths after these [...] And in them is the nature of fermentation more exactly 
described then ever.’8 Richard Lower, Willis’s collaborator at Oxford, similarly wrote that 
‘Willis’s aetiology of continued fevers too, inasmuch as it is accommodated to more 
recent discoveries, and the circulation of the blood, is a completely new one.’9 It was an 
account that proved highly influential.  In 1676, Charles Goodall, a member of the Royal 
College of Physicians, praised Willis’s ‘incomparable’ work on fevers and fermentation 
and placed his contribution alongside Sylvius, naming them as two of the greatest 
chemists of the age. 10 Historian Peter Anstey, has argued that Thomas Sydenham’s 
Methodus curandi febres (1666) was ‘almost certainly derived from the view of Thomas 
Willis.’11  
 
Willis was recognised by his contemporaries for having incorporated new chemical 
discoveries into his medical knowledge and practice. As Goodall remarked, ‘he hath not 
only ingeniously communicated many good medicines…but was master of greater Arcana 
in chymistry…none who readeth him, but must admire him for an acute Philosopher as 
well as a profound Chymist.’12 The modern historian, Robert Frank Jr., has thus noted 
that Willis’s reputation for being ‘innovative’ derived, at least initially, from his chemical 
work and not his anatomical projects. He notes, for example, Samuel Hartlib’s reference 
to Willis’s ‘ingenious’ experimental work. 13  Despite the noted reception of Willis’s 
chemical theories among his contemporaries, this aspect of his contribution has tended 
to be neglected in the historiographical literature on Willis. As Isler noted in 1968, ‘Of 
Fevers’ has been largely forgotten within the history of medicine – an observation he 
made whilst at the same time acknowledging that it was quite famous in his day: his 
                                                      
8 Matthew Mackaile, Moffet-well, or, A topographico-spagyricall description of the minerall wells, at Moffet in Annandale 
of Scotland translated, and much enlarged, by the author Matthew Mackaile (Edinburgh: Printed for Robert Brown, 
1664), p. 16. 
9 Richard Lower’s Vindicatio, a Defense of the Experimental Method (1665), ed. and trans. by Kenneth Dewhurst 
(Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1983), p. 279. 
10 Charles Goodall, The College of Physicians vindicated, and the true state of physic in this nation faithfully represented in 
answer to a scandalous pamphlet, entituled, The corner stone (London: printed by R.N. for Walter Kettilby, 1676), p. 
137. 
11 Peter Anstey, ‘The Creation of the English Hippocrates’, Medical History, 55 (2011), pp. 457-478 (p. 460). 
On the argument that Sydenham was derivative of Willis’s theory of fevers see: Stephen L. Sigal, ‘Fever 
Theory in the Seventeenth Century: Building Toward a Comprehensive Physiology,’ The Yale Journal of 
Biology and Medicine, 51 (1978), pp. 571-582. 
12 Goodall, The College of Physicians, pp. 137-8. 
13 Robert Frank Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle’, in The Languages of Psyche: mind and Body in Enlightenment 
Thought, ed. by George S. Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 107-147 (p. 116).  
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staunch critic, the physician Edmund O’Meara, even referred to it as ‘that famous 
doctrine of the Fevers.’ 14 More recently, in 2000, Stanley Finger observed that ‘the fame 
associated with Thomas Willis today does not stem from his acumen at diagnosis…nor is 
he well remembered for his chemical theories of medicine. Without question, it was his 
new way of looking at the brain and behaviour that is his most significant contribution.’15 
As Michael Hawkins has well examined, this failure to properly engage with Willis’s 
broader chemical influences is a product of a prevailing, present-centred concern with 
neurological brain.16   
 
Furthermore, of those assessments that have chosen to examine Willis’s chemical 
theories, a number have tended to view his contribution (on fermentation) as little more 
than an agreeable ‘bridge’ between older (alchemical) practices and the new ‘scientific’ 
chemistry. Willis, it is argued, did little more than make the elements of the former 
palatable to the latter. Isler, for instance, concluded that Willis’s primary contribution was 
that he ‘made (the theory) more attractive to the pioneers of experimental science.’17 
Donald G. Bates has similarly claimed that Willis was of interest here only in so far as he 
was ‘transitional’ and ‘derivative.’18 Frank Jr. further commented that, ‘in his chemistry, as 
in most other things, Willis was always the compromiser between ancients and 
moderns.’19 It is true that Willis’s account of fermentation incorporated aspects of 
Helmontian chemistry (influenced by the works of Paracelsus) into new corpuscular 
philosophies, which he achieved by embedding specific chemical properties in new 
concepts of material corpuscles. However, these readings too often express a concern to 
situate Willis within much larger intellectual traditions, rather than with examining his 
specific contributions on their own terms. That is, the specific ways in which Willis was 
able to construct and express his own ideas – including, but not limited to, his use of 
chemical analogies in medical-physiological applications.  
 
                                                      
14 Isler, p. 73. 
15 Stanley Finger, Minds Behind the Brain: A History of the Pioneers and their Discoveries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Publishing, 2000), p. 87. 
16 On these discussions see: Michael Hawkins, ‘Piss Profits’, p. 1. For a recent example of the kind of 
scholarship in question see: Mitchell Glickstein, Neuroscience: A Historical Introduction (MIT Press, 2014), p. 
299. 
17 Isler, p. 66. 
18 Don G. Bates, ‘Thomas Willis and the Fevers literature of the Seventeenth Century’, Medical History, 25 
(Jan., 1981), pp. 45-70 (p. 53). 
19 Frank, ‘Willis and His Circle’, p. 116. 
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In respect of Willis’s use of language, historically it has been his chemical-corpuscular 
writing that has, as Frank Jr. put it, ‘repelled’ and ‘befuddled’ commentators, as I have 
explored in the introduction to this thesis.20 The medical professor, Mervyn J. Eadie, for 
instance refers to Willis’s ‘extraordinary chemical embellishments,’ which he apparently 
‘superimposed’ onto his animal spirit concept.21 Such ornamental impositions suggest, of 
course, that chemical principles – at least, the early modern kind - had little to offer in 
elucidating Willis’s intellectual contributions. Eadie further argued that, in his chemical 
discourse on the spirits, it ‘becomes difficult to be sure if he may have slid from analogy 
into postulated chemical actuality.’ 22  Willis’s chemical discourses are seen, then, as 
especially problematic from these perspectives because of a sense of his improper 
reliance upon (or misuse) of chemical analogies. This of course implies that Willis other 
practices (around the brain) had not been subject to such speculative embellishments.  
 
Much earlier than this, in 1901, Michael Foster had also suggested that Willis had 
effectively ‘dressed himself up’ in the chemico-physiological ‘phrasing’ of his eminent 
colleagues, such as Robert Boyle, and that he therefore misunderstood and misapplied 
these terms and concepts. 23  Picking up on Foster’s claims, in 2003 Wes Wallace 
suggested that because he had merely borrowed terms he was not familiar with, Willis’s 
chemical language appears both inconsistent and also ‘fanciful’.24 This reinforces the idea 
that language is part of how we manage disciplinary boundaries; that to transfer terms 
across this boundary interrupts the relationship between words and their proper 
meanings. Again, Willis, in seeking to stray beyond accepted disciplinary boundaries, 
appears to fall foul of the restriction that language and terminology are ‘fixed’ in relation 
to the things they denote; rather than allowing for language to be a vehicle by which new 
meanings are generated - through importing objects, sense and meanings across different 
intellectual domains.  
 
What these discussions also reference is the idea that Willis’s chemical discourse reflected 
the influence of the alchemical tradition and works of Paracelsus, rather than the 
                                                      
20 Frank notes that modern commentators remain ‘befuddled’ by Willis’s corpuscular writing, p. 129. 
21 M. J. Eadie, ‘A Pathology of the Animal Spirits - the Clinical Neurology of Thomas Willis (1621-1675) 
Part II - Disorders of Intrinsically Abnormal Animal Spirits’, Journal of Clinical Neuroscience, 10.2 (2003), 146–
157 (p.156). 
22 Eadie, ‘A Pathology of the Animal Spirits’, Part I, p. 17. 
23 Michael Foster, Lectures on the History of Physiology During the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), p. 270, 275. 
24 Wes Wallace, ‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse in Newton, Willis and Gassendi: First Steps in a Mechanical 
Theory of Communication,’ Brain and Cognition, 51 (2003), pp. 66-94 (p. 75). 
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(acceptable) language of ‘modern’ chemistry - thus supposing that there was a clear 
distinction between the two that we can point to in this period. As discussed in chapter 
one, the alchemists were a group attacked, among other things, for their unrestrained use 
of elaborate and ornamental analogies. However, the idea of a shift from alchemy to 
chemistry in this period is itself a largely false distinction; it is impossible to meaningfully 
exclude the influence of the alchemical tradition from the “modern” chemistry of this 
period.25 As historian Ferdinando Abbri notes, in the early modern, ‘alchemy did not 
magically transform into chemistry; instead, obscure, volatile, and ancient ideas coexisted 
with clear and precise concepts.’ 26 Alchemical concepts and experiments were employed 
by a variety of groups, including the physicians and apothecaries - Willis was no 
exception in this regard.27 Stanton Linden has thus argued that, during this period 
alchemy was ‘reoriented’ towards medical applications rather than being rejected in any 
straightforward sense.28 It is to be expected, then, that Willis would have drawn on a 
variety of alchemical images and tropes, the use of which cannot be said to make him any 
less ‘modern’ or excessively ornamental, according to the standards of his time. 
 
Willis, Oxford’s Chemist 
 
Willis’s formal medical education was interrupted and curtailed by the outbreak of the 
English Civil War. He graduated with his MA in June 1642, just two months before the 
outbreak of hostilities and took up arms after only six months of formal training. His 
eventual award with a licence to practice medicine in 1646 was considered by Kenneth 
Dewhurst to be a ‘belated military honour,’ more than an academic achievement.29 The 
significance of this less than conventional path was that Willis was left at a considerable 
disadvantage when it came to medical practice. The deficit in his formal education was, 
however, augmented by his considerable chemical experience - initially under the wife of 
Thomas Iles, and later continued in his own rooms at Wadham College.30 In the early 
1640s, John Aubrey reported to Anthony Wood that Willis had ‘studied chymistry in 
                                                      
25 On this see: William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, ‘Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The Etymological 
Origins of a Historiographic Mistake,’ Early Science and Medicine, 3.1 (1998), pp. 32-65. 
26 Ferdinando Abbri, ‘Alchemy and Chemistry: Chemical Discourses in the Seventeenth Century’, Early 
Science and Medicine, 5.2, Alchemy and Hermeticism (2000), pp. 214-226 (p. 220). 
27 Stanton J. Linden, Darke Hieroglyphics: Alchemy in English Literature from Chaucer to the Restoration (Lexington, 
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 11.  
28 Ibid, p. 29. 
29 Kenneth Dewhurst, ‘Thomas Willis and the Foundations of British Neurology,’ in Historical Aspects of the 
Neurosciences, ed. by Frank C. Rose and William F. Bynum (New York: Raven Press, 1982), pp. 327-346 (p. 
328). 
30 Hawkins, ‘Piss Profits,’ p. 3.  
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Peckewater Inne chamber,’ while by 1649 John Lydall was referring to ‘Mr Willis our 
Chymist.’31 Indicative of his success and commitment to chemical investigation, Willis 
shared in furnishing a laboratory at Wadham during this time, at great expense.32  
 
By 1658, when Willis came to write his tract on fermentation, he had already amassed 
fifteen years of experience as an itinerant physician travelling between the medical 
markets around Oxford, where he prescribed a mix of traditional and chemical cures.33 
This background goes some way to explaining Willis’s considerable reliance upon 
chemical categories of explanation and frequent recourse to chemical analogy. His 
primary expertise and practical experience at this point in his career lay in medical 
chemistry, rather than anatomy or physiology.34 Michael Hawkins has aptly demonstrated 
how this chemical approach aided Willis’s professional and social interests; I build on this 
argument with a particular focus upon how chemical analogies informed (and thereby 
complicate) his knowledge about the brain and nerves.35 
 
Two Chemical Treatises: ‘Of Fermentation’ 
 
Along with his contemporaries, Willis turned away from Galen to draw on the new 
chemical-corpuscular principles in forwarding his account of fermentation. Chemistry in 
England during the seventeenth century was chiefly built upon corpuscularian physics. 
Imported from atomistic theory in the works of Pierre Gassendi, this sought to explain 
all natural phenomena according to the size, shape and motion of ‘atoms’ or ‘corpuscles,’ 
which comprised the smallest units of matter. The physical motions of these particles 
could be used to explain all perceptible changes in matter.36 Importantly, Willis diverted 
away from a purely mechanistic version of the corpuscular doctrine by describing 
chemical reactions both according to the activity and motions of corpuscles or particles, 
while at the same time maintaining that chemical properties had a ‘real existence in 
                                                      
31 John Aubrey, Brief Lives, vol. II (1669 – 1696), p.303. John Lydall to John Aubrey, 23 January (1648/9), 
Bodleian Library, MS. Aubrey 12 ff. 294r. 
32 Hawkins notes that Willis’s considerable expenditure on this laboratory highlights that his medical 
interests in chemistry, p. 10. 
33 Willis’s Oxford Casebook (1650-52), ed. by K. Dewhurst (Oxford, 1981), p. 42. 
34 Frank Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists (London: University of California Press, 1980), p. 169. 
35 Hawkins, p. 13. 
36  Antonio Clericuzio has argued that ‘in England and in Germany the combination of chemical 
Helmontianism and Boyle’s corpuscular views was fairly widespread’: Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A 
Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 6. 
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matter.’ 37  In line with these approaches, Willis’s account defined ferment by the action 
or motion of heterogeneous particles, contained within a body or vessel: 
 
Fermentation is an intestine motion of Particles, or the principles of every Body, 
either tending to the perfection of the same Body, or because of its change into 
another (DD, p.9). 
 
Ferments only occurred between particles of different chemical compositions, chiefly as 
a reaction between volatile alkaline salts or spirits, particles of sulphur and nitre. Under a 
ferment, the bonds between these particles were broken apart and reformulated; 
‘intestine’ here referred to these internal activities of particles, as they occurred within the 
body.38  Particles that were ‘of the same kind’ did not ferment. In all instances, the 
product of this particulate ‘tumult’ was an immoderate heat, violent motion or swelling 
of the matter (DD, p.1). Fermentation was a concept had long been employed by 
chemical philosophers as a means of explaining organic processes of growth, change and 
decay in natural bodies. It was, as Willis observed, a term chiefly associated with human 
industry – in the baking of bread, the brewing of beer and the production of wine (DD, 
p.1). It had also been used in alchemical discourses, since the fifteenth century, to 
describe a concept of an original life-force or ‘seminal sparks’ hidden in matter – this 
particular definition carried problematic cosmological associations, which Willis sought 
to avoid.39 The term ferment was also employed more broadly in this period as a 
metaphor for any agitation, violent tumult or agent of change within a body, applicable 
across medical, religious and political discourses. For example, John Locke, a student of 
Willis, spoke of his hypothesis laying ‘a ferment for rebellion.’40 It was also associated, 
through emerging physiological models, with the mental commotion and violence 
                                                      
37 Frank Jr., Harvey, p. 165; Clericuzio, Elements, p. 81. Audrey B. Davis also connected Willis’s ‘mechanico-
chemical’ concepts to figures such as Francis Glisson, van Helmont, Harvey, and Sylvius in ‘Some 
Implications of the Circulation Theory for Disease Theory and Treatment in the Seventeenth Century,’ 
Journal of the History of Medicine, 26 (1971), pp. 28-39. 
38 "intestine, adj.", The Oxford English Dictionary Online, March 2016.  
39 See for example, Ben Johnson’s Alchemist (1612) which refers to ferment as a seminal spark in matter: 
‘ferment, n.’, in The Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press). Allan Chapman and Anna 
Marie Roos both note that Willis eschewed the metaphysical or occult elements of Helmontian chemistry 
while retaining the basic tenets of his chemical model of ferments: Chapman, ‘Alchemy to Airpumps,’ p. 
37; Anna Marie Roos, The Salt of the Earth: Natural Philosophy, Medicine, and Chymistry in England, 1650-1750 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 113. 
40 John Locke, Two treatises of government, 1st edition, vol. 1 (London: Printed for Awnsham Churchill, 1690), 
p. 224. 
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experienced in an extreme passion as when, in 1671, John Milton spoke of his grief’s 
‘ferment and rage.’41 
 
Fermentation, as a subject of medical concern, was not new to Willis. It had long been 
linked to Aristotelian and Galenic notions of putrefaction and decay in the body. 
Ferments had, however, traditionally been explained according to humoral frameworks – 
a model that had, as Willis put it, in the age of ‘the circular motion of the Blood’, ‘began 
to be a little suspected’ (DD, p. 58). Willis’s proposed account of fermentation, as a 
chemical-corpuscular phenomenon, applicable to the blood, marked his rejection of 
traditional humoral medical theory. 42 Willis also incorporated the new frameworks of 
Harveian physiology, by building his explanations of the vital heat around the circulation 
of the blood.43  
 
What proved most contentious, though, was Willis’s application of the chemical-
corpuscular model of ferment from the liquids of the laboratory to the noble, life-giving 
liquor of the blood. Indeed, the entire basis of Willis’s account of fermentation relied 
upon his proposal of an analogous relationship between chemical spirits and those found 
within the blood. One of the primary ways in which Willis sought to justify this 
conflation of chemical and medical spirits was by noting the sheer scale of fermentation 
as an occurrence found throughout nature. As he reflects at the start of Fermentation, 
 
I thought I had been tyed only to the Bakers oven, and Brewers Furnace, being 
condemned to the Mill not to have proceeded beyond their limits, unless by chance, 
or with leave; but after that I had begun to look more deeply into the matter, I 
perceived I had gotten a far more large Province: Because it plainly appeared, 
besides these of Art, very many works of Nature, to be not only like, but themselves 
the effects of Fermentation. (Preface) 
 
As Willis argued here, the concept of ferment was applicable to any ‘Effervency or 
Turgency, that is raised up in a Natural Body, by particles of that Body variously agitated’ 
                                                      
41John Milton, Paradise regain'd, a poem in IV books: to which is added Samson Agonistes, 1st edition, vol.1 
(London: Printed by J.M. for John Starkey, 1671), p. 619. 
42 Isler cites Willis as the next major point of innovation in the history of the concept after Van Helmont 
and Sylvius, p. 66. 
43 Frank Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists, p. 167. Anna Marie Roos has argued that the Diatribae 
introduced ‘iatromechanism’ into English medicine by combining physical and chemical explanations 
within the new Harviean physiology and alongside traditional Galenic therapeutics: Salt of the Earth, p. 113. 
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(DD, p.1). Many diverse bodies were ‘apt to a Fermenting’ – liquid or solid, animate or 
inanimate, natural and artificial – from wine to the blood. Any chemical body, that is, 
which contained a ‘heterogeneity of parts or particles’ (DD, p.1). By having rendered 
fermentation as a specifically chemical definition, based on particulate motion, Willis 
converted what would otherwise have been an analogy between these different 
substances into a shared feature: by his definition, a ferment is not a specific 
characteristic of any one kind of material body, but a mechanism shared between many. 
Conveying this greatly enlarged the scope of his examples, Willis also used ferment as a 
metaphor for the ambitious ‘swelling’ of his own work: ‘I have brought into this Tract, as 
it were swelled up with a certain Ferment, the whole Provision, and Dowry of all Nature 
(Preface).  
 
For Willis, the entire natural world was ‘pregnant’ with ‘fermentative particles,’ which 
operated as the agents of all generation, change and growth in nature. Each and every 
corner of it was busied with a perpetual motion and agitation, just as burrowing ‘little 
Emmits in a Mole-hill’ (DD, p.16). As Willis noted, by the ‘varieties of Fermentation,’ 
the reasons for ‘the beginnings and endings of things’ were to be sought (DD, p.2). The 
operations of the human body were no exception. Just as fermentation could be 
observed throughout nature, and replicated in the laboratory and, so it could be 
identified in the body. Willis stressed that these ‘many works of Nature’ provided him 
with a certain weight of evidence for his notion that the blood fermented ‘just like’ other, 
similarly mixed, chemical bodies. Clearly, the precise action of ferment in the blood 
(occurring between atoms) could not be directly witnessed or demonstrated and so its 
‘evidence’ remained to an extent based on an analogy drawn between (and ultimately 
constituted by) some alternative chemical, laboratory-produced counterpart. Importantly, 
if Willis could propose that ferments in chemical substances occurred by the same 
mechanism as those within the blood, then the chemist’s knowledge of ferments, 
through their experiments heating and distilling chemical substances, could have a key 
role to play in furthering medical knowledge. I will return to this discussion later in the 
chapter. 
 
Problematically, it was unclear as to whether Willis was actually attempting to propose 
that liquors such as wine merely fermented like the blood or if they were being taken as 
the same event; this lingering ambiguity is left largely unresolved in Willis’s text and 
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created a tricky and contentious path for him to tread with his more critical readers. 
While many natural bodies appeared to share in the fermentative mechanism Willis 
explored here – in that they might swell or grow hot - the blood, as a vital, life-sustaining 
substance in humans and the most subtle of all material bodies ultimately belonged to a 
different order to the common, gross matter of wine, bread or milk and needed to be 
somehow made distinct from them. Willis pre-empted the likely objections that would 
follow from those accusing him of ‘prostituting unusual Notions…almost only heard of, 
in the shops of the Chymists’ in respect of the noble substance of the blood (DD, 
‘Preface’). He nevertheless firmly stated the superior explanatory power of chemistry, above 
all other approaches, as a means of unfolding the ‘nature and affections of the blood’ 
(DD, p.3). He considered that the directly perceivable effects of chemical change in 
matter would better equip him – through his use of analogy – to furnish the reader with 
intelligible explanations on the hidden events of the blood. As he noted, chemistry 
allowed the philosopher to ‘more easily’ represent phenomena ‘to the vulgar capacity, 
and lay them not only before their Eyes, but even into their very Hands’ (DD, p.3). This 
picks up on a particular way of thinking about the work of analogy as a means by which 
the reader might ‘see’ a new object through the calling to memory of a familiar one, 
represented in the text – a model that Bacon has also discussed in relation to rhetorical 
invention in science.44 This presentation to the eyes and hands of the reader was, 
importantly, supported by the fact that the effects of chemical changes in matter were a 
part of everyday life – from brewing beer to making cheese.  Here, Willis appears to 
position his use of a chemical analogy with the blood as a device intended to support the 
‘vulgar’ capacity of his readers; however, in his own writing, a reliance on chemical 
ferment as a metaphor for the properties of the blood suggests a much finer blurring of 
the boundaries between the image as cognitive support and as an idea which has since 
come to stand for the phenomenon under discussion. 
 
Willis’s application of chemical ferments as an explanatory framework for physiological 
and pathological events relied, ultimately, on the possibility of his applying a chemical 
analysis to the blood. As Willis set out in his preface to the reader, ‘I thought best, the 
common acception of humors being laid aside, to bring into use these celebrated 
Principles of the Chymists, for the unfolding the Nature of the Blood and its affections’ 
                                                      
44 Francis Bacon makes an argument about the work of analogy in bringing objects more directly to the 
senses in his The Advancement of Learning (1605), see: Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. with an introduction 
by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Book II, pp. 26-43 (p. 42).  
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(DD, p.59). The blood according to Willis was, like all natural substances, comprised of 
the five chemical principles embodied within material atoms or corpuscles – this was an 
amendment of Aristotle’s four elemental principles. Willis affirmed ‘all Bodies to consist 
of Spirit, Sulpher, Salt, Water, and Earth’ (DD, p.2). These elements differed in their 
levels of activity: Spirit, sulphur, salt were all highly active while water and earth were of a 
more fixed state. 45 Willis held that all chemical change occurred through a continuous 
process of forging new combinations between these particles, each of differing levels of 
volatility.46 It was these processes of transformation in natural bodies that the chemists 
sought to replicate by heating, evaporating, condensing, distilling and separating liquid 
compounds into vessels. As Willis wrote, it was ‘by an Analysis made by Fire,’ that 
chemistry ‘resolves all Bodies’ into the five principles (DD, p.2). On this basis it could be 
proposed that the blood acted (and fermented) in a manner comparable to other 
chemical substances.  
 
Chemistry was itself governed by an overarching anatomical metaphor: Willis proposed 
that the chemical hypothesis ‘determinates Bodies into Sensible parts, and cuts open 
things as it were to the life’, on which basis ‘it pleases us before the rest’ (DD, p.2). Like 
the anatomist, the chemist produces new knowledge by reducing a body into its 
component parts. As Willis wrote of the blood, ‘there are therefore in the blood as in all 
Liquors, apt to be Fermented, very much of Water and Spirit, a mean of Salt and 
Sulphur, and a little of Earth’ (DD, p.59).47 Moreover, by conceiving of the blood as a 
chemical compound, this allowed him to suggest that it could be subjected to the same 
modes of analysis as other chemical substances – including heating and separating it into 
its constituent parts. The nature of the blood - as a mixed chemical compound, rich in 
spirit and sulphur - was a key part of Willis’s explanation of the blood’s constant and 
self-perpetuating ferment. These chemical ideas did not merely represent devices to be 
used in illustrating a set of related yet distinct ideas to Willis’s readers; they formed a set 
of shared experimental practices applied to the blood in the same manner that they 
                                                      
45 Audrey Davis has argued that Willis’s concept of abnormal fevers was based around his five chemical 
principles, itself an extension of Paracelsian iatrochemistry: ‘Some Implications of the Circulation Theory’, 
pp. 28-39. 
46 Chapman notes that all chemical change in the seventeenth century was characterised by the ‘ceaseless 
wrestlings’ of atoms: ‘Alchemy to Airpumps’, p. 37. 
47 This was an amendment of older elemental theories see: Jan Prins, Walter Warner (ca. 1557-1643) and his 
Notes on Animal Organisms (PhD thesis: Utrecht, 1992). Audrey Davis notes that in the second half of the 
seventeenth century many physicians in England, including Walter Charleton, Francis Glisson, and 
Thomas Willis shared the same opinion on the elemental composition of the blood, ‘Some Implications,’ 
p. 73, 82. 
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would be used in an examination of wine or beer. This approach went someway to 
justifying Willis’s use of analogous comparisons between ferments in the blood and other 
volatile, chemical liquids - such as with wine, as the next section explores.  
 
The vital flame as ferment 
 
Despite the association with a violent tumult or commotion, Willis considered ferments 
to be a natural and constant condition of the blood. It was the chief mechanism by 
which he sought to explain its organic heat, effervescence, motion, consistency and 
certain pathological conditions. Above all, though, ferments were a means of explaining 
the vital heat of the blood – upon which all life, motion and sense depended – without 
recourse to a discernable flame or fire.48 As Willis noted, ferment came from the word 
‘Ferviment’, or ‘growing hot,’ from the Latin root to boil (DD, p.1). The blood’s heat and 
effervescence was explained by Willis in terms of a nitro-sulphurous ferment, which 
occurred, he argued, when heavier sulphurous particles (introduced by digestion) and 
nitrous particles taken from the air in respiration were joined with alkaline salts or spirits 
contained within the blood - much like ordinary flames received fuel and were sustained 
by the air.  
 
This ferment in the blood originated with a ‘chief ferment’ placed by nature within the 
ventricles of the heart. The ‘vital flame’ induced or ‘inkindled’ a ferment among the 
spirits of the blood, which was renewed each time they circulated through the heart. A 
fermentative heat was thereby transported to all parts of the body by the continuous 
circulation of the blood. As Willis wrote, ‘the first beginnings of Life proceed from the 
Spirit Fermenting in the Heart, as it were in a certain little punct,’ which in this case 
referred to the centric point of a geometric system or model (DD, p.13). Drawing on 
experiences from the kitchen and laboratory, Willis explained this process in the heart as 
occurring ‘much like Water boyling over a Fire,’ and as a process that was ignited within 
the ‘chimny’ of the heart (DD, p.13). This was explicitly a chemical event, as Willis 
described the effect on the blood in terms of the loosening of the bonds between spirit, 
salt and sulphur, which allowed them to break apart and form new bonds. 
 
                                                      
48 Frank Jr., Harvey, p. 168. 
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In these discussions, Willis effectively recast the much older notion of a vital flame – 
commonly used to convey a notion of organic heat and a life force in the blood or heart - 
in the language of chemical corpuscular philosophy. The ‘flame’ becomes a metaphor for 
the literal process of particulate commotion or ferment, rather than a literal 
representation of fire or an innate heat in the solid parts of the heart, as per Descartes’ 
mechanical theory. 49 Though ferment in this context was itself an analogy – in that it 
transposed observations from chemical substances to the hidden events of the blood – in 
the case of the vital heat, fermentation was employed as the actual mechanism underlying 
the analogy or metaphor of the vital flame. Willis frequently sought to make clear that 
the fermentative event behind the ‘vital flame’ was only like or ‘akin to’ domestic flame 
or fire, notably establishing it as a distinct form of combustion (non-destructive) based 
upon his particulate model: a fire without flame. As Frank has argued, Willis’s chemical 
theory of fermentation had obviated the need for an actual flame by explaining the 
production of heat as a particulate agitation.50 Willis drew upon many traditional terms 
and images in his discussion, but his idea of ‘enkindling’ the vital spirits of the blood was 
substantially new and chemically defined. 51  In referring to the heart as a ‘hearth’, 
‘furnace’ or ‘fireplace,’ Willis conveyed the conditions under which heat was applied to the 
blood, just as it was in the furnaces of the laboratory when heating wine – but this did 
not necessarily demonstrate the presence of a literal flame in the blood itself. 
 
Despite these assertions, Willis continued to (heavily) employ what was viewed as the 
traditional language of the vital flame and fire, such as when he spoke of the blood 
growing ‘impetuously hot and as it were inkindled into a flame.’ Willis certainly stressed a 
significant degree of proximity between ferments and the flame of the chemist, in terms 
of their shared effects and outcome. He used the terms almost interchangeably in his 
discussions: ferments are like a ‘flame put to wine’ while the ‘alteration which the blood 
receives in the Heart, may be equally deduced from a flame, or a Nitrous Sulphureous 
ferment’ (DD, p.66). Just as the flame in the kitchen or the chemist’s fire acted on and 
transformed matter, the vital heat in the blood gave rise to all organic changes, growth or 
decay in the body. This language was more a means of translating Willis’s familiar 
experiences and practices in the laboratory to the body, than it was indicative of his belief 
in an actual flame or fire. The use of this analogy was, however, far too vague for some 
                                                      
49 Frank Jr., p. 291. 
50 Ibid, p. 165. 
51 Ibid, p. 190. 
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contemporary commentators and a number queried whether the flame was being taken 
in a literal sense by Willis. These debates were properly addressed by Willis in an 
amendment featured in his later work during the 1670s, and will be returned to in greater 
detail in chapter five.52 
 
The resulting state of a boiling ‘tumult’ or ‘turgency’ within the blood, its swelling and 
expansion, similarly helped Willis to express the energy or force granted to the blood for 
its circulation about the body. Drawing here on topographical analogies, Willis expresses 
how when the blood is delivered to heart by the veins it is ‘running gently like a River,’ 
where after contact with the ferment, it becomes ‘like a Torrent’ with ‘noise and rage’ 
(DD, p.13). As Willis notes in the second tract on fevers, this fermentative force ensured 
that the blood ‘might be carried forward to all the parts of the whole body’ (DD, p.65). 
Willis therefore uses chemical ferments at least as a supplement to Harvey’s mechanical 
metaphor of the heart as a pump in explaining the circulation of blood. Willis still 
employs a mechanistic explanation here in that ferments involve the physical properties 
and motion of particles, but it is also explained by recourse to the specific chemical 
properties of certain particles. Certainly, Willis talks elsewhere about the blood being 
‘wheeled about after a constant manner, as it were in a water Engine’ (DD, p.64). We 
therefore have two different types of analogy – one chemical, one mechanical – being 
used to express the same thing (the circulation of the blood) in different parts of the 
discourse. These were not mutually exclusive analogies, as they refer to different aspects 
of a complex model – they nevertheless complicate any straightforwardly mechanistic 
reading of Willis. 
 
Chemical analogy: blood into wine 
 
Willis’s model of ferments in the blood was primarily built upon an analogy that he 
sought to establish between the chemical properties of spirits in blood and those found 
in wine. As he observed, ferments were chiefly met with in the blood as in ‘the working 
of Wine, and of other Liquors’ (Preface). Willis identified rich wine as a similarly volatile 
                                                      
52 Robert Boyle and John Mayow were especially hostile to Willis’s explanation of the vital flame, which 
Boyle directly attacked in his The Sceptical Chymist (London, 1661). On these debates see: Antonio 
Clericuzio, ‘The Internal Laboratory: The Chemical Reinterpretation of Medical Spirits in England (1650-
1680)’, in Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th Centuries, ed. by Piyo Rattansi and Antonio Clericuzio 
(Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 51-83 (p. 65-6); Ann Thomson, Bodies of 
Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
80-81. 
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liquid and proposed that both liquids were very much inclined to ferment (to a 
comparable degree) when heat was applied. The appropriateness of the wine analogy was 
defended by his noting that, ‘excepting the Blood of Animals, there are no Liquors that 
grow hot, like Wines,’ and in no other substances were there to be found such a supply 
of spirits, salt and sulphur (DD, p.23). What this meant was that the results produced by 
heating and experimenting with wine in the laboratory came closest to what Willis 
conceived of as the qualities of the blood, from his (limited) experiments on it, in terms 
of its notable effervescency and self-producing heat. The self-perpetuating ferment in the 
blood was, for example, ‘continually conserved; as is perceived in Wine, Beer, and other 
Liquors’ (DD, p.58). Wine behaved in a manner that fitted with and represented Willis’s 
physiological ideas about the blood – effervescency and heat were features already 
conceptually tied to the blood, which Willis was attempting to demonstrate (rather than 
discover) in a new chemical context through this useful analogy. The comparison of the 
blood with wine - especially as a context for thinking about the blood’s vital and life-
sustaining properties – clearly also drew on one of the most significant cultural 
repositories for imagery and metaphor in this period: the Bible. Its use in this context 
helped to plug a discussion of hidden and difficult chemical processes into the much 
more familiar and resonate language and imagery of liturgical life. 53  It was no great leap 
to think about the blood and wine as sharing in a symbolic resemblance, though it was 
far less clear to what extent this was to function as an analogy in the sense that Willis 
employed the comparison.  
 
The comparison with wine proved to be a central organising analogy, which helped unite 
Willis’s explanations across the tract on ferments and fevers. The visible and violent 
effervescence of wine and its explosive ability to break apart containing vessels – either 
when heated in the laboratory or left to ferment too long in barrels – notably informed 
Willis’s discourse on fevers. He noted, for instance, that when ‘new Wine, or new Ale or 
Beer, be closely Bottl’d up, or put into Vessels of small vent, they will grow so very hot, 
that often the Vessels are in danger of breaking’ (DD, p.1). This provided Willis with a 
                                                      
53 On the Bible as a rich source of narrative and imagery within representations on the early modern stage 
see: Helen Wilcox, ‘Biblical Presences in Shakespeare’s Tragicomedies,’ in Early Modern Drama and the Bible: 
Contexts and Readings, 1570-1625, ed. by A. Streete, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 48-67 (p. 51). 
As Wilcox notes, the Bible was ‘a major source of English vocabulary and style, rich in metaphor, turns of 
phrase and varieties of rhetorical forms.’ This familiarity was enhanced with the addition of the newly 
translated vernacular edition in this period. On the relationship between the body (as a source of evidence 
about nature) and religious metaphor in this period see: Peter Harrison, ‘The Book of Nature and Early 
Modern Science,’ in The Book of Nature in Early and Modern History, ed. by Klass van Berkel and Arjo 
Vanderjagt (Leuven: Groningen Studies in Cultural Change, 2006), pp. 1-26 (p. 6). 
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fitting and accessible analogy by which to express the symptomatic experiences of a 
fever, long expressed in terms of boiling or ‘raging’ of the blood. Fermenting liquors of 
wine and beer were particularly useful analogies to draw upon here as they were also 
familiar and common phenomena.  
 
The perceived proximity of bodily spirits with those found in wine (in terms of their 
states of volatility and reactivity) was reinforced or demonstrated by the commonly 
observed association between alcohol consumption and cognitive impairment. This 
relationship suggested the susceptibility of bodily spirits to reactions with the spirits 
contained in wine. As George Acton remarked in 1668, writing about Willis’s work on 
fermentation, ‘wee see how soon a little Spirit of Wine cheers and quickens the vital 
Spirit, by mingling it self presently with it by reason of their Analogie.’54 Moreover, 
according to the logic of the comparison, wine responded to the introduction of certain 
chemicals in a manner analogous to the blood’s own response to diet and other ingested 
substances or medical preparations. Just as salt ‘fixes’ wine in the alembic (making it less 
volatile), so the ‘Blood, being become salt, by means of an ill dyet, becomes less 
Spiritous’ (DD, p.7). This extends the analogy from the shared effects of ferments within 
wine and blood (as in heat or effervescence), to offer up a chemical framework for 
pathological explanations and even a model for medical care of the body – as I return to 
shortly. 
 
Besides wine, Willis also drew upon analogies from the domestic and agricultural setting 
to express his theory of fermentation. Ferments were commonly implicated in the 
coagulation of milk, making cheese or baking bread. Willis thus noted that milk and 
blood both soured and became ‘corrupt’ when spirits and sulphur ‘fly away’ from the 
mixture (DD, p.5). In his tract on fevers also, Willis identified ‘a similitude of it with 
Milk,’ which he used to explain coagulation of the blood into separate parts in instances 
of disease or post-mortem (DD, p.62). Taking wine and milk together, Willis further 
noted that the ‘Analogy of it with Wine and Milk is yet further confirmed by the use of 
them in our diet, out of which the blood is generated’ (DD, p.63). He observed that 
babies require milk for nourishment, while wine energises and ‘restores’ the vital spirits in 
the old. These comparisons were, Willis stated, ‘sufficient’ for showing the kinds of 
particles and substances comprising the blood. What he underlines here is that these 
                                                      
54 George Acton, Physical reflections upon a letter written by J. Denis…concerning a new way of curing sundry diseases by 
transfusion of blood (London: printed by T.R. for J. Martyn, 1668), p. 8. 
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chemical substances were not so distant from the body after all; they impacted on 
everyday lived (or embodied) experiences, as substances that were literally assimilated 
into the body as part of its nourishment and fuel.  
 
This use of common substances from the domestic sphere supported Willis  - as much as 
his readers - in attempting to comprehend alien and hidden events inside the body. As he 
observed, the ‘principles of the blood’ would ‘better appear’ by the comparison with 
liquors that are ‘in dayly use among us’ (p.59). It was on this basis that Dewhurst argued 
in the 1980s that Willis had effected a ‘farmyard empiricism’, on the grounds that he 
‘frequently argued by analogy, particularly those based on farmyard empiricism involving 
various forms of fermentation taking place in the kitchen, brewhouse, dairy, orchards, 
stables and fields of his North Hinksey farmhouse home.’ 55 Of course, Willis was not 
simply restrained to the kitchen or farmhouse, but significantly rooted his discussion of 
ferments in the setting of the laboratory – as I have noted in respect of his use of the 
wine analogy. As Don G. Bates argued (using Willis’s own analogy), in adopting new 
iatrochemical explanations Willis poured ‘new wine’ into ‘old bottles’ and conjured ‘up 
the laboratory rather than the kitchen.’56  
 
Ferments and Fevers: medical applications 
 
It was in Willis’s tract on fevers that the full medical implications of his new chemical 
definition of the blood and fermentation were set out. Though Willis indicated that his 
tract, ‘Of Fevers’ was founded on his extended observations and case histories of febrile 
diseases in his patients, what it essentially did was to apply his new model of ferments to 
these experiences. As Willis declared, ‘every Disease acts its Tragedies by the strength of 
some Ferment.’ Fevers were, he stated, the ‘chief instance’ of ferment (DD, p.16). 
Chemical ferments would, therefore, stand in place of the four humors at the centre of 
Willis’s disease categories. 57  All diseases were ultimately understood by Willis as a 
perversion of natural ferments in the blood. Under normal conditions, fermentation 
occurred in a consistent and moderate manner, affecting a ‘natural’ heat. This worked to 
maintain a healthy consistency of the blood by separating out and burning up any 
                                                      
55 Thomas Willis, Willis’s Oxford Lectures, ed. by Kenneth Dewhurst (Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1980), 
p. 155. 
56 Bates, Fevers Literature, p. 50. 
57 Andrew Wear, Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 362; Chapman, ‘Alchemy to Airpumps’, p. 37. 
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unwanted substances that had been introduced. However, if from poor diet or internal 
fault (i.e. faulty digestion), the chemical composition of the blood became improperly 
balanced or ‘corrupted’, then a preternaturally vehement commotion and boiling heat 
would follow. A diet rich in sulphur, for instance, made the spirits more volatile and 
created a more vehement ferment. As he described, 
 
The Liquor of the blood, continually boils up with their effervescency or growing 
hot […] if any Heterogeneous thing, or unagreeable to the mixture, be poured into 
the bloody mass, presently the Spirits being disturbed in their motion rage, shake 
the blood. (DD, p.59) 
 
The primary outcome of this event was a fever, which Willis described as ‘a 
Fermentation, or immoderate Heat, brought into the blood’ (DD, p.57). The internal 
motion caused by a fever was considerably violent, and ‘as it were truly an intestine war 
of the blood’ (DD, p.64), ‘intestine’ here meaning something that was internal, referring 
to the activity of particles contained within the body.58 Besides faulty digestion, poor diet 
or some poisonous matter, the heart could also be said to be at fault, when it inkindled 
the blood too much ‘as it were by fires put under it’ (DD, p.65). Fevers, then, were an 
ever-present and lingering threat to the healthy equilibrium of the body. They could arise 
from a number of causes, but in each case a disruption of the blood’s ‘natural’ ferment 
was the result. 
 
We see in Willis’s Oxford lectures especially, given in 1661, how these ideas shaped his 
medical approach, which held a particular focus on pathologies associated with the brain 
and nerves. As Willis had already noted, it was from fevers that the ‘great vices of the 
Natural oeconomy or Government’ arose – a metaphor that carried striking overtones in 
a period that saw society scarred by religious and political ferment and discord (DD, 
p.57).59 In his lectures, Willis expanded on the direct consequences ferments had for the 
brain, being implicated in various states from frenzy, delirium, melancholia, mania, and 
epilepsy to stupidity. He described, for example, how the circulating blood carrying the 
‘taint’ of feverish imbalances introduced ‘heterogeneous matter’ that ‘boils and swells in 
the brain,’ making it ‘completely unsuitable for the cortical regimen’ as it  ‘incites the 
                                                      
58 "intestine, adj.", The Oxford English Dictionary Online, March 2016.  
59 The metaphors of ‘oeconomy’ and ‘government’ are discussed in relation to this political context in 
chapter five of this thesis, p. 193. 
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spirits to various distractions’ in the nerves.60 Willis also took passion states more 
generally, such as ‘anger, sudden passions, terror, joy, intemperance, drunkenness, 
immoderate exercise,’ as being conditions that could give rise to (as well as be caused by) 
ferments.61 Notably, in his approach to treating these pathologies, Willis reasserted the 
value of chemical analogy, noting that the causes of melancholy, for example, must in the 
first instance be sought in the analogy between animal spirits and those spirits ‘extracted 
by chymical means.’ 62 Any investigation into their causes, effects and treatments was to 
be guided by chemical analogy.  
 
The language that Willis used to discuss fevers drew directly on his experiences in the 
laboratory investigating ferments. Fevers, he noted, were exacerbated by adding too 
much of one substance to a mixture, or when too strong a fire is used, while the blood 
would ‘boil over’ as with the ‘pot’ sat upon a stove. Of course, if the ferments of wine 
and those of the (diseased) blood were accepted as behaving in comparable ways, as 
similarly volatile chemical compounds, then the chemist was to be granted a measure of 
authority in the forwarding of medical explanations. Willis even declared that he could 
unfold the ‘Curatory intentions,’ effects and operations of every medicine according to 
the ‘Doctrine of Fermentation’ (DD, p.16). Specifically, Willis continued to refer to 
processes and observations involved in heating and experimenting with wine. Fevers 
were, he repeatedly stated, ‘best illustrated by an example of Wines growing hot’ (DD, 
p.66). In ever more explicit detail, he describes how, 
 
The Constitution of the Blood in a continual Feaver, is of the same sort as of 
Wines, when they grow hot […] in an Intermitting Feaver, the Blood is moved after 
that manner, as Wines […] Moreover, in this Feaver, the disposition of the Blood is 
of that sort, as of Wines, when in their decay and declination, they become ropy, 
unsavoury, or acid (DD, p.90). 
 
As we can see here, Willis effectively used levels of fermentative activity in the spirits of 
the blood to establish a spectrum on which to plot out the boundaries between normal 
                                                      
60 Willis, Lectures, ed. Dewhurst, p. 85. 
61 Willis, Lectures, p. 82. 
62 Willis, Lectures, p. 122. John Locke made a personal copy of these lectures from his notes, which are still 
held at the Bodleian library – on this see Dewhurst’s introduction to the Lectures and Frank, Harvey, p. 182. 
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and pathological states.63 He attempted to classify different types of fever (continual, 
intermittent) according to a schema that was, moreover, directly lifted from the different 
states or stages involved in the production of wine. Importantly, out of this discourse, 
emerges another related analogy: the work of the physician becomes analogous to that of 
the vintner. 
 The physician-vintner 
 
Like the vintner tending to wine, the task of the physician was, according to Willis’s 
comparison, to manage and maintain healthy ferments within the blood. As Willis noted, 
the vintner’s art offered up an analogous model: 
 
Yea we also endeavour the Cure of Diseases by the help of Fermentation: For to 
the preserving or recovering the Health of man, the business of a Physician and a 
Vintner, is almost the same: the blood and humors even as Wine, ought to be kept 
in an equal temper and motion of Fermentation. (DD, p.16) 
 
A moderate, well-managed ferment acted to maintain health; it sustained a requisite level 
of heat and could act as a ‘cure’ in burning up any unwanted and potentially harmful 
matter introduced to the blood. Blurring professional boundaries still further, Willis even 
discussed the ‘physical science’ taught to the vintners as comparable to a ‘Method of 
Medicine’ (DD, p.23-4). Interestingly, Willis allows the analogy to extend in the opposite 
direction too by referring to the condition of wine in medical terms – he notes that when 
the vintner purges wine of its impurities, its own ‘sickness may be healed’ (DD, p.23). 
Wine gets ‘sick’ in the same sense that the blood ‘ferments’, in the respect that their 
‘fault’ is rooted in the same mechanism (a chemical imbalance).  
 
Despite his chemical explanation of these events, Willis continued to advocate largely 
traditional Galenic therapeutics, such as blood letting and purges in instances of fever - 
perhaps because of the limits of as yet unproven chemical preparations, or because of the 
more orthodox expectations of patients. He nevertheless advocated these familiar 
                                                      
63 Frank has argued that, for Willis, ferments were the ‘key to unlocking’ the ‘medical benefits’ of Harvey’s 
new theory, Harvey, p. 167. Chapman has also argued that an understanding of ferments structured Willis’s 
medical approach, ‘Alchemy to Airpumps,’ p. 37. 
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practices according to the discourse of his new fermentation model – that is, by the 
language of wine production. For instance, he affirmed the usefulness of blood-letting (in 
specific stages of a fever) by noting that ‘when the blood grows too hot, even as Wine, it 
is usual to empty some out of the Vessels, and to ally its Fervor with temperat things’ 
(DD, p.16). When the blood ‘grows less hot that it should do,’ the physician should apply 
‘Cardiacks, Digestives’ to restore fermentation in the blood ‘no otherwise than Wines 
growing sour […] are mixed with more rich Lees, whereby they may purge or grow 
turgid anew’ (DD, p.16). Here, the professional discourse of the physician and the 
vintner merge.  
 
The wine analogy was projected, then, from the vintner’s craft, via the laboratory, to the 
fevered body of the patient – a series of intellectual leaps shortened by the capacity of 
the wine-analogy to encapsulate widely held notions around fever as a violent heat or 
raging of the blood. The analogy, supported by the noted effects on wine on an 
individual’s constitution, was an effective one: George Acton writing in 1668, cited 
Willis’s ‘excellent’ treatise on fermentation and affirmed the analogy between wine and 
the blood under a fever: the ‘motion in the Wine (as in our case of the fever) is stir’d up 
by the natural force and activity of its Spirit […] the scope of Nature is the very same in 
the fit of a fever.’ 64 Properly speaking, the physician-vintner analogy worked in so far as 
the intellectual activities of the iatrochemist – mapping chemical-corpuscular explanation 
onto the body of the patient - made ferments in wine and the body the same kind of 
event. This comparison was not in itself new; Don Bates notes, for instances, that the 
comparison with wine-making and bodily processes was itself Galenic.65 The degree to 
which Willis relied upon the analogy in his explanations was, however, certainly 
distinctive. As were the implications that he drew from the comparison, namely that the 
blood really was a chemical compound (rather than a composite of humors), which acted 
and fermented in a manner so closely united with wine as to be barely distinguishable. 
 
Willis’s doctrine proved to be highly influential. Summing up his influence in this matter, 
in 1684, Robert Boyle invited his readers to consider ‘how ordinary it is, especially since 
the Learned Dr. Willis’s Writings came to be applauded, to look upon Fevers as 
                                                      
64 George Acton, Physical reflections, p. 5. 
65 Bates, Fevers, pp. 45-70. 
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inordinate Fermentations of the Blood.’66 However, as I will now show, Willis’s doctrine 
aroused strenuous opposition from some of his contemporaries, much of which centred 
around the appropriateness (or not) of employing chemical analogies in a medical 
context. In particular, the close proximity between wine and the blood invited especially 
critical responses. 
 
Chemical analogies and medical contexts 
 
On the one hand, the spirits of the blood needed to be defined as physical, chemical 
corpuscles in order to justify investigating their powers along physiological lines. On the 
other, they needed to remain distinct enough from other types of matter, so as to be 
situated as a special kind of vital matter – that is, as material bodies which performed the 
life-sustaining operations of the corporeal soul in the body. Willis would have needed to 
tread a fine line between advocating his chemical-corpuscularian models whilst 
simultaneously avoiding charges of materialist heresy, which is discussed in more detail in 
chapter five. These tensions are relevant here in that they framed some of the more 
critical responses to Willis’s doctrine on fermentation. His evident reliance upon the 
analogy between spirits of wine and the blood in the tract raised the troubling prospect 
that Willis had failed to maintain a proper distinction between the subject and its object 
of comparison; that the spirits of the corporeal soul were, in fact, being taken as 
interchangeable with crude and base liquors. The comparison was so heavily utilised as 
an explanatory resource, that it is indeed difficult to see precisely where they (blood and 
wine) might have separated.  
 
Willis’s import of terms and explanatory categories from experimental chemistry to 
forward new physiological theories represented, for some, a serious transgression of 
disciplinary boundaries and posed a direct threat to a still largely Galenic medical 
establishment.67 John Betts, for example, argued in his De Ortu et Natura Sanguinis (1669) 
that the chemists had ‘subverted’ medicine and that chemistry was only useful if kept 
within its own bounds.68 Medicine, he argued, should follow Aristotle and Galen.69 In 
                                                      
66 Robert Boyle, Memoirs for the Natural History of Human Blood, especially the spirit of that liquor (London, 1684), 
p. 102. 
67 Hawkins writes that Willis took concepts almost exclusively found in the chemist’s laboratory and 
‘turned them into the essential foundation of medical knowledge’: ‘Piss Profits’, p. 17. 
68 John Betts, De Ortu et Natura Sanguinis (London, 1669). Quoted by Clericuzio, ‘The Internal Laboratory,’ 
p. 61. 
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having publishing his chemical theory of the blood, Willis had of course rejected the 
prevailing humoral definitions of the blood and invited the censure of Galenic 
physicians. Interestingly, Betts thought physicians could safely prepare chemical remedies 
but not use chemistry in formulating medical theory.70 What this suggests is that the issue 
was one of policing professional interests – of defending medical practice from the new 
chemical philosophy. Willis’s use of chemical analogies in his medical explanations 
threatened the authority claims of rival groups. This is not to say that Willis did not 
continue to employ aspects of humoral pathology or retain certain Galenic frameworks, 
but that his chemical analysis of the blood and fevers was sufficient to gain him a 
reputation for having set out a challenge to Galenic orthodoxy.  
 
By far the staunchest attack came from the Irish Galenic physician, Edmund O’Meara, 
who publically objected to Willis’s comparison between chemical and medical spirits in 
all its forms.71 Chemical analogies, O’Meara argued, had no place in medical explanations. 
A fellow of the College of Physicians since 1664, O’Meara launched an attack on Willis’s 
De febribus in his infamous Examen diatribae Thomae Willisii (1665). In it, O’Meara asked 
why it was that Willis had confused medical spirits with those extracted by chemical 
distillation – a direct challenge to the use of chemical learning in medical contexts.72 
Reflecting the broader struggles between the chemical physicians and orthodox 
Galenists, O’Meara claimed that the experimental chemists had made a ‘pretence of 
wisdom’ in medicine merely by the trick of ‘inventing new terms’ – that is, by 
(analogously) applying chemical terms to new objects. He declared Willis’s definition of 
spirits and fever vague and inadequate, suggesting that fever was an incorrectly applied 
term.73 Where Willis saw fevers as arising in the blood (as a chemical event), O’Meara 
believed that fevers were situated in the solid parts of the body as a form of innate heat.74 
Much of the force of O’Meara’s ire came from Willis’s failure to follow the strict logic of 
scholasticism, rather than an engagement with the substance of his arguments.75 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
69 Ibid, p. 61. 
70 Ibid, p. 61. 
71 J.B. Lyons, ‘O'Meara , Edmund (c.1614–1681)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online, ed. by 
Lawrence Goldman (Oxford: OUP, 2004). Clericuzio, ‘Internal Laboratory,’ p. 61. 
72 Edmund O’Meara, Examen Diatribae Thomae Willisii…De Febribus (London, 1665), pp. 59-60. 
73 Dewhurst, Vindicatio, p. 294. On Conlan Cashin’s defense of O’Meara see also p. 326. 
74 Frank, Harvey, p. 189. 
75 On O’Meara’s objection to this comparison see: Clericuzio, p. 61. 
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In addition to O’Meara’s claims, some notable chemical-corpuscular philosophers (who 
were more closely linked to Willis’s interests) also challenged the level of chemical 
accuracy in his use of the terms spirit and ferment, while nevertheless still accepting the 
use of chemical explanations in principle. Some of the more substantial criticisms aimed 
at Willis came from Walter Charleton, a learned physician and physiologist who directly 
engaged with Willis’s neuro-physiological ideas. His concerns, in contrast to those of 
O’Meara, centred on the choice and suitability of Willis’s analogies, in terms of how they 
reflected certain structural interpretations of the brain.76 While Charleton’s criticisms 
were significant, he did not dispute Willis’s use of chemical analogy but challenged how 
those comparisons were to be properly applied and interpreted. For instance, in his Three 
Anatomic Lectures (1683), Charleton refuted Willis’s theory by claiming that the blood was 
the liquor least likely in itself to ferment, ‘bearing a greater analogy to the nature of Milk, 
than to that of Wine, whatever the Willisians have said to the contrary.’77 He accepted 
that certain ferments occurred in ‘preternatural’ fevers of the blood, but that this was still 
less common than ‘vulgar physicians’ would like to imagine. 78 The analogy with wine, of 
course, had been selected with Willis precisely because of its notable inclination to 
ferment.  
 
A further charge made by Charleton was that Willis had used ferment - as an analogy 
applicable to any tumult in wine or the body - much too loosely. He attacked Willis’s 
theory of fermentation for its ‘its explanatory inadequacy’ but also because of ‘its 
adoption as a factotum’ - a master of everything.79 The charge here was essentially that 
the term was being employed to express a variety of unconnected or superficially related 
events, rather than as a way to name and express specific chemical phenomena in the body. 
This created an over-emphasis on points of similarity, at the expense of empirical 
accuracy. This is, of course, what analogies do: they isolate some points of similarity 
whilst obscuring other points of divergence. Echoing these charges in the late 1960’s, 
Willis’s modern biographer Isler similarly concluded that ‘the term ferment is not clearly 
defined in his [Willis] book’ and is used ‘with varied connotations, according to the 
                                                      
76 Michael Hawkins has thoroughly examined Charleton’s objections to Willis’s account in his doctoral 
thesis, The Empire of Passions: Thomas Willis’s anatomy of the Restoration Soul (PhD Thesis: University of 
London, 2004), p. 23, pp. 193-4. He notes that while he appeared to critique structural details, he did so on 
the basis of their moral implications, a topic that I return to examine in chapter five of this thesis. 
77 Walter Charleton, Three Anatomic Lectures (London: Printed for Walter Kettilby, 1683), p. 6. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Emily Booth (ed.), A subtle and Mysterious Machine: The Medical World of Walter Charleton (1619-1707) 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), p. 184. 
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context.’80 Again, this is because, for Willis, ferment was an explanatory tool used for 
describing a process of particulate commotion (rather than a specific quality tied to any 
one subject). This could, in theory, be applied to any agitated particles contained within a 
body. While the definition obviously relied upon the presence of certain chemical 
characteristics (i.e. volatility, heterogeneity), the precise nature of a substance could vary 
and yet still be said to have fermented. The whole basis of Willis’s argument had been 
that ferments between wine and the blood were a viable comparison because the 
phenomenon of ferment united a huge variety of natural and artificial events.  
 
This scope was clearly a problem for Willis’s contemporaries; it came close to the 
mapping out of correspondences and sympathies in nature, with its focus on what could 
connect up disparate events, rather than on the specific empirical attributes of the subject 
in hand. For Robert Boyle and John Mayow, that the phenomena of spirits and ferments 
could be so widely and loosely applied was a significant problem. Willis’s application of 
the category of ferments and the term spirit to any volatile body that effervesced and 
experienced a ‘turgency’, the blood included, was a particular source of contention here. 
Willis would therefore come under increasing pressure, moving into the 1670s, to more 
closely define his use of the category of spirit. Boyle and Mayow asked exactly what the 
(vital) spirits were made of and called on Willis to adopt a stricter chemical definition of 
the ‘vital flame’ (i.e. as the actions of ariel nitre), rather than rely on the general 
mechanism of ferment to express the phenomena. The vital flame analogy remained 
useful: it carried with it certain continuities with traditional medical tropes, which would 
help make his new chemical-corpuscular explanations intelligible and recognisable. 
Moreover, the flame (an everyday phenomenon) was a more accessible vehicle for 
expressing the quite abstract notion that particulate commotions equated to organic heat. 
These arguments were properly addressed in Willis’s later publications – they are touched 
upon here to the extent that they highlight the difficulties Willis faced in forwarding new 
and difficult chemical explanations within existing medical discourses. 
 
For Willis’s supporters, the highly polemical attacks issued by the likes of O’Meara 
represented a deliberate misreading of Willis’s use of the notion of ferment. Nathaniel 
Hodges (1629-1688), a collaborator within the Oxford Philosophical Club, used the 
flexibility involved in Willis’s definition to support the import of chemical discoveries 
                                                      
80 Isler, p. 65. 
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into more traditional medical frameworks. He publically defended Willis on the grounds 
that he had used ferment only as a useful analogy with respect to the blood.81 Referring to 
the ‘learned Treatise of Doctor Willis’ on fermentation, which ‘hath fully satisfied very 
many scruples,’ Hodges wrote in response to a polemical pamphlet published by the 
empirical chemical physician Marchmount Nedham against the Royal College of 
physicians (including Willis).82 He noted that Willis had only proposed that ‘atomical 
effluviums’ act ‘Analogously to ferment,’ and criticised Needham for misconstruing Willis: 
‘for in the whole I observe he misapplies the design and intent of those learned Authors he 
cites.’83 
 
Willis, for his part, had consistently noted that the blood was not identical to wine and 
could be said only to behave like wine under certain conditions. Despite Hodges’ defence, 
the blood really did ferment according to the chemical-corpuscular terms set out by Willis. 
But, crucially, it didn’t necessarily ferment in exactly the same way that wine or beer does. 
As Willis noted, wine and blood ferment ‘after a like (tho not wholly the same) manner’ 
(p.67). Wine was as proximate as it was possible to get in respect of the chemical 
character of the blood, yet, as fine as the gap between them was, it was still there. 
Though Willis was not explicitly clear about where these vital differences lay, what these 
debates failed to acknowledge was that Willis’s account included some important (if 
nuanced) distinctions between spirits of the body and other kinds of chemical spirit - so 
as to safeguard the superiority of the former. These distinctions related to Willis’s 
discussion of the role of the heart and the brain in supporting chemical processes in the 
body, as the next section examines. 
 
Ferments and the body 
 
Despite the arguments put forward by Willis’s critics, he did in fact propose important 
distinctions between the nature of chemical and medical spirits in the body. One of the 
chief ways in which this was addressed was through the role of the body itself. Willis not 
only mapped chemical principles onto specific physiological events, but also looked to 
support those analogies by representing the anatomical design of the body as a form of 
                                                      
81 Frank, Harvey, p. 240. 
82 Nathaniel Hodges, Vindiciae medicinae et medicorum: or an apology for the profession (London: Printed by J.F. for 
Henry Brome, 1666) pp. 149-150.  See also, Bates, p. 61. 
83 Hodges, Vindiciae medicinae, p. 150.   
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chemical apparatus. In his tract on fermentation, the body reveals itself as a structure 
designed to operate as a site of chemical processes and operations. Ways of conceiving 
of a relationship between (anatomical) form and (physiological) function therefore played 
a considerable role in supporting Willis chemical arguments.84   
 
On the one hand, the body conceived of as proto-laboratory underpinned the wider 
analogy between chemical and medical spirits as they could be taken as bodies that were 
produced by or subject to the same kinds of processes and conditions. Willis could 
propose that the spirits of the blood were of a chemical kind – and could be studied by 
the chemist’s methods - precisely because the body revealed its own design as a chemical 
apparatus. By another reading, it could be said that Willis used the unique design and role 
of the body as a means of separating ferments in blood apart from all other forms of 
chemical ferment. Importantly, the brain – as the seat of a corporeal soul - performed its 
‘chymical’ operations far beyond the skill of human artifice. The spirits of the body – and 
their medical ferments - were therefore of a similar but ultimate superior kind. In a sense, 
the chemist’s art replicated this superior and original work of nature. 
 
The first part of this argument concerned the role of the heart. While it performed its 
role in a manner analogous to a ‘flame put to wine,’ as a furnace or ‘fire-place,’ Willis also 
established the heart’s vital ferment was unique in nature. Firstly, it was ignited (at the 
point of generation) by nature itself and represented a continuous and self-maintaining 
life-force, sustained for as long as the organism lived. Secondly, it imparted a ferment of 
particular force and energy unmatched in other chemical substances or artifice. As Willis 
notes, when the blood ‘enters the Ventricles of the Heart, there suffers a greater 
effervescency,’ on which the vital heat of organisms depended (DD, p.59). Accordingly, 
the speed and effervescency of these spirits was always ‘above what is in Wine,’ as they 
derived their energy from the ‘Ferment of the Heart’ (DD, p.59). The fermentative 
power of the spirits in the body thus exceeds any comparative liquor found in nature. 
This helped Willis to explain how the motion of ferments in animals differed from that 
observed in vegetables – the latter being ‘slow and insensible,’ whereas in animals it was 
rapid and ‘conspicuous to the Eyes.’  This demonstrable effervescency was also 
                                                      
84 On Willis’s concept of the relationship between form and function in his work see: William F. Bynum, 
‘The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of the Brain,’ Isis, 64.4 (Dec., 1973), pp. 
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 125 
commonly observed in wine, which is why Willis so often used it as a point of 
comparison, yet Willis maintained that the heart’s ‘chief’ ferment was ultimately superior. 
 
Where Willis was explicit about the distinctiveness of bodily spirits, however, was in his 
discussion of the brain’s work in producing or ‘procreating’ the animal spirits. Willis 
presupposed that the animal spirits represented the highest and most subtle form of 
spirit and that they were exclusively seated in the brain and nerves. They were, he would 
argue, the primary instruments of the corporeal soul in man and were responsible for all 
acts of life, sense and motion. He conceived that these spirits were created out the raw 
spirituous materials carried by the blood from the heart to the brain. For Willis, this 
process was expressed through the work of the brain as a distillatory organ, meaning that 
it worked to distil and extract subtle spirits from the larger or gross particles of matter 
contained within the blood.85 By a localised ferment inside the brain, these spirits were 
further refined and subtilized by its operations. The resultant animal spirits were thereby 
made ‘fit’ for the works of animal government and were extended to all parts of the body 
through the nerves and blood. Whilst spirits of wine were both agile and volatile, the 
animal spirits of the blood were uniquely refined and volatilised, having been perfected 
by the brain’s distillatory processes. The nature and powers of these spirits were properly 
dealt with by Willis is his Anatomy, but their production – as the outcome of a chemical 
distillation in the brain – was first set out here, in his tract on fermentation. 
 
We get a sense of how significant this model was from the fact that it features, at some 
length, early on in the first tract. Here, Willis set out a particularly vivid account of how 
the brain’s structural design revealed and demonstrated its role in chemical distillation. 
Though he conceded that these events remained ‘very much in the dark,’ he nevertheless 
ventured an interpretation of the brain’s role in this process based around an analogy 
with a common piece of apparatus from the laboratory, the alembic. As he observed, 
 
It seems to me that the Brain with Scull over it, and the appending Nerves, 
represent the little Head or Glassie Alembic, with a Spunge laid upon it, as we use 
to do for the highly rectifying of the Spirit of Wine: for truly the Blood when 
Rarified by Heat, is carried from the Chimny of the Heart, to the Head even as 
the Spirit of Wine boyling in the Cucurbit, and being resolved into Vapour, is 
elevated into the Alembick; where the Spunge covering all the opening of the 
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Hole, only transmits of suffers to pass through the more penetrating and very 
subtil Spirits, and carries them to the snout of the alembic […] Not unlike this 
manner, the blood being delated into the Head, its Spiritous, volatile, and subtil 
Particles being restrained within the by the Skull […] as by an Alembick, are 
drunk up by the spungy substance of the Brain […] derived into the Nerves. (DD, 
p.14) 
 
The alembic was a two-part vessel commonly associated with the alchemical practice of 
distillation. It was an object with which Willis would have been intimately familiar as 
distillation made up a core practice of early modern ‘chymistry.’ 86  They were used to 
heat a compound substance so as to separate out (by evaporation) the subtlest or 
spirituous part of matter, which would be collected as a separate condensed liquid. The 
alembic actually refers to separate objects: the ‘curcurbit,’ contained the matter to be 
heated and was positioned over a fire, it was connected to a glass vessel (the alembic or 
‘glassie head’) on the roof of which the evaporated spirits condensed and were then 
siphoned off by connected tubes. The alembic set-up became an important intellectual 
tool in Willis’s attempts to interpret the brain’s functional role within the terms of his 
chemical practices and experience. 
 
In this passage, Willis takes the brain and heart together as two chief components of the 
alembic apparatus – the chemist’s fire connected to the distillatory apparatus positioned 
above it. The ‘chief ferment’ in the heart applied heat to the blood and also acted as its 
cucurbit (the pot placed over the fire). This caused the spirits to evaporate or ascend 
upwards to the brain, via the arteries, where the spirituous vapour condensed on coming 
into contact with the cold, boggy substance of the brain – like the spirits of wine 
condensing on the roof of the alembic. These spirits were contained by the skull and 
‘drunk’ up by the ‘spungy’ material of the brain, which separated out the larger particles 
from the subtle spirits. The logic of the chemist’s distillatory apparatus appears to map 
reasonably well onto Willis’s anatomical ideas about the form and substance of the brain 
and heart. Willis even managed to propose a correlate for the porous ‘spunge’ of the 
alembic in the soft, cortical substance of the brain. Again, the explanation continues to 
import directly from Willis’s experiences experimenting on wine. As he notes, ‘For truly 
the Blood when Rarified by Heat, is carried from the Chimney of the Heart to the Head, 
                                                      
86 On distillation as a core practice of early modern chemistry see: Mark Haeffner, The Dictionary of Alchemy 
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even as the Spirit of Wine boyling in the Cucurbit, and being resolved into Vapour, is 
elevated into the Alembick’ (DD, p.14). Willis’s discourse thus mapped his practical 
experiences and practices from the laboratory to the anatomical and medical body. 
 
Notably for Willis, distillation was a specifically chemical process - as opposed to the 
mechanical act of sieving and separating particles. As Clericuzio has noted, for Descartes, 
the production of animal spirits was analogous to sieving while Willis’s comparison with 
the alembic ‘saw the genesis of animal spirits as chemical distillation.’87 Within the 
alchemical tradition – from which the ‘chymistry’ in this period derived - distillation 
suggested either a substantive transformation in the nature of the matter or it referred to 
the extraction of a life essence or the most important part of something.88 Alchemy, in its 
broadest sense, referred to a set of principles, techniques and experiments derived from 
the works of Paracelsus or van Helmont, concerned with the transmutation of metals - 
often involving evaporation and distillation - which were in the late seventeenth century 
increasingly applied to medical or pharmaceutical pursuits.89  Willis thus affirmed in the 
opening chapters Of Fermentation that, ‘the Animal Spirit is wrought in the Brain’ by a sort 
of ‘chymical artifice,’ and is ‘performed even as a Chymical Elixir’ - a symbol from the 
alchemical tradition that referred to the transmutation of metals into gold or the liquid 
form of the philosophers stone - a universal cure (DD, p.42). As Willis employed it, the 
brain acted as a ‘distillatory bath’ for the spirits working to transform or refashion them 
into instruments of the corporeal soul – whereby they were ‘made more noble or 
excellent’ than any other kind of material body. Willis proposed that this distillatory 
transformation also occurred in conjunction with ‘a certain Ferment’ localised within the 
brain, which volatised and ‘sublimed’ the spirits extracted from the blood so as to make 
them ‘fit for the performing the offices of motion and sense’ (DD, p.15).  
 
Ultimately, in Willis’s model, all varieties of ‘spirit’ shared certain common chemical 
attributes, in that they were agile, subtle, volatile, and prone to motion or expansion. The 
vital and animal spirits were, however, once extracted and perfected within the brain, 
subtilized to a degree that was unobtainable by any human artifice. They had no direct 
analogy in nature. Likewise, the chemical operations of the brain and heart were similar to 
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the chemist’s own practices, but the actions of both far exceeded the latter. This sense of 
the brain as the ultimate chemical laboratory, exceeding the art of the chemist or vintner, 
was echoed by a slightly earlier contemporary of Willis’s, Henry Power (1623 -1668). For 
Power, it was the chemist’s art that in fact replicated the work of the soul in the body. 
Similarly committed to a chemical-corpuscular physiology, he positioned the corporeal 
soul as a sort of ‘proto-chymist’ in his Experimental Philosophy, published after the Diatribae 
in 1664. It may well have taken influence from Willis’s tract on ferments. Power similarly 
took the practice of chemistry as being analogous to the natural processes found in the 
body: ‘all the operations of nature within us are repractised by the chemists […] most 
powerfully demonstrated by chemicall Analogy.’ 90 He went on to liken the soul to a 
chemist inside this internal laboratory:  
 
What does the Soul, but (like an excellent Chymist) in this internal Laboratory of 
Man […] by these several physic-Chymical operations, but strive all this while to 
unfix, exalt, and volatise the Spirits conteined in our nutriment, that so they may be 
transmitted to the Brain, and its divarications.91 
 
Willis had likewise suggested, albeit implicitly, a comparison between the chemist’s 
practices and those of the soul by comparing the chief site of the soul’s operations (the 
brain) to the apparatus of the laboratory, through references to chemical objects from 
the alembic to the Balneum Mariae, matrat, and pelican.92  The corporeal soul, situated by 
Willis in this body-laboratory, oversaw and ministered to the body’s chemical operations. 
Power spoke in a similar vein to Willis when he considered how the body was ‘made in 
subserviency to the Animal Spirits’ by having been designed to support the processes of 
chemical extraction and distillation. Unlike Willis, he emphasised the role of all organs in 
these processes, whereas Willis consistently stressed the prime role of the brain in the 
chemical production of the spirits. Another of Willis’s contemporaries, Walter Charleton, 
was considerably more cautious here: writing in his Physiologica (1654) he spoke of the 
‘Curtain of obscurity’ that divided ‘Natures Laboratory’ (in man) from the investigations 
of human endeavor.93  
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Despite this notable role for the heart and the brain in chemical processes of the body, 
Willis was nevertheless consistently vague about precisely how the spirits of wine and the 
vital sprits substantially differed. The greater energy imparted to the blood by the action 
of the heart and the distillatory effects of the brain both described the particular 
conditions and unique processes that bodily spirits were subject to, but did not directly 
address the nature of the spirits themselves, as chemical bodies. Willis’s discussion of the 
brain as a distillatory organ clearly went part of the way, in that it provided a model for 
explaining how animal spirits were perfected and refined. But even here, Willis did not 
give a specific, chemical definition of the term spirit. We might argue, from the 
standpoint of a theory of knowledge, that such distinctions were impossible; that the 
analogy drawn between chemical substances (and the attendant practices of the 
laboratory) set and framed the limits of how Willis was able to conceive of the vital 
spirits. But for his contemporaries, it was an important point of contention: they sought 
to define, in a literal sense, what the spirits were.  
 
Returning to O’Meara’s attack, it was not just the comparison between the two kinds of 
spirit that he attacked (though he does this too), but also Willis’s suggestion of 
continuities between ways of knowing and demonstrating truths in medicine and 
chemistry.94 He dismissed the capacity of chemical methods to say anything about the 
body, accusing Willis of confusing spirits of the body with those produced by distillation. 
In contrast, as we have explored here, Willis considered that the body performed its own 
operations in a way that was entirely comparable to the actions of the chemist. Moreover, 
he had based his interpretation of the body on those very practices. Indeed, Willis’s use 
of the brain-alembic analogy pushed at the limits of metaphor. After all, the brain did, in 
a literal sense, ‘distil’ spirits from the blood as per a chemical operation. It must be 
viewed as an analogy, though, to the extent that it was based upon Willis’s comparison 
between parts of the brain to laboratory apparatus. But, as with Harvey’s pump 
metaphor, the analogy becomes so closely united with how Willis was able to conceive of 
the brain and its actions that its limits are blurred: the brain is, for him, a distillatory 
organ. It produces spirits by a specific, chemical process.  
 
                                                      
94 On the concept of ‘ways of knowing’ in science and their involvement in particular metaphors and 
practices see: John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New history of Science, Technology and Medicine (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5. 
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As we shall see in the following chapters, Willis represented the brain through a variety 
of objects – from a clock to a cabinet. No single image entirely encapsulated and 
represented the function of the brain within his physiological schema. A single analogy 
can, after all, only extend so far; its particular clarity always comes at the cost of 
obscuring some other detail or possible relationship. This is the same problem Willis has 
with his comparison of ferments in wine and the blood: the analogy expressed important 
shared features (effervescency, heat) while failing to express significant differences (the 
vital heat and spirits as a unique life-force, for instance). These ambiguities are (at least in 
part) addressed by the notion of the brain as a distillatory organ, which is used here to 
mark out how the animal spirits were both chemically produced and yet also distinct or 
transformed beyond what the chemist alone could express. 
 
Finally, beyond the certain provisions of body, we also get a sense of the distinct status 
of animal spirits directly from Willis’s use of language where he describes the actions and 
behaviours of the spirits. Willis reserved a distinct mode of expression for the chemical 
reactions of bodily spirits over those of wine; conveying a sense of the vital character of 
the bodily-spirits, Willis discussed their actions in largely personified terms. For instance, 
they engaged in mutual ‘embraces,’ or ‘lye quiet, and enjoy a deep peace’ (DD, p.16). 
When stirred up and forming new chemical bonds, they ‘variously meet one another, 
associate themselves, and again depart asunder […] they enter into divers Marriages, and 
suffer Divorces, on which the beginnings, the death, and transmutations of things 
depend’ (DD, p.16). Similarly, in Willis’s 1661 Oxford lectures, he spoke of ‘bad’ 
chemical spirits becoming melancholic, ‘depraved’ or ‘more sorrowful from eating food 
which is salty.’ 95 These descriptions work against readings that take the Diatribae as a 
straightforwardly mechanistic chemical philosophy. They also outline a distinct linguistic 
space for the spirits of the body and suggested a certain vital materialism (where material 
spirits, rightly disposed, could be said to posses their own, living powers). As Kathryn 
Tabb has recently argued, it is the consistently anthropomorphised characterisation of 
the animal spirits in his chemical-pathological discussions that marks out the vitalism and 
alchemical influences within Willis’s account. 96  
 
                                                      
95 Willis, Lectures, p. 126. 
96  Kathryn Tabb, “Struck, As it Were, With Madness:’ Phenomenology and Animal Spirits in the 
Neuropathology of Thomas Willis,’ in Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience, ed. by 
C.U.M. Smith and H. Whitaker, History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol. 6  (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2014), pp. 43-57. 
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Chemical theory and the anatomy of the brain: limitations 
 
As the passages cited above indicate, Willis made an effort to reconcile his chemical 
physiology with an anatomical model of bodily function. Though he made quite general 
references to the structure of the brain - which was to be expected considering his lack 
of direct anatomical experience at this point - he still appears to have assumed that the 
structure and design of the brain could be used to say something about chemical events. 
This endeavour wasn’t necessarily considered a success. Charleton attacked Willis on the 
very grounds that his anatomical account had failed to faithfully replicate the conditions 
observed in the laboratory. On this basis, Willis’s chemical analogies (between the 
ferments of wine and the blood) fell apart. Here, it was not simply the comparison 
between spirits that was being challenged, but the nature of the spaces and conditions 
under which they were said to ferment.  
 
Charleton took particular issue with the anatomical model assumed in Willis’s model of 
fermentation, questioning the kind of spaces represented in his account of the body. He 
noted that because the ‘arteries are fill’d with bloud even to distention’ there is ‘want of a 
convenient room’ to ‘permit’ the blood to ferment. 97  On this basis, he declared that 
there was no reason to accept Willis’s account. Andrew Brown, a Scottish physician allied 
with Thomas Sydenham, put the case more strongly in accusing Willis of intellectually 
‘bending’ the subject (the body of the patient) to conform to his chemical analogy. 
Concerning Willis’s use of Harvey’s model of circulation in his account of fermentation, 
Brown suggested that Willis had employed a certain degree of inventiveness in 
attempting to conflate his experiences of observing fevers in his patients with the kinds 
of ferments he witnessed in the laboratory. Willis, he wrote,  
 
[…] reasonably rejecting that of the Ancients, placed his in a notable effervescence of 
the blood & humours: This ingenious Philosophical Physician doth with great fervor bend 
both his own Brain and the Subject, to establish a certain effervescence in the blood of 
the Feverish persons, proportionate to the Fermentation of Liquors.98 
 
                                                      
97 Charleton, Lectures, p. 6. 
98 Andrew Brown, A Vindication of Dr. Sydenhams new method of curing continual fevers (London: Printed for 
John Hepburn, 1700), p. 142. 
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Brown went on to point out that Willis’s comparison failed precisely because it supposed 
that the body would reliably replicate the conditions present in the laboratory. As he 
wrote, Willis  
 
nowayes taking notice that all the Circumstances and Conditions requisite to the 
fermentation of Liquors, are not only wanting in the generation of Fevers […] the circuit 
motion of the blood will hinder its fermentation; as it falls out in Liquors which are to 
be fermented requiring rest.99 
 
He argued that while the blood was kept in constant circulation in the body, the 
fermentation noted in other liquors occurred when they were being held still in isolated 
vessels and held over a steady flame (a different sort of combustion to that represented 
by the ‘vital’ ferment in the heart). The circulating blood was only exposed to a ‘flame’ at 
certain intervals. The apparatus that ‘produces’ chemical spirits in the laboratory does 
not, therefore, find a fitting analogy in the conditions created within the body. Brown 
concluded by noting that it was not possible to observe the apparent signs of 
fermentation in patient’s blood (only a ‘token of viscosity’); rather, in Willis’s case, such 
interpretations were being ‘read’ or imposed onto the patient by analogies that reflected 
his chemical agenda. 100 This is of course the nature of analogy - it comes up against the 
increasingly public demands in this period for a direct and unmediated encounter with 
the world. Willis used chemical analogies to express events that could not possibly be 
directly observed or witnessed.  
 
These are interesting and sophisticated debates, which, although framed by the 
professional disputes of the day, revolved in part around contested analogies. This is 
important as it speaks to how scientific knowledge is not necessarily produced out of any 
direct engagement with empirical objects, but also through disputed interpretations and 
applications of analogy and metaphor. Moreover, what these debates reveal is that 
Willis’s most prominent analogy, linking ferments in wine and the blood, did not stand 
purely on its own merits; rather, it relied upon the related work of other supporting 
analogies – such as the analogy of the physician as vintner, or the brain as an alembic. 
These images made sense of the initial comparison and located its logic within wider 
intellectual frameworks – such as medical practice (physician-vintner) or anatomy (brain-
                                                      
99 Brown, A Vindication, p. 142. 
100 Ibid, p. 142. 
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alembic). The success of Willis’s chemical hypothesis would rest as much on the analogy 
between the blood and spirits of wine or milk as it did on representing the body as part 
of a chemical system. Importantly, what Brown and Charleton both pointed to in their 
criticisms was the importance of the body in the success of Willis’s chemical analogy of 
the spirits. They ultimately rejected Willis’s ferment explanation on the basis that his 
corresponding representations of the body did not, in their eyes, support the chemical 
analogy; the body was not comparable to the laboratory. This expresses the dynamic, 
interactive work of analogies within a given text – and their role in gaining assent (or not) 
for new concepts. 
 
Importantly, Willis’s chemical theories would directly inform his work on the anatomy of 
the brain in his second major publication, Cerebri anatome (1664). For example, based 
upon the knowledge that distillation and fermentation relied on the application of heat, 
Willis would later suggest that the plentiful supply of blood observed in his dissections of 
the brain evidenced that the brain had been designed to support those particular 
chemical processes. Willis’s model of the brain as a distillatory organ also had wider 
implications for his model of pathology in that it made the brain the chief fountain and 
store-house of the spirits. As Hawkins has noted, by exclusively situating and storing the 
spirits in the brain Willis created a potential ‘powder keg’ – whereby any ferment arising 
from the body could easily erupt these volatile bodies to significant and dramatic 
effect.101 These implications are further explored in chapter five. They are touched upon 
here in order to note how the chemical analogies employed in the Diatribae were already 
structuring ideas that would be pertinent to his later (and far more greatly studied) 
medical contributions. Moreover, it is Willis’s chemistry that gives some context for why 
he came to study the anatomy of the brain in the manner that he did and the nature of 





                                                      
101 Michael Hawkins, “A great and difficult thing’: Understanding and Explaining the Human Machine in 
Restoration England,’ in Bodies / machines, ed. by Iwan Rhys Morus (Oxford: BERG, 2002), pp. 15–38. 
102 Willis did not simply set out anatomical facts, but rather marshalled specific anatomical interpretations 
in order to support an existing physiological theory of the corporeal soul. Louis Caron also makes this 
argument in his doctoral thesis, The Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis (1621-1675) with Particular Reference 
to John Locke (1632-1704) (PhD Thesis: Kings College Cambridge, 2011), p. 22. 
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Ultimately, Willis utilised his chemical analogies to great effect: he was able to import and 
apply his existing knowledge and skills from the laboratory, and especially his 
experiments with wine, to advance difficult theories and hidden operations in the bodies 
of his patients. 103 His use of familiar and accessible chemical analogies was a vital 
conceptual aide to himself and his readers. This supported Willis’s efforts in establishing 
a successful medical career and his reputation as a learned physician: as the physician 
George Goodall, indicated in 1676, Willis was by this time well regarded as ‘a physician 
indeed and Philosopher by fire.’104 In these debates we also see how analogies invited 
multiple and contested readings. The validity of a particular philosophical model could 
be contested by challenging the interpretation of a key metaphors or analogy. Definitions 
of fermentation – whether they were applicable across chemical and medical domains or 
not - were disputed as part of the processes of consolidating the authority claims of two 
competing approaches to medicine. The disputes around Willis’s fermentation doctrine 
were as much about these contested authorities, than they were about his actual medical 
practice, which remained largely Galenic. As Goodall noted, Willis was to be owned as a 
‘Chymical-Galenist’ precisely because he had managed to appropriate his new chemical 
discoveries into largely existing medical frameworks.105 
 
As we have seen, Willis determinedly drew on chemical analogies in order to support 
medical-physiological explanations of disease and their treatment. However, despite the 
outrage from figures such as O’Meara, Willis did not necessarily always practice chemical 
therapeutics. While he was famous for a couple of secret preparations, Willis rarely 
prescribed chemical preparations to his patients, though he still continued to draw upon 
a chemical explanation or analogy to interpret the experience. This is indicative of the 
explanatory power of chemical analogies for Willis and their key role in underpinning his 
medical approach.106 The contemporaneous issues that surrounded Willis doctrine, then, 
lay with how his ideas on fevers intervened in the polemics of the day, less than it was 
about his actual medical practice.  
 
                                                      
103 Both Frank Jr. (1980) and M. Hawkins (1995) have explored the benefits to Willis’s career in choosing 
to draw on his chemical expertise to furnish new physiological explanations, see especially: Hawkins, ‘Piss 
Profits,’ p. 3, 17. 
104 Charles Goodall, The College of Physicians vindicated (1676), p. 107. Goodall was writing here in defense of 
the Royal College’s ‘legal jurisdiction’ in response to a group of medical chemists whom the Royal College 
had targeted. On this see also: Harold J. Cook, ‘Goodall, Charles (c.1642–1712)’, in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography Online, ed. by Lawrence Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
105 Goodall, The College, p. 66. 
106 Hawkins, ‘Piss Profits’, p. 17. 
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Involved in the core analogy, between spirits of wine and the blood, were numerous 
related tropes: the physician as vintner, or the body as chemical apparatus. The ways in 
which these related analogies were contested by Charleton and Brown, and ultimately 
undermined the overarching comparison, points to how a concept cannot be easily 
distilled from a single metaphor or analogy as they rarely stand or fall on their own. 
Rather, they tend to be supported, extended or amplified through the dynamic 
interactions between other examples from across the text. Willis also faced some 
significant limitations in respect of his analogy with wine when it came to medical spirits. 
Besides notable polemics, this tension reflected some difficulties involved in the 
transference of explanatory models from their original context to new objects, coming 
with the loss of some internal coherence. For instance, Willis wanted to employ the 
mechanism of ferment in respect of both wine and the blood – it had the greatest 
explanatory power in the context of those discussions - but within the framework of this 
analogy, he also found it difficult to express how these events were of a different kind. 
This comes back to the notion that no single analogy or metaphor is supposed to fully 
encapsulate a conceptual model – it may provide a fundamental structure or foundation 
for that concept, but cannot, on close inspection, be made to express all the detailed 
elements of that model. 
 
What these discussions denote, moreover, is that Willis’s chemical analogies (the 
concepts, practices and objects that they drew upon) structured his anatomical, 
physiological and medical approaches. Willis’s interpretations of the anatomical forms 
and structures that he would uncover were filtered through the lens of his existing 
chemical-physiological theories. They cannot be separated from how he came to 
conceive of the brain and nerves in his subsequent works. Willis’s chemical analogies do 
real, structuring work in his anatomical and physiological investigations. The famous 
‘neurological’ brain of Willis’s anatomical masterpiece was not simply produced out of 
the apparently ‘objective’ practices of dissection and experimentation: it was also the 
outcome of the interpretative models that he had already developed in relation to his 
chemical theories and categories of explanation. His concept of the brain emerges from 
an overlapping tangle of influences, practices, concepts and metaphors. Willis’s technical 
activities around distilling, evaporating and separating matter in his early career as an 
iatrochemist, for instance, informed his concept of pathological ferments; this likewise 
shaped how he came to interpret the structural function of the brain. These chemical 
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models were mapped onto the body first by the analogies in the text and then – in a 
physical sense – are imposed onto the body by the interpretative imposition of 
anatomist’s scalpel. As Robert Frank argues, Lower’s scalpel was ‘directed’ and informed 
by Willis’s ‘chemical agenda and schemas.’107 This will be explored further in the next 
chapter. 
 
Analogies and metaphors, then, enable knowledge to be transposed from one domain to 
another, to be mapped across disciplinary and professional boundaries - from the 
vintner’s craft, to the anatomists dissecting table. Concepts stray across the disciplinary 
boundaries built around them; the analogies explored in this chapter help to stress this 
inter-connectedness of ideas and practices. Their function in this context, works against 
any attempt to assess Willis’s contributions according to the criteria of one particular 
discipline and defy the neat picture of Willis as a neuro-anatomist in popular modern 
representations. The relationships mapped out here ought to caution, then, against 
stressing the independence of certain kinds of scientific practice or ways of knowing. A 
more nuanced understanding of the chemical discourse employed by Willis in his early 
career should act as an important means of complicating Willis’s famous work on the 
brain as a product of ‘neurology.’ 
                                                      
107 Frank, Willis and his Circle, p. 129. 
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Chapter Three 
The Unfolded Brain: New Methodologies and the Rhetoric of Practice 
 
Of all of his published works Willis is remembered, above all, for his Cerebri anatome 
(Anatomy of the Brain, 1664), in which he examined the anatomical structure of the brain 
and nerves.1 Today, the work is widely regarded as a foundational text for neurology and 
a starting point for the modern neurosciences.2 It is noted in particular for its discovery 
of new structures at the base of the brain and astute clinical observations on various 
pathological conditions.3 As the foreword to the 1971 edition noted, it is said of Willis 
that he has ‘written his name, if not upon our hearts, at least upon the bases of our 
brains.’4 Reflecting Willis’s important position within the medical profession, scholarship 
on Anatomy has tended to focus disproportionately upon the accuracy (or not) of Willis’s 
observations, his use of new techniques and the novelty of his discoveries, particularly as 
they relate to current interests around the history of mental illness and the modern 
neurosciences. 5 The cost of this focus has been the neglect of Willis’s broader theoretical 
work, especially his ideas on nervous physiology.6  
 
Underlying these approaches is the notion that the history of anatomical “discovery” can 
be expressed as a story of technical or practical innovation. Willis’s account, by this 
                                                      
1 Thomas Willis, ‘Anatomy of the Brain’, in Remaining Medical Works, translated by Samuel Pordage 
(London, 1681). All in text-citations will refer to this edition using the abbreviation ‘AB.’  
2 Michael R. Trimble M. D., has recently remarked that Cerebri anatome is ‘perhaps the most classic 
neurological text of all time’: The Intentional Brain: Motion, Emotion, and the Development of Modern 
Neuropsychiatry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), p. 51. For similar views see: Z. Molnar, 
‘Thomas Willis: Founder of Clinical Neuroscience’, Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 5 (Apr., 2004), pp. 329-335. 
Carl Zimmer refers to it as a ‘defining moment’ in neuroscience in his article, ‘Beyond the Ivory Tower,’ 
Science, 303 (Jan., 2004), pp. 42-44 (p. 43).  
3 Michael Trimble’s The Intentional Brain (2016), for instance, focuses predominantly on Willis’s study of 
mental illness (despite the modern connotations of this term) and his clinical observations, p. 53. 
4 Abraham Mizrahi, MD., forward to the 1971 reprint of the 1681 original by Thomas Willis, Willis: the 
Anatomy of the Brain (New York: USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 1971). On this legacy see: Noga Arikha, ‘Form 
and Function in the Early Enlightenment’, Perspectives on Science, 14.2 (2006), pp. 153-188 (p. 164). 
5 Michael J. Hawkins has discussed the disproportionate focus upon Willis’s anatomical work as being 
driven by the concerns and interests of the modern brain sciences, The Empire of Passions: Thomas Willis’s 
anatomy of the Restoration Soul (PhD Thesis: University of London, 2004), p. 11. More recently, Louis Caron 
has drawn attention to the same set of teleological difficulties in Willis scholarship: The Philosophical Reception 
of Thomas Willis (1621-1675) with Particular Reference to John Locke (1632-1704) (PhD Thesis: Kings College 
Cambridge, 2011), p. 11. 
6 Wes Wallace, for instance, describes Willis’s anatomical descriptions of the nerves as an ‘unequivocal 
doctrine,’ whereas his physiological explanation of nervous functions were, in contrast, a ‘series of 
metaphors’: ‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse in Newton, Willis and Gassendi: First Steps in a Mechanical 
Theory of Communication,’ Brain and Cognition, 51 (2003), pp. 66-94 (p. 77). 
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reading, is to be celebrated because it was the most accurate of its day and utilised new 
methodologies to observe the brain. As Nancy Siraisi has argued, historians since the 
nineteenth century have been ‘drawn’ to anatomical texts - over physiological accounts - 
because they appear to offer ‘indisputable examples of genuine additions to knowledge 
achieved by means of observation and hands-on practical activity.’ 7 Notably, Willis’s 
anatomical observations have proved far less controversial among historians than the 
(physiological) uses to which he put them.8 Above all, these positions fail to sufficiently 
attend to how, in producing knowledge, scientific practices replicate particular intellectual 
frameworks and that they do so by employing certain literary and rhetorical strategies.  
 
This chapter broadly addresses a number of points intended to complicate these 
readings. It argues, first of all, that Willis’s anatomical practices were inherently bound up 
with his chemico-physiological ideas concerning the nature of the corporeal soul – ideas 
which shaped both the development of his new method for dissecting the brain, and 
directed the interpretation of his findings.9 When Willis suggested that to ‘explicate’ the 
uses of the brain was as hard a task as to ‘paint the soul’ he did so precisely because the 
two ends – anatomy and physiology - were conjoined endeavours, in his view.10 In order 
to use the brain as a basis for speaking about the localised operations of the soul, as 
Willis intended, he first needed to present his readers with a new kind of anatomical 
object: one that was less fragile, wet and more reliably structured. As Walter Charleton 
noted, even the great anatomist Andreas Vesalius had found himself ‘still ignorant of the 
principal seat of the soul,’ owing to the brain’s difficult and elusive anatomy.11 Willis 
looked to overcome such obstacles by proposing an entirely new method for dissecting 
and observing the brain.  
 
                                                      
7 Nancy G. Siraisi, ‘Early Anatomy in Comparative Perspective: Introduction’, The Journal of The History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences, 50 (January, 1995), pp. 3-10 (p. 9). 
8 Robert Frank Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle: Brain and Mind in Seventeenth century Medicine,’ in 
George S. Rousseau (ed.) The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), p. 129. 
9 Robert Frank, ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle,’ p. 129. 
10 Adrian Johns argues that Willis’s project was ‘specific and unusual’ in that it was anatomy carried out in 
order to demonstrate the parts and powers of the soul: ‘The Physiology of Reading,’ in The Practice and 
Representation of Reading in England, ed. by James Raven, Helen Small and Naomi Tadmor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 136-170 (p. 144). On the close inter-relations between anatomy and 
physiology in this period see: Andrew Cunningham, The Anatomical Renaissance: The Resurrection of the 
Anatomical Projects of the Ancients (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1997), p. 208. 
11  Walter Charleton, A Brief Discourse (London: 1669), pp. 43-6. On the relationship between new 
anatomical learning and ideas about the soul in this period see: Richard Sugg, The Smoke of the Soul: Medicine, 
Physiology and Religion in Early Modern England (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 299. 
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Willis’s achievements in this area might appear to have had little to do with the work of 
metaphors and analogies. However, what unifies the discussions in this thesis as a whole 
applies here also: that to discuss only what Willis did without also considering how he 
was able to represent and make sense of those activities, through literary and linguistic 
strategies, is to misunderstand how knowledge is generated. 12 It was through his practical 
changes, and the authority claims he looked to build around them, that Willis was able to 
argue for (and validate) his new and alternative way of representing the brain – as a 
complex container for the soul. This ambition involved presenting the reader with very 
different representations of the brain from those of his predecessors: an object 
refashioned according to an alternate vision. These changes must be read not simply as a 
matter of technical progression but as part of a broader rhetorical strategy intended to 
invoke a new kind of solid and structured object, whilst drawing upon Baconian ideals of 
the ‘natural’ object.  
 
Few studies have dedicated much time to Willis’s new manner of dissecting the brain, 
with the exception of Robert L. Martensen and Louis Caron who have both made 
notable contributions here.13 I take these important studies in a different direction by 
examining the literary and rhetorical character of Willis’s claims to have achieved a more 
‘natural’ presentation of the brain, rather than commenting on whether this was, in fact, 
the case. I argue, moreover, that his interventions were no less creative or interpretative 
than earlier methods but that they were intended to support a specific embodiment of 
objectivity in practice in order to support an entirely different conception of the brain. In 
keeping with Robert Frank’s assessment of Willis’s work, this chapter is therefore 
concerned less with the accuracy of his observations as with how Willis was able to 
                                                      
12 Steven Shapin has notably argued that phenomena produced within the laboratory setting could only 
become classified as ‘knowledge’ or ‘matters of fact’ once they had first been made known through literary 
inscriptions and communication, which were fundamental to this process: Steven Shapin, ‘Pump and 
Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology’, Social Studies of Science, 14.4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 481-520 
(p. 484). The integral relationship between scientific knowledge and literary strategies has also been well 
addressed by Peter Dear (1985) and Bruno Latour (1986).  
13 Louis Caron, The Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis (2011). Robert L. Martensen examines Willis’s 
innovations chiefly as a means of contextualising the modern ‘cerebral’ account of personhood in his, The 
Brain Takes Shape: An Early History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Trimble (2016) also mentions 
Willis’s new method within the context of the development of the modern brain sciences, p. 51. As with 
the work by Martensen and Caron, this thesis is part of a growing field of scholars re-assessing Willis’s 
contributions; I therefore trace out a similar story concerning Willis’s innovations in brain dissection and 
his use of anatomy to talk about the mind, but do so in order to draw out different emphases, specifically, 
the rhetorical claims of Willis’s practices. 
 140 
represent the brain as a (re-formed) object of knowledge and the knowledge-claims he 
was able to construct around this new, material object.14   
 
One thread within the body of scholarship around Anatomy that is particularly relevant 
here, touching as it does upon the relationship between writing and practice, is the 
debate over Willis’s collaborations. Willis openly acknowledged collaboration with his 
colleague, Richard Lower, and the latter’s skill in conducting the dissection process - as 
he also acknowledged his discussions of the findings with Christopher Wren and 
Thomas Millington. However, following its publication, Anatomy quickly became 
associated with charges that Willis’s contributions had been chiefly literary and that he 
therefore took unwarranted credit for the substantially practical achievements of his 
collaborators.15 As Robert Frank notes, Lower’s practical skill was secondarily coupled 
with what he termed Willis’s ‘literary follow-through.’16 While the two men certainly 
fulfilled different roles, these assessments risk assuming that the two activities (the 
dissection and the recording of its findings) were distinct rather than interrelated events; 
that the agreed methodology was somehow not, in and of itself, argumentative but only 
(latterly) shaped by the application of textual schemas and agendas. There can be no 
simple opposition of Lower’s practical outcomes and Willis’s textual ones: the visceral 
findings exposed by Lower’s hand were only received as new ‘facts’ in conjunction with 
Willis’s representational strategies. Moreover, the dissection method followed by Lower 
was itself bound up with Willis’s particular way of thinking about the brain as a means to 




Following his appointment as Sedleian professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford in 
1660, Willis undertook an extensive programme of anatomical investigations into the 
                                                      
14 Frank argues that we ought to consider how Willis constructed his model of the brain within his specific 
epistemological setting rather than presenting his work as a list of achievements that either succeed or 
failed in anticipating modern practices, Willis and his Circle, p. 110. 
15 Anthony Wood, Athenae Oxonienses (London: Printed for Tho. Bennet, 1691-2), vol 3. The idea that 
Willis took credit for Lower’s work is now roundly dismissed. Willis openly acknowledged Lowers (and 
others) work in his preface - see: Frank Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists: Scientific Ideas and Social 
Interaction (Berkeley: California University Press, 1980), p. 128. 
16 Frank, Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists, p. 128. 
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structure of the brain and nerves in animals and humans.17 As he noted in the preface to 
Anatomy,  
 
No day almost past over without some Anatomical administration; so that in a short 
space there was nothing of the Brain, and its Appendix within the Skull, that 
seemed not plainly detected, and intimately beheld by us (p.53).  
 
Despite some notable early criticisms, the book was broadly well received by his 
contemporaries. Nicolas Steno, a prominent Danish anatomist and ardent critic of Willis, 
conceded in his Paris lecture of 1669 that ‘the best figures of the brain up to the present 
are those presented to us by Willis,’ though, he cautioned, they were ‘not entirely free 
from error.’18  The broad success of the work also owed credit to the richly detailed 
etchings of the brain provided by Christopher Wren, arguably more famous that the text 
which accompanied them.19 Indicative of its success, Anatomy ran to nine separate 
editions in its first twenty years. Why, then, did Willis turn to the brain (so successfully) 
at this point in his career? As chapter two explored, by this point the brain had come to 
occupy a particularly important position within Willis’s broader chemical and 
physiological explanations. In the 1650s, for instance, he had attributed hypochondria to 
a fault in the spleen but by 1661 he had relocated its cause to the brain.20 This serves to 
highlight that Willis’s research agenda was not simply about revealing the structure of the 
brain ‘in its own right’, but also to elaborate and underpin a set of pre-existing 
physiological ideas.  
 
Moreover, there was a notable gap to be exploited here: despite advances made by 
Andreas Vesalius in the sixteenth century, anatomical knowledge of the brain had 
progressed very little since Galen.21 As Willis complained, 
 
                                                      
17 On Willis’s time at Oxford and position within the experimental community, see: Frank, (1990); J.T. 
Hughes, Thomas Willis 1621-1675: His Life and Work (Oxford: Rimes House, 2009). 
18 Nicolaus Steno, ‘A Dissertation on the Anatomy of the Brain’, translated by G. Douglas (London, 1743) 
reprinted in Steno in Six Languages, ed. by Ole J. Rafaelsen MD. (Copenhagen: Rhodos, 1986), p. 61. 
19 Kenneth Dewhurst notes (somewhat unfairly) that the work’s success was ‘undoubtedly’ due to the 
technical skills of Christopher Wren: ‘Willis and Steno’, in Steno and Brain Research in the Seventeenth century, 
ed. by Gustav Scherz (London: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 46. This stance might be explained in relation to 
the modern fixation on scientific images as the prime conveyors of objective information. 
20 Frank, Harvey, p. 122. 
21 As Scott Manning Stevens has commented, ‘Vesalian anatomy had done much to demystify the hidden 
interior of the body…but the physiology of the brain remained obscure’: ‘Sacred Heart and Secular Brain’, 
in The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe, ed. by David Hillman and Carla Mazzio 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1997), pp. 263- 284 (p. 273). 
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Among the various parts of an animated Body […] none is presumed to be easier or 
better known than the Brain; yet in the mean time, there is none less or more 
imperfectly understood (p.55) 
 
Owing to years of clinical experience and numerous patient autopsies, Willis had also 
found himself confronted with the stark discrepancies between learned authorities on the 
brain – primarily Galen - and his own, first hand experiences.22 Having ‘wholly frustrated 
those illustrious Documents I had long since learned,’ Willis thereby resolved to produce 
a reformed body of knowledge on this subject by committing himself  
 
[…] not to pin my faith on the received Opinions of others, nor on the suspicions 
and guesses of my own mind, but for the future to believe Nature and ocular 
demonstrations: Therefore thenceforth I betook my self wholly to the study of 
Anatomy.’ (AB, Preface) 
 
This stance followed in the wake of a significant expansion of anatomical research in 
England during the seventeenth century, after human, rather than animal, dissection had 
been made legal by Henry VIII in 1541 – a move which encouraged new investigations 
into the body among members of the Royal Society.23 Mirroring developments in Padua, 
English anatomists challenged Galenic anatomy by turning back to the body itself; the 
body, made naked from the gloss and commentary of ancient authorities, was to 
represent its own, renewed authority - much like the “uncorrupted” texts of the humanist 
enterprise.24 It was to these developments that Willis’s statements – and the authority 
they sought to suggest - were intended to appeal. 
 
One of the more striking aspects of Anatomy was Willis’s proposal of a new approach to 
dissecting and investigating the brain – a new ‘anatomical administration’, as he put it. 
Where modern day, non-invasive imaging technologies have vastly diminished questions 
                                                      
22 Frank proposes that Willis’s investigations were fuelled by a ‘confrontation’ between his years of clinical 
experience and the distinctly non-anatomical Aristotelian tradition that he was required to teach on, ‘Willis 
and his Circle,’ pp. 120-123. 
23 From the thirteenth to the late fifteenth-century dissections on human cadavers were limited to Italy and 
southern France: Katherine Park, Secrets of Women: Gender, Generation, and the Origins of Human Dissection 
(Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2006), p. 19. 
24 Matthew Landers argues that these developments ‘produced many Vesalian texts in England,’ meaning 
the English natural philosophers were ‘inheritors’ of the empirical anatomy of sixteenth-century Padua: 
‘Early Modern Dissection as a Model of Organisation’, in Anatomy and the Organisation of Knowledge, 1550-
1850, ed. by Matthew Landers and Brian Muñoz (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012), p. 9. See also, 
Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal, ‘Embodied Empiricism,’ in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge, ed. 
by Wolfe and Gal (London: Springer, 2010), pp. 1-9 (p. 2). 
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of how to access the brain, this was a significant practical (and intellectual) problem 
facing early modern anatomists: how could reliable knowledge be produced from such a 
fragile and delicate object? Willis’s answer involved seeking to overturn prevailing 
methods of dissection altogether, declaring that: ‘for the anatomy of the brain to be 
rightly celebrated, I judge we ought not to proceed after the common way of dissection’ 
(p.11). His arguments were met with some interest: John Ward, a medical student at 
Oxford, on receiving news from a friend, recorded in 1665 that ‘Dr. Willis hath got a 
new way of opening ye Brains.’ 25  Anatomy duly opens with an entire chapter devoted to 
setting out this new procedure. Having declared that the ‘ocular demonstrations of 
nature’ – direct observation of the body, in other words - would be the first and last 
authority in these matters, Willis’s methodological account, which set out the manner of 
his observational practices, would be a vital foundation for his intellectual arguments. 
 
The ‘common method’ that Willis sought to overturn was known as the in-situ method 
of dissection, as used by Galen, Vesalius and Steno. As the name suggests, this method 
involved dissecting the brain while still encased inside the skull. The procedure began by 
first removing the top part of the skull, then cutting and peeling back the covering 
membranes to reveal the cerebral hemispheres. The dissection progressed downwards 
from here, working towards the brain’s central structures (the ventricles). The two figures 
below from Andreas Vesalius’s De humani corporis Fabrica (1543) are typical examples of 
the brain represented according to this method.  
 
           
Figures one & two: Andreas Vesalius, De humani corporis fabrica, 1543.  
                                                      
25  Quoted by Robert Frank, ‘The John Ward Diaries: Mirror of Seventeenth Century Science and 
Medicine,’ Journal of the History of Medicine, (April, 1974), pp. 147-179 (p.165).  
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Notably, the brain represented in this manner remained an integral part of the cadaver – 
depicted by Vesalius with the face still clearly visible. The brain is not represented here as 
a fully independent object of inquiry - visually, physically or intellectually.26 Though 
Steno and Willis disagreed on much concerning anatomy, they both agreed on one 
matter at least: that flawed and incomplete knowledge of the brain was in no small part 
due to the inadequacy of these common practices. Steno declared that ‘the true manner 
of dissecting the brain is as little known as its substance.’27 It was clear that these 
methods had done little to advance physiological explanations of brain function beyond 
(the increasingly discredited) Galenic account. 28 In seeking to displace Galenic theory, 
Willis began by attacking the very practices that had for so long supported and replicated 
those models. 
 
Willis argued that the in-situ procedure was intellectually selective, that it focused only 
upon what was most immediately and readily exposed in the forepart of the brain, rather 
than attending to any ‘complete’ investigation of the object. He declared that ‘all of it 
that appears, and is commonly described in the forepart or forehead, is beheld almost at 
a sight or two after some rude cutting up’ (p.5). In addition to this rude cutting up, by 
commencing from above, the in-situ method also tended to privilege the central 
structures and ventricles in the brain at the material expense of its underlying structures. 
These underlying parts were exposed only as the end point of a dissection, which 
increased the likelihood of their total disintegration.29 The in-situ methodology therefore 
assumed – and then imposed – a hierarchy onto the parts of the brain, as its work 
progressed towards a ventricular end point. This presumed order to dissection is 
                                                      
26 Michael Trimble (2016) likewise notes that Willis and Lower’s new method meant the brain ‘became a 
visual object, an independent organ,’ and that this enabled the application of new preservation methods, p. 
51.  
27 Dewhurst, Willis and Steno, p. 47. Noga Arhika has also commented that although Steno argued for a 
‘higher standard of draughtsmanship,’ he also accepted that ‘the semi-fluid consistency of the brain tissue 
made accurate reproduction difficult’: ‘Form and Function in the Early Enlightenment,’ Perspectives on 
Science, 14.2 (2006), p. 160. 
28 Scott Manning Stevens, ‘Sacred Heart and Secular Brain’, p. 273. Julias Rocca suggests that, in respect of 
the brain and nerves, Galen ‘was not eclipsed until Thomas Willis’: ‘Anatomy,’ in The Cambridge Companion 
to Galen, ed. by R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 242-262 (p. 257).  
29 The physician Mark Preul notes that both ‘the Galenic and Vesalian method of examining the brain in 
situ from above allowed only limited examination of the basal structures’: ‘A History of Neuroscience from 
Galen to Gall’, in A History of Neurosurgery, ed. by S. Greenblatt (Parkridge: American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons, 1997), pp. 99-130 (p. 106). 
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famously represented in Rembrandt’s painting, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Joan Deyman 
(1656). 30  
 
 
Figure three: Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Joan Deyman, (1656) 
 
It was a methodology that spoke, moreover, to the assumption that only specific 
structures within the brain (those privileged by the method itself) were functionally 
significant. Steno, like Willis, objected to the way in which such practices - taking 
advantage of the pliable material of the brain – were being used to support certain 
theories: ‘anatomists having hitherto too readily formed systems…moulded these soft 
parts in the manner that was most agreeable to each.’31  
 
It is the troubling materiality of the brain here, with its soft and pliable structure that 
underlines the perceived limitations of cerebral anatomy. This was compounded by the 
fact that it was also necessary to entirely dismantle the object in order to peer inside it. 
As Willis observed, 
 
We are not able to estimate the measure or to paint forth the pattern or draught of 
the frame […] unless the bulk or substance of the subject be first searched to the 
bottom, and its frame broken into pieces (p.55). 
 
Having first dismantled the brain in order to gain access, the anatomist negated the 
guiding ‘frame’ or ‘pattern’ constituted by the spatial relations between parts; he could 
                                                      
30 Jonathan Sawday has referred to this as a ‘taken for granted’ hierarchy in dissection, whereby cerebral 
matter was regarded as a ‘prelude’ to a set of more significant observations: The Body Emblazoned: Dissection 
and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 156. 
31 Dewhurst, Willis and Steno, p. 59. 
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not rely on anything that he observed thereafter. In this passage, Willis deliberately 
evokes an image of a ‘broken’ and deconstructed object - a partial and fragmented set of 
observations – despite this being an integral component of anatomy. To ‘anatomise’ 
something is to take something apart in order to study its component parts. This passage 
nevertheless cleverly shows Willis’s attempt to reframe his competitors’ practices of 
dissection as inherently destructive and distorting activities; by suggesting that there must 
be some way of investigating the brain without ‘breaking’ it apart, he sets up a basis for 
validating his own alternate practices. Furthermore, while the idea of seeking a 
“complete” as opposed to a partial account of the object may appear to be self-evident 
from our own current perspectives, it actually reflected a specific intellectual change in 
this period. Where large parts of the brain had been disregarded as functionally irrelevant 
(especially the cerebral hemispheres), Willis’s ideas concerning an integral correlation 
between form and function in anatomy led him to argue that any structure to be found in 
the brain suggested a specific function which the anatomist ought to examine. It was 
imperative, then, to pay attention to all – rather than some – of the brain’s solid 
structures.32 
 
What Willis properly refers to here is not so much the act of dissecting the brain – an 
activity he himself must engage in - but his predecessors’ failure to attend to the spatial 
relations between structures and parts in the course of their procedures - a set of 
considerations that would be consistently stressed in Willis’s own explanations. This 
situation was compounded by the related practice of representing the brain as transverse 
slices or sections – which further enhanced the prominence of the ventricles.33 While 
Galen had sliced vertically, Vesalius had attempted to ‘correct’ this presentation with 
horizontal slices – with limited improvements.34 Willis’s criticisms here focused on the 
disregard this method showed for nature’s sequencing of parts: 
 
                                                      
32 On Willis’s use of inference between anatomical form and physiological function see: William F. Bynum, 
‘The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the Functions of the Brain’, Isis, 64.4 (Dec.,1973), pp. 
444-468 (p. 450); Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape, (2004), esp. pp. 75-81. 
33 Contemporary neuroscientist, Michael Macmillan observes that ‘the technique of dissecting the brain in 
transverse sections reveal[s] the ventricles…more readily than other structures’: ‘Experimental and clinical 
studies of localisation before flourens,’ Journal of the History of the Neurosciences: Basic and Clinical Perspectives, 
4.3-4 (1995), pp. 139-154. 
34 On the various slicing methods described see: Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape (2004), p. 50; Greenblatt 
(ed.), A History of Neurosurgery (1997), p. 106. 
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Hence it came to pass, that the old Anatomists in dissecting the Brain, not 
sufficiently attending what was placed first, what second, and what after that in the 
order of Nature, cut its Globe as it were into slices or parts (p. 5). 
 
Slicing the brain constituted not only a violent but also subjective inversion. The analogy 
of a Globe rendered into slices, presents the reader with an incongruous image of 
unnatural partition; a direct inversion of natures own order. The slice converted three 
dimensions into two, representing a circle in place of a sphere, thereby excluding an 
entire set of spatial inter-relations (vertical or horizontal). The suggestion was that the 
sliced brain reflected only the creative interventions of the anatomist and not any quality 
belonging to the object itself. The results of these interventions were thus thought 
inherently unreliable and subjective. As Willis put it, dissections carried out in this 
manner saw ‘Phenomena arising by chance,’ such that ‘by others from a dissection 
otherwise made, the parts and processes of it appear far different from the former’ (p.5). 
His language here clearly drew upon the troubling implication that, hidden within the 
deconstruction of any object, lurked the prospect of erroneous ‘reassembly’ – taking 
anatomy away from the ideal of reading nature without representation. His fellow 
anatomists were, argued Willis, complacent in the value of their own schemas; they 
needed rather to defer to and follow nature’s own design.  
 
This situation was compounded by the material complexities of the brain, which Willis 
conceived of as a web of inter-related vessels and structures. He observed that, because 
the brain was so ‘rolled’ together no one part could be separated without also tearing and 
distorting some other part attached or intertwined with it: ‘as often as the substance or 
bulk of the Brain so conglobated or rolled together is cut […] the portions of divers 
parts cleaving together, are carried away with them’ (p.55). These representations – of a 
rolled or ‘conglobated’, compacted, sphere - were used here to foreground Willis’s 
proposal of an alternative method of dissection, to which I will turn shortly. Again, 
Willis’s concern to represent these specific features of the brain was not the simple 
outcome of greater accuracy; these were features of the brain that had previously been 
disregarded by his predecessors as sites of no intellectual significance, but which were 
now being used as a basis for an entirely different model of brain function. Speaking 
after Willis had published his findings, Steno seemed to agree, commenting that ‘I need 
not mention the method of cutting into slices, because it is owned by everybody that 
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nothing can be learned that way.’35  He concluded that the method produced only 
uncertainty, even on the definition of what a ventricle actually represented, it being ‘a 
very equivocal term.’36 Here Steno suggests – and Willis implies – that the problem of 
equivocal or disputed terms in natural philosophy could be tied into issues around 
practice: if one could claim to have followed an objective set of practices, then the 
outcome could not be viewed as equivocal. The names ascribed to these objects would 
be similarly reformed by such measures. 
 
Unfolding the brain 
 
In answer to these substantial issues, Willis proposed to turn the ‘common method’ on 
its head: instead of cutting away at the brain inside the skull, the anatomist would first 
remove it entirely from the skull, intact, before turning it upside down to observe its 
underlying structures.37 He argued that, before any act of cutting, the brain ought to be 
first fully removed from the skull, its membranes ‘wholly loosened,’ after which ‘the 
several parts ought to be turned over and stretched forth into their proper dimensions’ 
(p.55). Everything was to be observed and noted prior to any act of cutting. He 
concluded that, ‘with these things being first done, we will more largely deliver the 
Description of the Brain’ (p.6). What Willis proposed here amounted to more than a 
technical change in procedure, but an argument for a new way of looking at the brain, as 
an independent, self-contained object comprising a series of inter-connected parts. Willis 
was not, however, the first to have examined the brain by this method. Costanzo 
Varolio, Vesalius’s successor at Padua, had employed the method during the 1540s. 38 
However, it was Willis who, through the broad success of his publication, brought it to 
notice. A number of Willis’s Oxford contemporaries credited him, and not Varolio, with 
the innovation.39 In Willis’s hands, the methodological change was taken as yielding 
genuine advances in knowledge of the brain. Robert Plot, professor of chemistry at 
Oxford, noted in 1677 that ‘Dr Willis’s Method of dissecting the Brain…is new, and 
                                                      
35 N. Steno, ‘Anatomy of the brain,’ as quoted by Dewhurst, Willis and Steno, p. 43. 
36 Ibid, p. 65. 
37 Highlighting how Willis is often assessed according to how he informs current day practices, Kenneth 
Dewhurst notes that what Willis described here is the method used by pathologists today, p. 47. 
38 M. Preul, ‘A History of Neuroscience from Galen to Gall,’ p. 106. 
39 As Dewhurst points out, it ‘was, in fact, the same method adopted by Varolio, although an Oxford 
contemporary thought that it was original,’ p. 47. On Willis’s improvement of the understanding of 
underlying structures such as the cerebellum see: Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape, p. 50; Nathan Flis, 
‘Drawing, Etching, and Experiment in Christopher Wren’s Figure of the Brain’, Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews, 37. 2 (June, 2012), pp. 145-60 (p. 147). 
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most exact, that there is scarce any one Part in it, but what has receiv’d considerable 
Advancements.’ 40  Arguably, what is significant here is how Willis’s account of the 
procedure proved to be persuasive in its capacity to support a set of alternative 
physiological explanations. Ultimately, the two men used the new technique to make very 
different claims: Willis, that the anatomy of the brain could be used to make important 
claims about its operations; Varolio, by contrast, argued that one could say next to 
nothing about the brain by examining its substance.  
 
The new approach had a number of significant consequences. In the first instance, the 
freed brain created an entirely new set of perspectives by allowing the observer to vary 
and alternate their perspective. As Willis observed, the brain became mobile and, for the 
first time, entirely visible: ‘the whole frame or substance of the Brain and its Appendix 
may be somewhat elevated, and moved here and there, be everywhere conspicuous, and 
at length taken from the skull’ (p. 8). In this, Willis appealed to contemporary 
developments around the tool of perspective, as a means of more accurately representing 
the natural world in art; as with the camera obscura or the microscope, this was another 
means by which observation - the testimony of the eye -was being augmented and 
replicated more accurately.41 Willis was not the first to suggest that the body, if it were to 
be observed as a truly ‘natural’ object, needed to be viewed from multiple angles. In 1487 
Leonardo Da Vinci described to his reader that his ‘plan of the human body’ would be 
‘unfolded to you just as though you had the natural man before you,’ by ‘examining from 
different aspects, from below, from above and from the sides.’42 Willis’s claims to have 
represented the ‘proper dimensions’ of the brain were embedded in the same sort of 
validating claims attached to these observational practices – premised upon the primacy 
of direct observation and an attendance to perspectival matters. 
 
Observed in this new manner, the brain presented as a very different kind of object. 
Willis noted that the freed brain now appeared to him as a ‘curious quilted ball,’ however, 
he also noted that this spherical shape was itself only a temporary consequence of the 
                                                      
40 Robert Plot, The Natural History of Oxford-shire (Oxford University Press: Sheldonian, 1677), p. 301. 
41 On perspectival innovations in Dutch art during the Renaissance see: Svetlana Alpers, The Art of 
Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). On the influence 
of new technologies in representing the brain during this period, albeit from a quite teleological perspective 
see also: Daniel D. Cavalcanti, M.D. et al., ‘Anatomy, Technology, Art, and Culture: Toward a Realistic 
Perspective of the Brain,’ Neurosurgery Focus, 27.3 (September, 2009), pp. 1-22 (p. 11). 
42 E. MacCurdy, The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci (New York: George Braziller, 1956), quoted in Daniel 
Cavalcanti, ‘Anatomy, Technology, Art, and Culture,’ p. 11. 
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shape of the skull-container and the membrane rather than a structural feature of the 
brain itself. The brain only appears like ‘a curious quilted ball’ because of a membrane 
that ‘knits together’ its parts, when this is removed its parts ‘fall open’ and are found ‘lax 
and hanging loose’ (p.59). The ‘unfolded’ brain, within this presentation, works merely to 
expose the brain’s own structural dimensions, rather than those imposed upon it. Here 
Willis expressed an important and novel emphasis on the material substance of the brain. 
Only those parts that conformed to his reading of this definition of ‘structure’ were 
deemed worthy of investigation. This did not include the ventricles. By having removed 
the brain from the skull, Willis had observed that the ventricles were not an inherent, 
structural feature of the material object, but a consequence of its relation to the skull - a 
mere accident of its arrangement: they ‘go into one empty space or mere vacuity, 
resulting from the complication of the Brain’ (p.12). This pointed to an important shift 
of emphasis by Willis away from the empty spaces of the brain to its solid, structural 
form.43 
 
Nothing more clearly demonstrated the interpretative influence of rival dissection 
methodologies: transverse slices had revealed the ventricles to be central and of ‘obvious’ 
significance whereas unfolding the brain revealed precisely the opposite. Displaying a use 
of form to consider function, Willis later remarked that the ventricles’ role ‘seems to be 
only secondary, and as it were by chance’ (p.20). It made little sense, for Willis, that 
nature would have made a provision of complex structures in the brain only to situate 
the fundamental operations of animal government in its ‘empty’ cavities. Only complex, 
material constructions spoke to the purpose of design; and only God’s design could be 
made to speak to the body’s hidden functions. As William Bynum points out, ‘that the 
structures of the brain are intimately related to the functions of that organ is a 
proposition underlying all of Willis’s works on the nervous system.’44 Accordingly, the 
ventricles were instead likened to passive waste receptacles, akin to ‘jakes or sinks.’ As 
the next chapter explores, the passivity of these images comes in marked contrast to 
Willis’s representations of the cerebral structures.  
 
                                                      
43 George S. Rousseau has talked about Willis’s shift to a focus on the solid substance of the brain a 
paradigm shift: Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture, and Sensibility (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), p. 360. William F. Bynum also stresses this new focus by Willis on the solid structures of the brain 
see: ‘The Anatomical Method,’ pp. 444-468. 
44 Bynum, ‘Anatomical Method,’ p. 450. 
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The freed brain also became an upturned one, creating a new set of alternative 
observations and therefore new intellectual possibilities. As we can see in Wren’s famous 
etchings for Anatomy (Figure Four), the brain is represented both as an independent 
object, pictured apart from the cadaver, and with its underlying structures prominently 
on display.45  
 
 
Figure Four: Christopher Wren for Thomas Willis, Cerebri anatome (1664)  
 
In place of the ventricles, Willis’s focus now rested on the ‘most intricate frame and 
various recesses’ at the base of the brain, which, he noted, had been ‘less accurately 
discerned and investigated’ by his predecessors (p.6). One of the more significant 
changes attached to this approach concerned the nature of Willis’s physical engagement 
with the brain. Holding the brain removed from the skull created a vastly different 
experience in this regard: it could be held in the hands and gently prised apart or turned 
over, rather than being excavated or dismantled. Importantly, these changes allowed 
Willis to reframe his own actions in terms of explicating the brain, meaning ‘to unfold.’ 
This term originates from the Latin ex (out) and plicare (to fold), which became explicate 
                                                      
45 This way of representing the brain - independently and from beneath - became standardised through the 
broad replication of Wren’s famous etchings. A useful illustration of the image’s wider visibility can be seen 
in William Hogarth’s painting Credulity, Superstition and fanaticism: A Medley (1762). The work features a 
human brain in the lower right corner, positioned to expose its underlying parts. 
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(unfold) by the 16th century. Echoing da Vinci’s earlier example, Willis’s use of the verb 
in this context could carry the double meaning of both physically opening up the brain 
and at the same time “unfolding” hidden knowledge before the reader. As Willis 
described the process, 
 
Wherefore a true and genuine description of the Brain might be shewed before its 
substance and continuity is dissolved, before all things its whole frame or substance 
ought to be explicated (p.6).  
 
With the brain cut away from its appendages (the oblong marrow and the cerebellum), 
Willis observed how it could now ‘be wholly lifted up, turned forward, and unfolded into 
a plain […] stretched out into a broad floor,’ such that it might ‘be seen and handled’ 
(p.61). 46  The use of the verb to unfold (‘explicate’) is interesting here in that it 
foregrounds a linguistic emphasis by Willis upon the passive nature of his own activities 
throughout his account. The brain, held in the hands of the anatomist, could be carefully 
prised ‘open’ by rolling, loosening and stretching it apart; Willis recalled how these 
actions allowed the brain’s interior recesses to simply ‘lye yet more clearly open’ – his 
own physical interventions vastly diminished. None of these are actions that suggest a 
substantial re-making of the object, but which simply make it more visible by opening 
out its existing parts and projecting them onto a flat surface – a ‘broad floor.’ The brain 
is being revealed before the anatomist and, at the same time, to the reader’s gaze: they are 
both “witnesses” to the fact. Willis’s reference to the dimensions of the brain being 
flattened, ‘projected onto a plain,’ invoked the same imaging technologies being 
demonstrated on the white wall of the camera obscura. These images were taken as reliable 
representations of the world, even though they were an inverted image of the real thing.  
 
The ‘unfolded’ brain was, above all, presented by Willis as being a more naturalistic 
representation of the brain, in that it was unmediated by the methodological impositions 
of his rivals. Not only were new structures being revealed, but those that were already 
known could also now be conveyed in their ‘proper’ - and by extension, their ‘natural’ - 
dimensions.47 He suggests, for instance, that once the membranes have been loosened, 
                                                      
46 In Latin, ‘ac in planum explicari poterit,’Cerebri anatome (London, 1664), p. 22. 
47 On representing nature in this period as ‘unadornded’ and ‘naked’ objects, rather than as vehicles of 
symbolic meaning see: William Ashworth, ‘Natural History and the Emblematic World View,’ in 
Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 303- 332. 
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‘the several parts ought to be turned over and stretched forth into their proper 
dimensions’ (p.6). Throughout the work, Willis refers to parts being ‘freed’ (rather than 
torn) from other parts so that they might ‘easily appear’ to the eyes – rather, that is, than 
being presented to the reader by the anatomist, which implies an active or artificial 
arrangement. The oblong marrow, for example, is merely ‘loosened from its cohesion’, 
before being bent forth and lifted up (p.11). These acts of elevating, turning, and 
unfolding granted Willis the ability to vary and alter his perspective on various parts of 
the brain, all without fundamentally changing how they fitted together. His was a set of 
actions that would reveal the natural form of the object, rather than remaking it in a new 
image. This account was intended to stand in sharp contrast to (Willis’s presentation of) 
the wilful destruction entailed in his rival’s activities.  
 
Arguably, Willis’s framing of his methodology was an effort to obscure the inherently 
creative and intellectual work of dissection. His language of ‘unfolding’ the brain 
promoted the idea that such actions were part of a self-evident process of ‘opening’ of 
the brain. This was intended to make Willis’s role marginal in order to diminish any mark 
of his own creative input: freeing, unfolding and exposing parts are passive acts. The fact 
that membranes had to be removed and ligaments ‘cut a little’ to do so is intentionally 
minimised by this narrative. Moreover, ‘turning over’, ‘stretching forth’ and encouraging 
the brain into its ‘proper dimensions’ were all premised upon a change in our perspective 
of the object. Holding a brain removed from the skull, being able to turn it ‘upside down’ 
and manipulate its structures therefore creates a vastly different engagement with the 
brain as a material object – but overall, as an act of observation. These outcomes were 
derived both from a practical innovation (affording Willis new investigative possibilities) 
united with a sophisticated literary strategy.48 Where Louis Caron has discussed Willis’s 
new method of dissection as allowing him to ‘observe with more clarity the natural 
features of the organ,’ I would argue that his presentation of this particular method was 
intended to create the impression of a more ‘natural’ object according to the specific 
values of the period. 49 
                                                      
48 On the literary strategies involved in the experimental program and their involvement with practice, see: 
Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 63. For 
Boyle’s considerations on the essay genre and the role of witnessing see also: Scott Black, ‘Boyle’s Essay: 
Genre and the Making of Early Modern Knowledge’, in Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: Practices, 
Objects and Texts, 1400-1800, ed. by P. Smith and B. Schmidt (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
pp. 178-195.  
48 Robert Boyle, Certain physiological essays (1669), p. 13. 
49 Caron, Philosophical Reception, p. 14.  
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The authority that Willis claimed on behalf of this reformed methodology was intended 
to appeal to the rhetorical principles – and generic conventions - of the experimental 
philosophy. For instance, Willis had outlined the procedure in broadly sequential detail, 
indicating the assumption that his reader could replicate the event for themselves if they 
wished; he stressed his regular use of the microscope – experimentally augmented vision 
- and the presence of multiple participant observers from among the leading natural 
philosophers of the day.50 In his account of the procedure itself, he stressed that the ‘the 
disposition or order’ of all the brain’s parts was to be preserved in the precise sequence 
in which they ‘appear before the eyes’ – that new authority (pp.11, 12). Parts ‘appear to 
the eyes’ and are ‘followed’, rather than being demonstrated by the method. This all 
served to indicate Willis’s commitment to new standards of objectivity – through direct 
observation - as a mode of praxis.51 As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have argued, 
concepts of objectivity do not accord to a set of historically transcendent and self-evident 
principles but are bound up in historical and cultural conditions.52 In this period, it could 
be defined, along humanist lines, as a turning away from textual learning to focus on the 
raw material of ‘things’ in the natural world, as explored via the evidence of sensory 
perception and the experimental method.53   
 
Willis’s arguments here were also part of a much broader project during the period, as 
Steven Shapin has put it, aimed at reforming ‘the apparatus of representation’.54 Willis’s 
methodological claims were also about appearing to have established a new and valid 
mode of representing the natural world ‘as it is’. In this, Willis drew on related notions of 
the ‘natural’ object, stripped of learning, and utilised new technologies of observation 
(the microscope) and ideas of perspective. Indicative of these themes, Willis opened by 
stating his rejection of the ‘vain figments’ of learning and the ‘received opinions of 
                                                      
50 On the role of public observation and authority-making claims in this period see: Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). 
51 On notions of objectivity – rather than the pursuit of a fixed ‘truth’ – as a means of reformulating the 
natural philosophical project in this period, see: Stephen Gaukroger, ‘The Autonomy of Natural 
Philosophy: From Truth to Impartiality,’ in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in 
Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. by Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht, NE: Springer, 
2005), pp. 131-165 (pp. 159-60). 
52 For the argument that objectivity is a concept that is culturally and historically contingent, see: Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2007). 
53 Francis Bacon proposed a new basis for natural philosophy premised on the ‘foundation of experience’ 
and direct observation of nature in his Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620), p. 76. See 
also: Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
54 Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance,’ p. 481. 
 155 
others’ to rely solely upon the proof of ‘Nature and ocular demonstrations’ (preface). In a 
particularly vivid image, Willis reinforced his point by recalling that whole ‘catacombs’ of 
heads had been ‘slain’ to achieve this goal: his acts of observation were to be many and 
varied.  
 
This was a set of ideas that also drew on a specific Vesalian inheritance within anatomy. 
In the 1540s Andreas Vesalius had argued that anatomical learning ought to be premised 
upon the direct observation of the body and visual demonstrations alone, as opposed to 
the received opinion of doctrine.55 As Andrew Cunningham writes, with Vesalius, ‘the 
body is not being tested against a text, nor is a text tested against the body’, rather, the 
body stands as its own (visual) authority. 56  The Cambridge physiologist, Walter 
Charleton, noted in his anatomy lectures of 1683, ‘in things Anatomic, the Eye is a better 
Instructor than the ear.’57 The resultant, rediscovered body would stand to reform the 
errors and vanity contained in words and learning.58 The body, of course, still had to be 
narrated by the text, it could never be truly ‘naked’. New and alien forms needed to be 
made intelligible and meaningful, through metaphor and analogy. Vesalius had himself 
complained that demonstrators were generally ‘so ignorant of language that they are 
unable to explain their dissections.’ 59 The issue, then, was not one of banishing words 
from the body, but the need to reform that relationship: words needed to be fitted to the 
body, not the other way around. The language with which Willis presented his own 
methodology referenced these Vesalian notions of a direct and unmediated encounter 
with the body, whilst continuing to rely upon vivid and rich analogical devices to ensure 
create a coherent and meaningful representation of the body.  
 
Interestingly, as with the themes explored in chapter one, Willis’s literary strategy in this 
matter harked back to the Royal Society’s concern with a ‘plain style’ in natural 
                                                      
55 Andreas Vesalius, ‘Preface,’ De Fabrica Corporis Humani (1543), p. 3; translated by B. Farrington and 
printed in Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 1 (July, 1932), pp. 40-48 (p. 43). 
56 Andrew Cunningham, The Anatomical Renaissance: The Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of the Ancients 
(Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1997), p. 207. 
57 Charleton, Enquiries into human nature (1680), p. 42. As Alpers notes, recording visual observations, in 
written or pictorial form, was to be the basis for the new Baconian knowledge: (1983), p.73. 
58 Cunningham, The Anatomical Renaissance, esp. pp. 88-142. The research interests of the members of the 
Royal Society reflected this renewed interest in the body, on this see: Charles and Ofer (eds.), The Body as 
Object and Instrument of Knowledge, p. 2. See also David Harley, ‘Political Post-Mortems and Morbid Anatomy 
in Seventeenth century England’, The Society for the Social History of Medicine, (Jan., 1994), pp. 1-28. 
59 Vesalius, ‘Preface’, Fabrica,  p. 43. 
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philosophy, which was itself a deliberately construed literary strategy of the ‘non-style.’60 
As Willis records, when the brain is removed from the skull and its membrane cut, it is 
thereby ‘left naked, uncloathed’ (p.60). While this is a reference to the literal work of 
peeling back the membrane to reveal the cerebral matter underneath, it is also strikingly 
similar to the language which surrounded the reform agenda in the natural sciences: 
objects were to be divested of the layers of scholastic gloss and literary embellishment 
that had formerly ‘cloathed’ them by being presented directly before the senses. The 
revelations promised by the unfolded and opened brain – marked out as a specific break 
with the observational experiences of his predecessors – spoke directly to this sense of 
an entirely new and (textually, intellectually) ‘naked’ object. These ideas referenced 
parallel efforts to reform knowledge by addressing the relationship between words and 
things, informed the rhetorical claims of the empirical sciences.61  
 
Despite this rhetorical work, Willis’s actions were necessarily still creative interventions 
that altered the form of the object: just as the act of removing it from the skull 
necessarily altered its form, unfolding the brain into a flat ‘plain’ also represented a 
change in the brain’s ‘natural’ dimensions comparable to the practice of transverse 
sectioning: both created flat surfaces out of a spherical object. Despite his rhetoric to the 
contrary, Willis also necessarily sliced the brain; he could not avoid doing so if he wanted 
to observe sections under the microscope. He did so in conjunction with the application 
of new preservation technologies, which artificially preserved specimens for a much 
longer period. Willis had also been forced to concede that the great ‘bulk’ of the cerebral 
matter remained a significant ‘hindrance’ to a close examination of the basal structures 
and would therefore need to be removed before the former could be fully examined. The 
brain would, eventually, have to be excavated and dismantled. Willis’s account (and 
Wren’s accompanying images) were, furthermore, based upon composite rather than 
direct representations - an amalgamation of comparative anatomies. This work relied 
upon the core assumption, held by Willis, of a ‘remarkable analogy between Man and 
four-footed beasts’ (p.56). His study of the brain was therefore already being ‘mediated’ 
by these broader practices and by his intellectual commitment to the notion that 
structural features – shared between human and animal brains – could speak directly to 
                                                      
60 Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), p. 105. 
61  Devon Hodges argues that Vesalius aimed to present the body to the eyes of his students 
‘unencumbered by representation’ and to ‘present the unadorned truth to the eyes of his readers,’ in 
Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), p. 3. 
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matters of function.  
 
Most striking of all is the quiet admission, nestled towards the end of the chapter, which 
reveals that the unfolded brain described by Willis – on which so much of his 
observations depend - is in fact a substitute: only a sheep’s brain, and not human one, 
could be projected in the manner he described on account of the sheer bulk of the 
human cerebrum, which meant it could not be ‘so easily and thoroughly inverted’ (p.61). 
The human brain could be ‘bent back’ to allow examination of its interior, but a sheep’s 
brain could be entirely ‘spread plain.’ Willis’s investigation of the ‘unfolded’ brain was 
therefore dependent upon a set of transposed observations, conducted on the basis of a 
stable analogy between the structures in man and four-footed beasts. None of this is 
particularly well signposted in the text; Willis was distinctly vague about which brain he 
was unfolding. This was enabled by the fact that his argument rested not so much on the 
individual ‘facts’ of the object itself as in the claims being made about the kind of object 
it represented: the brain was a substantially solid, complex, structural object. 
 
A bowl of curds: contesting analogies 
 
Whether an anatomist chose to unfold or slice the brain, they confronted the same set of 
challenges when it came to investigating its fragile, gelatinous material.  Upon removal 
from the skull, the brain immediately begins to relinquish its form and rapidly 
disintegrates. As Steno had complained, the brain possessed a near fluid-like consistency 
such that its fibres ‘can hardly be touched without breaking.’62 The further one delved 
into its depths, the more its structures melted away. Willis pointed to this when he talked 
about the need to ‘explicate’ the brain before all its continuity and substance were 
‘dissolved’ (p.6). These material features did not simply represent a practical obstacle; 
they also created the unsettling impression that the brain itself had no substantial form, 
besides that which its container (or the anatomist) imposed upon it. As a result, Steno 
suggested that nothing reliable could be said about the brain: as he vividly remarked, 
‘when you would look into its inner substance you are utterly in the dark.’63 This left the 
                                                      
62 Nicolaus Steno, ‘A Dissertation on the Anatomy of the Brain’, translated by G. Douglas (London, 1743) 
reprinted in Ole J. Rafaelsen MD., Steno in Six Languages (Copenhagen; Rhodos, 1986), p. 59. On the 
unsettling prospect of delving into the elusive depths of the early modern body, Sawday (1995) comments 
that ‘The body’s interior architecture concealed dizzying depths and capacities… in which the imagination 
could lose itself,’ p. 16. 
63 Ibid, p. 16. 
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subject open to speculation and invention: ‘we know so little of the true structure […] 
that a Man of tolerable Genius may say about it, whatever he pleases.’64 This was a 
stinging criticism levelled against those anatomists – most notably Willis - who would 
presume to build physiological theories upon what could only be accepted as a flawed 
anatomy of the brain.65 
 
Figurative representations of the brain as a gelatinous, fluid mass reinforced these 
assessments and supported the arguments of figures such as Steno who sought to reject 
Willis’s notion of the brain as a container for the soul. 66 Willis’s task, therefore, was both 
a technical challenge – finding new technologies to circumvent these difficulties – and a 
matter of creating a new discourse around the brain, challenging prevailing 
representational strategies. In his efforts to rehabilitate the brain as a reliable material and 
thereby, intellectual, object Willis evoked a new kind of object through images of a 
‘structural’ and solid object, one displaying a variety of intricate textures and forms 
intended to supplant the fluid-brain evoked by his rivals. 
 
On the matter of the practical change, Willis adopted a pioneering (if rudimentary) 
preservation technique for ‘fixing’ the brain in alcohol, as used by Robert Boyle who 
noted that the ‘spirit of wine’ left a ‘clear prospect of the bodies immers'd in it.’ 67 The 
use of alcohol infusions had a dramatic impact: the brain could be studied for a matter of 
days, rather than hours, conferring obvious practical advantages onto Willis over his 
predecessors.68 It was also useful in preserving thin slices of brain tissue for close 
examination under the microscope. 69  This technique was amended through a new 
technique chirurgia infusoria, developed by Willis’s colleagues Christopher Wren and Dr 
Richard Lower, which involved intravenous infusions of alcohol and coloured dyes being 
                                                      
64 Ibid. For a discussion on Steno’s views regarding the limits of anatomical inquiry see: Kenneth Dewhurst, 
Willis and Steno, p. 46. 
65 Dewhurst, p. 46. 
66 On those objecting to materialist notions of the soul, including on the grounds of the brain’s physical 
inability to give rise to such events, see: John Henry, ‘A Cambridge Platonist Materialism: Henry More and 
the Concept of Soul,’ Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, 49 (1986), pp. 172-95. 
67 Quoted by Carl Zimmer, Soul Made Flesh: The Discovery of the Brain - and How It Changes the World (London: 
William Heinemann, 2004), p. 166. Zimmer notes that soaking the material in alcohol helped to fix the 
shape of specimens, which could then be more easily cut and sliced; this provided days, rather than hours 
of observation time, p. 176. 
68 On the new method of fixing the brain see: Sugg, Smoke of the Soul, p. 303; Cavalcanti, ‘Anatomy, 
Technology, Art, and Culture,’ p. 17. 
69 Bradley C. Lega,  ‘An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: How the Cerebri Anatome of Thomas 
Willis Influenced John Locke,’ Neurosurgery, 58.3 (2005), pp. 567-576 (p. 570). 
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injected into arterial vessels.70 It is often presumed that Willis’s access to these new 
techniques supplies us with an obvious explanation for the greater accuracy noted in his 
depiction of the basal structures and vascular system, as compared to Vesalius before 
him, for instance.71 However, this is more than a story of technical achievement.  
 
Willis’s interest in, and subsequent focus upon, the substantial material form of the brain 
was made possible by the advent of new technologies, but these events on their own do 
not explain his motivations. Rather, we must acknowledge that Willis’s practical focus on 
the intricate structures of the brain was broadly informed – and made meaningful – on 
account of his pre-existing physiological ideas. The new method was conceived as part of 
a wider effort to validate an alternative set of ideas about the nature of the corporeal 
soul, which he conceived in terms of animal spirits moving within the parts and channels 
of the brain’s interior spaces.72 Accordingly, Willis used his new dissection techniques to 
present the anatomical brain as characterised by solid, complex material structures – the 
‘channels’ and ‘chambers’ of the soul. These intellectual theories were realised – in the 
material of the body - through the application of new technologies. Despite the broad 
appeal to a more naturalistic presentation of the brain, what Willis created here was an 
alternative way of seeing the brain; one which was no less the product of the anatomist’s 
own specific emphases and physical interventions. 
 
These practical changes – and the arguments that were built around them – were 
importantly bound up in Willis’s use of language. He needed not only to stabilise the 
brain in a material sense, but also to suggest how this change could reveal an entirely 
distinct kind of object. This involved contesting popular representations of the brain as a 
wet and even repulsive object - the gelatinous mass evoked in Steno’s remarks. The 
English philosopher, Henry More famously likened the cerebral hemispheres to a ‘bowl 
of curds’ and the human intestines.73 This ignoble intestinal analogy was both effective 
and ancient, having also been employed by Vesalius to describe the convoluted 
presentation of the cerebral hemispheres. The analogy was notably persistent: in 1684, 
                                                      
70 On Wren’s development and use of this injection technology see: Sarah De Rijcke, Regarding the Brain: 
Practices of Objectivity in Cerebral Imaging, Seventeenth Century to Present (PhD thesis: University of Groningen, 
2010), pp. 34-5; Nathan Flis, ‘Drawing, Etching and Experiment,’ p. 155. 
71 Dewhurst, p. 46. 
72 Adrian Johns makes a similar argument, stressing that the ‘practical novelty’ of Willis’s method lent 
‘legitimacy’ to his claims about the soul: ‘The Physiology of Reading,’ p. 145. 
73 More’s idea of the brain was of a ‘watery, structureless substance’, see: Carl Zimmer, ‘Introduction: Bowl 
of Curds,’ in Soul Made Flesh, pp. 3-9. 
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for instance, Raymond de Vieussens maintained that of all the parts of the body the brain 
was most like the intestines.74  Analogies between parts of the body are a somewhat self-
referencing system – they do not extend or amplify beyond a shared domain (the body), 
as a comparison with a complex machine or celestial body might. Both the bowl of curds 
and intestines ultimately stressed the same point: that the brain was, despite its raised 
position, still a component of a corrupted, fleshy vessel. It certainly wasn’t a site fit to 
house the higher operations of the soul. Walter Charleton publically rejected Willis’s 
proposals noting that the ‘wet’ consistency of the brain made it a difficult notion to 
accept: 
 
[…] truly if any man shall seriously, and without prejudice consider the great bulk, 
cold temperament, various parts, fabrick and texture of the Brain; he will at length 
find but little reason to believe, that Nature hath framed it chiefly for a Laboratory 
of Spirits […] can a part so dense, so cold, so clammy, and to like a bogg, as the 
Brain seems to be, be thought an instrument fit for sublimation or rectification of a 
spirituose substance? 75 
 
The imagery evoked by Charleton, of the ‘cold’ and ‘clammy’ environment of the brain, 
evoked the fluid imbalances characteristic of traditional humoral physiology. Health was 
determined by a precarious balance between the four humors; by inciting an image of a 
predominately cold and wet brain, Charleton marked it out as an unlikely seat for a 
spirituous and active soul. 76 In this passage, Charleton looked to undermine Willis’s 
specifically chemico-corpusuclar theory of the soul by suggesting that the subtle matter 
of spirits could not be sublimed or circulated within such an environment. The 
laboratory analogy, site of experimental learning drawn upon so heavily in Willis’s earlier 
writing around the brain, is mocked and ultimately displaced here by the image of the 
bog - a visceral and dark setting. What we see here is how debates about the material 
qualities of the brain’s anatomy acted as proxy arguments for rival conceptions of the 
soul (and its relationship to the body). How the brain was to be framed – a laboratory or 
                                                      
74 Ludger Schwarte, ‘The Anatomy of the Brain as Instrumentalization of Reason,’ in Instruments in Art and 
Science: On the Architectonics of Cultural Boundaries in the 17th Century, ed. by Helmar Schramm, Ludger Schwarte 
and Jan Lazardzig, vol. 2 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 176-200 (p. 183). 
75 Walter Charleton, ‘Enquiries into human nature,’ in Anatomic prælections in the new theatre of the Royal College 
of Physicians in London, (London: Printed by M. White, for Robert Boulter, 1680), VI, p. 175. 
76 Martensen, pp. 12-13. See also John Sutton’s work on cultural representations of Englishmen’s brains as 
excessively moist and inconstant as a reflection of their environment: ‘Spongy Brains and Material 
Memories,’ in Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England, ed. by Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. 
Sullivan Jr. (Handmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 14-15. 
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a bog – carried high stakes indeed. It was important, then, for Willis to reframe this 
discourse. As he noted, the removal of the brain from the skull was itself intended to 
allow him a greater examination of ‘its make or fabric, and the disposition of order of all 
its parts [...]’ (p.60). Removing the membrane also showed that the ‘substance of the 
brain itself’ was distinct from that of its appendix, the cerebellum, with the latter 
displaying a striking ‘striated’ texture (p.60). Rather than an amorphous mass, the brain is 
here composed of various discrete parts, materials and textures – images that moved the 
reader far beyond the intangible, unfixed form suggested by the image of a bog or curds. 
This was a vital foundation for Willis to have established, which would be used to 
support his alternative physiological model of the mind. 77  In this, Willis did much more 
than simply improve upon the accuracy of the brain’s anatomy; as Anthony Clarke, along 
with many others, has stated, Willis is to be credited with having introduced a ‘new way 
of seeing the brain.’ 78 
 
Cerebral Topographies: Mapping the Brain 
 
One particular set of images that unites the themes discussed so far in this chapter is 
Willis’s extended use of topographical analogies; this drew upon both his prevailing 
rhetoric of naturalism while also emphasising how the complex, structural features of the 
brain might be seen as indicators of brain function. Where images of curds, intestines 
and bogs had couched the brain in a veil of opaqueness – a challenging and unworthy 
subject – Willis instead conjured an image of the brain as a detailed, terrestrial landscape 
to be explored and traversed, presented ‘in the mode of an atlas.’79 Like the world, the 
brain was richly inscribed with different forms and textures; his analogies thus conjured 
up images of river systems, valleys, or ploughed and furrowed fields. As Willis described 
it, ‘the substance of the brain is seen to be plowed, or laid as it were with furrows, out of 
which arise banks or ridges of broken crevices’ (p.92). These images helped to stress the 
textured quality of the cerebral landscape as well as its structural complexities. In the 
cerebral hemispheres – so long associated with the intestinal mass - its convoluted folds 
were instead likened to ‘a plot of ground, planted everywhere with nooks and corners’ 
(p.92). Although the two images did much the same work, in that they visually conveyed 
                                                      
77 Rousseau suggests that this was a vital innovation by Willis in his Nervous Acts (2004), p. 168. 
78 Edwin Clarke and Kenneth Dewhurst (eds.), An Illustrated History of Brain Function: Imaging the Brain from 
Antiquity (Norman Publishing, US: 2nd edition, 1995), p. 77. 
79 Flis, ‘Drawing, Etching and Experiment,’ p. 146. 
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the random folds which characterised the cerebrum, they also imported a very different 
set of associations. A ploughed field is in fact a cultivated feature of the landscape; it is a 
productive space. God, of course, as the ‘first workman’, had himself created these 
formations in the body precisely so that they might serve a valuable function. With his 
prior assumptions about the noble work of the brain, Willis certainly believed that these 
functions were to extend beyond the expulsion of waste products.  
 
These topographical scenes were also notably familiar and accessible. People could not 
peer inside their own bodies to study the intestines, but most would be able to see a plot 
of ground first hand or even tend to it themselves. These were images that divested his 
anatomical account of the darker, visceral connotations of the body and supplanted this 
with the rich discourse of geography.80 In co-opting the language of topography, Willis 
appropriated a collection of intellectual tools and textual signifiers used to organise and 
make sense of the space around us – tools which he transposed from the landscape of 
the new world to the new territory of the body. For instance, Willis describes how 
 
The anterior branches of the Carotides […] creeping upwards like a bounding 
River, distinguishes either Hemisphere of the Brain as it were into two Provinces 
(p.10). 
 
The brain was a structure comprised of discrete but interconnected regions or territories. 
As with the terrestrial globe, these features could also be used to denote inter-connected 
or communicating geo-political entities, a model which would have implications for 
Willis’s explanations of the operations of animal spirits between the two ‘hemispheres’. 
In another example, the nerves were described as gaining a ‘larger province’ in the mouth 
and face (p.12). Importantly, these were not spatial markers imposed by the anatomist’s 
knife, but naturally occurring characteristics of the cerebral-landscape; like the explorer, 
Willis presents the anatomist’s role as being to report, not remake, what he observed. 
Borrowing from geographical discourse was, on the one hand, a reference to the 
naturalism bound up in Willis’s broader narrative of the ‘unfolded’ (as opposed to the 
sliced) brain; it also represented a useful and specific analogue for the body. Provinces, 
                                                      
80 On the violence implicit in early modern anatomy see Sawday (1995), p. 1. On learned physicians 
wariness of being associated with the rough and violent work of common autopsy in this period see: Roy 
Porter, ‘Death and the Doctors,’ in In Sickness and in Health: the British experience, 1650-1850, ed. by Porter 
and Parker (London: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 245-57. This argument is repeated by Harley,  ‘Political Post-
Mortems and Morbid Anatomy,’ (1994), p. 21. 
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regions, hemispheres were all representations of how “things” were positioned in space 
relative to each other – a task shared by the cartographer and the anatomist alike.81  As 
recognisable signifiers of units of space in the world, these images helped to suggest a 
tamed and disciplined anatomy, helping to dispel the lurking prospect of visceral or fluid 
chaos.  
 
Willis’s language therefore evoked parallels between contemporary projects to ‘map’ the 
(rediscovered) body and the new world; both involved traversing new landscapes and 
both represented acts of discovery. Willis did not just describe the brain in the mode of 
an atlas, but also framed his observational experiences of the brain in terms of explorer-
discovery narratives. 82  The representational task faced by the anatomist, as they 
progressed deeper into hidden and alien terrain, was certainly open to a comparison with 
parallel efforts to map the edges of the atlas. As Jonathan Sawday notes, ‘the body was a 
territory, an (as yet) undiscovered country’, the exploration of which seemed ‘analogous’ 
to the experiences of the voyagers writing about the discovery of news lands.83 This 
mode of representing the body was by no means new to Willis: the body had long been 
evoked through a variety of spatial metaphors, while the narration of its form in terms of 
traversing a physical topography was a well-established trope in anatomical poetry. 
Prominent examples from this period include Phineas Fletcher’s Purple Island (1633) and 
John Donne’s first Anniversary poem ‘Anatomy of the World’ (1611). While not original, 
Willis certainly used topographical analogies to particularly vivid and original effect in 
articulating his ‘new’ vision of the anatomical brain.  
 
The elevated (rather than excavated) brain also meant that the brain’s features could be 
traced out in new and more flexible ways. As he noted, the carotid arteries were ‘more 
clearly beheld if the Brain be lifted up’, before instructing the reader to bend and tilt the 
brain in order to continue following the path of the optic nerves (p.8). These actions read 
                                                      
81 Sawday, Body Emblazoned, p. 86. 
82 Representations of the anatomical body frequently borrowed from cartographic practices. On this see: 
Sara Kowalski, ‘Severed Limbs and Dissected Bodies: Early Modern Discourses of Anatomy, Cartography, 
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as if they continued on from the passive acts of unfolding with which the process 
commences: Willis, like the explorer, follows and traces out pathways, tilting and bending 
the brain as he goes. As I’ve touched upon already, Willis was especially concerned to 
emphasise his attendance to the natural sequence and order of parts within the brain. 
Notably, even when Willis refers to his own acts of cutting (and he must), these actions 
are almost always conditioned by this surrounding narrative of sequential progress 
through a geographical landscape. This was an important contrast for Willis to establish - 
between an observational experience that was guided by nature’s own design against one 
that was imposed, fragmented and broken.84 Here, Willis in effect mediated the loss of 
(an artificially imposed) order to the brain by deferring – as the explorer might - to the 
order presented before him by nature. 
 
In addition to these images, Willis also drew on a host of organic, vegetative analogies, 
especially in attempting to represent the networked complexities of the vascular 
structures. The nerves penetrated the brain, for instance, like ‘young branches of Vines’ - 
a familiar sight in the garden - as they ‘branch’ out and ‘impart roots’ (p.8, 10). The 
arteries similarly rose up on either side of the brain to encompass and bind the sphere or 
globe of the brain together: sending ‘forth shoots and little branches on every side’ they 
‘intimately bind about the utmost compass of its Sphere’ (p.10). These structures formed 
a particular visual challenge. Like creeping vines, they displayed  
 
[…] several tails or little feet compacted together, all of which, although distinct 
one from another, are endued with figures diversly expanded…thrust everywhere 
into the same Globe (p.5).  
 
The image resonated, for Willis, with the spectre of the ‘labyrinth’ only he was now 
tasked with mapping its contours onto the flat of the page. One of the ways in which 
Willis developed and disciplined the potential chaos lurking within this imagery of 
creeping vines and shoots was through the supplementary (and notably artificial) image 
of a net, a constructed or man-made object. He describes how,  
 
                                                      
84 Kowalski also argues that, through certain figurative representations of the brain, Willis attempted to 
construe a notion of his dissected brain as an object that could still be ‘trusted’ to reveal its natural form: 
‘Severed Limbs’, p. 14. 
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[…] the subject may be seen covered with the infolding Vessels, as it were with a 
net admirably variegated or flourished, and its sight or aspect shews like the picture 
of a fruit bearing wood (p.10). 
 
The inclusion of the image of the net helps to tame the initial prospect of the mass of 
tails and feet by drawing our attention to the replicating, visual pattern created by the net. 
As with a net, the vessels created inter-related, replicating units of space extended over a 
large area (though not in a regular fashion). While he could not describe in exact detail 
every ‘unit’ of this net he could, through the comparison, impart a (borrowed) structural 
logic. Both the net employed by fishermen and the vessels of the brain were structured in 
such a way as to distribute evenly, over a large surface area. As a constructed object used 
in industry, it was an image that also helped to infer a notable artifice in the vascular 
structures and nerves: these images moved the reader away from the initially chaotic 
prospect of feet and tails to an image of purposeful and rational design. As William 
Bynum notes, the notion of providential artifice as something revealed in the design of 
the body was a key factor in Willis’s use of anatomical form to speak about physiological 
function. 85 
 
The pattern represented by the net was nevertheless significantly complex – defying 
direct visual representation. The ‘wonderful net’ or rete mirabile was, for instance, depicted 
in diagrammatic form as a unit of cross-hatched space in Vesalius’s illustrations of the 
brain.86 A more accessible and indeed, naturalistic, picture of the same networked effect 
is instead supplied by the image of a ‘fruit bearing wood.’ The wood created an image of 
branches heavy with appendages, forming a complex visual matrix of divaricated forms 
and distributed fruits. This was a far more accessible representation of structural 
complexities that could not otherwise be described directly and of Willis’s broader 
argument that these vessels served for the even distribution of blood across the brain. 
Once again, these images served to emphasise the naturalness of the object Willis 
presents to the reader.  
 
                                                      
85 On the assumption of design, and therefore a designer, in the correlation of form with function in early 
modern anatomy see: Bynum, ‘The Anatomical Method,’ (1973), p. 445.  
86 On this and the broader history of representing the rete mirabile see: Sebastian Pranghofer, “It could be 
Seen more Clearly in Unreasonable Animals than in Humans”: The Representation of the Rete Mirabile in 
Early Modern Anatomy,’ Medical History, 53 (2009), pp. 561-586 (p. 566). See also, Richard Sugg, Smoke of 
the Soul, p. 284. 
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The image of the ‘fruit bearing wood’ was not, however, a simple visual analogy for the 
‘natural’ object presenting before Willis’s eyes; rather, it was a picture generated 
specifically by his use of intravenous imaging techniques.87 As he describes it,  
 
[…] the picture of a fruit-bearing wood, the Idea of which, the Vessels of the Brain 
more aptly represent, and are themselves seen better and more distinctly, if you first 
squirt into the Carotidick Artery some black liquor’ (p.10).  
 
By adapting the intravenous infusions pioneered by Wren and Lower to inject coloured 
dyes into the cerebral arteries, Willis created an augmented sight in the brain which both 
enhanced the visual presentation of the vessels and also made them better conform to 
the analogy he had proposed.88 These practices visually – and intellectually - enhanced 
those structures that were most important to Willis while at the same time diminishing 
those that weren’t. Notably, what Willis reproduced here was the experimental 
replication of blood-flow - the inanimate object is by such means reanimated, providing a 
simulation of its function in life. Again, Willis’s practices worked here to reinforce his 
particular way of seeing the organ as one primarily intended to support physiological 
operations. Here, the vessels are not visualised in their own right but highlighted as 
formations that could be made to speak to the nature of the spirituous activities which 
occurred within them.  
 
Willis used this imagery of the rich, cerebral ‘landscape’ to foreground important 
functional claims. His analogy between arteries and rivers, for instance, helped the reader 
imagine both their visual appearance (as networked structures) and their role in 
channelling and directing the flow of blood about the brain. Willis’s interest in the 
movement of blood and nervous juices through these complex structures further 
consolidated his rejection of the vague circulation models denoted by the ventricular 
theories, derived from Galen. The meandering and crooked nature of these vessels 
moreover, especially at the base of the brain, further suggested the provision of flood 
defences. Willis interpreted these features by drawing on existing ideas about the 
differences between human and animal physiology noting, for example, that in humans 
the carotid artery enters the brain as an ‘undivided channel’ and rarely sent out small 
                                                      
87 On technology and visualisation see Flis, p. 146. 
88 Lega, ‘How the Cerebri Anatome of Thomas Willis Influenced John Locke,’ pp. 567-576. 
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‘shoots,’ because, he reasoned, humans needed a free and full supply of blood for the 
enactment of the ‘generous Affections’ of the sensitive soul (p.29). To which end,  
 
[…] it is behoveful for its River not to run into narrow and manifoldly divided 
Rivulets, which would scarce drive a Mill, but always with a broad and open chanel, 
such as might bear a Ship under Sail (p.86) 
 
On the one hand, Willis recorded his direct observation that the carotid in humans is less 
divaricated (or networked) than in animal brains; at the same time he also connected this 
observation, through the analogy with the mill and ships under sail, to his interpretation 
that human brains were anatomically designed to support greater affective capacities. His 
anatomical findings reproduced and confirmed a working model, rather than being a 
simple matter of empirical discovery. Having noted the need for an unhindered supply of 
blood to the brain, Willis also looked to demonstrate a corresponding provision of 
defensive structures, suggesting that the ‘meandering’ and ‘crooked’ ascent of the carotid 
artery, like a ‘river’ carving its way through a valley, would moderate this plentiful flow of 
blood into the brain. As he noted, by this ‘imbowing’ the blood was ‘carried about by a 
longer compass, (that the Torrent of the Blood, before it comes to the border of the 
Brain, might flow slowly and pleasantly with a broken force)’ (p.48).  
 
This too was a reading of the brain which Willis looked to demonstrate through his 
experiments with coloured dyes: ‘the liquor being plentifully injected, could not so 
suddenly pass through the very small Vessels covering the Brain’ which prevented the 
brain from being subject to the ‘violent impulse of the liquor’ (p.30). Notably, the results 
of this experiment did not stand on their own: rather, the observable outcomes were 
made sense of by reference to the distinctions encapsulated in the contrast established 
between the open channel and the crooked ‘imbowing’ of the arterial rivers. From 
narrow rivulets to broad channels, these analogies – used in conjunction with new 
imaging techniques - were used to propose significant physiological models of human 
and animal brain functions, thereby moving well beyond the traditionally agreed 
parameters of anatomy.89 
 
                                                      
89 Caron, p. 24. 
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These discussions were, in turn, used to support a quite different kind of metaphor: that 
of the brain as an apparatus of chemical distillation, used by Willis in his Diatribae Duae 
(1659) and then repeated in Anatomy. As he observed, the blood vessels, arranged ‘like 
leaves of a wood’, worked to instil animal spirits into the brain ‘as it were [by] a Chymical 
Artifice’ (p.48). The vascular pathways further reminded Willis of ‘little serpentine 
channels hanging to an alembic’ – the glass flask used in the distillation process. 
Particular attention was paid, here, to the work of the arteries in establishing the 
conditions required for distillation to take place inside the brain. He observes, for 
instance, the ‘notable provision’ of ‘imbowings and branching’ of the arteries that hinders 
the approach of the blood ensuring that, ‘concerning the matter to be distilled…great 
care is taken both that choice of matter may be had, and that only a due proportion of it 
be exposed to distillation’ (p.54). Here, Willis took the findings of his experiment – 
which showed a slowing down the influx of blood - as a feature designed to support the 
process of distilling and refining the spirits delivered to the brain.  
 
These anatomical findings were therefore being interpreted through – and used to 
reinforce – pre-existing intellectual models conceived by Willis, shaped by his earlier 
chemical practices. Images of rivers, crevices and branches helped to map a set of 
chemical ideas onto an anatomical (and thus more empirical) setting. This complicates 
any sense in which Willis used his analogies to simply illustrate the anatomy of the brain 
he saw before him. Furthermore, these examples show how topographical imagery could 
also intersect with and help to extend a chemical metaphor. This highlights both that his 
anatomical findings were mediated by his physiological and chemical theories, but also 
that a given set of analogies or metaphors do not necessarily operate in isolation within a 
text. They can be used to extend and develop an apparently unrelated set of images. 
 
Interestingly, the topographical and vegetative imagery of these examples was not applied 
uniformly to the entire brain but featured most prominently in his discussions of the 
brain’s cerebral hemispheres (its ‘grey’ matter) and major arterial networks. Once the 
brain had been ‘opened’ up to expose the so-called ‘white’ interior structures, the 
typographical imagery largely gives way to a far more architectural and mechanistic set of 
analogies (p.12). The outcomes of these contrasting image-sets are explored in the next 
chapter. The point I wish to emphasise here is that topographical analogies served a 
specific function at a certain point in these explanations. They were also part of a 
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broader contrast, noted by Willis, between grey and white material structures in the brain 
– visually embodied in two vastly different sets of analogies. Overall, topographical 
images helped to establish the brain as a complex, interconnected body of parts: spatially 
organised (as hemispheres and provinces) and bound together as one ‘globe’. They also 
provided a platform for considering functional implications through references to flood 
defences and river-flow management. Willis was less concerned here to discuss the 
specific, localised operations of the soul inside the brain than he was interested in 
establishing a larger physiological framework against which to frame those events. The 
success of Willis’s broader argument – that the brain could indeed house the 
physiological operations of the soul – was, for example, importantly grounded in his 
observations that the brain received a plentiful provision of blood and spirits from the 
body and that it could also manage and refine the ingress of that matter. These were 





Willis promoted to his reader the idea of a direct and unmediated encounter with the 
brain as a ‘natural’ object, chiefly by describing an unfolded rather than a dissected brain 
– a claim he substantiated and developed through naturalistic imagery and topographical 
analogies. Despite all of his narrative work Willis still, at some stage, cut or broke parts of 
the brain in order to peer inside; his claim to expose the all the brain’s hidden recesses to 
view clearly required a much greater level of physical intervention than merely stretching, 
lifting or unfolding. However, what Willis’s narrative achieved more broadly was to push 
this conflict to the margins. Arguably, his framing of his methodology around a language 
of naturalism and the passive acts of freeing, unfolding and exposing the brain was an 
attempt to diminish the creative impositions of dissection, to erase (as far as possible) his 
own active presence. It was also a means by which to claim a specific kind of authority – 
signified through reformed observational practices – with which to support his later 
arguments around the soul. 
 
Within more traditional scholarship around Willis, it has been proposed that his 
physiological ideas mark a deviation from an otherwise meticulously empirical 
investigation into the brain and nerves. This suggests that his descriptions of anatomical 
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structures were objective and free from the literary excesses of his functional 
explanations. This reading fails to take account of the rhetorical arguments bound up 
within Willis’s account of his own practices and the specific kind of objectivity he strove 
to adopt in order to validate his physiological arguments concerning the soul. Moreover, 
the nature of his findings - their significance and meaning – was fundamentally mediated 
through his use of particular literary strategies of representation. Willis’s arguments relied 
in no small part upon the effectiveness of his images of the brain as a new kind of object, 
moving from an amorphous mass to a complex ‘globe’ marked out by discrete 
‘provinces’ and channels. The outcomes of his Anatomy thus relied upon a set of 
contested analogies of the brain, rather than being produced by a straightforward 
technological development or neutral observational experience. 
 
The key point here has been to challenge approaches that treat anatomical discovery as 
independent of the literary representations that surround those events: Willis’s claims to 
objectivity were based as much on his practices as the rhetorical claims he was able to 
construct around those acts. There is no possibility of an anatomical account bound only 
by the work of describing the body ‘as it is’. For Willis, the work of describing the brain 
was simultaneously a project to map out the hidden places of the soul and to suggest 
something about its activities. Here, Willis’s metaphors and analogies of the brain were 
not merely illustrative guides but arguments for a particular vision of the soul. His 
descriptions of the ‘unfolded’ – or explicated - brain allowed him to emphasise the 
importance of the structure and sequence of the brain and its underlying structures; these 
were the sites and structures within which his explanations of the soul’s operations 
within the body would be situated. This is not to undermine Willis’s contributions to 
anatomical knowledge, but to emphasise how, through the work of analogy and 
metaphor in science, knowledge is produced out of the dynamic intersections between 
language, culture and practice. The issues raised here remind us of the need to consider 
the intrinsic relationship between practice and rhetoric in the history of science; there is 
no simple dichotomy between scientific knowledge and literary strategies. 
 
Lastly, the correlation Willis drew between limited physical intervention in the body and 
claims of a more objective or accurate account is perhaps evident in our use of modern 
imaging techniques – to the extent that there is increasingly no need to actually dissect a 
brain in order to study how it works. These modern techniques reproduce a certain 
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emphasis on the movement of blood through structures of the brain, rather than being 
concerned with structure in its own right. This is not to say that such practices are a 
direct inheritance from Willis; but to suggest that ways of looking at the brain are always 
shaped and limited by the availability of technologies and the metaphors and linguistic 
structures available to make sense of them. There is no self-evident representation of the 
brain to be found, only historically specific ones; this is true of Vesalius’s sliced brain as 
much as it is of Willis’s ‘unfolded’ brain and the modern MRI scan.  
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Chapter four 
The Cloistered Brain and the Clockwork Cerebellum 
 
In 1653 the Cambridge Platonist Henry More remarked that the ‘Brain, with all its 
Caverns is but one great Nerve;’ a hollow, conduit structure.1 It was, for More, also an 
unstructured and disturbingly moist object, which he chose to compare to a ‘cake of 
sewet’ and a ‘bowl of curds.’ It was thus too ‘laxe’ to house something as noble as the 
soul. 2  Where More had seen only caverns and curds, Willis instead emphasised a 
complex, solid and structural representation of the brain. He described an intricate 
architectural setting replete with cloisters, cells and chambers. Importantly, reflected in 
these contrasting representations of the brain’s internal spaces, were two vastly different 
models of the soul. While Willis’s account was in no small part the outcome of new 
techniques for physically investigating the brain, it was also bound up in the ways in 
which he was able to conceive of the brain through the lens of a particular physiological 
theory of the soul. 
 
Reflecting on the next stage of his anatomical investigation, Willis wrote that having ‘thus 
far beheld the Coverings of the Brain,’ a consideration of the ‘Fabrick and true Hypotype 
or Character of the Brain and its Appendix, together with the action and use of all the 
parts’ should follow.3 What was notable about his approach here was the particular 
emphasis on the structure and fabric of the brain itself, alongside a broad disregard for 
its cavities or ventricles – previously significant locations for models of brain function. 
Moreover, beyond simply describing the physical form of the brain, Willis explicitly 
sought to use his anatomical account to provide a more solid foundation for a detailed 
physiological model of brain function. He is often heralded as being the first to establish 
the brain (and the nerves which served it) as the exclusive seat of the sensitive soul in the 
body; the ways in which he chose to represent his anatomical findings was an important 
                                                      
1 Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul (London, 1659), p. 130. John Henry, ‘A Cambridge Platonist's 
Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul,’ Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 49 (1986), 
pp. 172-95.  
2 More retained his conviction even after Willis’s much celebrated anatomical research had been widely 
disseminated after 1664 showing it to be a solid, structural object, Immortality, p. 106. 
3 Thomas Willis, ‘Anatomy of the Brain’, in Remaining Medical Works, translated by Samuel Pordage 
(London, 1681), p. 90. All in-text citations will refer to this edition using the abbreviation ‘AB.’  
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part of this intellectual contribution.4 Willis’s arguments, for instance, were broadly 
premised upon a correlation between (anatomical) form and (physiological) function: the 
more complex the anatomical formations he observed, the more complex the functions 
he was able to ascribe to them.5  
 
The question of how the anatomical structure of the brain could be used to reveal the 
(invisible) workings of the soul sat at the centre of Willis’s anatomical work. 6 Though 
this constituted (for a number of Willis’s detractors) a dangerously speculative leap from 
what was known to what could not be, Willis’s application of anatomical learning in 
order to consider the nature, powers and arrangement of the soul fitted into a long 
established tradition of using the providential design of the body to make teleological 
arguments concerning the soul in natural philosophical works.7 A notable example is in 
the work of the influential sixteenth century Wittenberg anatomist Phillip Melanchthon, 
whose popular and widespread Commentarius de anima, published in 1540, became one of 
the most widely printed commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima in the period.8 His work is 
significant here in that it incorporated aspects of Galenic anatomical learning into a 
                                                      
4 As George Rousseau has argued, it is less the (much celebrated) ‘accuracy’ of his anatomical descriptions 
than his important ideas about the brain as the exclusive seat of the corporeal or sensitive soul, which 
marked out his work as paradigmatic: George Rousseau, Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and 
Sensibility (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 168. 
5 That Willis’s anatomical method was premised upon the inferences between anatomical form and 
physiological function has been well established by William F. Bynum, ‘The Anatomical Method, Natural 
Theology, and the Functions of the Brain’, Isis, 64.4 (Dec., 1973), pp. 444-468 (p. 450); Robert Martensen, 
The Brain Takes Shape: An Early History (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 75-81; Adrian 
Johns, ‘The Physiology of Reading and the Anatomy of Enthusiasm,’ in Religio Medici: Medicine and Religion in 
Seventeenth century England, ed. by O. P. Grell and A. Cunningham (Aldershot: 1996), pp. 136-170 (p. 144). 
6 Adrian Johns argues that Willis’s project was, on this basis, ‘specific’ and unusual: ‘The Physiology of 
Reading,’ p. 144. Michael Hawkins also argues that Willis only described anatomical form to effect an 
explanation of the passions of the soul, ‘The Empire of the Passions: Thomas Willis’s anatomy of the Restoration 
soul’ (PhD thesis: Imperial College, 2004), p. 196. Louis Caron similarly proposes that this use of anatomy 
to support a discourse on the soul pushed at the accepted boundaries between anatomy, physiology and 
theology in this period: The Philosophical Reception of Thomas Willis (1621-1675) with Particular Reference to John 
Locke (1632-1704), (PhD Thesis: Kings College Cambridge, 2011), p. 24. However, Hawkins and Caron’s 
positions overstate the case: Willis’s works were part of a much longer tradition of using anatomy to 
investigate the soul, as seen in the works of Phillip Melanchthon and the Wittenberg anatomists. On this, 
see: Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: the case of Phillip Melanchthon (New York: 
CUP, 2006) and Vivian Nutton, ‘Wittenberg anatomy’, in Medicine and the Reformation, ed. by Peter Grell Ole 
(London: Psychology Press, 1993). 
7 As Vivian Nutton has argued, it was ‘commonplace’ to find expressions of teleological argument in 
anatomy: God left his ‘footprints’ in the body, as in nature, as ‘evidence for man to contemplate.’ This was 
especially evident in Wittenberg anatomy, where such arguments offered a response to the chance model 
of epicurean atomism: Nutton, ‘Wittenberg anatomy’, (1993), pp. 11-32 (pp. 18-20). On Nicolas Steno’s 
attacks on Willis’s use of anatomical knowledge see: Kenneth Dewhurst, ‘Willis and Steno’, in Gustav 
Scherz (ed.) Steno and Brain Research in the Seventeenth century, (London: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 46.  
8 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, (2006), p. 84. 
 174 
Christian (largely Lutheran) reading of Aristotle’s treatment of the soul. 9  Notably, 
Galenic anatomy had itself sought to align a tripartite schema of the faculties of the soul 
with particular parts and functions of the body: the incomparable artifice of the body 
reflected the hand of the creator, rather than chance occurrence, and this design 
necessarily spoke to the nature or arrangement of the soul it was designed to contain. 
Willis would himself apply a tripartite model of the soul to represent the arrangement of 
its faculties within body, but with a focus on the specific micro-structures and textures of 
the brain itself – rather than the traditional three venters of the Galenic body - as the 
souls exclusive ‘seat’ in the body.  
 
To have the soul sit at the centre of a medical investigation of the body of this kind was 
also reflective of the traditional education physicians such as Willis received at Oxford 
during this period, which maintained a long and widespread tradition of inquiry into the 
soul in its natural philosophy curriculum, focusing on explication of Aristotle’s De anima. 
Physicians of the learned medical tradition all used the philosophical teachings of the 
undergraduate arts course - shaped by Aristotelian treatments of the soul - as a starting 
point for their own medical investigations.10 While commentaries on Aristotle were in a 
decline over the course of the seventeenth century, the soul nevertheless still formed ‘the 
culmination of a course in natural philosophy’ – and thus medical training - in this 
period. 11 Willis’s education was no exception to this; we need only look to the title of his 
De Anima Brutorum to see how he positioned himself in reference to Aristotle’s De Anima. 
 
The point to be noted here is that Willis’s use of cerebral anatomy to think, in 
teleological terms, about the intended arrangement, powers and faculties of the soul was 
not in itself radical. Both Melanchthon and Willis after him drew on a long tradition of 
teleological thinking within anatomical leaning, notably expressed by Vesalius, whereby 
dissection could be justified on the basis of its capacity to reveal the imprint of divine 
craftsmanship, every part having been designed and arranged for a particular function.12 
This elevated knowledge of the body alongside that of the soul. Willis’s descriptions of 
                                                      
9 As Kusukawa argues, Melanchthon’s Commentarius ought to be read as a work on ‘human anatomy and the 
rational soul,’ though historians routinely overlook the significance of the anatomical component, p. 101. 
10 Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Ideas in Context) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
11 As Richard Serjeantson has argued, though Aristotle ceased to ‘sit at the centre of the web of 
investigations into the soul, the de anima tradition was transformed rather than straightforwardly rejected,’ 
‘The Soul’, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Desmond M. Clarke and 
Catherine Wilson (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 119-141 (pp. 120-121).  
12 On this, see: Nutton, ‘Wittenberg anatomy’, Medicine and the Reformation, (1993), pp. 18-20. 
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the cerebral anatomy he investigated are, therefore, an important and even integral 
component of his broader arguments about the soul. Willis’s arguments that specific 
structures in the brain could be used to express a (quite expanded) range of functions 
and activities for the animal spirits nevertheless probed new and potentially contentious 
ground; how he chose to represent the details of his anatomy of the brain is therefore 
important when examining his defence of a new physiological model of the soul. 
 
What is of interest here, specifically, is how Willis marshalled his specific analogical and 
metaphorical representations of brain-structure to buttress his use of inferences from the 
body in order to make claims about the soul. The anatomical ‘facts’ he described here 
were not merely the result of empirical ‘discovery’– their significance as sites of 
knowledge and as a particular kind of evidence (as objects that spoke to a concept of the 
soul) are established through creative, intellectual activities – including literary strategy. 
Even as Willis grappled with the visceral forms displayed on the dissecting table before 
him, it was his conception of the body as a vessel for a particular kind of material soul 
that gave meaning and form to those observations. The soul is necessarily the object of 
his Anatomy.  
 
The themes that I seek to pick up on here have been variously touched upon in 
scholarship from the late 1980s onwards, in particular by Robert L. Martensen (2004) 
and Michael Hawkins (2003). Hawkins argues, for instance, that ‘it is difficult to 
understand his [Willis’s] theories fully without an appreciation of how he believed that 
anatomical knowledge of the structure of the brain and nerves revealed their hidden 
physiological and pathological aspects.’13 As Roy Porter and others have also shown, 
Willis’s concept of the soul was ‘not aloof but plugged into the bodily economy’ – an 
economy which, according to Willis, was importantly tied into anatomical form.14 Willis’s 
concept of the soul must therefore be understood also in relation to his representations 
of the body’s structural form.15 More recently, Louis Caron has stressed the significance 
of Willis’s marshalling of anatomical facts in support of his ‘ideological commitments’ 
                                                      
13 Michael Hawkins, The Empire of the Passions, p. 196. See also: Robert L. Martensen, ‘When the Brain came 
out of the Skull’, in A Short History of Neurology: The British Contribution 1660-1910, ed. by F. Clifford Rose 
(Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1999), pp. 19-35. 
14 Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 59. 
15 Ludger Schwarte argues that Willis derived ‘the internal architecture of the rational soul from the 
anatomy of the brain and nervous system’: ‘The Anatomy of the Brain as Instrumentalization of Reason,’ 
in Instruments in Art and Science: On the Architectonics of Cultural Boundaries in the 17th Century, ed. by Helmar 
Schramm, Ludger Schwarte and Jan Lazardzig, vol. 2 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 
176-200 (p. 189). 
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concerning the mind, noting that in this pursuit was ‘doing something unprecedented.’16 
However, as I have noted above, this position overstates the radical nature of Willis’s use 
of the body to discourse on the soul, which reflected a long-standing tradition within 
natural philosophy.17 I also seek to shift the emphasis here by proposing that Willis’s 
anatomical ‘facts’ were not in themselves self-evidently available or independently 
deployed in this endeavour: these facts were created and made possible by the theory of 
mind that Willis held.  
 
I seek to build upon this body of work by being more explicit about the significance of 
literary strategies in the formation and argumentation of these ideas. Willis had already 
expressed a quite detailed physiological model of the body in his De Fermentionae and in 
his Oxford lectures of 1661, well before he began dissecting the brain.18 His notions 
about the nature of spirits and souls looped back and disciplined the ways in which he 
then saw and read the body before him; these relationships are bound up in the figurative 
language used to describe the body. In this I build on work by Ann Jessie Van Sant, who 
has argued that the ‘physical and non-physical “spaces” of Willis’s brain were ‘extensively 
related by the figurative language used to describe them.’19 That is to say, the specific 
structures Willis described were made, through certain figurative devices, to speak to his 
ideas of what was occurring within those functional spaces. 
 
Though aspects of Willis’s theory of the soul are necessarily discussed here - as a 
structuring framework to his anatomical descriptions - Willis’s specific ideas around the 
powers and pathologies of the soul, as well as the wider religious implications, will be 
examined in considerably more detail in the following (and final) chapter of this thesis. 
Lastly, in dealing with Willis’s literary representations of the brain’s structural economy, I 
also refer back to the physical and technical practices Willis employed, as I considered in 
the previous chapter. These practices, as I have argued, privileged observations of the 
brain’s structural qualities over and above other considerations. In this way literary and 
technical practices are brought together. 
 
                                                      
16 Caron, Philosophical Reception, p. 22, 25.  
17 Kusukawa, Transformation of Natural Philosophy, p. 84, pp. 99-101; Nutton, ‘Wittenberg anatomy,’ p. 20. 
18 Louis Caron also makes the point that Willis had in place a well structured physiological account of the 
soul by the time he came to write his Anatomy, see: Philosophical Reception, p. 61. See also: Caron, ‘Thomas 
Willis, the Restoration and the First Works of Neurology,’ Medical History, 59.4 (2015), pp. 525-553 (p. 541). 
19 Ann Jessie van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 63. 
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Anatomy and the soul: the ‘empty trunke’ 
 
I have suggested that, in seeking the soul, Willis began with the body - but how did he 
make this leap, from dissecting the body to representing the soul? And on what grounds 
did he defend this particular approach? Despite the rise of mechanical and materialist 
philosophies in the period, prevailing medico-philosophical and literary conceptions of 
the body continued to be structured by notions of spirits and souls.20 To investigate the 
body was to say something about the soul that inhabited and gave meaning to it; they 
were, to an extent, inseparable endeavours in this period.21  As Willis noted of the task he 
had set himself: ‘Wherefore to explicate the uses of the Brain, seems as difficult a task as 
to paint the Soul’ (AB, Preface). This task was, of course, one and the same thing for 
Willis: he described the intricate parts of the brain in order to reveal the secret hiding 
places and pathways inhabited by the soul (AB, p.92).22  
 
The brain, for Willis, was first and foremost a container for the animal spirits. The spirits 
were, as he put it, the primary or ‘immediate instruments’ of the soul and as such were 
extended to all parts of the body: ‘spirits are the Authors of the Animal Function, and do 
constitute the Hypostasis of the Soul it Self’ (AB, p.18-19). The spirits were produced in 
the brain from the vital spirits of the blood and performed all the tasks of government 
and sensation by receiving and carrying impressions of the objects of sense between 
body and brain, travelling through the nerves. Anatomy would lead on to knowledge of 
the soul’s actions in the body by providing a (visible) framework within which to frame 
and situate these various activities of the animal oeconomy. As he sets out,  
 
after the figures, sites, processes of the whole and singular parts should be 
considered […] some truth might at length be drawn forth concerning the exercise, 
defects, and irregularities of the Animal Government. (AB, Preface) 
 
                                                      
20 As Simon Schaffer argues, ‘if a mechanical philosophy was to be possible, the minimum condition was 
the establishment of a proper space for spirit’ (in the body). Spirits and souls were both the ‘source’ and 
‘target’ of these anatomical-physiological enterprises: ‘Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophies,’ Science in 
Context, 1 (1987), pp. 55-85 (p. 57). 
21  On early modern physiology and anatomy see: Andrew Cunningham, ‘The Pen and the Sword: 
Recovering the Disciplinary Identity of Physiology and Anatomy before 1800. I. Old Physiology - The 
Pen,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33 (2002), pp. 631-665. 
22 Hawkins argues that Willis doesn’t study the body ‘for its own sake’ but as a means to illustrate his 
theory of the passions of the soul, The Empire of the Passions, p. 194. 
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Despite Willis’s apparent optimism, this equation (uniting form, place and function in the 
brain) was neither a given nor without controversy. Where the invisible actions of the 
soul had once been the preserve of theologians, natural philosophers – drawing on a long 
Aristotelian tradition of investigating the soul - now developed their discussions of the 
soul along increasingly corporeal lines, employing atomistic and quasi-mechanical 
explanations to consider the nature of animal spirits. However, despite the confidence of 
these new sciences, it was still unclear as to why the bodies of the deceased should have 
revealed anything about the mechanism of life. This situation was further complicated by 
the fact that Willis’s own theory of the soul granted to its corporeal part (the animal 
spirits) a certain vital agency, rather than a purely mechanical action; it was even less 
clear, then, how the physical structure of the body might be made to speak to the nature 
and actions of that soul.23 
 
We get some sense of the opinions against which Willis set himself from the work of the 
English poet, Edward Calver, who in 1643 - while Willis was still undertaking his medical 
training at Oxford - published the Divine Passions, in which he mused (with some 
suspicion) upon the role of the anatomist-physician.24 Calver was a parliamentarian 
sympathiser who would later write poetry on the ‘reconstitution of the body politic’ 
following the English civil war. In this piece, he appears to first muse on its destruction, 
through the same metaphor of the body.25 As Jonathan Sawday has convincingly argued, 
anatomy and poetry shared overlapping frames of reference in this period, so it is not 
incongruous to find a poet pondering the tensions of the body-soul relationship in these 
terms. 26  Calver vividly cast the anatomist’s endeavour as a violent and crude 
deconstruction of godly design – a tearing down of the ‘walls’ comprising the body-
edifice - and an ultimately flawed undertaking: 
 
Man peradventure, like a butcher may,  
Unmake those walls which thou hast made of clay, 
Rip up mans body, open every part, 
Take out his entrails, looke into his heart, 
                                                      
23 I explore Willis’s notion of spirituous agency in chapter five of this thesis. 
24 Edward Calver, Divine Passions (London: printed for Richard Harper, 1643). 
25 The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography refers to Calver’s poetry as a ‘meagre talent,’ about which 
little is known: Nigel Smith, ‘Calver, Edward (bap. 1598?),’  
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press (2004) <http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/article/4408> [accessed 23 Sept 2016] 
26 Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
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Note every artrie, conduit pipe, and veine, 
And pry into the chamber of the brain.27 
 
Calver questioned what form of enlightenment these destructive efforts would bring the 
presumptuous, prying anatomist, asking ‘what can man in this description read’ when 
having ‘unlocked the doore of some rich cabinet [...] Doth finde it empty, all its jewels 
gone.’ The body, as a ‘cabinet’ for the soul, once opened by the ‘key’ of death finds itself 
transformed:  
 
Mans body straight becomes a trunke bereft  
Of all its matchlesse treasure, empty left.28 
 
The ornate body-cabinet is instantly reduced to a crude, empty ‘trunke’ - an early modern 
term for a dead body or a one without a head, bereft of a soul.29 All that remained for the 
anatomist to admire, then, was ‘the curious art about the little frame’ of the one-time 
cabinet, the former dwelling places of the soul. As Calver notes, drawing on a Cartesian 
metaphor of the body-machine, it was the (now absent) soul that had given the physical 
features of the body significance in the first place: it was the soul that ‘sets every wheel a 
working in the frame.’30  The structure of the anatomical body, the poem argues, 
provided very little by way of insight into its own operations. Notably, both the cabinet 
and the trunke are, when compared to the metaphor of the body-machine, passive 
objects; the cabinet (once opened) is a display piece for the (passive) anatomist-observer; 
the trunke, a mere, and now redundant, storage vessel. Calver’s objections here provide a 
useful context for thinking about the perceived limitations of anatomy; it also speaks to 
the kind of argumentative work required of Willis’s account as the poem, in particular, 
undercuts the premise that anatomy could be used to talk about the soul. 
 
Interestingly, while the body is crudely dismantled, the anatomist’s actions in respect of 
the brain are of a different order: prying into secret chambers, they sought knowledge 
they were not necessarily entitled to. In the 1660s the influential anatomist, and vocal 
critic of Willis, Nicolas Steno took up these same concerns, complaining of the arrogance 
                                                      
27 Calver, Divine Passions, p. 96. 
28 Calver, p. 96. 
29 "trunk, n." Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 10 February 
2015. 
30 Calver, p. 96. 
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of the anatomist who looked to discuss the invisible matters of the soul through the 
body.31 Both Vesalius and Steno after him stuck firm to the notion that anatomy was 
only to be concerned with describing form and structure - the ‘fabric’ of the body - 
rather than to speculate on (physiological) function, which necessarily relied upon the 
related concept of animal spirits or pneuma.32 As invisible atoms, these bodies could not 
be directly described or their actions explained according to the demands of experimental 
or empirical philosophies. Similarly, the Cambridge Platonist Walter Charleton expressed 
uncertainty over the ‘invisible’ motions of the spirits and rejected Willis’s explicitly 
physiological (rather than preternatural) approach to the soul. 33 Employing much of the 
same imagery used in Calver’s poetry, Willis sought to make the opposite argument 
about the brain: that the lifeless structure of this organ could tell him something 
meaningful about the function of the soul.  
 
A shadowy form 
 
One of the ways in which Willis addressed these tensions was to suggest that the spaces 
created inside the brain formed an inverted or negative image of the sensitive soul. He 
described how the first operation of the soul was to ‘frame the Body as it were its 
domicil or little House.’ The soul ‘frames the Body, is Co-extended with it, and fitted 
exactly, as to a little Box or Sheath.’34 In so doing, it rendered the body fitted to its uses 
and was therefore ‘intimately united to the Body’ as its active ‘form’ (SB, p.6-7). The 
sheath in particular develops an image of the brain as a container designed to conform to 
the shape of its object – just as the sheath is fitted exactly to the dagger. To study the 
form of the container is to denote something about which it is designed to contain; like a 
plaster cast, its hollow spaces revealed an image of an absent entity. The soul, thin and 
                                                      
31 Nicolaus Steno ‘A Dissertation on the Anatomy of the Brain’, translated by G. Douglas (London, 1743); 
reprinted in Steno in Six Languages, ed. by Ole J. Rafaelsen (Copenhagen: Rhodos, 1986). For a discussion 
on Steno’s views about the limits of anatomical inquiry, see: Kenneth Dewhurst, ‘Willis and Steno’, in Steno 
and Brain Research in the Seventeenth century, ed. by Gustav Scherz (London: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 46. 
32 Julius Rocca, ‘Anatomy,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. by R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 242-262 (p. 247). 
33 Walter Charleton, Enquiries into human nature in VI. Anatomic prælections in the new theatre of the Royal College of 
Physicians in London (London: Printed by M. White, for Robert Boulter,1680), p. 13, 170. On Charleton’s 
objections to Willis’s physiological theory of the soul, see: Michael Hawkins, “A Great and Difficult 
Thing": Understanding and Explaining the Human Machine in Restoration England', in Bodies/Machines, 
ed. by Iwan Morus (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2002), pp. 15–38. 
34 Thomas Willis, De anima brutorum (1672), translated into English by Samuel Pordage in Two Discourses on 
The Soul of Brutes (London, 1683), p. 6. All in text citations will refer to this edition using the abbreviation 
‘SB.’ 
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corporeal, extended to all parts of the body, therefore formed what Willis evocatively 
described as the ‘Spectre, or the shadowy hag of the Body’ (SB, p.6).  
 
Where the body was conceptualised as a sheath, box or chest this placed the image of the 
body front and centre (with the shape of the soul implied); Willis ends up with an 
(indirect) image of the soul itself, lifted from the body. Though he had acknowledged 
that ‘we can discern nothing with our eyes, handle with our hands, of these things that 
are done within the secret Conclave or Closset of the Brain,’ what he achieves with the 
images above is to propose an alternative mode of ‘sight’ where the soul is observable as 
an inverted image of the bodies negative space (SB, p.27). As he writes, if the ‘whole 
sensitive soul’ is to be viewed […] we must altogether represent the same Figure and 
Dimension, and the whole Head with its System and Appendix; so that as we may 
behold all these parts, shadowed in the same Image’ (SB, p.24). While these passages are 
taken from Willis’s later publication of 1672, The Soul of Brutes, I use them here in order 
to illustrate the intellectual assumptions that were being implicitly relied upon in Anatomy. 
Moreover, these passages provide some sense of the physiological outcomes that 
Anatomy was intended to help fulfil: as Willis stated, ‘for the Crown of the Work, a 
certain Theory of the Soul’ should be added to the ‘naked Anatomical Observations’ 
(AB, p.192).  
 
A key principle at work in these discussions was the notion that, as nature does nothing 
in vain, the brain’s structural form was the necessary product of providential design. This 
form must, then, be taken as speaking to the brain’s intended role or purpose. As 
something presumed to have been designed to house the soul, Willis approached the 
brain as being fitted to the specific needs and requirements of that soul. As Galen had 
also stated in his De Usu Partium, ‘in every case the body is adapted to the character and 
faculty of the soul.’35 This was a sequence of reasoning which allowed the anatomist to 
propose that they could grasp the functions of the body by deconstructing and 
understanding the artifice of its design. Indeed, the anatomist traced out the parts of the 
body in order to reveal its divine artifice. As Devon Hodges effectively put it: ‘anatomical 
truth was not based simply on observation and enumeration of parts of a dissected body; 
                                                      
35 Galen, Galen on the usefulness of parts of the body, translated by Margaret Tallmadge May (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1968), I, p. 68. 
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an anatomist also claimed the ability to see how each part of the body revealed the divine 
purpose of its creation.’36 
 
The architectural body: vaults and chambers 
 
Of course, any analogy taken in isolation reveals certain explanatory limits. Both the 
sheath and little box analogies were able to say very little about how the soul actually 
occupied or moved within what was (for a sheath or box) a largely undifferentiated 
interior space. These objects did not express how a body of active, self-moving atoms 
might have arranged themselves so as to be so intimately conjoined with the hard shell of 
the container. To support his presentation of the brain as an internally complex 
structure, Willis developed his discussion by drawing on a set of widely used architectural 
metaphors of the body. The body could thus be conceived of as an edifice, built from 
component parts fitted together, and with the implication of multiple spatial partitions - 
rooms, chambers, cells and so on. 
 
Not all parts of the brain were subject to this metaphorical treatment, however. Willis 
often drew a distinction between the ‘dual substances’ of the brain: the ashy-grey cortical 
matter and the white medullary parts.37 The medullary substance formed the underlying 
or interior structures of the brain (the cerebrum) and its appendix, and was prominently 
represented in terms of architectural structures. The cortical substance, in contrast, was a 
soft and spongy material, which formed the brain’s exterior shell, commonly thought to 
resemble the intestines. Willis had, unlike his contemporaries, made efforts to ascribe 
greater structural (and thereby functional) significance to this cortical mass - casting its 
folds and crevices in terms of a distillatory role, rather than an amorphous ‘bowl of 
curds.’ He nevertheless maintained that it was the medullary structures that constituted 
the proper places of the soul and the seat of animal government. The ‘brownish’ and soft 
cortical matter, he observed, ought to be removed by ‘gently scraping with the point of a 
Pen-knife’ in order to ‘better expose’ the white medullary structures lying underneath 
(SB, p.25). While descriptions of the spirit’s passage into the brain had evoked images of 
                                                      
36 Devon Hodges, Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), p. 
3. 
37 There was already a general distinction being made in anatomy textbooks between the ‘soft’ grey matter 
and ‘solid’ white matter, but these were vague at best and didn’t extend to specific physiological 
explanations. For example see: Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia (London: printed for William Laggard, 
1615), p. 455. 
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fluids moved (or distilled) through topographical features, the medullary parts conjured 
up a noble, architectural setting. As Willis remarked, his Anatomy examined not only the 
‘outward Courts and Porches of this Fabrick, as it were of a certain Kingly Palace, but 
also its intimate Recesses and private Chambers’ – the medullary spaces (AB, p.192). As 
Willis noted, the medullary substance being ‘harder than any other portion of the brain,’ 
was seen to be ‘chambering or arching the brain’ creating various ‘vaults’ for the spirits to 
inhabit (AB, p.93). These ‘marrowy’ chambers – and their related structures - were 
designed, Willis argued, to support and organise the localised operations of the sensitive 
faculties, as the rest of this section will explore.  
 
Images of vaults and arches were often used to describe the callous body in particular. 
The largest of the white structures, the callous body refers to a flat band of nerves, 
nestled at the centre of the brain, which unites the two cerebral hemispheres. Its curved 
shape created the impression of a vaulted or arched ceiling covering the interior cavity 
space of the brain. Vesalius had also described it as ‘resembling a vault (fornix) or arched 
roof,’ upon which the structural integrity of the brain depended.38 Upon entering the 
brain, the spirits were first brought to this chamber: ‘they are brought at last into the 
Callous Body, as into a spacious field; where, as in a free and open place, these spirits being 
newly produced, are expatiated or issue forth (AB, p.93). This was a spatially demarcated 
process of transformation for the animal spirits: emerging from labyrinthine folds of the 
cortex, characterised as crevices and branches, the spirits now circulated freely within an 
open, communal and urban arena. In this, they moved into a far more determinable 
space.  
 
Vaulted and arched ceilings, or palatial porches, were of course features of buildings – 
not bodies. Architecture was a prominent and widely employed metaphor for the body in 
this period, both within anatomical texts and literature, but especially in relation to 
accounts of dissection. 39  As Ludger Schwarte has argued, for Willis and his 
contemporaries, ‘the assumption of a brain architecture (“fabrica cerebri”) is much more 
than an analogy’ – indeed, it was a metaphor, guiding how the body was to be 
investigated and understood.40  It expressed notions around the constructed nature of the 
                                                      
38 Vesalius, Fabrica (1543), quoted in Peter Mitchell, The Purple Island and Anatomy in Early Seventeenth century 
Literature, Philosophy, and Theology (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), p. 81.  
39 P. Mitchell, The Purple Island, p. 81; David Cowling, Building the Text: Architecture as Metaphor in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Sawday, The Body Emblazoned, (1995). 
40 Ludger Schwarte, Instrumentalisation of Reason, p. 187. 
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body and established it as something which could be explored and examined as an 
artificial edifice – in the sense of it being reducible to a set of component parts which 
could be made to speak to its design.41 The brain and body really were materially 
fashioned and constructed; in which sense, the body was both like and unlike all artificial 
bodies in the world – from other animals to clocks to buildings. The anatomist could 
therefore investigate the fabric of the body as the features of a building might be 
surveyed - in order to understand how its composite parts related to the structure of the 
whole. Vesalius, in Book I of his Fabrica, mused that ‘what walls and beams provide in 
houses, poles in tents, and keels and ribs in ships, the substance of bones provides in the 
fabric of man.’42  In a later example by Samuel Collins, System of Anatomy (1685), he stated 
that the aim of anatomy was to ‘give a pleasant prospect of the elegant building of Man’s 
body […] of the several apartments […] and the rich household stuff and fine furniture 
contained in them.43  
 
The human body was at once a source and object of the architectural metaphor. In an 
example from 1624, Henry Wotton described how the ledges of a building were 
‘interlayed like Bones,’ in his Elements of Architecture. 44  Gothic architecture from the 
eleventh century, in turn created ‘rib-vaulted’ ceilings, highlighting the interplay between 
the body and architecture. These were, of course, an interconnected set of discourses; 
human construction sought to reflect the fundamental principles of geometry and 
proportion, as expressed in God’s own creations in nature, the body being the chief 
example of divine artifice. Architectural theory was a particularly useful proxy for 
thinking about how physical structures were arranged in space, which was precisely what 
the practice of anatomy sought to relate. 45  Anatomy, echoing architectural theory, 
concerned itself with underlying structures, depth and volume, rather than surface 
qualities.46 As Walter Charleton observed in his Enquiries into Human Nature (1680), the 
anatomist considered and interpreted the structure of the body as one would study and 
admire a work of architecture: in respect of the brain, for instance, he appreciated ‘the 
pillars that support it, the arch’d roof that covers and defends it, the fret-work of the 
                                                      
41 On the early modern use of the term artifice in relation to the body see: Robert L. Martensen, The Brain 
Takes Shape. An Early History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 83. 
42 Quoted by David Cowling, Building the Text, p. 111. 
43 Samuel Collins, A Systeme of Anatomy, 2 vols. (London, 1685), I. p. i. 
44 Henry Wotton, ‘The Elements of Architecture’ (orig. pub. 1624), A collection of lives, letters, poems (London: 
T. Roycroft, 1672), p. 29.  
45 Sawday, Body Emblazoned, p. 136. 
46 Harry F. Mallgrave, The Architects Brain: Neuroscience, Creativity, and Architecture (West Sussex: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2010), p. 11. 
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Ceiling […] the four vaulted cells.’47 The body was, at the same time, a source of 
architectural knowledge: Vitruvius’s geometry, for example, stressed the proportional 
relations of body as a basis for architectural theory - we might think about how a ‘foot’ is 
a unit of measurement here.48  The architectural metaphor therefore referenced the 
perceived relationship that existed between human and natural artifice, being that the 
former aimed to replicate the principles operating in nature as far as possible. 
 
This conceptual framework extended between anatomical and literary treatments of the 
body.49 In popular poetry we find numerous examples of the body-interior represented as 
a building that could then be figuratively traversed by the anatomist-explorer.  Two of 
the most famous examples are Edmund Spencer’s extended allegory in book two of the 
Fairie Queene, ‘The House of Alma’, and Phineas Fletcher’s epic poem the Purple Island, 
where man’s body was represented as an island to be traversed and explored. Fletcher, 
for instance, wrote that ‘Mans Bodie’s like a house: his greater bones/ Are the main 
timber; and the lesser ones/ Are smaller splints […] his heart/ Is the great chamber, full 
of curious art.’50 John Donne’s Poems similarly described travelling through the ‘vaults’, 
‘ladders and cellars’ of the body-interior.  
 
The spaces of a building also say something about the kinds of activities they are 
intended to be used for; in this instance, vaulted rooms suggested a familiar (that is, 
human) set of behaviours or activities for the spirits. Grand chambers, vaulted ceilings 
and the lofty porches of a kingly palace were all elevated spaces and signifiers of human 
activity - rather than spaces designed for passive or domestic storage.51 Once the spirits 
entered into the callous body, they were ready to take up the task of government. 
Whereas For Donne, the mind was an obscure, ‘infinite Hive of honey’ and an ‘insatiable 
whirlpool,’ and the brain therefore cast as little more than a fluid receptacle, for Willis, 
the mind was to be located and traced out through a complex set of architectural 
spaces.52  Notably, though Vesalius had made reference to ‘vaulted ceilings’ in the brain, 
                                                      
47 Walter Charleton, Enquires into Human Nature (London, 1680), ‘Preface.’ 
48 Sawday, p. 76. Mallgrave also notes that Alberti likewise proposed that the geometric rules of perspective 
were ‘corporeally embodied in human form,’ The Architects Brain (2010), p. 11. 
49 As Mitchell argues, these anatomical and literary representations shared ‘conceptual content,’ The Purple 
Island, p. 81. 
50 Phineas Fletcher, The purple island, or, The isle of man (Cambridge: the printers to the Universitie of 
Cambridge, 1633), p. 13. 
51 As Sawday notes, Donne’s imagery here is associated with domestic or ‘low culture,’ as opposed to 
Willis’s altogether more elevated images of kingly palaces, cloisters and cells, p. 19. 
52 Ibid, p. 18.  
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and Calver to its empty ‘chambers’, Willis sought to trace out a far more complex interior 
space, replete with discrete cells and cloisters. 
 
Emporiums and Marts 
 
Though Willis had already explained how the callous body structured the interior cavity 
like a vaulted ceiling, providing space for the spirits to meet and circulate, he also looked 
to expand on its proposed physiological function by introducing another set of images. 
Employing a socio-economic unit of space – the public market – he proposed that the 
callous body was also a site where the spirits could publicly come together and perform 
tasks as agents of the animal oeconomy. Willis described how the spirits emerged out of 
the ‘several winding Crevices’ to 
 
[…] meet together, and remain as in a publick Emporium or Mart; from whence, as 
occasion serves, they are raised up, and drawn forth for the uses of every Faculty 
(AB, p.93) 
 
An emporium or ‘mart’ described a centrally located trading location. The analogy also 
spoke to brain as a broader geo-political microcosm: London, for example, was described 
in 1657 as the ‘chief Emporium of Great Britain,’ signifying its political and economic 
centrality. In a later publication, London was also referred to as ‘a Mart of Nations, it 
being the great Emporium or Mart-Town.’53 The callous body is therefore being situated 
here as a central locus of the wider body-oeconomy: the primary ‘mart’ in the ‘chief 
kingdom’ of the body.54 The exchange of goods and services represented by the analogy 
made sense of Willis’s physiological notion that this was a space in which all the spirits 
would wait to be selected and drawn forth by the animal faculties. These spaces were a 
recognisable and familiar part of the fabric of urban life; the reader could easily imagine 
the kinds of activity occurring here - meetings, trade, and commerce.  
 
The image of the public market moved the reader away from purely architectural 
structures to think about dynamic spaces in which the spirits acted within the ‘economy’ 
of the animal government. These anthropomorphised spirits now occupied a civic space 
                                                      
53 Samuel Rolle, Londons resurrection, or, The rebuilding of London (London: printed by Tho. Pankhurst, 1668), 
p. 79. 
54 James Howell, Londinopolis (London: printed by Thomas Dring, 1657). 
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– as suggested by their activities of ‘meeting’ together, mingling and being ‘at leisure’. 
This is as opposed to being passively stored as material bodies within a container or 
receptacle (such as a vault). As Willis stated, while the spirits were (chemically) 
‘procreated’ in the cortical matter, in the medullary parts (such as in the callous body) 
they laboured in their proper ‘shop’ or ‘work-house’ (AB, p.95). Though Willis had 
conveyed a sense of scale and volume with his images of vaults and chambers, he 
required the analogy of the shop or ‘mart’ to underline his conception of these interior 
structures as the functional spaces of the soul and, in turn, to expand on his rendering of 
the body as a geo-political entity - the brain being a ‘kingly palace’ or a chief ‘kingdom’ 
where the sensitive faculties where to be seated. It was also a space where the animal 
spirits had been brought, like goods, into their ‘principal shop’ for ‘purchase’ by the 
faculties; this sense of passivity is qualified though by the image of the workhouse and 
the broader uses of personification in relation to the spirits. 
 
Images of urban or architectural spaces also further underlined Willis’s physiological 
argument that the spirits were substantially and qualitatively transformed when they 
entered into the medullary structures of the brain. This was an argument he had 
previously made in relation to the chemical processes of distillation: a material change 
now embodied by the kinds of space the spirits have come to inhabit. Only at this point, 
and not before, could the animal spirits embody the sensitive faculties of the soul. It was 
fitting, then, that these ‘transformed’ spirits should perform their tasks within an 
identifiably human set of spaces. Interestingly, the mart-emporium was an uncommon 
analogy in anatomical or medical texts. This is perhaps because, unlike vaults and arches, 
it pushed at the agreed (if not practised) conventions around the use of analogy as a 
purely illustrative aide by speaking more to the (inherently speculative) activities of the 
spirits, rather than the brains observable and material form. It nevertheless served a 
useful function here in extending the discussion into the realm of a socio-economic 
model. 
 
Locating the faculties 
 
According to Willis’s theory, while the spirits circulated and waited in this ‘chamber’ or 
‘emporium’, they properly performed their tasks (of animal government) by moving 
through specific, discrete locations in the brain. This rooting of specific mental functions 
 188 
to certain parts of the brain is what is meant when historians refer to Willis’s localisation 
model – although this is itself a modern term. Before I explore some of the images used 
in connection with these structures, it is useful to summarise Willis’s approach to, and 
the historical context around, models of localised brain function. Today, the modern 
neurosciences place considerable emphasis on being able to pinpoint specific brain 
functions within the neural-structures of the brain, even locating memory at the 
subcellular level.55 Localisation theories are therefore viewed from present perspectives as 
being significant to historical studies of the brain. It is a theory largely traced to the 
neurology of the nineteenth century, though it has a much older history going back to 
Galen. The faculties had traditionally been located in one of three ventricular cavities 
within the brain. The ventricles, according to Galen, were receptacles for psychic pnuema 
–what Willis would later refer to as the ‘animal spirits’ - which performed all the vital and 
sensory functions of the body.56 Later Christian scholars modelled the cell-doctrine along 
the same lines as Galen’s model, locating the faculties inside three (or alternatively, in 
Avicenna’s non-Christian model, five) communicating cavities or ‘cells’ in the brain. The 
anterior cell (which housed the sensus communis or ‘common sense’) was where sense 
impressions were first delivered to the imagination; the middle cell was the seat of 
reason; and the posterior cell the home of memory. Though the physiological 
mechanism behind this model was accounted for in very general terms, the cells came to 
be seen as dynamic, communicating structures.57   
 
With the rising influence of new experimental physiologists in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the cell doctrine – along with Galenic doctrine more widely – 
became the subject of sustained critique. The broad spatial organisation of the faculties 
denoted in these models nevertheless remained remarkably stable. As Thomas Vaughan 
in his A Brief Natural History (1669) wrote, ‘It is a common received Opinion in 
Philosophy that the principal faculties of the Soul […] are distinguished by three several 
Cells or Ventricles in the Brain.’58 Unsatisfied with the notion of the spirits being 
                                                      
55 The modern notion of the biological cell – as a basic component of all organisms – traces its roots to the 
uptake of microscope technologies and to the terminology used by Robert Hooke in his Micrographia 
(1665), although ‘cell theory’ doesn’t emerge until some time later. On this see: Paolo Mazzarello, ‘A 
unifying concept: the history of cell theory,’ Nature Cell Biology, 1.1 (1999), pp. 13-15. On the modern 
concept of the cell as having a form of ‘memory’ see: Martin Schwaerzel et al., ‘Extinction Antagonizes 
Olfactory Memory at the Subcellular Level,’ Neuron, 35.5 (August, 2002), pp. 951-960. 
56 Galen actually located the faculties within the substance of the brain (not its empty cavities), though he 
didn’t offer specific details on this: Julius Rocca, ‘Anatomy,’ p. 247. 
57 Cowling, Building the Text, p. 112. 
58 Thomas Vaughan, A Brief Natural History (London, 1669), p. 76. 
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circulated in some vague capacity inside a brain-cavity, Willis and his contemporaries 
sought to investigate (what they considered to be) the precise physiological mechanisms 
that lay behind these mental phenomena.  
 
Willis’s primary contribution here was in having decisively shifted focus away from the 
ventricular cavities to consider how the spirits moved through the complex, physical 
structures of the brain in the performance of their functions. 59  Robert Hooke, in 
contrast, had not been concerned with precisely where the soul was located, only stating 
that it was to be found ‘somewhere in the Brain of a man.’60 Willis, on the other hand, 
sought to ascribe the functions of the soul to discrete structures and parts in the brain, 
with a particular focus on its solid substances. 61  In his model, sensation (or the 
‘phantasie’) was found in the corpus striata, Imagination in the corpus callosum, and 
memory in the cortical spires of the ‘barkie’ exterior of the brain. According to Willis, 
when a sensible impression was carried to the brain – by a mechanism analogously 
represented ‘as an undulation or waving of waters’ - it first reached the callous body 
where ‘a perception or inward sense of the sensation’ arose. Following this, the 
impression passed through the callous body towards its forepart where the imagination 
was located; finally, progressing further, the impression struck ‘against the Cortex of the 
Brain, as its utmost banks,’ and created an impression of the object in memory. This 
same motion was  ‘afterwards reflected or bent back,’ to affect a memory of the thing felt 
(AB, p.96). As Louis Caron has argued, the spatial nature of this physiological model 
required the spirits to pass through certain structures in sequence; an act of imagination 
had to occur prior to memory, and remembering had to involve the imagination.62 Here, 
Willis marked out a far greater emphasis on the spatial dimensions of phenomena of the 
mind – and their relationship to the material structure of the brain itself. Having been 
one of the first to routinely use a microscope, Willis was able to trace out in 
                                                      
59 Willis was determined to undermine ventricular theories of brain function. On this see: Martensen, The 
Brain Takes Shape, p. 83 
60 Douwe Draaisma, ‘Hooke on Memory and the Memory of Hooke,’ in Robert Hooke: Tercentennial Studies, 
ed. by Michael Cooper and Michael Hunter (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 111-122. 
61 On Willis’s localization theory see: George Rousseau (1976); Adrian Johns (1996); L. Caron, (2011), p. 
60-1; Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 83. Kenneth Dewhurst likewise acknowledged Willis for his ‘pioneering’ 
localisation model, ‘Thomas Willis and the Foundations of British Neurology,’ in Historical Aspects of the 
Neurosciences, ed. by F.C. Rose and W.F. Bynum (New York: Raven Press, 1982), pp. 327-346  (p. 336-7). 
62 Louis Caron argues that Willis ‘pushed beyond’ an account of the animal spirits that was ‘essential and 
highly generalised,’ in order to consider precisely how they moved through specific spaces to account for 
the various mental functions, First Works of Neurology, p. 544. 
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unprecedented levels of intricacy structures that would provide him with the physical 
basis for an alternative rendering of the doctrine of localisation.  
 
Cells and cloisters 
 
The new cerebral anatomy revealed to Willis by his dissections, appeared to be as visually 
complex as the soul’s functions were thought by him to be diverse or manifold. Though 
he had described the faculties using relatively broad schematics - memory and 
imagination constituted as a motion from centre to periphery - Willis extended his 
discussion by also stressing the role of a partitioned set of bounded spaces. Evoking 
images of much smaller structures such as cells, cloisters, pores, orbs and tracts, Willis 
further enhanced the structural and textural complexity of his account. As Willis 
described, having being drawn forth from the callous body, the spirits did ‘depart of 
themselves’ and enter into various ‘diverting places,’ where they were kept ‘as it were in 
distinct Cloisters or Cells to be drawn forth for the manifold Exercises of the animal 
Function’ (AB, p.95). In contrast to the communal mingling of the market place, or the 
‘undulating waves’ of memory-imagination sequences, these spaces inferred a quieter, 
more secluded or private character upon the activities of the spirits. Here, the spirits 
would arrange themselves into specific orders and sequences, protected from 
interference within the cloistered cells of the brain. Here, the emphasis on communal 
(physiological) mechanisms shifted to matters of order, seclusion, storage or safekeeping. 
 
The use of the cloister analogy in this context specifically suggested an enclosed, private 
space or a ‘place of religious seclusion’; it came from the Latin claustrum meaning to lock 
in an enclosed place or claudere, ‘to close.’63 One could be ‘cloistered’ away in a small 
space, for example, in 1663 Thomas Southland posed the question, ‘Do you think I can 
cloister up myself, Be kept coop’t, like a Chicken in a Pen.’64  Equally, a cloister could be 
used to suggest a network of interlinked spaces, such as a covered walkway inside a 
covenant, which could also be used to support the overall impression of a network of 
judiciously divided spaces within an overarching architectural building – a sense extended 
through the related use of images of cells and spires. 
                                                      
63 "cloister, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 10 February 2015. 
64 Thomas Southland, Love a la mode (London: printed for John Daniel, 1663). 
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As with the cloister, in the seventeenth century the term ‘cell’ (or its Latin equivalent, 
‘cella’ or ‘celula’) was commonly used to describe a small or confined dwelling space, 
usually a monk’s cell.65 These were small, private units of discrete and bounded space. 
Robert Hooke is considered to have been the first to use the term ‘cell’ to signify a 
structural unit comprising organic bodies in his study of the structure of cork in 1661. 66 In 
respect of the human body, cells had featured in much older models of the brain. In the 
middle ages, the term cell was commonly used to refer to one of three communicating 
cavities or ventricles in the brain, in which the animal faculties were located; though this 
was less a specific, structural designation than it was a spatial schema for organising the 
primary faculties across general regions of the brain. Alexander Ross in 1652 wrote, for 
instance, that the ‘common sense, the imagination, the discursive, and memorative 
qualities […] have their distinct cels,’ while not referring to any specific anatomical 
structures.67 Van Helmont, who was influential in Willis’s chemical work, used the term 
‘least cell’ to refer to the brain’s ventricles. 68  Increasingly, over the course of the 
seventeenth century, the cell took on a much more overtly physiological emphasis in 
models of brain function. For instance, James Howell wrote in his A Dialog between the soul 
and bodie (1651) that the exhalations of his spiritual affections caused the blood to ‘boyl’ 
and rise up to ‘fill all the cells of my brain to contemplate his goodness.’69  
 
Willis’s specific contribution to the history of the cell is linked to this physiological 
context and his ideas about the possibility of ascribing specific functions of the brain to 
discrete structures within its substance. When Willis talked about cells inside the brain he 
did so in reference to a complex network of interlinked bounded spaces, wherein the 
spirits (carrying the imprint of thoughts and memory) would be organised and stored 
without interference from one another. As he described, ‘in such, distinct Cells, and 
parted one from another […] the divers Species and Ideas of things are kept apart’ (AB, 
p.92).70 These ‘cells’ were not like those of the older schematic models of the brain; 
instead of housing vaguely localised faculties of the brain, they formed a complex matrix 
                                                      
65 Cowling, Building the Text, p. 112. 
66 Hooke used the term specifically in reference to the properties of cork, and not in the sense of a monk’s 
cell. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), ‘Observation XVIII.’ 
67 Alexander Ross, Arcana microcosmi, or, The hid secrets of man’s body discovered (London: printed by Tho. 
Newcomb, 1652), p. 59.  
68 Van Helmont, Ortus medicinae, English translation by John Chandler (London, 1664), p.156 
69 James Howell, A Dialog between the soul and bodie (London, 1651), p. 45. 
70 These memory-cells are actually inside the folds of the cerebral gyrations; this is separate to the cerebral 
‘crevices’ described by Willis in relation to the spirits distillation into the brain, which describes the spaces 
in-between these folds. 
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of structures which supported the specific – and myriad - activities of the animal spirits. 
In Willis’s model, then, we see ‘cells’ becoming both specific, physical structures of the 
body and at the same time much more smaller units of space.  
 
The notion that cells were the smallest units within much larger and complex 
superstructures (as in a network) had been expressed earlier by Robert Hooke in 1661, 
who observed that the micro-structures of cork resembled a ‘Cavern, Bubble, or Cell […] 
distinctly separate from any of the rest’.71 He used both ‘pore’ and ‘cell’ to describe how 
cork was comprised of ‘a great many little Boxes,’ within which air was ‘perfectly’ 
enclosed, hence the buoyancy of cork.72 For Hooke, the cell analogy was used here to 
indicate a judiciously divided, bounded and discrete set of spaces within a much larger 
and complex structure. The prolific writer of natural philosophy, Margaret Cavendish, 
Duchess of Newcastle-upon-tyne, also notably expressed this sense of ‘networked’ cells 
within the context of the brain in a poem from 1653. Comparing the compartments of 
the brain to a beehive, she wrote 
 
The Head of Man just like a Hive is made, 
The Braine, like as the Combes exactly laid. 
Where every thought just like a Bee doth dwell, 
Each by it selfe within a parted Cell.73 
 
The poem continues to by making bees analogous to individual thoughts, which mingle 
in a swarm or ‘take flight’ in various directions, hence the need to order them and keep 
them bounded in cells. These examples are close to the sense in which Willis had also 
employed the term in respect of the brain, in that the emphasis rests on how cells were 
designed to protect thoughts by keeping them apart and distinct.  
 
Willis’s premise that the actions of the animal spirits produced all the complex effects of 
the animal faculties relied, in part, on the implications of this particular reading of 
cerebral anatomy - as something furnished with discrete, yet interconnecting cells. The 
provision of partitioned and bounded structures was a significant support to Willis’s 
broader physiological model, which supposed that the corporeal soul performed its vital 
                                                      
71 Robert Hooke, Micrographia, p. 116. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Margaret Cavendish, ‘Similizing the Head of Man to a Hive of Bees’, Poems (London, 1653), p. 149. 
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and sensitive actions on the basis of matter ‘rightly disposed.’74 As John P. Wright has 
already argued, like Gassendi, Willis ascribed ‘life to atoms structured in a certain way.’75 
That is to say, in order to assign ever more complex functions to the corporeal soul, 
some assurances were needed to suggest how the spirits could go about their operations 
without cross-interference and the chaos of mingling forms. As Willis stressed 
throughout Anatomy, he conceived of a need for a certain imposition of order (however 
precariously maintained) to be applied to the spirits in the brain - a requirement 
supported by their arrangement within chambers, cloisters and now cells. The spirits, he 
argued, ‘ought, for the various Faculties of the Soul, to be composed into various series, 
and divers orders and dispositions, therefore ought to be moved within perculiar orbs 
and tracts’ (AB, p.96-7). For the acts of imagination and memory especially, the spirits 
were to be moved ‘within certain and distinct limited or bounded places,’ to serve as a 
protection against the prospect of intermingling. Even within the apparently open and 
‘spacious field’ of the callous body, the spirits were not simply left to ‘lye disorderly or 
lossely,’ but were organised and arranged by ‘being limited with certain Bounds and 
Cloysters’ (SB, p.25). Bounded cells take on a new significance here – as a physical 
foundation for this physiological model. 
 
Willis was also able to indefinitely extend the spaces provided here through imagery of 
replicating units and cells. As he later described, these spaces formed a ‘most ample and 
highly intricate Labyrinth of Cloysters […] all of them distinct, and designed to certain 
offices’ (SB, p.23). Areas with many cell divisions could be said to correspond to the 
soul’s capacity to enact complex, distinct activities – and thus give rise to 
correspondingly complex mental phenomena. The order suggested in discrete, bounded 
spaces is maintained without sacrificing complexity, the space being replete with internal 
divisions. 
Willis’s approach in highlighting and detailing these complex structural features echoed 
the Baconian view of the body, which, as Sawday has noted, represented the most 
complex spatial organisation in the universe, composed of ‘passages and pores…cavities, 
                                                      
74 John Wright, ‘Locke, Willis, and the Seventeenth century Epicurean Soul,’ in Atoms, Pneuma, and 
Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed. by M. J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 239-258 (p. 246).  
75 As John Wright has argued, ‘Willis concludes that there is no reason to think that matter, as it is put 
together in a living body, cannot produce even the most complex actions of animals,’ ‘Locke, Willis and 
the Epicurean Soul,’ p. 250. 
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nests and receptacles’. 76   Of course, Willis applied this same notion of structural 
complexity in a very specific way to his new anatomy of the brain, in order to make 
original claims about its functional attributes (moving away from passive cavities and 
receptacles). With Willis’s account, complex operations were being inferred from (and 
projected back onto) complex spaces in the brain. This points to an important principle 
at work in Willis’s work – being a correlation between complex form and 
correspondingly complex functions.77 The physical separation created by these bounded 
cells allowed Willis to multiply the individual functions and operations being undertaken 
by the sensitive soul at any one point. This was required in order to demonstrate how the 
physical spaces of the brain could be said to accommodate the manifold acts of the 
higher faculties. Willis was laying the anatomical foundations for his theory that the 
sensitive soul possessed far greater powers than were traditionally allotted to it. Willis 
employed the visible complexities of cerebral anatomy as a proxy body of evidence for 
the (invisible) physiological operations of the soul. The more complex the structure, the 
greater the functional complexity that could be ascribed to it.  
 
Willis was evidently keen to stress that the freedom of movement denoted in his image 
of the ‘mart’ and emporium did not equate to chaos - to a swarming mass of spirits. 
Certainly, prevailing physiological theories of the mind evoked such fears in the period, 
with the prospect of swarming, swirling spirituous bodies. Margaret Cavendish wrote, for 
instance, about the ‘confusion’ of Epicurean atoms which produced ‘strange and 
monstrous figures’ and ‘blinded the perception’ of the mind.78 In 1661, Joseph Glanvill 
questioned whether cells were in fact adequate to ensure order in this setting, thereby 
seeking to challenge Willis’s theory of the soul as a material agent located within the 
brain. As he argued in his Scepsis Scientifica; Or, the Vanity of Dogmatizing, Glanvill asked 
how it was that the bustling animal spirits carrying the individual objects of memory, 
which were ‘ever and anon justled,’ could ‘so orderly keep their Cells without any 
alteration of their site or posture.’79 Clearly, the cell – as a structural unit of the brain – 
was closely informed during this period by debates around the possibilities or not of 
localised, physiological explanations of brain function. Though Willis’s model would 
                                                      
76 Sawday, p. 94. 
77 Robert Frank Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and His Circle: Brain and Mind in Seventeenth century Medicine,’ in 
The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. by George S. Rousseau (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), p. 132; William F. Bynum, ‘The Anatomical Method,’ p. 450. 
78 Margaret Cavendish, The description of a new world (London: printed for A. Maxwell, 1668). 
79 Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica; Or, the Vanity of Dogmatizing (London, 1661), p. 36. 
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need to extend someway beyond anatomical explanations if he was to elaborate on 
mental phenomena at the level of spirituous activity, the point to be made here is that his 
interpretation of brain-spaces were not guided by simple empirical goals, but by broader 
theoretical arguments.  
 
The provision of discrete cells was also a feature of the brain that Willis drew upon to 
outline a distinction between animal and human faculties. He noted that the cerebral 
gyrations, with their ‘manifold convolutions’, created ‘Cells or Store-houses severally 
placed’ where the ‘species of sensible things’ were to be kept in safety and seclusion (AB, 
p.92). Though the brain’s ‘cloysters’ were interwoven or ‘variously implicating one 
another,’ he maintained that in these cells, the spirits (carrying the objects of sense or 
memory) would remain entirely ‘distinct’. Animals, however, had much smaller and less 
complex cerebral gyrations, on account of which Willis argued that they had a limited 
capacity to remember things and only recalled things of a similar type - precisely because 
they lacked the bounded cells which would have enabled them to keep thoughts separate 
and distinct. As he writes, ‘for that in such, distinct Cells, and parted one from another, 
are wanting, in which the divers Species and Ideas of things are kept apart’ (AB, p.92). In 
fishes, for instance, the cerebral ‘gyrations’ were ‘plain and even,’ they therefore acted 
largely on the basis on ‘natural instinct’ rather than active memory-recall (AB, p.92). 
Willis employs comparative anatomy here to reinforce his reading of the function of the 
cerebral gyrations as pertaining to memory, a faculty in which humans notably excelled 
beyond the capacity of animals. These ‘bounded places’ are also taken as materially 
supporting his notion that the spirits movements would often be ‘iterated or repeated 
through the same tracts or paths’, such as when we call on a particular memory (AB, 
p.92).  
 
However, did these images of small, bounded cells not also promote a restrictive 
environment? With the proliferation of spatial partitions in the brain, the individual 
spaces in which the spirits were to act became increasingly smaller (even if there were 
more of them). As Margaret Cavendish wrote in 1653, a cell was lowly and restrictive, a 
place to kept locked up in: ‘I live in a low Thatcht House, Rommes small, my Cell/ Not 
big enough for Prides great Heart to dwell.’80 Francis Bacon had himself used ‘cell’ as a 
metaphor to link a notion of being physically constrained with intellectual constraints: 
                                                      
80 Cavendish, ‘Of Poverty’, Poems, p. 95. 
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the ‘schoolmen,’ he noted, with their ‘wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors…as 
their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges’ had produced little 
learning about the physical world beyond their books.81 In a spiritual setting, however, 
the monk’s cell might have been physically limited but would have inversely supported 
focused spiritual reflection (upon which it set no such limits). Despite the ambiguities 
entailed in the associations of the cell, as Willis sought to promote a quasi-materialist 
model of the mind he would have needed to defend it against the notion that the soul’s 
proposed materiality could have set a physical-spatial limit to the varied powers and 
actions of the animal faculties.82 
 
While compact cells and cloisters may have worked against what Willis saw as the natural 
tendency of the animal spirits to unfettered expansion in Willis’s explanations, they did 
not necessarily restrict their activities (AB, p.96). The generally agreed view that the 
spirits were exceedingly subtle bodies also helped to alleviate the potential for tension 
here. As Willis noted, the spirits were sufficiently subtle (indeed, the most subtle bodies 
found in the natural world) that they ‘require no manifest cavity’ for ‘their expansion,’ 
and could expand perfectly well in very dense substances (i.e. the nerves) (AB, p.127).83 
They were, of course, able to move within or through a complex, permeable matrix. In 
this interconnected web of structures, the spirits movements between various cells or 
chambers were being similarly localised to the solid structures of the brain, rather than 
being a swirling mass of mixed bodies. As Robert Frank argues, Willis’s model proposes 
an image of ‘spiritous particles residing in a differentiated neural matrix.’84  
 
The spirits did not need expansive cavities; what they actually required were boundaries, 
a means of being ordered and separated from other bustling spirits. The spirits, he noted, 
‘being very subtil, and apt to fly away, require not such large and open spaces, rather than 
                                                      
81 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605), in Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. by Brian Vickers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), I, pp. 27-28. 
82 Anatomists in this period would have been aware of the dangers of reducing the soul’s faculties down to 
material structures of the brain, on this see: John Henry, ‘The Matter of Souls, Medical Theory and 
Theology in Seventeenth century England’, in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth century, ed. by Roger 
French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 87-113. Willis’s model did, 
in fact, set limits on the powers of the sensitive soul by insisting on the superior role of the Rational soul, 
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prevailing models – as the next chapter will explore in greater detail. 
83 Willis used these ideas to argue that the spirits were able to move within the (dense, but permeable) 
structure of the nerves, even though no cavity could be discerned through the microscope. See Martensen 
(2004) on these themes, p. 85.   
84 Frank, ‘Willis and His Circle,’ p. 133. 
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the more narrow passages and little pores, such as are made in the substance of the 
Brain’ (AB, p.96). As volatile bodies prone to expansion and evaporation, the spirits 
relied for the performance of their activities on these cells, pores and passages. As Willis 
noted, ‘for the various Faculties of the Soul, to be composed into various series, and 
divers orders and dispositions, therefore ought to be moved within peculiar orbs and 
tracts’ (AB, p.97). These structures replicated inwards to form a network of spaces, on a 
labyrinthine scale, which were both complete and interrelated (in the sense of judiciously 
divided, so that each element has its distinct place), and self-contained sphere of 
activity.85  What Willis appears to be referencing here, with the emphasis on a ‘peculiar 
orb’, is this sense of a discrete, spatially demarcated zone of action. The spirits, tasked 
with undertaking specific roles for the animal faculties, acted within their given orbs – 
rather than communally (or randomly), in an undifferentiated cavity. The emphasis here 
is on the ordering work of space, not its expansiveness. We return here to the 
associations between cells and cloisters and notions of secrecy or privacy: carrying the 
individual impressions of thoughts and memory, the spirits needed to be protected from 
intermingling. Notably, Willis’s reading of brain structure depended upon – and always 
refers back to – his pre-existing physiological conception of the spirits and his intellectual 
commitment against ventricular circulation models. 
 
It could be suggested that there is some tension here between preceding images of 
sweeping, fluid wave-mechanisms and Willis’s intention to describe the spirits as being 
ordered and quietly arranged within cells and cloisters. Fluid-mechanisms do not neatly 
map onto the architectural setting or onto notions of neatly ordered and partitioned 
spaces. They refer to different measures of scale as well as modes of action. These 
analogies do not, however, need to be consistent to be coherent: wave mechanisms 
conveyed how the spirits were moved through a broad expanse of space, while cloisters 
and cells suggested how, at a more detailed level, the spirits performed their various 
allotted tasks in the midst of these larger movements throughout the brain-space. Read at 
different stages of the narrative, both examples served the reader in understanding 
different aspects of a complex conceptual model. 
 
                                                      
85 William West, Theatres and Encyclopaedias in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 18. Jonathan Sawday has also discussed Francis Bacon’s descriptions of the body as a series of 
pores and cavities, which Willis echoes in his rendering of the cerebral landscape: Body Emblazoned, p. 94. 
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Finally, it is also interesting to consider how Willis used the term ‘cell’ with an awareness 
of its analogical function; the structures he observed within the brain resembled the cells 
observed in bee-hives or the dwelling places of monks but, as the dwelling place of the 
soul, were a unique category of space. Today, the cell is a foundational concept within 
the biological sciences, referring to the most basic unit of living organisms - both at a 
structural and functional level. It is so successful that it has largely ceased to function as a 
metaphor at all.86 In a distant echo of Willis and Hooke’s emphasis on the cell as a 
psychical unit in the architecture of bodies, its role is today expressed through the 
metaphor of the ‘building block of life’ – one that carries the ‘code’ of DNA within its 
nucleus. In the context of modern biology, however, cells also are not passive containing 
structures, but active producers; for instance, they replicate and reproduce DNA. 
Moreover, since the 1980s the cell has undergone further changes and attracted new 
metaphors; as cell biologist David Baltimore commented in 1984, ‘biologists needed to 
find the cell’s brain’ – meaning its nucleus.87  Older biological analogies of the cell as a 
‘factory’ were to give way to a more complex entity, with its actions governed by a 
nucleus and various chemical proteins. It is a metaphor that has not simply been 
‘inherited’, but adapted to new discoveries and concepts within modern science. 
 
The brain and cerebellum: a comparative anatomy 
The spaces inside the brain (by which Willis meant the cerebrum) were notably distinct 
from its appendix, the cerebellum. Descriptions of cells and cloisters were only 
applicable to the brain; the cerebellum presented a very different landscape.88 The brain 
was believed by Willis to have been designed to house the animal faculties of sensation, 
memory and imagination. As such, its structural provisions, or the spaces created within 
the brain, were required to support a free and indeterminate motion among the spirits so 
as to avoid limiting their ability to form a variety of impressions in response to sense 
objects or the appetite – neither of which were routine or predictable. As Willis 
described, ‘for the various and manifold actings of the superior Faculties,’ the cerebral 
gyrations were ‘garnished with an uncertain, and as it were fortuitous series, that the 
exercises of the animal Function might be free and changeable, and not a determined to 
                                                      
86 On the variable uses of ‘cell’ in modern biology see: Evelyn Fox Keller, Refiguring Life: Metaphors of 
Twentieth-century Biology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 36. 
87 David Baltimore’s views on the cell are discussed by Evelyn Fox Keller, Refiguring Life, p. 27. 
88 Where Willis referred to the ‘brain’ he used this as shorthand for the cerebrum, which encompassed the 
cerebral hemispheres and the core ‘white’ structures of the brain. 
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one (AB, p.92). Willis’s particular reading of these anatomical features therefore reflected 
a spatial dimension to the presumed scope and diversity of human mental phenomena. 
The brain supported free movement while still maintaining the necessary partitions 
required for complex operations to occur unhampered. The spirits penetrated through 
pores, expanded inside orbs or carved out deep tracts in the brain’s soft tissue – but they 
performed their offices within the cells or cloisters of the cerebrum and they did so 
freely. 
 
This varied cerebral-topography was established in stark contrast to the form, texture 
and role of the cerebellum. Importantly, Willis drew here on the important trope of the 
body-machine. The cerebellum was a much smaller structure tucked underneath the 
brain (as it was arranged in the skull) but was connected to it via the oblong marrow – a 
structure furnished, Willis observed, with ‘porticoes’ and ‘highways’ to facilitate the 
passage of spirits between each part. A largely neglected structure, the cerebellum (or 
‘little brain’) had generally been cast as a storehouse repository for memory 
impressions.89 Though Vesalius had improved upon its description, even he had declined 
to ascribe to it a specific physiological function.90 Willis blamed this general state of 
ignorance on his predecessor’s specific neglect of the fabric and substance of the brain, 
commenting: ‘as to the office or use of the Cerebel in general nothing of it occurs, 
spoken by the Ancients, worthy of its fabric, or agreeable to its structure’ (AB, p.111). It 
was upon precisely these two aspects – substance and structure – that Willis looked to 
construct an alternative theory of the cerebellum. Of course, as a structure tucked 
underneath the brain, the cerebellum had been made more visible - as an intellectual and 




Firstly, by noting that the cerebellum was proximate to but much smaller than the brain, 
Willis deduced that it served an important - yet ultimately secondary - role in animal 
government. He characterised this relationship through a socio-political analogy, as 
                                                      
89 Drawing on the work of Galen, Nemesius (390) described how ‘if it is the cerebellum that is damaged, 
only loss of memory follows,’ On the Nature of Man, English trans. (1955), p. 341; cited by Stanley Finger, 
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90 Mark C. Preul, ‘A History of Neuroscience from Galen to Gall,’ in A History of Neurosurgery in its Scientific 
and Professional Contexts, ed. by S. H. Greenblatt (Parkridge, IL: The American Association of Neurological 
Surgeons, 1997), pp. 99- 130 (p. 106). 
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resembling that between a city-state and its ‘province’ or an arm of local government. 
Situated between the brain and the praecordia (heart and chest), the cerebellum was a 
form of boundary gatekeeper, the first body to greet the spirits rising up from the body 
seeking entry into the brain-city. Local government marked a significantly heightened 
status for the cerebellum, which had hitherto been cast as a passive repository. Willis had 
even granted to the cerebellum - this newly crowned ‘second’ seat of government - its 
own body of animal spirits, set apart from those in the brain: ‘the Cerebel is a peculiar 
Fountain of the animal spirits designed for some works, and wholly distinct from the 
Brain’ (AB, p. 111). This constituted, in effect, a further sub-division (or localisation) of 
the sensitive soul. Together, they formed what Willis termed the ‘double fountain’ of the 
sensitive soul.  
The cerebellum was primarily cast by Willis as the body that produced the routine and 
reflexive responses required to satisfy the vital needs of the body – such as respiration or 
the pulse. This role was represented by Willis through the metaphor of the clock: 
 
For indeed those in the Cerebel, as it were in a certain artificial Machine or Clock, 
seem orderly disposed after that manner within certain little places and boundaries, 
that they may flow out orderly of their own accord on series after another without 
any driver, which may govern or moderate their motions. (AB, p. 111)  
 
The clock metaphor was a popular trope in this period, especially among mechanical 
philosophers such as Descartes, but also among corpuscular philosophers such as Robert 
Boyle. It is often discussed in relation to the emergence of the ‘modern sciences’ for its 
role in representing an emerging mechanical world-view - an explanation of nature that 
stressed its order and regulation.91 It was used, primarily, to express the notion that 
nature operated according to mechanism, which allowed it to function independently of 
an immediate agent, by virtue of the contrivance of their parts. These parts were set in 
motion by God, the original ‘watchmaker’. As Boyle noted, The world was ‘like a rare 
Clock, such as may be that at Strasbourg […] the Engine being once set a Moving, all 
things proceed according to the Artificers first design.’ 92  Following a teleological 
argument, complex designs were taken as implying an intelligent designer.  
                                                      
91 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), p. 106. 
92 Robert Boyle, The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. by Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis, 14 vols. (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 1999), vol. 10, p. 448. 
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These ideas directly informed themes in Willis’s model of the cerebellum. As Willis 
writes in the Epistle Dedicatory to Anatomy, the name of natural philosophy is ‘abused’ 
by those who study the ‘wheels, curious frame […] small pins, and all the make and 
provision of a Clock,’ and yet does not ‘acknowledge the Artist, to whose Labour and 
Wit he owes all those things.’ While we may not ever fully comprehend the intricacies of 
God’s design, the philosopher could grasp certain dynamic principles at work within 
nature and represent those in human artificial designs – as represented by the clock.93 
The metaphor related to anatomy in that it supposed that the body, being similarly 
constructed, could like the clock be deconstructed and separated into its various parts in 
order to comprehend the logic of its design.  
 
Clocks are an interesting example of the relationship between technological practices and 
the availability of certain metaphors across disciplinary discourses. Clocks emerged in the 
fourteenth-century as mechanical marvels of the astrological sphere, but none had a 
natural oscillator until the seventeenth century, when Galileo designed the pendulum. 
The first design of these self-regulating clocks went into production in 1657 – just before 
Willis’s Anatomy was written.94 Just as clocks created a range of new possibilities for the 
regulation of social life in the seventeenth century, here too they provided a new way in 
which to read the body in terms of a set of self-regulatory mechanisms - providing a new 
lens through which to interpret the work of the body and the significance of its artifice. 95  
 
In a physiological context, the clock related to the Cartesian metaphor of the body-
machine. Descartes had conceived of all natural bodies as automata in his Treatise on Man, 
where he argued that humans were complex machines driven by the physical force of the 
passions, which put the various parts of the body into motion. All actions of the body 
were ultimately the outcome of the arrangement of these parts.96 As with architectural 
theory, the machine analogy was especially useful for expressing how complex 
                                                      
93 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the scientific imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 
(Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 323. 
94 Jim Bennett, ‘Clock and Chronometer’, in The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. by John 
L. Heilbron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 158-161 (p. 159). 
95 This analogy features most famously in William Paley’s Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and 
Attributes of the Deity (1802). On this see: John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion; Some Historical Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 196. 
96 The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes, ed. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), I, p. 108. Although Descartes’ L’Homme refers 
instead to the human body as an automata, a hydraulic imitation moved by water pipes and air, to express 
the physiology of the nerves. On this see: Dennis Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in 
Descartes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 29. 
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component parts (of a body) fitted together and related to the whole. Robert Hooke 
used a particularly extended clock-metaphor in his study of nature under the microscope, 
Micrographia, published in 1665 to express how a fault in any one of these parts could 
have larger effects in the organism/machine. In a discussion on the decomposition of 
organic matter Hooke drew upon the idea of a broken clock. Opening with an explicit 
concession to the reader’s comprehension, he began:  
 
To explain my meaning a little better by a gross Similitude. Suppose a curious piece 
of Clock-work, that had several motions and contrivances in it, which, when in 
order, would all have mov’d in their design’d methods and Periods.97  
 
He goes on to suppose that if this clock were to be broken, with ‘several parts of it being 
dislocated’, as the other parts ‘also have dependence upon them […] so the whole 
instrument becomes unserviceable, and not fit for any use.’98 As he further illustrates, if 
the vegetable ‘machine’ has any one part corrupted by mould, the whole body produces 
effects other than that which it was designed for - everything is corrupted. Notably, the 
machine-metaphor applied to any natural body (vegetable or animal) as both were 
examples of divine artifice or construction. The owner of the broken clock, ‘ignorant of 
the Watch-makers Art, wonders what is betid his Clock’ and is forced to conclude some 
intervention by the ‘Artist’ as he has no other means to explain how these effects are 
wrought; but the clock is stopped by its own mechanical fault. This thread of reasoning 
served a particularly useful medical analogy, in the sense that the physician looked to 
identify faults in the body-machine, rather than supernatural causes such as the 
intervention of demons or evil spirits. 
 
The mere fact of structural complexity did not however, suggest (in and of itself) that the 
cerebellum was an object available to be read through the metaphor of a machine; or else 
the cerebrum – a far more complex structure – would also be open to the same 
comparison. For Willis, it was the conjunction of structural complexity and regular or 
replicating forms that suggested to him the mechanical nature of the cerebellum and the 
comparison with the clock. Underpinning the mechanical analogy was a compared 
anatomy between the brain and cerebellum, through which Willis attempted to correlate 
observable structural and textural differences with distinct functional roles. It was by 
                                                      
97 Hooke, Micrographia, p. 133. 
98 Ibid, p. 133. 
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setting up a stark contrast between two distinct types of space that Willis argued for the 
distinctiveness of their roles. As he observed, the cerebellum was characterised by a 
regular and striated form which stood in contrast to the irregular, meandering formations 
of the cerebral: 
 
Wherefore whilst the Brain is garnished as it were with uncertain Meanders and 
crankling turnings and windings about, the compass of this is furnished with folds 
and lappets disposed in an orderly series. (AB, p.110)  
 
These ‘lappets’ and ‘folds’ were, Willis noted, ‘ordained with a certain and determinate 
series, and almost after a like manner in all’ (AB, p.110). A lappet commonly referred to 
an overlapping fold or pleat in a men’s shirt and had elsewhere been used to describe 
folds in the liver, though Willis was the first to adopt this analogy in relation to the 
brain.99 These features could not have been more different to the cerebrum’s ‘uncertain 
manner’, with its creeping and winding formations, characterised through topographical 
or vegetative imagery. Willis repeatedly stressed the proportional and repetitive pattern of 
the shapes he observed in the cerebellum, which he also compared to concentric rings or 
circles: 
 
Its folds are disposed in a certain orderly series; for the exterior frame of it seems to 
consist of thin lappets, or little rings or circles, being contiguous and 
infolded…with a parallel site or situation. (AB, p.67)  
 
In contrast to rolling and meandering crevices, we find geometric shapes and neat folds 
arranged in a continuous and parallel order. These images - of repeated folds, lappets and 
circles - created a far more comprehensible and manageable picture for the observer (in 
this instance, the reader) than crevices and branches. They suggested the cerebellum’s 
openness to being ‘mapped’ or subject to the rules of geometry – though they did not 
necessarily imply a lack of structural intricacy. This comparison, between the striated or 
convoluted bodies, was actually Galenic - though Willis’s work represented a greater 
degree of anatomical detail and an innovation in terms of the functional explanations he 
looked to make on the basis of those distinctions.  While folds and lappets were, like 
cells and cloisters, demarcations of spatial partitioning, they were specifically interpreted 
as having imposed a uniform or determinate order upon the spirits. Where as the 
                                                      
99 "lappet, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2016. Web. 25 September 2016. 
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variegated spaces of the cerebrum had required the spirits to actively navigate them, 
rather than being passively shunted about as per a hydraulic machine, in the cerebellum, 
the effect of its spatial design was entirely mechanistic. 
 
The main distinction between brain and cerebellum therefore described a tension 
between free and uniform, or regimented motions of the spirits. Notably, the animal 
spirits in both brain and cerebellum were materially of the same kind, each having been 
‘procreated’ by the same cortical-distillation process – any distinction in their roles and 
activities had, therefore, to be ascribed to their particular environments and the 
structures they inhabited. The distinctive patterns or behaviours physically adopted by 
the spirits corresponded to their habitation, and produced different functional roles. 
Willis took the spaces in the brain as supporting the far more variable requirements of 
the voluntary affections, in that they were not spatially proscriptive or uniform. The 
spirits here flowed ‘neither by such a continual course without intermission […] nor are 
sustained by a perpetual provision […] but both the loss of them, and their reflection, are 
uncertain, unequal, and variously interrupted’ (AB, p.415). These processes were 
necessarily characterised as unpredictable and irregular to account for (or avoid setting 
distinct limitations on) the actions performed by the mental faculties. As Willis would 
later affirm, within each cell or chamber of the brain, the spirits could enact an ‘infinite 
Variety of Actions and Passions’ and were allowed ‘Stretchings forth of a divers sort’ for 
the ‘divers uses of the Animal Faculties’ (SB, p.25, p.22).  
 
The structuring of the cerebellum, in contrast to the brain, was used by Willis to suggest 
a correspondingly ordered and uniform arrangement of the spirits, so that it was able to 
perform its ‘solemn acts’ by a ‘customary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘equal efflux’ of spirits. In 
these cerebellar spaces the spirits were ‘expanded according to the Rule and Method 
naturally impressed on them.’ As Willis noted, the ‘radiation of the Spirits from the 
Cerebel doth flow after another manner than the other from the Brain’ (AB, p.114). 
Willis elaborated on these distinctions by proposing his theory that the spirits housed 
within each part attended to two distinct aspects of the nervous system: the voluntary 
and involuntary nervous responses. The brain housed the higher faculties of memory, 
imagination and the phantasy (perception or judgement), which - under the conscious 
oversight of the will and the rational soul - produced the ‘voluntary affections’ (our 
conscious acts and movements). The cerebellum, on the other hand, was granted a lower 
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order of functions: the  ‘involuntary affections,’ which included respiration, the pulse, 
and reflexive motor responses. As Willis wrote, 
 
The office of the Cerebel is to procreate animal spirits apart from the spirits 
begotten in the Brain, and to dispense them into the Nerves, the Executors of the 
involuntary Actions and Passions.’ (AB, p.114) 
 
Notably, the reflexive, autonomic nature of the motions of the spirits was enabled (that 
is to say, inferred from) the structural features of the cerebellum. The uniformity 
observed in the cerebellum was used to materially underline Willis’s ideas around the 
routine and reflexive nature of the involuntary passions. He proposed that the cerebellar 
spirits responded to the basic, vital functions of the body ‘silently’ and by an independent 
capacity, which did not involve conscious perception in the brain (unless such 
mechanisms were to become corrupted by a pathology or fault). The cerebellum’s 
operations could occur automatically, that is without the involvement of perception and 
will, precisely because it had been constructed according to the logic of a machine. In 
this sense, Willis correlated the cerebellum with the cerebrum of lower beasts, which 
were also structured in a ‘plain and even’ order – leaving them able to respond only to 
basic stimuli and recognise certain natural objects on the basis of autonomic (that is, 
non-reasoned) responses. The cerebellum, then, is a ‘lesser’ brain.  
 
This separation of roles was essential: the autonomy of the involuntary function allowed 
for the vital operations (such as respiration) to continue uninterrupted, such as when we 
are asleep. At the same time, the spirits of the involuntary system were offered some 
(limited) degree of protection from the passions afflicting the brain by being housed in a 
separate, if proximate, body.100 Willis’s explanations of sleep also relied upon cerebellar 
independence in that they freed up the spirits of the brain to rest. The spirits of 
cerebellum were not inclined to rest as their work was said to be less arduous and even 
easy – dispensed as they were by the ordering work of the cerebellum (SB, p.87). Sleep 
was, Willis described, essentially the ‘shutting up’ of the external senses while the 
involuntary actions continued to operate autonomously.  
                                                      
100 The cerebellum was the first part of the brain to receive impressions carried by the spirits from the 
body, but only vehement affections (caused by objects promising good or evil) where strong enough to 
continue onwards to the brain. Likewise, strong affections conceived in the brain, by dint of their 
proximity and a ‘shared walkway’, could affect spirits residing in the cerebellum. This helped to explain the 
accompanying physical effects of some more forceful passions (i.e. increased heart rate during fear).  These 
bodies therefore shared certain affects of the passions, but only in the more violent cases. 
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This model, which localised the voluntary and involuntary systems to two discrete 
bodies, was credited to Willis in particular. As Robert Plot, professor of Chemistry at 
Oxford, wrote of Willis in his ‘Natural history’ of 1677, ‘his placing of the Spirits to serve 
to voluntary actions in the Cerebrum, and those that serve Involuntary in the 
Cerebellum, is a noble and useful discovery.’101 Importantly, Willis’s innovation did not 
come about simply because he had improved on the ‘accuracy’ of the anatomical 
account. Rather, it was based upon how he mobilised certain aspects of that account to 
make important claims about the nature of the corporeal soul and its core functions. 
Specifically, he used the form and texture of these bodies to infer distinct kinds of 
activity and movements of the spirits. 
The chief argument underlying these descriptions was that the cerebellum served a more 
complex function than was generally accorded to it. As Willis bemoaned, ‘Others place 
the Memory in this part, supposing the cerebellum to be as it were a Chest or Box […] 
but it is far more probable that this faculty resides in the cortical spires’ (AB, p.111). To 
have accepted the cerebellum as a mere storage vessel for memory would have been to 
frame it similarly to the ventricles - as a vague, undifferentiated cavity space. Willis was 
inclined to disregard such explanations, using images of folds, circles and lappets to argue 
against prevailing readings of the cerebellar function by creating an internally complex 
structure. These features were evidence, he felt, of it having been providentially 
fashioned for a correspondingly complex (if regulated) set of operations. 102  Taken 
together, these spaces complicated the interior of the brain, with each set of spaces 
inferring a complex set of functions uniquely attributable to that part. 
 
The limits of mechanism 
 
Humans weren’t just like other machines; according to the Cartesian model, they were 
themselves fully functioning automata. Automata – self moving, mechanical simulations 
of animals or humans - had existed since ancient times and, as Jessica Riskin has noted, 
primarily functioned as an amusing ‘dramatization of a philosophical problems’ – being 
                                                      
101 Robert Plot, Natural History (London, 1677), p. 302. 
102 On Willis’s correlation of complex form and function, see: William Bynum, ‘The Anatomical Method,’ 
p. 450. 
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whether animals and humans operated mechanically.103 Though Willis certainly drew 
upon mechanistic categories of explanation where they were useful to him, he set a 
number of significant limits to the mechanical aspects of his explanations. The clock-
metaphor, for instance, is limited to only one aspect of the nervous economy, rather than 
being applied to the body as a whole. Moreover, the cerebellar function was based both 
on the mechanical provisions of the cerebellum and on a certain natural ‘instinct’ 
possessed by the spirits themselves. Ultimately, the more complex outcomes of machines 
(and mental phenomena) required the interventions of a ‘driver’ (such as the rational 
soul). Whilst the clock image represented an expanding confidence among the new 
sciences in their ability to deconstruct and understand the inner workings of the body, 
Willis’s account of the brain (as opposed to the cerebellum) worked against mechanical 
explanations. Here, Willis’s discussions were somewhat limited by a sense of uncertainty: 
the cerebrum’s physical complexities and contusions covered the spirits moving there 
under a veil of opaqueness (secluded in chambers and cells): their motions could not be 
predicted or mapped out according to the spaces they inhabited. His evocation of the 
cerebral space therefore evoked a notion of spirituous agency: it was a space that above 
all required navigation. The spirits were not mechanically shunted about or disposed into 
action by their container; indeed, they could actively overrun it and carve out new tracts 
for themselves, as the next chapter will explore in more detail. 
 
The cerebellum provided no such observational tension with its straightforward folds, 
lappets and orderly series. Its anatomical artifice was easily mapped onto an available 
technology through the metaphor of the clock. The cerebellum, like a machine, was 
reduced and exposed as the mere sum of its parts and processes – any mystery undone. 
Looking specifically at the British context here, John Henry has argued that the clock 
metaphor was received with ‘reserve and ambivalence’ in contrast to the continent – 
which speaks to the English reticence over mechanical philosophies on the whole.104 
Interestingly, Henry shows that the metaphor stood for ‘regimentation’ and even 
‘mindless compulsion’ in this setting – two features that align with and inform Willis’s 
model of the cerebellum, as distinct from the (superior) brain.105 The clock image, of 
                                                      
103 Jessica Riskin, ‘The Defecating Duck, Or, the Ambiguous Origins of Artificial Life,’ Critical Inquiry, 29.4 
(2003), pp. 599-633 (p. 601). 
104 On the ‘local contexts’ of mechanical philosophy’s reception, see: Simon Schaffer, ‘Godly Men and 
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pp. 55-85 (p. 55). 
105 Henry, Scientific Revolution, p. 106. 
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course, only applied to the involuntary part of the sensitive soul and not the ‘superior 
legion’ of the animal spirits, which remained free to move and to be directed by the 
rational soul. This speaks to Willis’s grand balancing act, incorporating some of the most 
influential aspects of materialism and atomism, while marking out a protected space for 
the (Anglican) soul against those forces.106 What Willis achieved here, above all, was to 
have drawn a firm distinction between the clockwork cerebellum and the cloistered brain 
– the latter being a private and sacred space, left alone from the encroachment of 
mechanism relegated to the cerebellum. 
 
As the image of the labyrinth had been used to suggest, though it was equally as 
constructed as the cerebellum, the space of the brain spoke more to the (incomparable) 
artifice of the creator – to some category of design that went beyond what man could 
feasibly replicate and went beyond the limits of what could be explained by mechanism 
alone. This was not to suggest, of course, that Willis could not expose and relate the 
anatomical structure of the cerebrum – but that it was of a level of complexity that 
placed certain details beyond reach (i.e. precisely what it is that happened inside the 
privacy of the ‘cloister’ or the lofty ‘spires’ of memory). This reflected Willis’s notion that 
the cerebrum housed the highest of the sensitive faculties; a liminal phenomenon, that 
reached out from the body towards our spiritual selves. 
 
An interesting comparison can also be drawn from the different knowledge-producing 
practices implied by images of cells, chambers and cloisters and the clock. A machine is 
taken apart to understand how it works; cloisters and chambers are lived in, or peered 
into. The clock suggests an act of deconstruction by the anatomist, whereas architecture 
does not – we don’t need to take a building apart to note its features; instead we observe 
it, move through its spaces. Looking back to Calver’s poem, there is a sense here in 
which the ‘prying’ and crude anatomist is pushed into the background when Willis talks 
about the secluded, spiritual spaces of the cerebrum. Lastly, coming back to the role of 
language, Willis’s concept of the cerebellum, and likewise the cerebrum, were necessarily 
constructed through analogical reasoning. Willis had himself stated that this new role for 
the cerebellum – housing the involuntary function - had been arrived at via a ‘certain 
thread’ of analogical reasoning, ‘to which afterwards happened an Anatomical inspection, 
which plainly confirmed me in this opinion’ (AB, p.111). The cerebellum’s role was 
                                                      
106 On Willis’s relationship with Anglicanism see: Robert Martensen, “Habit of Reason’: Anatomy and 
Anglicanism in Restoration England,’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine, xvi (1992), pp. 511-535. 
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established only in comparison to the brain and expressed through the contrasts noted 
between a clock and a public market, a kingly palace or a city-state. These images, in turn, 
informed and directed the anatomical findings, as Richard Lower’s letters to Boyle on the 
research prepared for Anatomy made clear. Lower observed that Willis had ‘several times’ 
demonstrated to him, using the physical anatomy of the body, ‘his opinion of the use of 
cerebel for involuntary motion.’107 As his analogies were being demonstrated against the 
evidence of the body, so they in turn defined how that evidence was being read and 
understood. 108 Taken together, these spaces complicated the interior of the brain and 




In drawing attention to the brain’s intricate and bounded spaces, Willis shaped a 
particular narrative of brain function as something which occurred as a series of discrete, 
localised physiological operations inside the brain, rather than as broad sweeping 
motions inside ventricular cavities. Though he had referred to anatomy as an ‘inelegant 
foundation’, it clearly provided him with a means by which to infer key physiological 
mechanisms by providing a spatial matrix in which to plot their secret affairs (AB, p.192). 
Explanations of cognition and the vital functions of the body could – and were - being 
built around descriptions of the ways in which animal spirits moved through the various 
structures of the brain; a model that Willis developed with a leading focus on the solid 
substances of the brain itself.109  
 
This is all very far away from the ‘opaque veil’ which two of Willis’s contemporaries, 
Nicolas Steno and Walter Charleton, had felt to be shrouding the brain’s interior 
operations. It also rather inverts the significance of Calver’s ‘empty trunke’. Even with 
the soul materially absent, the body-trunke, reimagined as a complex series of chambers, 
cells and cloisters or a clock, retained its significance post-mortem because of its 
embodiment of divine artifice - a container fashioned in the image of the soul it had been 
designed to house. The subtle shifts in emphasis between the cloisters of the brain, and 
                                                      
107 Letter from Lower to Boyle, 18 Jan (1661) [/2], p. 462; quoted by Robert Frank Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and 
His Circle’, p. 128. 
108 Frank has argued that Willis’s concept of the cerebellum ‘directed the interpretation of the findings,’ p. 
128. 
109 On the animal spirits and the origin of sensibility see: G.S. Rousseau, ‘Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: 
Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility,’ Studies in the Eighteenth Century, 3 (1976), pp. 137-57. On 
Willis’s use of the physical model see: Adrian Johns, ‘The Physiology of Reading,’ p. 138-161. 
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the clockwork machinery supporting the soul’s lower orders, further highlighted a two-
tiered hierarchy of the soul – its voluntary and involuntary parts - enshrined in the spaces 
in which they resided. This was a significant intellectual contribution. What Willis 
achieved here was to distribute and ground the manifold functions of the soul within the 
solid-structures of the brain. He thereby altered what the alignment of function and place 
actually meant in terms of a physiological model of brain function. This is what is meant 
by the epithet the ‘father of localisation’ in the modern neurosciences.110  
 
Above all, Willis’s representation of this interior landscape reveals how anatomical ‘facts,’ 
rather than being self-evident, are generated through the projection of specific 
intellectual or philosophical concerns onto the body. These interests shape the body 
through language. Lastly, It is important to note that Willis sought to account here for an 
ideal model, against which patterns and symptoms of dysfunction (pathologies of the 
soul) could perhaps be identified. He mapped out structural provisions that might, under 
the right conditions, incline the spirits to follow productive patterns and behaviours. 
Ultimately, though, the body-container could only speak to the processes and operations 
it was designed to support, rather than being any consistently reliable measure of how 
the soul would act within or invert those provisions of the brain. The body did, of course, 
in conjunction with physiological knowledge, provide a framework for establishing a 
normative model of health against which pathology could be traced out. The specific 
parts, powers and pathologies belonging to the soul itself will be explored further in the 
next and final chapter. 
                                                      
110 On Willis’s legacy in this area see: An Illustrated History of Brain Function: Imaging the Brain from Antiquity, 




The Soul of Brutes: Parts, Powers, and Passions. 
 
In his Anatomy of the Brain, Willis had argued that the material substance and structure of 
the brain was directly relevant to discussions of the mind. Yet it was the nature of the 
corporeal soul that formed the proper object of inquiry within his medical and 
anatomical investigations into the body. Willis had exposed the inner recesses of the 
brain precisely in order to peer at what could not be seen. 1  Building upon the 
‘foundations’ of his anatomy, in 1672 Willis published a physiological and pathological 
account of the sensitive soul in De Anima Brutorum (‘Soul of Brutes’), examining the 
soul’s parts, powers and passions. 2 As he expressed it, this was no simple task: the search 
for knowledge of the soul was a ‘timeless labour,’ starkly overshadowed by a ‘dark 
Blackness, not less than the shades of Hell it self’ (SB, p.1). This did not appear to dim 
Willis’s conviction that the soul could, in fact, be brought to light using the new 
intellectual tools of the chemical-corpuscular philosophies. As Willis stated in the preface 
to Soul of Brutes, all theories of the soul in his age were built upon Pierre Gassendi’s 
demonstration that the soul was ‘plainly corporeal’ and a  ‘subtil knitting of atoms’ (SB, 
p.2). Here, Willis sought to expand on what was for him an already working model of the 
sensitive soul, foregrounded in his earlier chemical investigations and his Oxford 
lectures.3 It is Willis’s ideas around the substantially corporeal nature of the sensitive soul 
that form the focus of this chapter. It considers the qualities attributed to this soul and 
by what power they were to be performed, its passions, and lastly, its relationship with 
the immortal rational soul. 
 
                                                      
1 On pre-modern uses of anatomical investigations into the body as a basis for examining the soul see: 
Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: the case of Phillip Melanchthon (New York: CUP, 
2006) and Vivian Nutton, ‘Wittenberg anatomy’, in Medicine and the Reformation, ed. by Peter Grell Ole 
(London: Psychology Press, 1993). Nancy Siraisi has also addressed these themes in relation to Vesalius’s 
reading of Galen’s teleological reasoning, in which evidence of natures providential design in the body 
reveals an ‘instrument’ designed to support the functions of the soul: Nancy G. Siraisi, ‘Vesalius and the 
Reading of Galen’s Teleology,’ Renaissance Quarterly, Vol. 50, 1 (Spring, 1997), pp. 1-37 (p. 4). 
2 Thomas Willis, De anima brutorum (1672), translated into English by Samuel Pordage, Two Discourses on The 
Soul of Brutes (London, 1683). All in text citations will refer to this edition using the abbreviation ‘SB.’  
3 While there are clear threads between his various publications, I do not assume a straightforward 
ideological continuity here. Willis’s on going practices around the brain (chemical, anatomical, clinical) and 
the advent of new inventions necessarily informed and altered what he was able to say about the soul at 
different points in his career. 
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Willis’s contributions on these topics have been routinely overlooked in favour of his 
anatomical discoveries. As Ann Thomson has noted, while his views on active matter 
and the soul are important, his anatomical study of the brain has generally been 
considered his ‘primary contribution’ to medical history.4 Historian of neuroscience Carl 
Zimmer also fails to acknowledge the significance of Willis’s views on the animal spirits 
remarking that, despite Willis’s work being a ‘defining moment in neuroscience’, he 
described the ‘wanderings of invisible spirits as if he had travelled alongside them.’5 In 
essence, the suggestion here is that Willis had strayed away from what could be 
(experimentally) verified and indulged in an altogether more imaginative narrative. More 
recently, Wes Wallace proposed that while Willis’s anatomy of the nerves was 
‘unequivocal,’ his explanations of their (physiological) function were conveyed through 
an alternating ‘series of metaphors.’ 6 Building on this, in 2014 Jody McNab cited Willis’s 
(over)use of metaphor as an explanation for his ‘contradictory’ account of nervous 
transmission.7  
 
This chapter argues, in contrast, that Willis’s use of multiple figures need not be seen as 
either equivocation or confusion, but were rather the result of expressing different 
aspects of a complex and dynamic model. Furthermore, his concepts of animal spirits, 
active matter and the soul, as with many of his contemporaries, were at the centre of his 
wider practices around the brain. Conveyed through vivid and dynamic analogies, these 
concepts were a vital component of, and not accessory to, his intellectual contributions. 8 
In this way, Soul of Brutes casts a new light onto the famous achievements of Anatomy: 
understood as a basis for constructing an early modern concept of the soul, the account 
becomes less recognisably ‘modern’ – certainly than prevailing focuses on his 
experimental practices would imply. Moreover, Willis’s views on the animal spirits, as 
active bodies of matter, can be used to argue against straightforwardly mechanistic 
                                                      
4 Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 83. 
5 Carl Zimmer, The Soul Made Flesh: The Discovery of the Brain - and How It Changes the World (London: William 
Heinemann, 2004), p. 44. 
6 Though Wallace does go on to examine these metaphors in some detail, pointing to their relevance to his 
theories and practices, this stance reinforces a broader assumption that anatomy is rooted in visible ‘things’ 
and thus exercises a firmer discipline on the use of figurative devices. Wes Wallace, ‘The Vibrating Nerve 
Impulse in Newton, Willis and Gassendi: First Steps in a Mechanical Theory of Communication,’ Brain and 
Cognition, 51 (2003), pp. 66-94 (p. 77). 
7 Jody McNabb, ‘Thomas Willis: The Faculties and his Two Cognitive Frameworks,’ Brain and Cognition, 91 
(2014), pp. 131-137 (p. 137). 
8 Michael Hawkins further notes that Willis’s works are appropriated to provide a historical context for 
current neuro-anatomical discourses: The Empire of the Passions: Thomas Willis’s Anatomy of the Restoration Soul 
(PhD thesis: Imperial College, 2004), p. 11. 
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readings of his work. Though his account of the brain’s structure was unprecedented in 
its complexity, it was not presented as a functionally deterministic model. It is important, 
therefore, to consider how the soul was itself thought capable of operating and acting 
within the brain-spaces explored in the previous chapter. It is important also to recognise 
that Willis’s natural philosophical concept of spirits and souls did not grow up in a 
vacuum: rather, it reflected his particular professional, religious and socio-political 
contexts. This is a point that has been well made by a number of historians. As Michael 
Hawkins has argued, Willis ‘explicitly linked matters of physiology and pathology to 
social, political and religious concerns.’ 9  In this Hawkins builds on a number of 
important cultural history approaches to Willis, notably by Robert Frank Jr. in the 1980s 
and more recently by Robert Martensen, who have insisted on situating Willis’s theories 
in their wider religious, cultural, professional and socio-political contexts.10 This chapter 
builds upon these areas of discussion, examining the cultural and socio-political 
resonances represented in the key metaphors and analogies employed by Willis. 
 
Spirits and Souls in the Seventeenth Century  
 
Early modern souls were multifaceted objects of knowledge, drawing upon competing 
natural philosophical traditions, theological, socio-political and medical influences. What 
binds these various accounts in the seventeenth century was the attempt to explain an 
animating principle that could be used to separate living from non-living bodies in the 
natural world.11 These explanations primarily rested upon a notion of ‘spirit’, conceived 
of as an atom or ‘corpuscle’ that moved and enlivened organic bodies. Spirits were at the 
centre of physiological, medical and theological explanations of the soul in the 
seventeenth century. They were variously conceived as bodies that produced powerful 
affective states, which could be used to unite the physical body and mind; moving into 
the latter part of the seventeenth century, they were a chief object of inquiry for the 
physiologist or physician, more than the theologian. Despite their core significance in 
discussions of body and mind, the term spirit did not convey a stable or agreed 
definition. Whether they were material or immaterial, active or inert, and how they could 
                                                      
9 Michael Hawkins, Empire of the Passions, p. 11. 
10 Robert G. Frank Jr., ‘Thomas Willis and his Circle,’ in The Languages of Pysche: Mind and Body in 
Enlightenment Thought, ed. by George Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 107-147. 
Robert Martensen, The Brain Takes Shape (2004). 
11 Daniel Garber, ‘Soul and Mind: Life and Thought in the Seventeenth Century’, in The Cambridge History of 
Seventeenth century Philosophy, ed. by D. Garber and M. Ayers (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), pp. 759-795. 
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even be studied were highly contentious questions. Furthermore, as invisible and 
insensible particles, any account was explicitly reliant upon the work of metaphor and 
analogy. Popular tropes compared them to breath, wind, fluids, flame or beams of light.  
 
One of the key principles underlying early modern medical concepts of spirit was Galen’s 
physiological theory of psychic pnuema. For Galen, the soul was composed of (or had as 
its primary instrument) this subtle substance, which bore connotations with ‘wind’ or 
‘breath’.12 The pneuma performed all the vital and sensory functions within the brain and 
body and resided inside the brain’s ventricles.13 Early modern concepts of the animal 
spirits traced their roots back to the pneuma, which were rendered into the Latin spiritus 
animalis.14 According to Aristotle - whose framework continued to dominate well into the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - all living things differed from inanimate objects in 
that they possessed an animating life principle or ‘soul’ (anima in Latin and psuchê in 
Greek); this principle was materially embodied within the animal spirits, which came to 
be conceived of as the chief instruments of the soul acting inside the body.15 Willis also 
referred to the soul as ‘anima,’ to indicate a corporeal soul. As he notes, 
 
It is demonstrated […] some subtil particles flow, and cause Animality or life in all 
[…] we rightly call the Animal Spirits, and the constitutive part of the Sensitive Soul 
(SB, p.22).  
 
The corporeal soul was comprised of two kinds of spirit: vital, residing in the blood and 
the Animal spirits within the brain and nerves (SB, p.22). While the powers and attributes 
of the sensitive soul were substantially corporeal, Willis adhered to the traditional 
Aristotelian position in assigning the intellective powers and volition (the will) to an 
                                                      
12 The concept of Pneuma was important in sixteenth and seventeenth century pneumatic philosophies, 
later associated with the element or spirit of air. On this, see: Peter Barker, ‘Stoic Contributions to Modern 
Science,’ in Atoms, Pneuma and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed. by Margaret 
Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 135-154 (p. 147). 
13 Julius Rocca, ‘Anatomy,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. by R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 242-262 (p. 247). 
14 The ‘spiritus animalis’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were thought to be produced from the 
vital spirit and were generally located in the brain - as opposed to ‘natural spirits’ traditionally located in the 
liver or vital spirits in the heart, see: C.U.M. Smith and others, eds., The Animal Spirit Doctrine and the Origins 
of Neurophysiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 50. 
15 Aristotle defined the soul as a ‘substance as form of a natural body which has life in potentiality,’ De 
Anima, II, 1, 412b5-6. 
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immaterial rational soul (mens or mind) belonging to man alone, to which the sensitive 
soul was ultimately subordinate.16 Man was, therefore, a ‘two-soul’d Animal’ (SB, p.1).  
 
A particularly significant theme in this period is the responses by natural philosophers to 
the highly influential mechanical philosophy. René Descartes was one of the most 
notable proponents of this new philosophy. For Descartes, the soul, properly 
understood, was incorporeal and indivisible - utterly separated from the category of 
spirit. The soul possessed only one power: thought.17 The animal spirits residing in the 
body were, in this model, merely inert or passive atoms, hydraulically shunted about the 
body-machine like fluids in a mechanical water-fountain. This effectively reduced all 
bodily functions and sensory perception to mechanistic outcomes; animals (and human 
bodies) were mere automata.18 Willis’s account of the spirits drew on a number of quasi-
mechanistic categories of explanation, some of which echoed Cartesian analogies, while 
also departing significantly from that philosophy. This comes from the fact that both the 
new mechanical and chemico-corpusuclar philosophies – which Willis adhered to - drew 
from influential Epicurean atomism and the naturalia minima tradition, concerned with the 
actions of atoms or spirits as the smallest units of matter.19 Epicurus had utilised a 
concept of spirit as the most basic form of matter, proposing that all perceivable natural 
phenomena could be accounted for by the physical properties of these atoms - their 
combinations, size, shape and motions, acting below the level of sense.20 The English 
physiologists, in contrast to the mechanists, held that living things possessed a material 
                                                      
16 See Daniel Garber, ‘Soul and Mind’ (1998), p. 760. Jaime Kassler points out that the Aristotelian 
tradition continued to influence Willis’s work even whilst he rejected many parts of its doctrine: 
‘Restraining the Passions: Hydropneumatics and Hierarchy in the Philosophy of Thomas Willis,’ in The Soft 
Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, ed. by Stephen Gaukroger (London: Routledge, 
1998), p. 153. 
17Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), pp. 87, 89. Descartes, Letter to Arnauld, 4 June 1648, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
ed. by J. Cottingham and others, vol. iii. Correspondence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 
355. 
18 James, Passion and Action, p. 87. 
19 On these traditions within the chemical philosophies of 1600’s England, see: Allen G. Debus, The 
Chemical Promise: Experiment and Mysticism in the Chemical Philosophy 1550-1800 (Sagamore Beach, MA: Watson 
Publishing International, 2006). 
20 In purely materialist accounts (which dispensed with the idea of an immaterial soul altogether), all natural 
events and changes were the outcome of a ‘fortuitous concourse of atoms,’ occurring without divine 
guidance.  On the influence of epicurean atomism in English theories of spirit, see: John Henry, ‘A 
Cambridge Platonist's Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul’, Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes, 49 (1986), pp. 172-95; idem, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active 
Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory,’ History of Science, 24 (1986), pp. 335-81. 
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soul responsible for the effects of organic life and the acts of the animal government - 
the primary category of which were corpuscles or spirits. 21  
 
A ‘certain waving’: waves, beams and nervous transmission 
 
Unlike the continent, England witnessed a limited uptake of mechanical philosophy.22 
Like many of his English contemporaries, Willis elected to re-interpret Galeno-
Aristotelian notions of spirit through the prism of chemical-corpuscular principles, 
though still drawing upon selected aspects of the mechanical philosophy. Willis, for 
instance, described the spirits as driving the ‘animal machine’ and were moved about the 
nerves ‘as it were [in] Pipes and other Machines’ (SB, p.24). Some of Willis’s analogies 
directly echoed Cartesian ones, such as when he described the brain as a ‘perpetual 
fountain’ of the spirits, or when he referred to spirits blasted through ‘wind-pipes,’ ‘like 
the Chest of a musical Organ’ (AB, p.105). The use of such analogies did not make Willis 
a mechanist; just as William Harvey’s use of the pump metaphor did not preclude his 
rejection of a mechanical world-view.23 A far more substantial influence on Willis was the 
work of Pierre Gassendi. 24 He drew extensively on Gassendi, for instance, when he 
sought to ascribe active and self-moving powers to the animal spirits, as opposed to the 
inert, matter-in-motion categories of the mechanists. 25  As this section explores, despite 
                                                      
21 On the common belief in a corporeal, lower soul comprised of spirits or atoms, see: Antonio Clericuzio, 
‘The Internal Laboratory: The Chemical Reinterpretation of Medical Spirits in England (1650-1680)’, in 
Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th Centuries, ed. by Piyo Rattansi and Antonio Clericuzio (Dordrecht; 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp.51-83 (p. 59); John P. Wright, ‘Locke, Willis and the 
seventeenth century Epicurean Soul,’ in Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity, Osler (ed.), p. 244. 
22 Willis’s theories are viewed by Clericuzio as ‘a chemical re-interpretation of animal spirits,’ providing a 
‘viable alternative’ to the Cartesian theory of sensation: ‘The internal laboratory,’ p. 67. 
23 As Domenico Bertoloni Meli explores, Harvey, like Willis, rejected the mechanical world view but used 
aspects in ‘limited domains’: ‘Machines of the Body in the Seventeenth Century,’ in Early Modern Medicine 
and Natural Philosophy, ed. by Peter Distelzweig and others (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), pp. 91-116 (p. 93). 
Furthermore, ‘mechanics’ did not constitute an unambiguous set of principles in this setting and were 
applied in conjunction with chemico-corpuscular ideas and longstanding Galeno-Aristotelian frameworks. 
On the ‘semantic ambiguities’ of mechanics in this period, see: Peter Distelzweig, “Mechanics’ and 
Mechanism in William Harvey’s Anatomy: Varieties and Limits,’ Early Modern Medicine (2016), pp. 117-140 
(p. 117).  
24 On Willis’s debt to Gassendi see: Robert Frank Jr., Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists (London: University 
of California Press, 1980), p. 249; Wright, ‘Locke, Willis and the Epicurean Soul’, p. 246; Thomson, Bodies 
of Thought, p. 81. 
25 As John Henry argues, few in this period reduced the body to a pure machine, most referred to vital 
qualities in some form: ‘The Matter of Souls: Medical Theory and Theology in Seventeenth Century 
England’, in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. by Roger French and Andrew Wear  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 94. Simon Schaffer argues that, for English natural 
philosophers in the 1670’s, mechanism failed to displace core organising notions of spirit and soul: ‘Godly 
Men and Mechanical Philosophies,’ Science in Context, 1 (1987), pp. 55-85 (p. 57). On the limited uptake of 
mechanism in England see: Walter Pagel, Jan Baptista van Helmont Reformer of Science and Medicine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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featuring mechanistic elements, Willis’s model was very much premised upon those 
medical physiologies utilising theories of active matter in this period.26 
 
Willis broadly represented the corporeal soul’s transmission of sensory and locomotive 
impressions between body and brain through a dual, hydropneumatic model.27 The 
spirits carried their impressions either as the gentle ‘winds’ of instinct, or the vehement 
winds of a passion; elsewhere, they ‘flowed’ through the nerves as a certain fluid 
‘undulation,’ which could be stirred up by the ‘winds’ of affection (SB, p.45). This clearly 
distinct from the hydraulics of Cartesian mechanics, whereby fluids (or air) were forced 
through the nerve-pipes by external forces to move solid parts of the body. Willis’s 
explanations still relied upon the physical motion of material bodies, but explored their 
effects in terms of their active, internal activities and variable configurations. In 
particular, Willis used a wave-propagation analogy, informed by corpuscular notions, to 
express his model of nervous transmissions. 
 
When an impression was received by the soul, Willis described how ‘a certain fluctuation 
or waving is stirred up in the Hypostasis of the whole soul,’ by which the spirits carried 
out the acts of sense and motion in the body (SB, p.56). The impressions of sensible 
objects (‘species’) were physically carried by the spirits like a ‘wavering of waters,’ 
whereby impressions were passed through the nerves, not as a direct physical force, but 
by encouraging a certain motion or ‘inkindling’ in neighbouring spirits, spread 
throughout the entire ‘fluid’ body. These ‘waves’ were then ‘reflected’ and refracted back 
through the nerves (SB, p.48).28 This model relied upon the motive predisposition of the 
spirits and their extension as a continuous body of atoms – rather than upon external 
hydraulic forces. A wave (fluctus) described an irregular pattern, or (forceful) fluctuation, 
typically denoted in a body of water, usually the sea.29 It was a term widely used to reflect 
a variable form of motion, as in a wavering beam of light. For instance, in 1660 Robert 
                                                      
26 John Henry, ‘The Matter of Souls,’ p. 90. 
27 Kassler argues that Willis’s cerebral physiology was primarily organised around a hydropneumatic model, 
‘Restraining the Passions,’ p. 153. However, the ‘human hydraulis’ conceit was also complicated by other 
(potentially conflicting) images within the text. 
28 On this see Frank, Oxford Physiologists, p. 248. D. F. Harris suggested that this analogy had a ‘germ of 
truth’ and cited Willis’s ‘reflected’ waves as the origins of modern neuroscience’s concept of reflex action – 
despite fundamental differences with seventeenth century concepts of spirits: ‘The Metaphor in Science,’ 
Science, 36 (Aug., 1912), pp. 263-269 (p. 265). On fluid mechanics in physiological models of the period, 
see: Des Chene (2001), p. 38; S. Gaukroger (1995), p. 247, 277. 
29 See for example, Richard Huloet who described how ‘Waue as water doth in tempest, fluctuo,’ Abcedarium 
Anglico Latinum (London: G. Riddel, 1552). 
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Boyle described how bubbles ‘ascended with a wavering or wriggling motion.’30 It could 
also be metaphorically applied to signify a changeable or fluctuating state of being - such 
as when the vital flame was cast into fluctuations and ‘irregularities’ by the ‘winds’ of 
passions or when a person displays a ‘wavering’ resolve. In the Latin original of De anima 
brutorum, Willis used ‘fluctuatio’ and ‘undulatio’ together (‘fluctuatione undulosa’) to indicate 
the analogy with a wave-motion. Unda is the Latin root of wave, later undulatus.31  
 
Though the notion of undulation originally referred chiefly to bodies of water, it was also 
being used in this period as a metaphor for the transmission of light and sound through 
various mediums. In 1637, for example, Descartes published on the refraction of light 
using an analogy with sound waves. 32  Gassendi had also developed an influential 
corpuscular theory of light based around the agitation and motion of particles, upon 
which Robert Hooke developed a new theory of ‘pulse’ or ‘wave’ propagation during the 
1660s.33 A wave in this context referred not to the qualities of a specific substance 
(water), but to a motive mechanism occurring at the particulate level within larger 
masses. Willis used the term within this specifically corpuscular framework. The 
corporeal soul, according to such models, shared important qualities with fluids as a 
continuous ‘hypostasis’ of atoms suspended and moved within a medium. As Willis had 
previously stated, the soul was defined by its ‘moveable and fluid character’ (AB, 108).34 
Wave motion was specifically used to denote the involuntary and transient changes 
among the normally ‘quiet’ spirits, when they would ‘enter into a peculiar way of 
Gyration or turning round, or of undulation or waving […]’ (SB, p.61). With each spirit 
itself inherently predisposed to move, the overall form of the soul constantly altered its 
shape, just as waves in the sea made its form swell and undulate. Here, Willis uses ‘fluid,’ 
in respect of the soul, as an adjective to describe its state of being non-fixed, or the 
inherent pre-disposition of spirits to self-motion.35 
                                                      
30 Robert Boyle, New Experiments Physico-mechanicall, xxiv (London: 1660), p. 193. 
31 Thomas Willis, De anima brutorum, (London, 1672), p. 155, 160, 207. 
32 Hanna Pulaczewska, Aspects of Metaphor in Physics: Examples and Case Studies (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag GmbH, 1999), p. 186.  
33 On the concept of light as a motion or ‘pulse’ propagated through a transparent medium, see: Thomas 
Birch, The History of the Royal Society, vol. 3 (London, 1757), pp. 10-15. Hooke studied light patterns and 
compared them to fluid wave propagation in his ‘Observation IX’, Micrographia, (London, 1665; 1969), p. 
81. 
34 Wes Wallace reads this analogy as a ‘movable printing block whose shape is constantly adaptable,’ 
creating different sentences, p. 79. 
35 This comes from the Latin fluidus and fluere, ‘to flow’ (related to ‘fluent’). From the 1660s onwards it is 
used as a noun to describe any substance capable of flowing: "fluid, adj. and n." OED Online. Oxford 
University Press, December 2016. Web. 12 March 2017. Robert Boyle was the first to use fluid as a noun 
to denote specific nature of fluid substance. 
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Despite having used ‘waving’ to denote a changeable and fluctuating form (of the soul), 
Willis also argued that just as impressions passed ‘unchanged’ through water and air, so 
they were also conveyed through the hypostasis of the soul. He argued that waves were 
far from chaotic and in fact offered a useful analogue for the spirits’ proposed capacity to 
carry many distinct images simultaneously - even as they passed across each other’s 
paths. He describes how various sensory impressions were simultaneously received by 
the corporeal soul like ‘a River […] when many wavings have been stirr’d up, by various 
and divers strokes together.’ These wave-like impressions ‘pass thorow, or cut one 
another,’ yet remain unchanged, ‘still distinct, and inconfused.’ As Willis asks, ‘why then 
may we not suppose, that in the Airy systasis of the Soul, (which also is founded in a 
Watry Humor),’ such manifold species  ‘may be at once brought to the Common 
Sensory, without Confusion?’ (SB, p.58-9) 
 
Notably, despite a recurrent use of the fluid analogy to explain the animal spirits’ actions, 
Willis sought to clarify that they were to be properly compared with the ‘beamy texture’ 
of ‘light rays’ – an analogy not used by Descartes (SB, p.32). The animal spirits were 
‘lucid’ and ‘airy’ particles emanating as rays (radiis) of light flowing from the vital flame, 
implanted throughout the nervous stock were like a ‘continued beaming’: 
 
[…] the Animal Spirits as Rays of Light, proceeding from this Fire, are Configured 
according to the Impressions of every of their Objects […] as it were meeting 
together with reflected irradiations, cause divers manner of motions (SB, p.33). 
 
The sensible impressions held by the spirits were ‘irradiated’ through the nerves as beams 
of light, reflected and refracted ‘as it were by Dioptrick Glasses’ until they at last 
represented their image on the ‘white wall’ of the corpus callosum of the brain - the 
soul’s ‘inferior chamber’ (SB, p.22). The rational soul then ‘beheld’ these images ‘as in a 
looking glass’ (SB, p.32). These explanations explicitly drew on new inventions in the 
field of optics: the spirits, Willis noted, were represented to the ‘Callous Body,’ ‘as it were 
upon a white wall,’ referencing the inverted images produced by the newly invented 
camera obscura.36  The brain acts as a kind of ‘light chamber’ for the spirits. We also 
could think back here to the notions of perspicuity – as a quality of language – discussed 
                                                      
36 On the camera obscura and early modern perspectival ideas see: Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: 
Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 27-33.  
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in chapter one; by using light in this context, a sense of innate clarity, or illumination, is 
granted to the impressions carried by the spirits to the mind. 
 
As with Willis’s discussion on the movement of waves, the camera analogy was once 
again employed here to further his argument that the spirits could be relied upon to 
faithfully re-present their images without physically ‘confounding’ one another. This was 
in answer to the charge that, as a moving mass of particles, the spirits could not possibly 
carry all the discrete impressions of their objects and represent each with clarity inside 
the physically limited space of the brain: 
 
I say none ought to wonder, who hath beheld the Objects of the whole 
Hemisphere, admitted thorow an hole into a dark Chamber, and there on a sudden 
upon Paper exactly drawn forth, as if done by the Pencil of an Artist: Why then, 
may not also the Spirits, even as the Rays of light […] exhibit them without any 
Confusion or Obscuring of the Species? (SB, p.33) 
 
As with the clock, Willis selects one of the most complex and (presumed) accurate 
devices in this period. If the camera – a man made device - could replicate the ‘whole 
hemisphere’ with exactness then, Willis argued, the corporeal soul (which exceeded any 
human artifice) could be assumed to equal if not exceed such powers. Unlike the clock, 
this invention is not intended to convey notions of regularity or autonomy, but the 
capacity of the soul to reliably communicate complex – and variable - forms and figures 
to the brain.  
 
Willis referred here not to waves but to light rays, which moved ‘not by a waving 
fluctuation, but proceeds with only strait rays or strokes’ (SB, p.76).37 Light waves, unlike 
fluid waves, were not thought to bend around objects. However, in contrast to the 
images of straight, beaming ‘rays’, Willis also noted that the actual image carried by the 
spirits (comprising these ‘rays’) were, as motive particles, still subject to a waving motion: 
‘Yet, the Character of the object, is conveyed […] as it were by a certain waving.’ This 
consisted of an ‘inkindling,’ as in fire, propagated between neighbouring spirits implanted 
in the containing medium (SB, p.58). The particles transmitting the illumination (beneath 
the level of sense) wavered in the sense of being ‘inkindled,’ like a flame.  
 
                                                      
37 ‘Strait’ comes from rectus in Willis’s Latin original, De anima, p. 207. 
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There is a distinction, then, between how Willis represents the overarching model of 
nervous transmission between body and brain (as refracted beams of light) and the 
specific mechanism by which the form or figure of an object was held and conveyed by 
the spirits. Here, analogies with light, fluids and flames are being used interchangeably; 
not because he was being ‘contradictory’, as McNabb has argued, but in order to express 
different aspects and levels of complexity within the larger model.38 They are phenomena 
united, moreover, by a corpuscular understanding of the wave-propagation model. 
Furthermore, by having drawn these points of comparison, Willis had pointed to an 
analogy between the spirits’ capacity to carry the visible, audible and tangible qualities of 
objects to the senses and the actions of the air in transmitting these qualities to the sense 
organs (SB, p.58). The animal spirits were, however, importantly distinct from those of 
the air in the respect that they could hold the image and form of their object, which they 
themselves embodied (SB, p.24-5).  
 
Together, these images assigned an internal mechanism of communication or 
transmission to the corporeal soul; although the effect is given in response to stimuli, the 
mode of action belongs to the soul itself. This is bound up in Willis’s use of the language 
of optics and geometry, of ‘reflected’ and ‘refracted’ waves, or irradiated and undulating 
spirits, appropriated within new corpuscular discourses. The corpuscular concept of 
wave mechanism was a bridge between these discourses, which allowed Willis to easily 
switch between fluids, winds or light when describing the spirits’ various qualities. The 
spirits were, however, neither one thing nor the other; as a unique class of material, they 
held no direct analogue in natural bodies and therefore needed to draw upon various 
objects to convey their multifaceted powers and nature. Importantly, in these 
discussions, the analogical basis shifted from typical mechanical devices (the pump or 
clock) to corpuscular processes that also drew upon aspects of mechanical explanation – 
from distillation to wave propagation. These analogies offered more flexible explanatory 
tools, which, in keeping with the nature of the animal faculties, were non-determinist and 




                                                      
38 Jody McNabb, ‘Two Cognitive Frameworks,’ p. 137. 
39 As Bertoloni Meli (2016) has argued, device-analogies (the pump, clock) express regularity and are less 
helpful when thinking about disease states, p. 96, 109. 
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The Vital Flame  
 
A key image in Willis’s efforts to ascribe an organic or vital life principle to a material 
soul came in his image of the vital flame. As I touched upon in chapter three, the vital 
flame was a notion rooted in Willis’s chemical ideas around fermentation. In his model 
of the soul, as expressed here in 1672, the vital spirits accounted for all the functions that 
sustained life, from respiration to digestion. He compared this quality of the soul to a 
flame, lying hidden within the blood, it stirred up the spirits into life as a certain 
‘inkindling.’ Like a flame, the soul existed only ‘in so far as it acts […] when motion 
ceases, so does its existence’ (SB, p.8). When ‘inkindled’, the vital soul was engaged in a 
constant and rapid self-motion that produced light and heat. The ‘winds’ of the 
affections caused the vital flame to constantly fluctuate and change its shape - ‘fanning’ 
or extinguishing it altogether. As Willis described it, 
 
There is not much more difference between an insensible and a sensible Body, than 
between a thing uninkindled, and a thing kindled […] In like manner, the Vital 
humour in an Egg, remains torpid and sluggish in the beginning, and like to 
unkindled matter; but as soon as it is actuated, from the Soul being raised up, 
presently like an inkindled fire, it excites Life with Motion and Sense, and in the 
more perfect Creatures with heat. (SB, p.33) 
 
The notion of an animating principle in bodies was commonly expressed through this 
trope of the flame in the seventeenth century. In 1627, Francis Bacon described the 
spirits of animate bodies as all being in some way ‘kindled and inflamed’ as a ‘fine 
commixture of flame, and an aerial substance.’40 Robert Burton likewise noted that ‘as 
fire is in a torch, so are the spirits in the blood.’41 The flame analogy of the soul 
proliferated in theological works as much as it did in medical-physiological writing.42 
Walter Charleton, for instance, also conceived of the soul as a very ‘thin’ and ‘pure 
flame’, embodied by the activity of the spirits placed within the blood and extended 
throughout the body.43 William Harvey located the vital life principle in the blood, but 
considered this to be one and the same as the spirits of the blood and did not ascribe to 
the flame analogy. He nevertheless similarly defined spirit (according to Hippocrates) 
                                                      
40 Francis Bacon, Sylvia Sylvarum (1627), p. 153.  
41 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford: Printed for Henry Cripps, 1621), p. 28. 
42 Henry, The Matter of Souls, p. 110. 
43 Walter Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature, Anatomic Prælections VI (London, 1680), p. 384. 
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according to its motive qualities, as ‘whatsoever attempts anything by its own endeavour 
and arouses any motion with agility and vehemence, or initiates any action.’44 
 
Notably, the vital flame attracted new chemical-corpusuclar definitions during the latter 
part of the period. Willis’s own account retained a strong vitalistic and alchemical 
influence, marking out the vital spirits as a unique sort of matter, which pertained to a 
life principle – following in the tradition of Helmontian archaei or seeds. He followed 
Gassendi in proposing a certain ‘vital materialism,’ in ascribing an innate self-moving 
force or sensibility to the spirits. The souls of brutes were, Willis argued, a ‘heap’ of 
‘most subtle Atoms […] extreamly movable,’ all ‘stirred up with Life into motion’ (SB, 
p.6). Following on from his earlier chemical work, Willis clearly likened the vital soul to a 
flame by defining it as a fermentative commotion - a particulate agitation created by nitre 
reacting with sulphur to effect a chemical ‘ferment’. This established a non-destructive 
form of heat production: a fire without flame. 45  In this way, Willis explained the 
analogical basis of the flame: organic heat, and therefore life, was sustained through a 
chemically induced, particulate ‘commotion,’ rather than being a literal fire or flame. This 
account of the vital flame offered an important basis for promoting physiological 
explanations of sensitive life in Willis’s work. However, during the late seventeenth 
century, this reading of the analogy came under particular scrutiny, eventually leading to 
Willis amending his position in the Soul of Brutes. Here, Willis’s use of and reliance upon a 
particular analogy was explicitly challenged; a whole theory contested on the basis of the 
apparent limitations (or shifting interpretations) of an analogy. It offers a useful example 
of how Willis grappled with the indispensability of certain analogies – even as those 
around him sought to reject the analogical roots of their own discussions.  
 
The Cambridge Platonist Henry More notably dismissed Willis’s notion of the vital flame 
as  ‘psychopyrism,’ by which he meant a reduction of the soul’s higher powers to gross 
chemical events. 46 More drew on mechanical principles in attacking Willis’s account, 
arguing that although a flame might appear to have a self-moving property, it was 
                                                      
44 William Harvey, Disputations touching the generation of animals (1651), translated by Gweneth Whitteridge 
(Oxford, 1981), p. 347. 
45 See chapter two of this thesis for more detailed discussion of these ideas. See also, Clericuzio, Internal 
Laboratory, p. 65. 
46 Henry More, An Answer to a Letter of learned Psychopyrist, published in Joseph Glanvill’s Saducismus 
Triumphatus: Or Full and Plain Evidence concerning Witches and Apparitions (London, 2nd edn. 1682). The idea of 
a vital life principle being embedded in matter (as with the vital flame) was, for Henry More, potentially 
heretical. Henry, The Matter of Souls, pp. 107-8. 
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actually moved by the collision of particles: ‘when you apply a lighted Candle to light 
another Candle, the parts […] are put into motion by the moved parts of the lighted 
Candle.’47 Here, More was defending his belief in an immaterial and immortal soul – 
organic heat was a purely mechanical event.48 Many philosophers (dualists and non-
dualists alike) disagreed with the idea, shared by Willis and Lower, that there was some 
kind of flame or ‘inkindling’ heat within the blood on the basis that fire was 
demonstrably destructive, when the organic heat within living bodies was required to be 
generative. The Galenic physician Edmund O’Meara, for instance, criticised Willis for his 
‘vague’ use of the term spirit by the import of inappropriate chemical terms, but also for 
having misunderstood the concept of a vital flame by employing it in a literal rather than 
analogical sense.49 Echoing O’Meara, in 1667 the physician Conlis Cassin claimed that 
Willis had significantly mistaken the clearly metaphorical nature of the ‘vital flame,’ 
which both Harvey and Descartes had (correctly) recognised.50 Though Willis did not use 
the flame literally, he did at times blur its boundaries, as I will shortly demonstrate. 
 
More significant were the criticisms from fellow experimental philosophers at Oxford. 
Robert Boyle took particular issue with Willis’s fermentative explanation.51 Boyle and 
John Mayow both called for the flame analogy to be replaced by a more precise chemical 
definition of the vital spirit (as a reactive nitrous particle).52 Unlike O’Meara and More, 
Boyle and Mayow accepted chemico-corpusuclar explanations of the vital principle, but 
sought a much stricter chemical definition. Boyle called into question the ‘omnipotence’ 
of the term spirit, suggesting that the chemists applied it to any distilled, volatile liquid 
that could be produced: ‘as for what the Chymists call spirit, they apply the name to so 
many differing thing…they have no clear notion of the thing.’ 53 In his Tractatus duo 
(1668), meanwhile, Mayow argued that ‘we do not need to have recourse to an imaginary 
                                                      
47 On the ‘psychopyrism’ charge see: Henry, Matter of Souls, p. 109; Thomson, Bodies of Thought, p. 8. 
48 John Henry argues that More’s extreme dualism was not representative of the English context - most 
accepted some variant of the vital flame conceived of as a material spirits: Matter of Souls, p. 110. 
49 See Kenneth Dewhurst’s conclusion to Richard Lower’s Vindicatio, a Defence of the Experimental Method 
(1665), (Oxford: Sanford Publications, 1983), p. 294. 
50 Dewhurst, Vindicatio, p. 296. 
51 I explore Willis’s use of the analogy between chemical and medical processes in chapter two of this 
thesis. It is something Michael Hawkins has explored in some detail in his article, “Piss Profits’: Thomas 
Willis, his Diatribae Duae and the Formation of his Professional Identity,” History of Science, 49.162 (2001), 
pp. 1-24, (p. 13). On Boyle’s wariness of vitalist explanations, see: Thomson, Bodies, p. 81. 
52 Both Boyle and Mayow were hostile to Willis’s explanation of the vital heat as a product of fermentation, 
which Boyle condemned in The Sceptical Chymist (London, 1661). On this, see: Clericuzio, Internal Laboratory, 
p. 65-6; Thomson, p. 80-81. 
53 Robert Boyle, ‘Experiments and Notes about the Producibleness of Chymical Principles’, in The Works of 
the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. by Thomas Birch, 6 vols (London, 1772), 1, p. 609. 
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vital flame’ such as Willis employed.54 He instead proposed that the vital heat was 
produced by the action of nitro-aerial particles from the air reacting with saline-
sulphurous particles within the blood. 55 Here, the issue was less about “correct” use of 
the flame (as figuration) as it was an attempt to move away from the concept’s analogical 
foundations altogether, replaced by an empirical, chemical reality. The spirits were to be 
‘disciplined’ (as objects of knowledge) by being made to carry a direct and specific link 
between words (spirit) and object (nitre plus sulphur). The vital spirits, in this context, 
function as a sort of forgotten or ‘dead’ metaphor.  
 
By 1688 Willis had amended his position in his tract on the Pathology of the Brain and 
Nerves.56 By the time he published Soul of Brutes in1672, he had accepted the prevailing 
notion that the vital spirit was in fact aerial nitre, reacting with sulphur in the blood.57  
However, the flame continued to offer a more effective vehicle for expressing the 
phenomena now defined as ariel nitre. The flame analogy persisted long after the debates 
of the 1670s. For instance, in 1691 John Ray, the famous naturalist and Royal Society 
member, wrote that the body was a machine enlivened and driven by the active powers 
of the soul, which he again likened to the flame of a candle: ‘the Body is but the Machine 
or Engine, the Soul that actuates and quickens it; the Body is but the dark Lanthorn, the 
Soul or Spirit is the Candle of the Lord that burns in it.’58 On Willis’s part, even though 
he had recently accepted the ariel nitre definition, in 1672 he went on to reaffirm the 
flame comparison, writing:  
 
[…] wherefore, after so many Learned Men, it will be no Paradox to affirm, That the 
Soul lying hid in the Blood, or Vital Liquor, is a certain fire or flame; which Opinion agrees 
well enough with right Reason (SB, p.5).59  
 
                                                      
54 John Mayow, Tractus Duo (Oxford, 1668), English translation in Medico-Physical works (Oxford, 1926), pp. 
105-9. 
55 Mayow, Tractus Quinque (Oxford, 1674), in Medico-Physical Works, pp. 34. Clericuzio, Internal Laboratory, p. 
58; Thomson, Bodies, p. 79. On Boyle’s own views on the spirit of nitre, see: Frank, Oxford Physiologists, pp. 
259-60 (esp. p. 255). 
56 Much of the pathological discussion in Soul of Brutes drew on material from Willis’s medical lectures from 
1661 and his tract, An Essay on the Pathology of the Brain and Nervous Stock, (London, 1668) in Medical Practice, 
translated by Samuel Pordage (London, 1681), p. 3.  
57 Willis here refers his reader to his views ‘wrote lately’ on the ‘Accension of the Blood’, Soul of Brutes, p. 
22. Ibid, pp. 21-23. 
58 John Ray, The wisdom of God manifested in the works of the creation being the substance of some common places 
(London: Printed for Samuel Smith, 1691), p. 124. 
59 Willis stated that he was able to ‘stand on the authority of one Gassendus’ in this matter, but also cited 
other figures such as Faber and Hogelande, Soul of Brutes, p. 5. 
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Without being conclusive either way, he noted that all authorities ‘shook hands’ on the 
principle that the corporeal soul was either a flame or at least something analogical to it: 
‘its Act or Substance is either a Flame or a Breath, neer-to, or a-Kin to Flame’ (SB, p.5). 
He further attempted to clarify that it was only similar to a domestic flame in the specific 
respect that it was similarly fed by the nitrous particles derived from the air, reacting with 
sulphurous particles in the blood. The chemical nitre definition did not displace the (still 
effective) image of the vital spirit as flame, so much as it worked to clarify the analogous 
(rather than metaphorical) nature of the relationship: the blood and fire are both ‘fed’ by 
nitre, in which sense they share a structural relationship, but they retained important 
differences. Here, Willis’s vital materialism intersected with his chemical principles: if 
natural fire and the vital heat were both instances of sulphur ‘fed’ by nitre, then what 
exactly was it that separated them? The idea that these spirits (unlike other substances) 
possessed vital, active powers or a ‘life-force’ that went beyond what could be explained 
by their physical or chemical properties alone was one such way to address this. The vital 
spirits bestowed life where fire destroyed. 
 
However, the problem of how the flame could be both like and different to a domestic 
(destructive) flame remained. Willis continued to grapple with and blur the boundaries 
between metaphor and analogy here. He stated that he had rejected the ancients 
‘dictated’ notion that the soul be ‘actual fire or flame,’ and instead redefined the flame as 
‘a heap of most subtil Contiguous particles, and existing in a swift motion,’ fed by 
sulphur and ‘some other nitrous thing in the Air.’ In the same work he later stated that 
the vital soul ‘is not so like to flame, but even a flame it self’ (SB, p. 33-7). Ultimately, 
Willis could not have conclusively resolved these issues, but he did look to draw on 
another analogy to expand and upon his position. He noted that the chemist’s own use 
of fire could be seen as productive rather than destructive: it dissolved all natural bodies 
into their constituent parts and thereby revealed the basic components of ‘life.’ It 
represented a process of revealing hidden qualities and ‘opening up’ material bodies, like 
anatomy. This reconstituted new bodies out of compound states, rather than destroying 
matter. As he noted, the vital flame was not like a ‘common flame’, but ‘silently burns 
with a gentle and friendly heat, like a Fire shut up in a Balneo Marie […] and as so 
destroys not the Blood, but inkindling the Liquor,’ it gives life to the organism (SB, p.22). 
The vital flame is ‘friendly’ and ‘gentle’ - a generative catalyst. It evokes the flame of the 
alembic and thus the practices used by the alchemist to ‘produce’ spirits as things that 
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existed in the world - just as the flame ‘procreated’ the animal spirits from the matter of 
the blood. He described the body (specifically, the hearts left ventricle) in this context as 
a ‘fireplace’ – a cradle of life.  The flame analogy was also deeply entangled in the wider 
model Willis promoted in his writing. It helped to make sense, for example, of the 
relations between the spirits of the blood and those of the nerves – the latter being cast 
as a ‘beamy’ radiation emitted from the vital flame in the blood. The flame’s propensity 
to change its shape and fluctuate in that familiar, lively dance also provided a useful and 
compelling visual schema for the ‘flames’ of the passions, illustrating the physical 
alterations imposed upon the soul when afflicted by the ‘winds’ of the passions. It is an 
image that remained useful and effective, even when set against the demands of the new 
chemical learning.  
 
A ‘Knowing Power’ 
 
Whilst the vital spirits were the basis of organic life, it was the animal spirits of the 
sensitive soul, which properly enacted the complex tasks of animal government (SB, p.6). 
As Willis acknowledged, the vital portion of the soul was ‘scarce sensible or knowing’ 
(SB, p.55). Even Gassendi had ‘pass’d over’ how ‘the flame […] however framed with 
the most excellent artifice […] can be able to produce the Acts of the animal Faculty’ 
(SB, p.4). These powers – if they were to be assigned to the corporeal soul itself - 
necessitated the animal spirits’ capacity to act.60 As Willis concluded, it is plain that the 
sensitive soul performs its tasks ‘beyond the Virtue or force of any other machine, and to 
perform by its own proper Virtue or strength’ (SB, p.32). Willis therefore argued against 
what he termed the ‘vulgar’ opinion that matter is ‘merely passive’ noting that, ‘on the 
contrary, Atoms, which are the matter of sublunary things, are so very active and self-
moving, that they never stay long […] they cut forth for themselves Pores and Passages, 
into which they are Expatiated’ (SB, p.33).61 Using striking imagery here, Willis proposes 
that the spirits had the power to actively ‘cut’ and carve out their own tracts in the soft 
tissue of the brain. This somewhat undermined (or at least sat in tension with) the 
                                                      
60 Thomson, p. 82; Clericuzio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the 
Seventeenth Century (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 100. 
61 On the agency granted to the animal spirits as part of the vitalism characterising English corpuscular 
theories see: Thomson, pp. 80-82. On Willis’s views on active matter see: Charles T. Wolfe, Materialism: a 
Historico-philosophical Introduction (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), p. 53; Kathryn Tabb, ‘Struck, As it Were, 
With Madness: Phenomenology and Animal Spirits in the Neuropathology of Thomas Willis’ in Brain, 
Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience, ed. by C.U.M. Smith and Harry Whitaker, vol. 6 of the 
series History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 43-57. 
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anatomical provisions and safeguards in the brain that he had so carefully set out 
previously. The brain is more of a tabula rasa for the spirits’ own activities, than a set of 
architectural confines.  
 
Both Willis and Gassendi invoked a form of personified language to emphasise the 
spirits’ self-moving powers; Gassendi noted the spirits’ ‘capacity to take hold of each 
other, to attach themselves to each other, to join together.’62 Moreover, in executing their 
roles, the animal spirits were thought to display a notable agency: when faced with an 
object, the spirits could in effect choose how to respond based on their ability to 
apprehend natural objects and form (non-rational) responses.63 These spirits were not 
only chemically active, but approached powers of sensible perception, a form of natural 
or ‘sensitive reason’ that guided them to make beneficial choices. Willis argued that the 
sensitive (rather than vital) part of the soul picks and ‘choose[s] Acts’ from a ‘Council, or 
a certain Deliberation.’ This soul, ‘being so gifted naturally […] is knowing and Active, 
concerning some things necessary for it’ (SB, p.32). Mechanical explanations were 
inadequate, he held, when looking to express how the soul ‘perceives itself to feel, and is 
driven according to that perception into divers Passions and Actions’ (SB, p.34). 
Organised in a certain way, these spirits amounted to a material system of ‘thought’.64 
This power was required to belong to the corporeal soul alone in order to allow it to 
respond to sensory objects without the need for a direct and continuous involvement of 
the rational soul; such oversight would require the rational soul to be divisible and 
therefore finite (SB, p.32).65  
 
These complex ideas were importantly bound up in Willis’s use of language and imagery 
around the spirits. A key theme here was the use of a personification and 
anthropomorphic metaphors. 66 When talking about the sensitive soul, for instance, he 
                                                      
62 This language is reminiscent of Willis’s earlier descriptions of spirits ‘recoupling’ and ‘divorcing’, as 
discussed in chapter two of this thesis, p. 25. 
63 Wright, ‘Locke, Willis and the Epicurean Soul,’ p. 246. 
64 As Wright has noted, Willis followed Gassendi here in ascribing life to atoms structured in a particular 
way, p. 246. 
65 Hawkins notes that the autonomy of these spirits in responding to localized needs in the body harks 
back to Helmont’s notion of the archaei, implanted in specific organs and tasked with different roles: 
Hawkins, Empire, p. 36. See chapter four of this thesis for Willis’s explanation of the autonomic nervous 
response. 
66 Kathryn Tabb has convincingly explored the use of anthropomorphic metaphors by Willis and argues 
that this works against the mechanistic reductionism often attributed to Willis: ‘Struck, as it were, with 
Madness’, (2014). On the agency granted to the animal spirits as part of the vitalism characterising English 
corpuscular theories see: Thomson, pp. 80-82. 
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describes her ‘flying away from some approaching evil […] she retires inwardly, and 
leaving her watch, hides her head’ (SB, p.32). In another example, he describes the spirits 
placed within in the organs of sense as being like ‘Watchmen,’ furnished with a ‘peculiar 
Provision, and an appropriate manner or Disposition’ appropriate to their assigned roles 
(SB, p.57). The spirits here embody human roles, complete with dispositions and 
manners peculiar to them – and even desires. In the passion of desire, the spirits are ‘as it 
were naked and destitute of all helps, like Beggars ask an Alms, which they most greedily 
desire’ (SB, p.52). The spirits were also made to embody specific pathological states: as 
Willis noted, madness ‘begins’ with the spirits, which acquire, in themselves, the 
‘disposition’ of madness becoming ‘furious’ or ‘depressed’ (SB, p.202-3). 67  The 
characteristics of the melancholic similarly derived from the ‘opaque, ‘gloomy’ and 
‘stygian’ nature of the animal spirits themselves (SB, p.188).68 Here, the stygian analogy 
refers here to the Greek mythology of the River Styx – a dark infernal blackness.69 Spirits 
could further be induced into madness by a chemical imbalance of the blood, also 
described as a stygian water: this water ‘as it were possess[ed] with a certain madness, the 
Spirits therein flowing, and implanted.’70 These descriptions were used to make the spirits 
convey certain (disordered) states of mind; they become a proxy, narrative embodiment 
of the mental states experienced by the patient. It is not the patient who rages, but their 
spirits. As Willis noted in his Pathology of the Brain, the spirits were the ‘immediate subject 
of […] Disease’ (PB, p.15). These linguistic tools helped to underline Willis’s broader 
proposition that, far from being inert bodies, the animal spirits were in fact the 
immediate and vital agents of the corporeal soul.  
 
Willis illustrated his idea that the sensitive soul could produce effects beyond the ‘art’ 
imitated by mechanical devices through an analogy with the musical organ. The organ 
was, he noted, capable of producing complex musical harmonies by ‘the labour of him 
playing on it,’ yet he had also seen such harmonies reproduced by ‘the mere course of 
Water’ in a ‘self-moving water organ’ (SB, p.34).  The key distinction here was that the 
water organ could only produce a determined set of melodies; in contrast, the corporeal 
                                                      
67 On the use of this language see: Tabb, Struck with Madness, (2014). 
68 Hawkins, Empire, pp. 45-6. 
69 From the Latin Stygius, referring to a dark underworld, derived originally from the Greek myth of the 
River Styx: "Stygian, adj. and n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2016. Web. 12 March 
2017. 
70 Willis, ‘Pathology of the brain and nervous stock: on convulsive diseases,’ in The Remaining Medical Works 
of Dr Thomas Willis, translated by Samuel Pordage (London: Printed for T. Dring, 1681), p. 10. 
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soul had the power to vary its ‘tune’ by disposing the spirits into any order or 
arrangement. In humans, ‘their souls […] ought to be attributed a certain faculty of 
varying their Types, and of composing them in themselves’ (SB, p.34). The soul 
‘institutes’ a great ‘many series of Actions,’ as are ‘necessary for itself’ (SB, p.34). In other 
words, the capacity of the corporeal soul to adopt and hold the manifold figures and 
forms of any sensory object, or an impression sent from the rational soul, required the 
ability to vary and re-formulate its spirits into new series and orders – to change their 
shape, like a flame or fluid. The sensitive soul possessed the capacity of the musician-
composer to vary the tune  
 
These notions were also notably represented in Willis’s ideas around the transmission of 
nervous impressions. Upon receiving an impression (external or internal) the spirits, 
stationed like soldiers in the body, as in a ‘watchtower’, were immediately ‘ordered into 
various special groups and formations.’71 Willis compared these variable formations to 
something akin to a bodily gesture, an act of communication. As he continued, ‘the 
faculties of the same Soul depend upon the various Metathesis and gesticulation of those 
spirits’ (varia metathesis and gesticulatione dependent). This was an act of communication 
between the inferior and the superior soul: ‘she [the soul] induces according to the 
various impulse of the Objects, various Gestures and Species in herself ’ (SB, p.56). 
Metathesis, a Greek word later translated into the Latin for ‘transposition,’ was a quite 
technical term referring to the reordering of sounds, syllables, letters which could 
amount to a shift in sense or meaning. In 1633, for example, Thomas Adams had noted 
that ‘idle misplacings’ of meaning, ‘like Anagrammes’ were a ‘transposition of letters […] 
the beginning is where the end should be.’72 In 1673, Richard Allestree reflected on how 
a ‘little transposition may quite alter the case.’73 The re-ordering of spirits is comparable 
here to the construction and re-construction of a sentence.74  By re-arranging their 
configurations, order or disposition they were able to represent new ideas or forms; just 
as words, transposed in a sentence or speech, effect new and different meanings. 
Significantly, the analogy reflected Willis’s view that nervous impressions were in some 
aspects akin to an act of communication. 
 
                                                      
71 Wallace, ‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse,’ p. 80. 
72 Thomas Adams, A commentary or, exposition upon the divine second epistle general (London: 1633), p. 1632. 
73 Henry Ainsworth, The Art of Logick (London; 1657), p. 77.  
74 Wallace, p. 79. 
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The reordering of words in a sentence is also comparable to the way in which re-
organising one’s limbs creates a new kind of physical gesture. To gesture comes from the 
medieval Latin gestra, or gerre, meaning to carry.75 It could refer to one’s physical posture 
or deportment, or an arrangement of the limbs intended to (externally) signify some 
interior affection – as in an act of worship. It was often the involuntary expression of a 
violent affection of the soul – a physical signification of interior passions. It was, above 
all, a communicative act linked to the art of speech. Bacon had considered gesture in 
relation to the art of speech, as a means by which oratory is enhanced or emphasized. It 
could also be used in place of verbal speech, such as when nations ‘of different Language 
[…] serve their turne, by Gestures.’76 It was an act that, metaphorically, ‘speaks to the 
eye.’77 Bacon further noted that gestures had ‘some similitude with the thing signified, 
and are kind of Emblemes’.78 This echoes the sense in which Willis used gesture here to 
denote the soul’s ability to (physically) signify a certain image of the thing felt, a figure or 
representation of the object. As the body uses physical gesture to communicate, so the 
soul analogously performs ‘gestures’ to communicate with (or make representations to) 
the judgement and intellect. Gestures were also essentially transient; like the fluidity of 
the soul, or its fluctuating flame, a gesture reflected the soul’s state of being ‘un-fixed’ 
and actively changeable. For Willis, it was a means of expressing the soul’s fluid form 
when subjected to an affection: in desire or aversion, for instance, Willis examined after 
‘what manner or ways of Gesticulations or Gestures, she [was] composed in either 
Affection’ (SB, p.52).79 In Willis’s account of nerve transmission, his use of gesture in 
partnership with metathesis supports a dynamic model of communicative acts by the 
corporeal soul - more akin to a language than a purely mechanical action.80 Used together 
in this way, these analogies – drawing on linguistic structure and bodily gesture - spoke to 
an embodied form of signification, wherein the spirits are moved around like words or 
limbs to represent variable meanings.  
 
The nerve ‘impulse’ had, of course, also been described by Willis as a form of particulate 
wave mechanism of propagation and diffusion and compared to the physical vibration 
                                                      
75 "gesture, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, September 2016. Web. 18 November 2016. 
76 Francis Bacon, ‘The Knowledge concerning the organ of speech […] also called Grammer,’ The 
Advancement of Learning (1640), in Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), Book 6, p. 258. 
77 Bacon, Advancement, p. 182. 
78 Ibid, p. 259. 
79 In De anima brutorum, the Latin for this is ‘animae componere gestus,’ p. 155. 
80 Wallace points to the ‘semantic terms’ used by Willis here as an indication of the linguistic nature of the 
analogy, p. 79.  
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caused when the strings of a harp are plucked (SB, p.61). These explanations are not 
necessarily in conflict with the analogies of gesture and (linguistic) transposition. There 
remained an undisputed physical element to the performance of these ‘impressions’ or 
‘gestures’, but this could not on its own fully express the nature of the event. The 
‘vibrations’ of the spirits in the nerves were not uniform or routine; as with the musical 
tune, the soul needed to be able to reconfigure itself based upon its own needs (and 
perceptions of need) – this went beyond what vibration alone could express. 81 Fluid 
waves, light beams, and the camera analogy all picked up on the same idea being 
considered here: that the spirits could actively and dynamically carry the form of their 
objects and that they could vary these formations accordingly to communicate clearly 
and reliably with the soul, without the immediate direction of the rational soul or by the 
application of some mechanical force. In the previous chapter, I touched upon this 
argument as it was used by Willis to explain the providential design of the cerebrum’s 
random and convoluted spaces – suggesting that these spaces, being irregular, would not 
confer deterministic patterns of motion onto the spirits. In the above passage, the 
emphasis has been shifted to the spirits themselves: how they conducted themselves 
within these ‘free’ (non-determined) spaces of the brain. It asks what directs them and by 
what power they perform their tasks. For Willis, the mechanical philosophy did not have 
an answer to these questions. 
 
A Protean Soul 
 
The active, self-moving attributes of the spirits expressed, on the one hand, their capacity 
to perform the complex actions of the animal faculties; on the other, it suggested that the 
faculties were entirely vulnerable to the passion states which afflicted this inherently 
moveable soul. As Willis had noted in his Anatomy, the brain kept a plentiful store of the 
spirits within the orbicular prominence, which it constantly replenished with its 
‘fountain’; this essentially produced a concentrated mass of highly volatile, easily 
disturbed spirits in the seat of the faculties, leaving humans exceptionally vulnerable to 
the effects of the passions. 82 Early modern passions were a hugely important, multi-
faceted concept that united natural philosophical, medical, religious and moral accounts 
                                                      
81 Wallace argues that these waves were not ‘stereotyped’ or ‘uniform’ in Willis, p. 79.  
82 As Michael Hawkins has argued, Willis’s physiological model of the passions marked humans out as the 
most vulnerable of all creatures: ‘A Great and Difficult Thing’: Understanding and Explaining the Human 
Machine in Restoration England,’ in Bodies/Machines, ed. by Iwan Rhys Morus (Oxford: Berg, 2002), p. 21. 
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of human behaviour and experience.83 A passion described an unnaturally vehement 
affective state – a movement or change - imparted upon the soul. 84 An affective state 
only became a passion, in the sense of a pathological state, when the motions of the 
spirits became unnaturally vehement or immoderate. All of the ‘vehement’ (and therefore 
pathological) affections belonged to the corporeal soul, seated in the brain. If the spirits 
were ‘quiet’ then the body functioned along expected lines; if their motions were violent, 
then the faculties could be unseated, or else grow ‘deaf’ to the rational soul (SB, p.45).85 
This occurred when the animal spirits received an especially forceful impression of an 
object promising good or evil, or else received an impression of internal fault or 
corruption from within the body (e.g. from chemical imbalance), which was then 
transmitted to the phantasy in the brain.  
 
The passions – as disordered physiologies of the spirits - involved both the mind and 
body in the resultant ‘discordant motions’ of the soul. As Willis illustrated, through a 
naturalistic analogy, just as a violent blast shook both the tree and its leaves, so the 
passions affected the body and mind in substantial ways (SB, p.56). The animal faculties 
were especially liable to disarray as they relied upon arranging the spirits into specific 
‘orders’ and ‘series’; if this process was thrown into disorder, then the rational soul would 
receive corrupted and false ideas from the imagination. Willis describes how the 
impressions (of good or evil) disturbed the ‘beamy’ radiation of the animal spirits and, by 
‘undulations or waverings brought to it’, fanned the vital flame in the blood creating 
‘irregularities’ and ‘inequalities,’ like the blasts of wind acting on water (SB, p.32). The 
flame was ‘in danger to be always blown out,’ by sudden joy or suffocated by sadness 
(SB, p.31). In extreme cases, passions could be fatal: the animal faculties so seriously 
‘perverted’ that the vital functions, over which they governed, would be left to decay 
until ‘by degrees is abolished’ (PB, p.13). Increasingly, the passions were explained via 
chemical-corpuscular categories, rather than by reference to traditional notions of the 
four humors, or as the outcome of purely spiritual or moral failings – though aspects of 
                                                      
83 On the nebulous boundaries between physiological, religious and political concerns reflected in theories 
of the passions, see: Harold Cook, ‘Body and Passions: Materialism and the Early Modern State’, Osiris, 17 
(2002), pp. 25-48; Peter Dear, ‘A Mechanical Microcosm: Bodily Passions, Good Manners, and Cartesian 
Mechanism’, in Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge, ed. by C. Lawrence and S. Shapin 
(Chicago: 1998), pp. 51-82; Hawkins, Empire, p. 9. 
84 On the passions as a distinctly early modern category of knowledge see: Thomas Dixon, From Passions to 
Emotions: the Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Susan 
James, Passion and Action, (1997).  
85 For a useful summary on this model see: Kassler, p. 148. 
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humoral pathology continued to be interwoven within these accounts.86 The passions 
were not, however, necessarily harmful or pathological; the drive to seek out food was 
helpful, for example (SB, p.53).  
 
One of the most vivid images employed by Willis in his treatment of the passions was 
that of a ‘protean’ soul: 
 
Truly the Sensitive Soul, like a Proteus, is wont to be so diversly disturbed and 
altered, into manifold Kinds, with the various Fluctuation, and divers sorts of 
Inclination of the Animal Spirits, Blood and other Humors, that a cense or view of 
all the Passions, can scarce be had. (SB, p.49) 
 
Illustrating the inherent instability within the animal oeconomy, Willis evokes an image 
of a fluid tempest. In Greek mythology the proteus was a sea-god, which, like the 
passions of the soul, eluded attempts to define it by its propensity to constantly change 
its shape. The proteus provided a useful motif here for Willis’s chemico-corpuscular 
understanding of the passions and his rejection of scholastic approaches. The passions 
were to be understood, he argued, by knowledge of the underlying physiological 
behaviours of the spirits (rather than by external effects), and of the chemical conditions 
that altered the various states of the spirits (as either fixed, active or volatile). In contrast, 
scholastic models had organised the passions into eleven types, arranged under two 
headings: the Concupiscible, which has six passions – pleasure and grief, desire and 
aversion, love and hatred; and the Irascible, which has five passions – anger, boldness, 
fear, hope, and desperation (SB, p.49). Willis noted that the list overlooked many notable 
passions, such as shame and pity. Moreover, as he had illustrated through the proteus, 
such a complete view of all the passions could ‘scarce’ be had under these circumstances. 
Instead, he plotted the passions along a continuum between two states of spirituous 
activity (quiet or active), along which an infinite number of variations could be plotted. 
As the proteus analogy suggested, the varied passions were united only by their common 
(corpusuclar) mechanism. The proteus was therefore a vivid articulation of the principle 
                                                      
86 In medical practice more generally, the influence of humoral pathology and Galenic therapeutics 
persisted late into the seventeenth century. Hawkins notes that even anti-scholastic physicians continued to 
employ the qualitative language of humoral pathology, Empire, p. 45. See also Dewhurst, ‘Willis in Oxford: 
some new MSS,’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, (April, 1964), pp. 26-31 (p. 27); Stephen L. Sigal, 
‘Fever Theory in the Seventeenth Century: Building Toward a Comprehensive Physiology,’ The Yale Journal 
of Biology and Medicine, 51 (1978), pp. 571-582 (p. 577). 
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that the passions were not discrete or bounded ‘things’; each passion was a disturbance 
or change in the hypostasis of the soul. All the passions were characterised as the soul 
becoming ‘unequal, and as it were not Comfortable to the Body’ by being either enlarged 
or reduced to a varying degree (SB, p.45).87 The passions reflected this fluidity; an ever-
changing balance of spirits, chemicals and humors in the blood or nervous juice.  
 
Willis was not the first to use the proteus as an image to represent a physiological model 
of the mind. Robert Burton, in his Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), had also used the image 
to convey his notion that the phantasy was easily thrown into a swirling chaos, which 
made its ideas unreliable and uncertain: ‘so diversly doth this phantasie of ours affect, 
turne & winde, so imperiously command our bodies, which as another Proteus or a 
Camelion can take all shapes (though for Burton the phantasy did not represent the 
‘knowing part’ of the corporeal soul, as Willis suggested).88  This imagery also harked 
back to older, humoral notions of fluid bodies – which had by no means been entirely 
displaced in this period. In 1650, for example, Thomas Vaughan used the proteus to 
signify the inconstant and variable nature of humoral bodies, subject to fluctuating 
passions, when he wrote ‘This is it makes the Soul subject to so many Passions, to such a 
Proteus of humors.’89  Notably, in alchemical traditions the proteus was a name given to 
the volatile spirit known as Mercurius or Hermes, the prima materia or first matter 
(sometimes represented as the sea). In order to create the philosopher’s stone – a 
universal cure - the alchemist was required to first capture Mercurius and tame him. This 
was a trope also utilised in literature. In Paradise Lost (1667), John Milton wrote that the 
alchemists, ‘by their powerful art they bind/Volatile Hermes, and call up unbound/In 
various shapes old Proteus from the sea,/Drained through a limbeck to his native form’ 
(3.602-5). 90 Here we see how the image of the proteus connects up with Willis’s concepts 
around the spirits as chemical corpuscular bodies; in the last line of Milton’s poem, he 
describes the proteus being chemically distilled (through the ‘limbeck’) into his ‘native’ 
form – that is into spirits, as the basic components of matter.  
 
                                                      
87 Willis acknowledges this schema as an amendment of the Aristotle’s ‘forked measure’ of the sensitive 
appetite, Soul of Brutes, p. 48. 
88 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford: Printed by John Lichfield and James Short, for Henry 
Cripps, 1621), p. 110. 
89 Thomas Vaughan, Anthroposophia Theomagica; or a discourse of the nature of man and his state after death 
(London, 1650), p. 46. 
90 John Milton, Paradise Lost (1667) in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, ed. by M. H. Abrams and 
Stephen Greenblatt, 7th edn, vol I. (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2000). 
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The proteus figure also drew on more traditional tropes of the passions as natural 
tempests, conveyed through images of storms, floods, and thunderous explosions.91 The 
passions of the corporeal soul, for instance, raged underneath the seat of the rational 
soul, like ‘clouds and thunder gathered beneath the feet of Olympus.’ The soul was either 
a ‘calm Sea’ or a body of ‘water shaken into various Circles’ by the blasts of winds in a 
storm (SB, p.45). These illustrations were a common means of conveying the disruptive 
power of the passions. In 1630, Thomas Wright, for instance, wrote that ‘we may 
compare the Soule without Passions, to a calme Sea, with sweete, pleasant and crispling 
streames; but the Passionate, to the raging Gulfe, swelling with waves, surging by 
tempests, minacing the stony rockes, and endevouring to overthrowe Mountaines.’92 
These images spoke to pervasive fears around bodies long subjected to the fluctuating 
imbalances of the humors.93  
 
These themes also relate to contemporaneous research around the pneumatic qualities of 
the air. It was during this time that Boyle was researching the chemical composition of 
particles in the air (namely, ariel nitre), conducting public experiments to demonstrate its 
‘elastic’ force with his new mechanical vacuum pump.94 In Soul of Brutes, Willis drew upon 
these ideas when he remarked that both the nitrous particles of the air and animal spirits 
are calm when free and ‘unmixed,’ but have an explosive potential when shut up in the 
muscles, just as air shut up in clouds might produce a hurricane or thunder (SB, p. 24). 
Natural storms were an effective and vivid way of representing the amplifications in the 
force of the spirits, which were (together) capable of producing effects far larger than 
their individual size suggested – just as particles in the air. These analogies were also a 
means of establishing the violent force of the passions; something which occurred 
beyond the powers of blasts made by manmade machines. Ultimately, the proteus 
highlighted the futility of the ordering imperatives of the brain-cabinet – its movements 
                                                      
91 Willis himself had drawn heavily on these associations in his Anatomy, where he uses images of the blood 
cast into ‘whirlpools’ or breaking the ‘banks’ of the brain’s flood defenses, p. 49. As Jaime Kassler has 
argued, in Willis, the passions created ‘cerebral storms’ which inferred disordered mental states onto the 
patient, p. 157. 
92 Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde in generall  (London, 1630), p. 59. 
93 On early modern anxieties around fluid, humoral bodies and the ‘wriggle work’ of the animal spirits, see: 
John Sutton, ‘Spongy Brains and Material Memories’, in Embodiment and Environment in Early Modern 
England, ed. by M. Floyd-Wilson and G. Sullivan (London: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 14-34; Gail K. Paster, 
Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds., Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History 
of Emotion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
94  On Boyle’s Oxford experiments with the ‘pneumatic engine’ see: W. Bray, ed., The Diary and 
Correspondence of John Evelyn, 3 vols (London: 1852), III, p. 255; Frank, (1980), p. 52. 
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could be managed by the physician (like the chemist-vintner attending to ferments), but 
never controlled. 
 
One of the most notable aspects of the above passage was the tension created by placing 
the soul within a body ‘cabinet’ – to which the ‘proteus’ soul was meant to be both 
adequately ‘fitted’ and to also water ‘gently.’ Willis described how, 
 
The whole Corporeal Soul, so long as she is quiet and undisturbed, she is fitted to 
her proper Body equally, as to a certain Chest or Cabbinet, and waters all its Parts 
gently, both with little Rivulets of Blood Circulating, and actuates and inspires them 
every where with a gentle falling down of the Animal Spirits. (SB, p.45) 
  
Opening his chapter on the passions with this image, Willis drew upon the tension 
implied by a fluid juxtaposed against the spatial order suggested by the cabinet’s role to 
underline how the passions were, fundamentally, a physiological disordering of the 
arrangement of the spirits. A passion state, according to this description, involved two 
primary changes to the soul: it would move from a state of being ‘quiet’ to one of 
disturbance or ‘raging’ and, as a result of this, would no longer ‘fit’ equally to the body 
cabinet. This inverts a previous analogy, where the soul (under normative conditions) 
was said to bear a close relationship to the form of the body as its ‘shadowy hag,’ fitted 
as it were to a ‘sheath.’ All the major passion states were perversions, of one kind or 
another, of the spirits movements within the brain and nerves. The proteus, as a being 
defined by its un-fixed form, neatly encapsulated this position. Here, the blunt forces 
observable in nature are set against the intricacies of brain structure, detailed in his 
anatomical work: what use are cabinets, cloisters and cells when trying to contain a 
proteus soul or defend against a raging flood? The brain may have displayed an 
incomparable artifice, but this was as nothing when considered against the effects of the 
passions. 
 
The cabinet as an analogy for the bodily-container of the soul was an immensely rich and 
well-established trope, but it was quite unusual, however, to find it coupled with a fluid 
soul in a physiological setting. Wider examples of the trope cast the soul as a precious 
jewel placed for safekeeping within the body-cabinet. In a sermon from 1668, Thomas 
Vincent remarked that ‘whilest the soul doth abide in it, the body is the inferior part, the 
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body is but the Cabinet, the soul is the jewel.’95 John Donne likewise, in his Sermons 
(1631), commented that the soul was placed like ‘the best jewell in the best Cabinet’ – the 
brain being the most elaborate and highest placed organ of the body. In these examples, 
the cabinet-jewel pairing conveys the hierarchy between flesh and spirit, the body 
reduced to a mere, if elaborate, container. Originally a room containing private 
collections, or a room in a museum, the cabinet came to represent an elaborate piece of 
furniture designed for the safekeeping for high value objects.96 In the original Latin 
edition, Willis used thecæ which could refer to a reliquary – a cabinet or chest were 
religious relics might have been stored; this complemented the notion of the brain as the 
seat of the corporeal soul and ‘throne’ of its pure spirit, the rational soul. In the late 
fourth century, for instance, St John Chrysostom (347-407) urged the faithful to kiss a 
theca containing saintly relics.97 Coupled with the Latin capsulæ  (used in the plural) this 
conveyed the sense of the brain as a container for a precious object that also possessed a 
number of discrete compartments or capsules – key features of Willis’s vision of 
cerebral-anatomy. The image also fed into the tradition of the ‘cabinet of curiosity’ - a 
prominent object in the material culture of the university based, humanist natural 
philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.98 In 1665 Robert Hooke, writing 
about nature’s storage of plant seeds, noted ‘in what delicate, strong and most 
convenient Cabinets she lays them.’99 The cabinet, in this sense, also functioned as an 
anatomical metaphor of knowledge. As Henry Oldenburg wrote, ‘by Anatomy we have 
sometimes enter’d into the Chambers and Cabinets of Animal Functions.’ 100  This 
underlined Willis’s claims about the uses of anatomy for revealing the secret hiding 
places of the soul and were especially pertinent to his arguments about the localisation of 
the soul, secreted away in bounded spaces, draws and compartments.  
 
                                                      
95 Thomas Vincent, The wells of salvation opened, or, Words whereby we may be saved (London: printed for Thomas 
Pankhurst, 1668), p. 50. 
96 "cabinet, n." OED Online. (Oxford University Press, December 2015). Web. 26 January 2016. 
97 John Crook, English Medieval Shrines (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), p. 13. 
98 On early modern cabinets, see: Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor, eds., The Origins of Museums: The 
Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth century Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; 2nd edn., 
2001); Ken Arnold, Cabinets for the curious: looking back at early English museums (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); 
Helmar Schramm et al., eds., Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter & Co. KG., 2005). 
99 Robert Hooke, ‘Observation XXIX,’ Micrographia (London: 1665), p. 90. 
100 Henry Oldenberg, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 2 (London, 1667), p. 411. Walter Charleton 
also wrote that he had employed ‘all my collections, Observations, and Speculations Philosophicall, only to 
the furnishing the little Cabinet of my own brain,’ The Immortality of the Human Soul (London, 1657), p. 11. 
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While it is possible that Willis’s contemporary reader could have been able to draw out 
these rich and manifold cultural associations from his use of the cabinet, it is not possible 
to attribute them all at once to the analogy. When situated in the context of this specific 
chapter, dealing with the pathological passions, the cabinet analogy does something quite 
specific. As I have explored in relation to the proetus image, a fluid soul placed within 
the cabinet inverted traditional images of the soul as precious jewel, to a specifically 
physiological end. It jars when we try to imagine a fluid entity being contained in this 
manner, let alone to conceive of it consistently obeying the organisational possibilities of 
the cabinet, within its draws and shelves; as might also be the case in relation to cells, 
chambers and cloisters. Willis had elsewhere described the brain as a ‘castle’ or ‘citadel’, 
complete with ramparts and defensive flood-gates and these were, like the cabinet, also 
images of the brain as a containing place for the soul. However, the focus here was on 
the brain’s external defences; how it protected, rather than organised or arranged the soul 
within it. The cabinet re-draws the reader’s focus onto the (far more vulnerable) internal 
space of the brain. Though the brain could marshal a defence against the “enemy at the 
gate” (keeping out ‘morbifick’ matter in the blood), it faced a different order of threat 
from within its own walls – in the store of volatile spirits stockpiled there. Even when 
the flood defences held, the spirits were liable to being disrupted by any forceful sensory 
impression delivered to them. A cabinet – awkwardly awash with the proteus-soul – 
encapsulates this problem far more vividly: the external defences displayed in the brain-




While Willis’s account of the corporeal soul was primarily built around a set of 
naturalistic explanations (incorporating themes around vital and active matter), the 
metaphors and images he employed in this account also reflected aspects of the specific 
socio-political setting in which he was writing and his own religious commitments. 
Robert Martensen and Michael Hawkins in particular have examined Willis’s work with a 
focus on the context of the civil war (Hawkins) and the religious politics of Restoration 
England and Willis’s Anglicanism (Martensen). I do not look to substantially revisit these 
discussions here, but it is nevertheless important to recognise how the metaphors Willis 
chose to employ also necessarily relate to these broader contexts.  
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It is important not to conflate, in any straightforward way, Willis’s acknowledged 
devoutness and commitment to the established Anglican Church with the motivations 
and outcomes of his natural philosophical arguments. Martensen has, for instance, 
described Willis as having produced an Anglican anatomy, marshalling the evidence of 
his experimental practices to support orthodox liturgical practices within the church.101 
Whilst the ‘light’ of natural reason, expressed through the learning of experimental 
philosophy, was undoubtedly being utilised by philosophers in attacking the mystical 
claims of certain nonconformist groups, in choosing to write about the soul within 
(rather than in contrivance of) a broadly Anglican framework Willis did not necessarily 
construct a natural philosophical argument in order to support the political and social 
cause of the established church. We should be cautious not to reduce Willis’s complex 
ideas and practices (anatomical, chemical, physiological) to derivatives of his religious 
orthodoxy. However, as I’ve mentioned, there were elements of his discourse that 
certainly could have been perceived (by the contemporary reader) as supporting the 
position of Anglican church in relation to contemporary forms of religious non-
conformism in this period.102 Specifically, in forwarding medical explanations for the 
‘natural causes’ of radical evangelism (e.g. melancholy or frenzy) Willis’s account – 
among others – undercut the legitimacy of alternative spiritual claims of illumination.  
 
An important context here was Willis’s direct, first hand experiences of the English Civil 
War. 103 While fighting for the Royalist cause, he would have witnessed the devastating 
impact of – what would have been understood as – symptoms of unrestrained passion 
on the correct model of social order and governance. Willis evoked the spectre of civil 
war and societal conflict when he characterised the relationship between the two souls in 
the body as one of continuous conflict - an ‘intestine strife’ that caused the two souls to 
                                                      
101 Robert Martensen has argued that Willis’s naturalistic explanations of the passions supported the 
established church by providing a context in which unorthodox religious experiences could be explained 
through new physiological learning: “Habit of Reason’: Anatomy and Anglicanism in Restoration England,’ 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, xvi (1992), pp. 511-535. 
102 Following the Act of Uniformity in 1662, which required clergy to follow all rites and ceremonies as set 
out in the Book of Common Prayer, a Nonconformist could be defined as any subject who followed a 
non-Anglician or non-Christian religion. This included Puritans, Evangelists, Calvinists, Baptists, 
Presbyterians, Methodists and Quakers. The restored Anglican Church thus positioned itself as the ‘true 
church’ (the Bride of Christ in England). Archbishop Gilbert Sheldon – Willis’s patron – himself 
‘endorsed’ legal action against Nonconformists during the mid-1670s. On this see: Elizabeth Clarke, Politics, 
Religion and the Song of Songs in Seventeenth century England, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 182. 
103 Hawkins has examined the influence of the civil war on Willis’s theory of the passions: Hawkins, 
Empire, p. 17. On the civil war in Oxford, see: Ian Roy and Deitrich Reinhart, ‘Oxford and the civil wars’, 
in The History of the University of Oxford, ed. by N. Tyacke, iv (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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move against each other ‘more than Civil Wars’ (SB, p.38). Willis also depicted the 
corporeal soul as the metaphorical subject living under the rule of the rational soul, with 
the former ‘growing weary of the yolk of the Other’ and often looking to ‘free it self 
from its Bonds, affecting a Licence or Dominion’ (SB, p.43). The corporeal soul, 
possessing natural appetites and instincts that made it disposed to the attractions of the 
flesh, could not always be ‘restrained’ by reason and could defy the its rightful 
governance. 
 
The socio-political imagery used here picks up on the much older metaphors of 
‘government’ and ‘oeconomy’ used in representing the soul’s relationship to the body-
system in this period. Plato used ‘government’ as a metaphor to think on the nature of 
the soul in his Republic, which he imagined as a city-state governed by the ‘philosopher 
king’ (the rational part of the soul).104 In this model, the king ruled over four lesser forms 
of government within the Republic, which broadly corresponded to human 
temperaments. Willis, as I explored in chapter four, had also represented the lower 
faculties of the sensitive soul (particularly the spirits of the cerebellum) as forming a 
regional arm of government or city province, operating under the sovereign rule of the 
rational soul (AB, p. 410). The ‘animal oeconomy’ was another important metaphor, 
frequently employed by Willis, which referred to the order and governance imposed by 
the faculties of the soul upon the workings of the body-system. As Willis notes in the 
preface to Soul of Brutes, the corporeal soul ‘serves for the Vital oeconomy or 
government’ (SB, ‘Preface,’ ii). Originally an Aristotelian metaphor, oeconomy was derived 
from the Greek word oikos meaning ‘house’ or ‘household’ to denote the proper 
guidance – or rules applying to the running of – a household or estate.105 In the table of 
Greek and Latin terms provided for the reader in Samuel Pordage’s 1681 edition of 
Willis’s Practice of Physick, ‘Oeconomie’ is listed as referring to ‘a certain order of doing 
anything, an household rule, regiment or governance.’106 We could also think back here 
to Willis’s metaphor of an ‘emporium’ or ‘mart’ inside the brain where animal spirits 
publically met in order to conduct their business: these metaphors represented systems 
for ordering and arranging the activities of its agents - be they citizens, members of a 
household, divisions of government – or animal spirits. A passion state was, in contrast, 
                                                      
104 Plato, The Republic, introduction by Melissa Lane and translation by Desmond Lee (London: Penguin 
Classics, 2007). 
105 Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary with a New English Translation, ed. Sarah B. 
Pomeroy (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
106 Samuel Pordage, The Practice of Physick (London, 1681), p. 511. 
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a disruption to the proper application and order of this government or oeconomy, as it 
was overseen by the soul within the body.  
 
These themes – of (reasoned) governance and order – were structuring concepts in 
models of the soul. Set against the political and societal turmoil of the time, such 
expressions gestured to an overlapping discourse which positioned health – both of the 
medically and social conceived body – as resting on the maintenance of a natural state of 
order and hierarchy between parts, organised around a model of sovereign rule. They are 
particularly pertinent to Willis’s discussions of the animal spirit’s capacity towards 
extreme volatility, characterised in places as a personified form of political disobedience, 
in their propensity to grow ‘deaf’ to and disregard the rule of their sovereign rational 
soul. Willis made vivid reference to humans being ‘drawn several ways, by a double army’ 
within themselves by the on going struggle between appetites of the flesh and the 
dictates of reason (SB, p.43). The passions afflicting the soul were at once medically and 
politically conceived phenomena, entangled by a shared language and core metaphors.  
 
The imagery of social division and conflict within the animal oeconomy – between the 
instruments of government (the ‘army’ of animal spirits) and the government itself (the 
soul’s rational faculties) – would have certainly echoed with themes of societal schism 
generated by disputes over the position of religious nonconformists in relation to the 
Anglican Church during the Interregnum and beyond the Restoration itself. Where 
models of household economy and political government had provided a metaphorical 
basis for thinking about the operations of the soul within the body, the body could now 
similarly offer up a model (of pathology) that would prove useful for those seeking to 
articulate, and ultimately dismiss, religious dissent against the established church and 
state. 
 
Indeed, experimental philosophers were able to offer naturalistic, medicalised 
explanations for the dangerous religious passions that had incited such divisions, which 
could in turn be read as a rebuttal of the spiritual claims of nonconformist groups. Méric 
Casaubon, for example, was a French-English humanist scholar who resided in Oxford 
during the civil war. A figure sympathetic to the Royalist and Anglican causes, he caused 
some controversy in 1656 when he published his Treatise Concerning Enthusiam, in which 
he critiqued the displays of enthusiasm and claims of mystical illumination propagated by 
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radical nonconformist (a threat, as he saw it, to the classical text based learning of the 
humanist tradition).107 Employing medically orientated interpretations, he cast the zeal of 
their orators as symptomatic of individuals moved to frenzy, who thereby opened 
themselves up to devilish possession. In a language similar to that which Willis’s would 
use in his discussion of fermenting animal spirits, Casaubon noted that enthusiasm was a 
‘naturall fervency, or pregnancy of the soul, spirits of brain, producing strange effects, 
apt to be mistaken for supernaturall.’108  These orators were, moreover, likely to move 
their audiences to frenzy, leading to societal conflict.109 As he wrote: ‘To commend 
[ecstatic rhetoric] to ordinary people…is to perswade them to madnesse; and to expose 
them to the illusions of the Devil.’110  
 
Willis, himself a staunch Anglican and Royalist, later described the conditions that drove 
men from a proper allegiance to church and state as the product of delirium and 
madness.111 His arguments around the capacity of a passion state to potentially corrupt or 
invert the mind’s powers of perception, judgement and reason certainly offered a 
naturalistic framework wherein certain claims of religious experience and personal 
revelation could be cast as the effects of pathological conditions; as the ravings of the 
person suffering under a delusion.112 If the rational soul were subject to an excessively 
powerful (metaphysical) passion, such as the love of god, it might temporarily abandon 
its oversight of the corporeal soul or even induce a passion in the animal spirits. All 
restraint would then be removed from the corporeal soul as the seat of our sensory 
perception and judgement. As Richard Allestree similarly claimed in his Forty Sermons 
(1684), when a passion ‘lays restraint upon the superiour part of the Mind, [it] keeps the 
understanding in fetters [...] [and] takes off all ties from the inferiour. Gives not only 
                                                      
107 On Casaubon’s proposal that experimental philosophers should ‘purge’ society of ‘demonic tropes’ see: 
Ryan Stark, Rhetoric, Science and Magic in Seventeenth century England (The Catholic University of America Press, 
2009), p. 148. 
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licence, but incitation to the other Passions to take their freest range, to act with the 
utmost impetuosity.’113 With the potential for the ‘knowing power’ of the corporeal soul 
and the intellect to be mutually involved in the formers disturbance, those suffering a 
passion could be working upon false or corrupted ideas and, crucially, be unaware of it. 
As Joseph Glanvill remarked, ‘We scarse see any thing now, but through our 
Passions.”114 These people were wrong, but also very sick; mislead by their own minds.  
 
This stance was reflective of Willis’s broader rejection of any clear distinction between 
the physician’s role in care of body and soul: a frenzy aroused within the sensitive 
faculties of the mind stood to impart harm onto its incorporeal counterpart, the rational 
soul. Willis thus stated in 1668, that ‘the health of the Soul should take its beginning 
from the restored health of the Body’ (PB, Epistle). As he had argued, the corporeal soul 
was disposed to embroil the rational in its own ‘sicknesses’, as disturbed spirits in the 
brain could ‘induce alterations’ in both the body and the Rational soul (SB, p.45). 
Consequently, the need to maintain proper order and governance within the animal 
oeconomy stood both as an issue of medical and spiritual concern: were the physician to 
treat the fervent spirits of an epileptic, he also stood to potentially save the patients 
spiritual soul by keeping them open to right reason and true religion. The physician 
claims a role here in maintaining the interconnected spiritual and physical health of the 
patient, through manipulating the underlying causes of pathology in the body. It was, he 
argued, ‘no new thing that there should be an Entrance into the Church thorow the 
Spittle’ (PB, Epistle).  
 
This would have consequences for how patients conducted themselves as members of 
the religious-political community: as Willis observed, the sick ‘saying good-bye to their 
errors and disease at the same time, become not only healthy and wise men but more 
virtuous’ (PB, Epistle). Though he did not explicitly employ the body-politic metaphor, 
Willis gestured to a relationship between the unrestrained passions acting upon the mind 
and corresponding socio-religious schisms. 115 As he observed, the delusions of the mad 
and the melancholic were a sickness of the brain that at the same time drove the sufferer 
away from a spiritual life and from the spiritual community at large: 
                                                      
113 Richard Allestree, Forty sermons (Oxford: 1684), vol. I, p. 346.  
114 Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing: or Confidence in Opinions (London, 1661), p. 119. 




And truly, as the Stupid Deliriums of Melanchollicks, the Caninish madness, 
and others sprung from an infirm Brain, have driven some, both from the 
Communion of Saints, and from the Society of men (PB, Epistle). 
 
In 1668, he described the disease of the ‘Epilepticks’ as comparable to the symptoms of 
insane or delirious evangelists described in the gospels: ‘These I say, and many other Sick 
men whom I here every where describe, seem not much to differ from those whom we 
read of in the Evangelists’ (PB, Epistle). With humans so vulnerable to the effects of 
unrestrained passions, the physician’s role was of the upmost significance – to the patient 
and the religious community at large. Where, in his earlier discussions, the body had 
offered Willis with an analogue for the chemist’s laboratory, home to fermenting spirits 
acting upon the mind, when coupled with the metaphors of animal government and 
oeconomy these fermenting spirits could also be cast as political and even radical agents 
– as bodies conducting civil war or overrunning sovereign rule. The body is a 
microcosm, here, for the religious ferments driving divisions in society at large.  
 
The entanglement of natural philosophy with the religious politics of the day was widely 
expressed among Willis’s contemporaries: the physiologist Walter Charleton noted that 
the passions were the source of all ‘false opinions’ in their age while the theologian and 
Oxford Royalist, Henry Hammond cast the errors of judgement belonging to the 
phantasy as the ‘dangerous mother of heresies’ within the Christian community.116 While 
Willis’s account, like Causubon’s, offered an implicit support for the authority of the 
Anglican Church - in undermining the claims of personal revelation forwarded by some 
religious enthusiasts - this doesn’t demonstrate that Willis came to those conclusions in 
order to specifically promote his religious commitments. 117  It was not uncommon for 
experimental philosophers of this period to conceive of - and address - phenomena such 
as religious enthusiasm through the lens of naturalistic, physiological explanatory 
categories. Moreover, the medical explanations he provided were derived from and 
                                                      
116 Walter Charleton, ‘Epistle Prefatory’, Natural History of the Passions (London: Printed by T.N. for James 
Magnes, 1674). Henry Hammond, Sermons Preached, April, 1663 (London: printed for Robert Pawlet, 1675), 
p. 157. On Hammond’s theological views see: Caron, Philosophical Reception (2011), p. 81; Hawkins, Empire, 
p. 151. 
117 Robert Martensen, “Habit of Reason’: Anatomy and Anglicanism in Restoration England,’ (1992), pp. 
511-535. Willis did not directly cite a body-politic metaphor, as Hawkins has noted (p. 16), although 
Martensen proposes its significance in Willis’s works is implied. Certainly, there is some analogy drawn 
between treating the individual and helping to heal the spiritual community. 
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consistent with the broader conceptual architecture of his natural philosophical model of 
the soul and his practices investigating the body: a model of the soul and body, which, as 
this thesis has been examining, drew on a variety of eclectic influences and practices 
from across his career.  
 
Though medical and political discussions (around the passions) were clearly very much 
entangled during the period, Willis was writing first and foremost on a matter of natural 
philosophy. That he did not directly engage in the polemics of the church and its 
perceived detractors does not mean, however, that readers of his natural philosophy 
would not have been entirely able to relate his imagery (of the soul engaged in civil war 
and strife) to the political and religious tensions of the day. These associations were 
supported by a long-standing set of metaphors which took the body and society as 
templates for thinking about the other. This reminds us of metaphors chief power – 
being to actively move between and possibly invert recognised boundaries between kinds 
of discourse, be it medical, political, social or religious. 
 
For supporters of the established church and state, it was possible to conceive of 
metaphors as tools that could be used to invert the ‘true’ sense and meaning of things by 
nonconformists.118 Tensions between rival religious groups were often expressed through 
the contested use and interpretation of scriptural metaphors (e.g. The Song of Songs and 
the trope of mystical marriage became especially controversial in the 1630s). 119 
Metaphors had, after all, been subject to a long history of suspicion as the chief vehicle 
by which the rhetorician persuaded an audience through an appeal to (or incitement of) 
the passions. Hobbes’s, for example, made an explicit attack on ‘monstrous’ metaphors, 
which he positioned as the mother of ‘seditious philosophies’ - even as metaphor sat at 
the centre of Leviathan. 120 The notion that the mystical and ecstatic rhetoric of 
nonconformists, which invited potential possession and madness in those whom it 
struck, could overpower the rational faculties, feeds back, then, into wider discussions 
(chiefly among those philosophers who supported the established church and monarchy) 
                                                      
118 To quote Robert Stillman, ‘the attack on metaphor forms part of the vocabulary of linguistic crisis that 
has its political origins…in the specific requirements of the Jacobean discourse of power’: Robert E. 
Stillman, The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth century England: Bacon, Hobbes, and Wilkins, 
(London: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1995), p. 125. 
119 Elizabeth Clarke, drawing on the arguments of R. F. Jones, notes that metaphor was central in the 
attacks on nonconformity in this period: Politics, Religion and the Song of Songs (2011), p. 181, 178. 
120 Stillman notes that metaphors were ‘recurrent and indispensible to Leviathan’s conceptual design’: The 
New Philosophy (1995), p. 118. 
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of the need for a ‘plain style’ to act as the instrument of reasoned discourse.121 Willis’s 
use of metaphor was not in itself problematic or ‘unscientific’ in this setting, any more 
than Hobbes’ use of it in Leviathan was: in the hands of certain groups, metaphor could 
be cast as a tool of sedition and inversion, while in the hand of the experimental 
philosopher it was a tool of discovery and invention. As Robert Stillman argues, 
Metaphors were both a threat and opportunity for Renaissance writers.122   
 
Willis nevertheless clearly looked to accommodate his Christian faith within his 
physiological explanations. This was no easy task; in his endeavour to advance a greater 
set of physiological powers for the corporeal part of the soul, he ventured down what he 
described as a ‘path beset by thorns.’ His arguments posed the question of what (if any) 
role remained for the immortal or rational soul. The chemico-corpuscular arguments put 
forward by Willis were not necessarily atheistic but could nonetheless be perceived as 
paving the way for a heretical monism which rejected any ontological distinction between 
body or soul – accepting only a material soul or animating principle.123 However, there is 
no reason to suggest that Willis saw his pursuit of physiological explanations of the soul 
and his Christian faith as incompatible. Indeed, Willis viewed his theories as entirely 
orthodox and ‘agreeable to a good Life, and Pious Institution’ (SB, p.1).124 As we can see 
in his description of epileptics, despite following a predominantly chemico-humoral 
explanation of the affliction, Willis did not exclude the role of faith and prayer in its 
treatment and saw the renewal of ‘true religion’ as part of the wider work of the 
physician treating such conditions.125  
 
                                                      
121 Stark, p. 57. 
122 Stillman, p. 125. 
123 This refers to the form of monism growing out of the medical tradition, and not the mechanical 
philosophies, as promoted by Francis Glisson and William Harvey. This branch saw matter as having 
active powers, which could amount – if taken to its full conclusion – to all vital powers being the result of 
a purely material soul. On this, John Henry also notes that Willis’s Soul of Brutes would have been 
particularly attractive to mechanical and materialist monist positions: ‘The Matter of Souls,’ p. 90-1, 94. 
See, also: Thomson, Bodies of Thought, p. 83.  
124 As Martensen has argued, Willis’s naturalistic explanations helped to buttress his Christian stance on the 
rational soul by incorporating new physiological learning whilst retaining a space for the superior work of 
the divine. Jody McNabb’s 2014 article goes further, arguing that Soul of Brutes reflected a puzzling ‘return 
to orthodoxy’ in its continued support of the rational soul and that ‘Willis abandoned the empirical basis of 
observation for the authority of the Church,’ p. 136. This significantly neglects the ways in which 
anatomical knowledge was given meaning by notions of the soul in this period.  
125 Willis employed new iatrochemical remedies alongside traditional Galenic therapeutics, including the 
use of bloodletting. For an example of Willis’s recommendation of chemical remedies, see: Soul of Brutes, p. 
131. Hawkins discusses this in some depth, Empire, p. 55. Sigal noted that Willis was ‘not above turning to 
Galenic argument, when it served his purposes,’ (1978), p. 577. 
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Far from looking to dispense with the immortal soul, Willis used his anatomical and 
physiological work to buttress its superior work. 126  By having pushed at the limits of the 
sensitive soul’s (physical) capabilities, Willis believed that he had outlined a much 
reduced, but clearly demarcated role. 127 Restricted to purely intellective and immaterial 
powers, the rational soul was placed at a remove from the fault and corruption which 
material bodies where inherently subject to. This was not intended to undermine the 
existence of a rational soul, but rather to exclude it from matters of the flesh.128 As Willis 
stated in the ‘Preface’, the two souls needed to be differentiated and not just viewed as 
two points on a scale of perfection so as to preserve the ‘Dignity, Order and Immortality’ 
of the Rational soul (SB, p.1). He had intended to show ‘the utmost thing that living 
Brutes can know or do,’ by its corporeal or sensitive powers, in order to reveal the work 
of the rational soul (SB, p.34). The rational soul therefore existed in the negative spaces 
created by the physiological powers of the sensitive soul – as the corporeal soul was itself 
illuminated by the empty spaces of the body, as its ‘shadowy hag’. 129 Again, light features 
as a recurring metaphor for knowledge here, even if the shadow is only an indirect 
product of illuminating an object.  
 
Like the dualists More and Cudworth, Willis tested the limits of what could be explained 
physically (and mechanically) in order to demonstrate – by its very limitations - the 
necessary existence of an immortal soul, though he came to very different conclusions. 130 
It is this aspect of Willis’s thinking that has been seen as his most conflicted or confused 
because he sought, on the one hand, to rely on physiological explanations of the sensitive 
soul while at the same time trying to maintain a role for an immaterial, rational part. 
Jaime Kassler has therefore referred to Willis’s philosophy of the soul as ‘janus faced,’ in 
                                                      
126 As Hawkins notes, while aspects of mechanical philosophy were being utilised within seventeenth 
century physiological theory, this did not necessarily exclude the role of an immaterial soul, though this 
certainly ‘relocated’ and ‘restricted’ its actions to a realm beyond the body, Empire, p. 15. 
127 Lester S. King notes that Willis ‘had to whittle away at the functions of the rational soul, whose 
properties he relegated more and more to the animal soul,’ The Philosophy of Medicine. The Early Eighteenth 
Century (Cambridge, Maa., 1978), p. 142. Martensen, p. 98. 
128 Willis’s work was welcomed at least by the Greenwich vicar, John Turner in his Physico-Theological 
Discourse, where he quoted at length from the ‘excellent and judicious’ Soul of Brutes and repeated Willis’s 
claim that man’s superiority was only accounted for by an immaterial soul, (London: 1698), p. 58. 
129 As John Henry has remarked, the rational role is inferred from the outlines of the primary account (of 
the corporeal soul), p. 98. 
130 The Cambridge Platonists, such as Henry More, adopted a radical dualism between soul and body while 
employing mechanistic explanations of body functions in order to show – by the very limitations of 
mechanical explanation – the necessity of an entirely immaterial soul. For More, atoms needed a 
continuous and providential guidance from the divine, The Immortality of the Soul (London: 1659), p. 130. On 
this see: B. J. T. Dobbs, ‘Stoic and Epicurean Doctrines in Newton’s System of the World,’ in Atoms, 
Pneuma and Tranquility, ed. by Osler (1991), pp. 222-238 (p. 223). 
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that it adopted mechanistic aspects while trying to accommodate his Christian faith.131 
The important point here is that, for Willis, these were not incompatible goals.132  
 
Interestingly, Willis used a comparison with new computational inventions from the field 
of mathematics and astronomy to evidence the necessary and perfect powers of the 
rational soul. Because the mind can propose and solve abstract algebraic ‘riddles’ - which 
deal with hidden values and universals, rather than sensory knowledge – Willis held that 
the soul’s powers were themselves purely immaterial, abstract and intellectual: 
 
What shall I say concerning the Proportions of a Circle […] being most exactly 
computed? What besides, that the Humane Intellect having learnt the Precepts of 
Geometrie and Astronomie, takes the spaces of inaccessible places, and their heights 
[…] yea the dimensions of the whole Earthly Globe […] there will be no place for 
doubting, but that the humane soul […] must needs be far above the Brutal, 
Immaterial and Immortal’ (SB, p.40). 
 
The rational soul can, in the manner displayed in the art of geometry, ‘compute’ 
dimensions that exceed sensory perception. Computed comes from the Latin ‘com’ 
(together) and ‘putare’ (to settle an account). Computare, and compute were first used in 
1613 to describe a person who performed calculations; this was therefore a relatively new 
term, which Willis is using to support his claims about the relative powers of the two 
souls.133 Willis makes reference here to the ‘truly amazing’ and ‘certain demonstrations of 
mathematicks,’ taking these practices as an analogue for the more perfect reasoning 
powers of the mind: the discipline is noted as being ‘a-Kin or greatly alluding to the 
Humane mind’ (SB, p.40). These abilities point to the possession of the rational soul as 
the defining feature of what it is to be human. Interestingly, what are often cited as the 
new intellectual tools of modern ‘science’ (geometry, astronomy) are used here to 
reinforce a Christian notion of the immortal soul, challenging any clear distinction in this 
period between the intellectual tools of ‘philosophy’ or ‘science.’  
 
                                                      
131 Kassler, p. 147.  
132 Stanley Finger notes that Willis ‘had no intention of offending the ecclesiastics,’ Minds Behind the Brain: 
A History of the Pioneers and their Discoveries (Oxford: Oxford University Publishing, 2000), p. 90. 
133 In 1623 the first mechanical calculating machine was invented by the German professor of astronomy, 
Wilhelm Schickard. In 1642, Blaise Pascal invented a machine called the Pascaline that could add and 
subtract and carry between digits. See, April J. Wells, Chapter one ‘History’, Grid Database Design (London: 




As this chapter has demonstrated, Willis’s conception of the corporeal soul was far from 
materially reductive or simply mechanistic. Instead, it reflected important vitalistic and 
alchemical influences, vividly expressed in his language around the active and vital 
powers of the spirits. The historical impact of The Soul of Brutes has, somewhat unfairly, 
been assessed by a number of scholars as laying a foundation for the reduction of the 
mind to the physical functions of the brain; but this is more accurately the outcome of 
our own preoccupation with Willis’s anatomical explanations and dismissal of his vitalist 
views around material spirits.134 Others have suggested that Willis’s attempts to appease 
the church amounted to little more than kotowing to convention in order to protect him 
from accusations of atheism.135 However, to point to political expediency as a reason for 
Willis’s position on the soul is to incorrectly suggest that his religious views were 
somehow inconsequential to his intellectual practices: that religion was outside of his 
‘science’. These views neglect the ways in which Willis used his anatomical and 
physiological arguments – through a dynamic set of metaphors and analogies - to 
support his notion of a dual corporeal and incorporeal soul. Just as the body created a 
‘shadow’ outline of the corporeal soul, this in turn created a negative space for the 
rational soul.  
 
Where images of devices such as the alembic or the clock had helped Willis, in his earlier 
works, to express a normative model of regular processes and routine functions, these 
images did little to extend his discourse on pathology and disease (where outcomes were 
decidedly un-predictable and irregular). Instead, new chemico-corpusuclar analogies were 
being utilised around distillation, light rays and wave-patterns or propagation. These 
metaphors and analogies – tied as they were to a wealth of new inventions in this period 
- provided new ways of articulating complex physiological phenomena. Moreover, in 
                                                      
134 Zimmer argued that the soul’s ‘mental’ faculties were made a ‘prisoner of its fleshy structures and 
weaknesses’ by Willis, Soul Made Flesh, p. 229.  Marc Jeannerod also argues that Willis’s insistence that the 
soul could be physically divided and extended to all parts of the body helped to fatally undermine the 
concept of a singularly indivisible soul and that this was a necessary pre-condition for dispensing with a 
concept of ‘soul’ (in the immortal sense) altogether: Le Cerveau-machine, p. 19; quoted by Thomson, Bodies, 
p. 85. These readings can be set against what Simon Schaffer has described as a tendency to view 
mechanical explanations as ‘indicative of ‘progressive,’ ‘Godly Men’, p. 55. 
135  Thomson, p. 83. Hansruedi Isler, Thomas Willis, 1621–75, Doctor and Scientist, (London: Hafner 
Publications Company, 1968), pp. 172-3. Paul F. Cranefield suggested that Willis was at pains to stress his 
religious affiliations so as to legitimise his otherwise naturalistic pursuits: ‘A Seventeenth century View of 
Mental Deficiency and Schizophrenia: Thomas Willis on “Stupidity or Foolishness”, Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, xxxv (1961), pp. 291-315 (p. 306). This is an argument John Henry rejects in Matter of Souls, p. 98. 
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attempting to demonstrate how the corporeal soul could itself form a material basis for 
all the aspects of our vital and sensitive life, Willis looked beyond these images. 
Anthropomorphising and personifying the spirits, or looking to bodily gesture and 
linguistics, he expressed the animal spirits capacity to ‘vary the tune’ of the musical 
organ; to make decisions and communicate with the higher soul. In exploring these ideas, 
this chapter has further underlined that, despite his use of apparently proto-scientific 
intellectual tools (observation, experiment) and his import from the new learning 
(geometry, optics, pneumatics), Willis’s ideas could not be divorced from the wider 
socio-political and religious contexts in which he lived and worked. The body was more 
than an anatomical structure to Willis; it was a vessel designed for, enlivened and given 
meaning by the actions of the vital and sensitive souls. 
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Conclusion 
Willis, Literature and Science 
 
Outlining Willis’s contributions to the concept of nerve transmission in 2003, Wes 
Wallace drew attention – like many before him - to Willis’s ‘fanciful’ language, noting 
that his scientific insights had displayed a ‘quasi-poetic intuition.’1 Willis’s apparently 
‘literary’ inclinations continue to mark him out as an equivocal figure in the history of 
modern science and medicine.2 Though a number of notable historians have sought to 
address this situation by examining Willis’s ideas within their cultural and social contexts, 
notably Robert Frank, Robert L. Martensen and Michael Hawkins, this thesis offers the 
first extended study of the metaphors and analogies Willis used to describe, investigate, 
and comprehend the brain. This thesis has explored the relationship between language 
and scientific practices in the work of Willis, with the aim of enriching and deepening 
our historical understanding of Willis’s extraordinary career and legacy, while also 
contributing to broader discussions about language and science.  
 
I have argued that the apparently ‘literary’ devices of metaphor and analogy are, in fact, 
an integral component in the production of scientific knowledge, rather than accessories 
or embellishments to it. Drawing on this position, this thesis has addressed the tendency 
within scholarship on Willis to ‘cherry pick’ his clinical and anatomical discoveries while 
being dismissive of his theoretical writing on the physiological functions of the brain and 
nerves as confused or fanciful. As Julian Jaynes once notably described, Willis’s works 
are marked by an ‘astonishing combination of worth and worthlessness.’ 3  These 
approaches have attempted to separate out what Willis did in his physical examination of 
the brain and nerves from the intellectual explanations offered in his writing. A historical 
reputation for a florid and embellished style of writing is clearly not the only reason for 
selective readings of Willis. These can also be explained by the present-day fascination 
                                                      
1 Wes Wallace, ‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse in Newton, Willis and Gassendi: First Steps in a Mechanical 
Theory of Communication,’ Brain and Cognition, 51 (2003), pp. 66-94 (p. 75, n. 20). 
2 On the social and cultural turn in medical history, see: Frank Huisman and John Harley Warner (eds.), 
Locating Medical History: The Stories and Their Meanings (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), esp. 
p. 95. On Willis’s equivocal position, see: William Bynum, who argues that Willis’s historical reputation has 
proved less secure than his contemporary one, ‘The Anatomical Method, Natural Theology, and the 
Functions of the Brain,’ Isis, 64.4 (Dec., 1973), pp. 444-468 (p. 450). 
3 Julian Jaynes, ‘The Problem of Animate Motion in the Seventeenth Century,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 
31.2 (Apr., 1970), p. 230. 
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with the neurological brain, and the preoccupations of medical professionals with an 
explicitly medical interest in Willis, who have been the authors of key works on his 
contribution. 
 
These readings of Willis also intersect with – and reproduce – a set of deeply entrenched 
historical attitudes to the role of literary strategies (and especially the use of metaphors) 
within science. As Chapter One demonstrated, a sense of hostility towards and rejection 
of metaphor (and to a lesser extent analogies) emerged out of a specific set of debates 
within seventeenth century natural philosophy and was then embraced as part of the 
character of modern science. While these devices (metaphors and analogies) are generally 
considered to be useful tools in modern science, especially in relation to communication 
with various wider publics, metaphors and analogies are still viewed as devices that are to 
be managed with caution to ensure they inform, rather than mislead.4  
 
One 2016 article attacks the use of anthropomorphic metaphors in virology, arguing that 
the metaphor leads to claims that viruses are ‘alive’ and that ‘goals’ and intentions can be 
attributed to them to explain infection processes (viruses have ‘wars’ and adopt 
‘strategies’).5 We could think here about Willis’s use of anthropomorphic metaphors to 
attribute agency to the animal spirits in his pathological discussions. The effectiveness of 
anthropomorphic metaphors, and the unease they generate, are nothing new. The author, 
M. van Regenmortel, cites the warning that while metaphor might be ‘effective in 
enlivening a lecture or an article,’ we must remain alert to the fact it is ‘only a metaphor.’ 6 
Again, metaphor and analogy are accepted here as valuable ‘tools’, but also as something 
to be approached with caution.  
 
The question is, what kind of tools are they? Science has long suggested that metaphor 
should be employed ‘neutrally’, primarily for communicating with an external, non-
specialist public. They are distanced from the work of science itself. 
The boundary between pre-modern and modern science is often drawn with reference to 
attitudes towards the appropriate use of figurative language in science (as opposed to its 
                                                      
4 Phillip Ball, 'A Metaphor too Far,' Nature (23 February, 2011). 
5 M. H. V. van Regenmortel, ‘The Metaphor that viruses are living is alive and well, but it is no more than a 
metaphor,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 59 (2016), pp. 117-124 (pp. 117-
118). 
6 Ibid, p. 118. 
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use in literature or politics).7 In Chapter One, I explored this in relation to the work of 
Gentner and Jezoirski, who attempt to formulate parameters for the ‘scientific’ use of 
metaphor and analogy. As the thesis has shown, Willis repeatedly falls foul of such 
modern distinctions and stipulations about what is a ‘proper’ use of language in science. 
His own remarks in Cerebri anatome - that it was from ‘analogy and frequent ratiocination’ 
that a ‘true and genuine use of it occurred’ - are often cited in support of these readings 
(AB, p.91). As the physicians Meyer and Heirons concluded, this was not the language of 
somebody truly interested in anatomy, but spoke to his ultimate motives in using the 
body to discourse on the mind and soul.8 In Chapter Two, I explored how some current 
scholars have proposed that Willis employed analogy in the ‘wrong’ way; that is, like the 
alchemists rather than in the manner adopted by his experimental colleagues. He was 
‘owned’ by his analogies, rather than controlling them, and thus belonged to an older 
style of analogical reasoning.9  
 
Although Willis is celebrated for his notable discoveries relating to clinical observation 
and structures within the brain, his historical position is nevertheless tarnished by what 
such authors claim to be his love of ‘words as words.’10 Falling back on present-centred 
concepts of usefulness and relevance, the medical or scientific ‘content’ of Willis’s works 
is seen as somehow extractable from the historical jargon of his writing. There have been 
many reasons cited to explain Willis’s ‘fanciful’ writing style and, notably, our discomfort 
with it: his vanity and a love of fame; an effort to conceal inadequate empirical 
foundations; the confusion wrought from haphazardly importing terminology from one 
discipline to another.11 The last proposal – that of an inexpert use of foreign terminology 
(applied from chemistry to human physiology) is a particularly illuminating one. As seen 
in Chapter Two, the import of chemical terms into new and alien contexts (physiology or 
anatomy) was not a case of Willis ‘dressing up’ in the clothes of his peers (as Wallace 
implied), but a vital means by which new meanings and new ideas could be generated. 
The metaphor of the brain as an ‘alembic,’ through its association with alchemical ideas 
and practices, helped to import (what was, for Willis) a familiar explanatory framework 
                                                      
7 Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski, ‘The shift from metaphor to analogy in western science’, in 
Metaphor and Thought, ed. by A. Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 447-480. 
8 Alfred Meyer and Raymond Heirons, ‘On Thomas Willis’s concepts of neurophysiology: Part I & II,’ 
Medical history, ix (1965), II, p. 150. 
9 Gentner and Jeziorski,  ‘The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy’, p. 448. 
10 Michael Foster, Lectures on the History of Physiology During the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), p. 270. 
11 Ibid, p. 270; Meyer and Heirons, ‘On Thomas Willis’s concepts of neurophysiology,’ p. 145; Wes Wallace, 
‘The Vibrating Nerve Impulse,’ p. 75. 
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of chemical distillation: this enabled him to express his idea that the animal spirits were 
‘procreated’ by the brain, in a transformative rather than purely mechanical sense. These 
arguments are an important means of countering claims that Willis reduced brain 
function to anatomical structures. Moreover, this example also speaks to the impact of 
the material environment and practice in the availability of certain metaphors: Willis 
looked to the alembic; today, we might look instead to a circuit board or computer to 
express ideas about brain function. These are incompatible, historically contingent 
notions of the brain.12  
 
Chapter five, in particular, challenges readings which have cast Willis’s neurophysiology 
as ‘equivocal’ or ‘confused’ on account of his use of an alternating series of metaphors 
and analogies. What it demonstrates is that these figures were not intended to be read as 
a single, coherent picture of the brain; rather, they were used selectively in order to focus 
on specific aspects of a complex model. In setting out his theory of neurotransmission, 
Willis described blasts of wind and ‘strait rays or strokes’ of light moving through the 
nerves; shortly afterwards, he spoke about the images carried by these rays in terms of a 
fluid, moved ‘as it were by a certain waving’ (SB, p.58, p.76). What united these images 
was Willis’s corpuscular concept of wave mechanism, which provided an atomistic 
definition of action in both fluid and air. These examples were not the product of 
confusion or equivocation, but reflective of Willis’s recourse to a specific, early modern 
theory of matter.  
 
Another theme, which arises in conjunction with the overtly medical emphasis in placed 
on Willis’s works, has been to explain away his ‘embellished’ and ‘fanciful’ writing as a 
result of it having been translated by the poet, Samuel Pordage. Undoubtedly, 
translations produce errors and can reproduce the ideas and assumptions of the 
translator. However, what is of interest here is the particular concern caused by the 
poetic (rather than medical) background of this particular translator. This points to a 
special concern over the accuracy of technical, medical terms, which are most often the 
cause of complaint here.13 Importantly, these views overlook a vital difference between 
                                                      
12 For a recent discussion of the conceptual basis of the circuit metaphor in neuroscience see: George 
Lakoff, ‘Mapping the Brain’s Metaphor circuitry: metaphorical thought in everyday reason,’ Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 16 December, (2014) https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00958. 
13 Charles Symonds described Pordage’s translations as ‘ponderous and ambiguous,’ also claiming this 
obscured the ‘true’ worth of Willis: ‘Thomas Willis, F.R.S.’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 15 
(Jul., 1960), pp. 91-97 (p. 97). 
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early modern anatomy and our own understanding of the discipline: that the boundaries 
between what constituted natural philosophical enquiry and poetry were less well defined 
and distinctly more fluid. As Jonathan Sawday has convincingly shown, poetry and 
anatomy engaged in overlapping discourses of the body in this period.14 Many of the 
tropes and metaphors used by Willis would have been recognisable to Pordage, who 
himself expressed a keen interest in anatomical learning within his own poetry. Here, 
once again, historical context can be used to challenge traditional assessments of Willis 
contributions and the ‘literary’ problems they appear to suffer from. 
 
Willis and neuroscience: disciplines and their histories 
 
In 1799, Hutchinson’s Biographia Medica observed that ‘perhaps no writings which […] 
prove such uncommon talents to have been in the writer, were ever so soon laid aside 
and neglected as the works of Willis.’15 Far from it, Willis has been the subject of a 
significant reappraisal by historians, which took off around the same time that scholars 
coalesced around ideas of neuroscience as a scholarly community founded in the early 
1960s: these stories are intertwined. 16  Notably, in the 1990s, the neuroscientific 
community formalised its desire to marshal a specific historical narrative: Gordon 
Shepherd recalls how, in the face of pressures to engage the public with its research, he 
recognised the discipline’s need to ‘take responsibility’ for its history and worked to 
establish the Committee on the History of Neuroscience, which met from 1992 onwards.17 
In seeking to forge a collective identity from among many disparate fields, modern 
scholars connected with neuroscience have sought to present a deep, shared history for 
the brain sciences - grouped around a nucleus of neurology.  
 
By projecting a set of present-centred concerns back onto historical practices around the 
brain – including those of Willis - modern neuroscience has looked to reproduce 
historical ways of investigating and thinking about the brain in its own image. As Stephen 
Casper, among others, has noted, the reproduction of the long history of neuroscience 
                                                      
14 Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned (1995). 
15 B. Hutchinson, Biographia Medica (London, 1799), vol.11, p. 68. 
16 On the emergence of the term ‘neuroscience’ in the 1960s see: Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached, 
Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2013), pp. 26-8. 
17 Gordon M. Shepherd, Creating Modern Neuroscience: The Revolutionary 1950s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
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involves obscuring the various intellectual, linguistic, cultural and institutional contexts in 
which knowledge about the brain has been produced.18 The universalist claims on which 
present-day neuroculture is built allow the brain and nerves to be situated beyond history 
as an essential model of human nature.19 These factors have impacted on the treatment and 
uses of Willis as a historical figure within the discipline. To the extent that this thesis roots 
Willis’s account of the brain in a specifically early modern conceptual framework, 
through his metaphors and analogies, it contests how neuroscience uses historical 
practices to reaffirm aspects of its modern identity. It argues that we should resist the use 
of them in any simple anchoring or decontextualized way.  
 
The use of language, metaphor and analogy is key part of this story. As this thesis has 
explored, what Willis’s metaphors and analogies express is just how ‘other’ the 
conceptual architecture of his brain is. When Willis cut open the brain he saw a 
laboratory for animal spirits; a cabinet or fountain for the soul; a castle, furnished with 
chambers and cloisters, to house securely and to organise the material substrates of 
thoughts and memories, a clock operating the involuntary nervous system. Ultimately, his 
effort to understand its structure was, unlike modern neurology, part of a much broader 
project to map out the hidden operations of the soul and to treat its afflictions. Equally, 
as we saw in chapter five, Willis’s physiology was also intended to address issues around 
the ‘civil war’ between the passions of the flesh and the sovereignty of reason. In these 
discussions, he addressed not only neurological or ‘medical’ matters, as we might 
understand them, but also a set of theological concerns concerning the health of the 
(Anglican) soul. The over-arching point being made across these chapters is that we 
cannot understand Willis’s ideas or discoveries on our terms: it must be on his. 
 
Analogy, metaphor and science: eternal vigilance? 
 
The idea of a binary opposition between a scientific and literary use of language is part of 
a deeply entrenched set of attitudes, which continue to exert a strong influence. As Clive 
Sutton argued in 1994, ‘no scientist or science teacher wants to be caught dabbling with 
                                                      
18 Stephen T. Casper, ‘History and Neuroscience: An Interactive Legacy,’ Isis, 105.1 (March, 2014), pp. 123-
132. 
19 For an example of historical scholarship situating the nerves and Brain beyond history and culture, see for 
example: Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (London: University of California Press, 2008). 
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‘mere words.’ 20  Literature and science are not, however, inevitably or inherently 
oppositional categories, rather, the categories emerge as opposites out of a specific set of 
arguments put forward during the early modern period.21 Indeed, in light of the cultural 
turn in medical history and the emergence of scholarly fields examining the integral 
relationship between literature and science, it might be pertinent to ask whether it is still 
necessary to defend or explain the role of metaphor and analogy in science at all. It has 
been argued, for instance, that the indispensable role of metaphor and analogy in science 
is now so widely agreed upon that it effectively operates as a truism, especially among 
linguists and cognitive scientists.22 This is not, however, the whole argument.  
 
While the effectiveness of metaphors and analogies (beyond mere embellishment) is now 
broadly accepted, the nature and limitations of their work – whether they are simply 
tools of public engagement or a part of the very fabric of how we ‘do’ science - remain 
matters of some considerable debate. In 2000, Sabine Maasen observed that metaphors 
continue to be regarded within the social sciences as ‘educational, yet lacking genuine 
insight; as economical carriers of complex meaning, yet easily misleading.’23 Indeed, the use 
of metaphors and analogies in science today are accepted on account of a body of work 
that has sought to demonstrate how they are said to operate differently within the scientific 
context: as neutral ‘tools’ to help inform the public.24 Work around the future of 
metaphor in science therefore tends to focus on how these tools can be made more 
effective, while remaining cautious of their potential restrictions on the ‘content’ of 
scientific knowledge itself.25 
 
A recent example is Timothy D. Giles’s book Motives for Metaphor, where he discusses the 
‘problem’ of metaphor as it applies to technical communications in science: can they be 
relied upon to accurately convey precise, ‘technical’ information as well as broader 
                                                      
20 Clive Sutton, ‘Nullis in verba’ and ‘nihil in verbis’: Public Understanding of the Role of Language in 
Science, The British Journal for the History of Science, 27.1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 55-64 (p. 59). 
21 Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1. 
22 Hanna Pulaczewska, Aspects of Metaphor in Physics: Examples and Case Studies (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1999), 
p. 1. 
23 Sabine Maasen, ‘Metaphors in the Social Sciences: Making Use and Making Sense of Them,’ in Metaphor and 
Analogy in the Sciences, ed. by Fernand Hallyn (Dordrecht; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 
199. 
24 James Bono, ‘Science, Discourse and Literature: The Role/Rule of Metaphor in Science,’ in Literature and 
Science: Theory and Practice, ed. by Stuart Peterfreund (Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), pp. 59-
89 (p. 60-1). 
25 Timothy D. Giles, Motives for Metaphor in Scientific and Technical Communication, ed. by Timothy D. Giles and 
Charles H. Sides (London: Routledge, 2016 [2008]), p. 2. 
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concepts (such as the ‘clockwork’ universe of Newton’s metaphors).26 His discussions are 
a useful summary of the themes discussed here. Metaphor and analogy, he acknowledges, 
are valuable, but the issue here – the ‘problem’ with metaphor – is that the success (or 
not) of new ideas, as they are conveyed from a scientific community to the public beyond 
them, is too reliant upon the success or failure of a metaphor. As Giles reflected, even 
after many years of debate, the general public are still not convinced by the claims for 
human cloning, a failure he links to the lack of an effective, central metaphor to 
communicate cloning to the public.27 Giles doesn’t actually argue that metaphors should 
not be used in technical writing, but that there should be educational training given to 
ensure the correct use of these tools.28 However he is also wary of how such devices can 
become conservative or restrictive. Metaphor becomes a ‘problem’ in science, he argues, 
when it becomes ‘myth, which can occur when a scientist has too much invested in a 
metaphor and resists a paradigm shift.’29 There is still a sense here, then, that metaphor 
can obstruct the processes by which knowledge is produced, (in this case, blinding the 
scientist to new findings), rather than it being co-constitutive of knowledge itself. 
 
There is clearly knowledge bound up with metaphor – to insist that the two are co-
constitutive is not to deny the real existence of things in the world, but to say they are 
nevertheless inseparable. For instance, the metaphor of the ‘living’ or goal-orientated 
virus cant simply be dispelled in order to get at a truth lying ‘underneath’ the metaphor; it 
can, however, be displaced by a new – perhaps more useful or productive metaphor. 
Exposing the metaphorical roots of knowledge doesn’t necessarily more clearly reveal the 
‘truth’ of its object, however we can certainly interrogate metaphors and analogies to 
suggest where they are no longer being productive or illuminating. A metaphor which 
might initially give rise to a new way of thinking about something can, in time, become to 
be seen as restrictive as the practices and findings that are grouped around it start to 
push at its limits or even come into conflict with it. Recent attacks on the hardwired 
brain – which now sits in conflict with the competing metaphor of the malleable, ‘plastic’ 
brain - is one example of where a leading metaphor might have reached its limits.30  
 
                                                      
26 Ibid, p. 2. 
27 Ibid, p. 1. 
28 Ibid, p. 153. 
29 Ibid, p. 3. 
30 For a recent example, see: Edward Hallowell M.D., ‘Your Brain is Not the Hard-Wired Machine You 
Think It Is,’ Psychology Today, Jan. 10 (2014) 
 <www.pyschologytoday.com/blog/driven-distraction/201401> 
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One area in which metaphors are increasingly seen as relevant, therefore, is on the matter 
of disciplinary change. As Lina Hellsten and Brigitte Nerlich suggested in 2011, we ought 
to ‘worry’ about metaphors especially in light of their current role in ‘reducing’ biology to 
the digital domain; the presumptions involved in these metaphors ought to be 
challenged, the authors suggest, in order to halt this reductionism.31 As Hellsten and 
Nerlich identify, these concerns have supported an increased interest in research around 
complex, mixed metaphors in science and how these complex metaphorical chains 
inform public understanding.32 The metaphors and analogies that have enabled the 
extension of modern neuroscience across a plethora of discourses – from mental health 
to crime – deserve, and attract, particular attention here. To say that metaphors are an 
integral part of disciplinary change is not to contradict the argument that they are integral 
and even constitutive of knowledge: metaphors rise and fall because they are perishable, 
in the sense that their meaningfulness is rooted in historical and cultural contexts. This 
does not make them ‘other’ to the knowledge they produce; all it means is that as 
knowledge changes so do the metaphors considered useful.  
 
In these discussions, we should also consider the role played by metaphors that appear to 
have passed over into the realm of definite description, such as Harvey’s ‘pump’ 
metaphor of the heart or the ‘blueprint’ model of DNA. These metaphors move from a 
figurative to a literal description in terms of their common usage; they are so successful 
that they cease to operate as visible metaphors at all. It is difficult, for instance, to imagine 
how we might return to a position where the ‘pump’ action of the heart recalls a 
mechanical metaphor of the body – rather than a very real sense of the existence of 
biological mechanisms. This prospect, of the inseparability and invisibility of certain 
metaphors in relation to what we know, goes to the heart of anxieties around the 
relationship between metaphors and science: that they can become so bound up in 
knowledge that we cease to recognise (and thus be able to interrogate) their work.  
 
While it is problematic to insist on a denotable boundary between metaphor and 
knowledge, it is nevertheless helpful to think about what benefits might be had from 
seeking out new metaphors to intervene in and open up innovative ways of thinking. 
Looking to historical metaphors - with an awareness of how they are involved in changes 
                                                      
31 R. Jones (2010), quoted in Lina Hellsten and Brigitte Nerlich, ‘Synthetic Biology: Building the Language 
for a New Science Brick by Metaphorical Brick,’ New Genetics and Society, 30.4 (2011), pp. 375-397. 
32 Ibid, p. 377.  
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to thought – can play an important a role here. Willis’s imagery of the ‘unfolded’ brain 
can be used to interrogate current assumptions around the ‘objectivity’ of imaging and 
brain scans. Learning from and examining the brain is increasingly a matter of 
computerised imaging techniques, rather than a physical encounter; many neurological 
scientists might struggle to correlate what is being represented by a MRI scan of the 
brain with the visceral object, if it were laid before them. Willis’s discussion of the rolled 
and unfolded presentation of the brain could be used to ask questions around how we 
access and handle the material brain (beyond simply learning surgical procedures).  
 
What this thesis contributes to these discussions is a vital historical context to shed light 
on the ongoing role of these devices in modern science. As Chapter One explores, 
members of the early Royal Society – many of whom are used as leading figures of the 
‘scientific revolution’ – did not ascribe to any simple rejection or suppression of these 
devices, at least in practice, despite a keen sense of the possible risks (as well as benefits) 
of metaphor in their work. These devices were – and remain – a vital component of 
scientific concepts and practices; this was true as much for Willis as it was William 
Harvey or Robert Boyle. Willis was nevertheless himself challenged by the difficulties of 
drawing a firm boundary around metaphor, analogy and the things he sought to describe. 
As he remarked, the corporeal soul ‘is either a Flame or a Breath, neer-to, or a-Kin to 
Flame’ (SB, p.5). While Willis clearly accepted these figures as useful and even 
indispensible, he also acknowledged an inherent ambiguity in their work. As Nietzsche 
once observed in relation to metaphor, ‘truths are illusions of which one has forgotten 
that they are illusions.’33 Clearly, metaphors and analogies are sites of massive contest in 
science but also more generally: they are seen as productive, dangerous and illusory while 
being indispensible to human thought. With this in mind, to dismiss or overlook them 
seems irresponsible; to believe we can operate without them is naive. Instead, as this 
thesis has shown, we need to recognise how their power to make knowledge is 
embedded in historically specific systems of thought.
                                                      
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On truth and falsity in their extramoral sense’, in Essays on Metaphor, ed. by W. 
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